Keynes and Socialism

(Text of a talk I delivered at the Neubauer Institute in Chicago on April 5, 2024.)

My goal in this talk is to convince you that there is a Keynesian vision that is much more radical and far-reaching then our familiar idea of Keynesian economics.

I say “a” Keynesian vision. Keynes was an outstanding example of his rival Hayek’s dictum that no one can be a great economist who is only an economist. He was a great economist, and he was many other things as well. He was always engaged with the urgent problems of his day; his arguments were intended to address specific problems and persuade specific audiences, and they are not always easy to reconcile. So I can’t claim to speak for the authentic Keynes. But I think I speak for an authentic Keynes. In particular, the argument I want to make here is strongly influenced by the work of Jim Crotty, whose efforts to synthesize the visions of Keynes and of Marx were formative for me, as for many people who have passed through the economics department at the University of Massachusetts.

Where should we begin? Why not at the beginning of the Keynesian revolution? According to Luigi Passinetti, this has a very specific date: October 1932. That is when Keynes returned to King’s College in Cambridge for the Michaelmas term to deliver, not his old lectures on “The Pure Theory of Money,” but a new set of lectures on “The Monetary Theory of Production”. In an article of the same title written around the same time, he explained that the difference between the economic orthodoxy of the “the theory which I desiderate” was fundamentally the difference between a vision of the economy in terms of what he called “real exchange” and of monetary production. The lack of such a theory, he argued, was “the main reason why the problem of crises remains unsolved.”

The obvious distinction between these two visions is whether money can be regarded as neutral; and more particularly whether the interest rate can be thought of — as the textbook of economics of our times as well as his insist — as the price of goods today versus goods tomorrow, or whether we must think of it as, in some sense, the price of money.

But there is a deeper distinction between these two visions that I think Keynes also had in mind. On the ones side, we may think of economic life fundamentally in terms of objects — material things that can be owned and exchanged, which exist prior to their entry into economic life, and which have a value — reflecting the difficulty of acquiring them and their capacity to meet human needs. This value merely happens to be represented in terms of money. On the other side, we may think of economic life fundamentally in terms of collective human activity, an organized, open-ended process of transforming the world, a process in which the pursuit of money plays a central organizing role. 

Lionel Robbins, also writing in 1932, gave perhaps the most influential summary of the orthodox view when he wrote that economics is the study of the allocation of scarce means among alternative uses. For Keynes, by contrast, the central problem is not scarcity, but coordination. And what distinguishes the sphere of the economy from other areas of life is that coordination here happens largely through money payments and commitments.

From Robbins’ real-exchange perspective, the “means” available to us at any time are given, it is only a question of what is the best use for them. For Keynes, the starting point is coordinated human activity. In a world where coordination failures are ubiquitous, there is no reason to think — as there would be if the problem were scarcity — that satisfying some human need requires withdrawing resources from meeting some other equally urgent need. (In 1932, obviously, this question was of more than academic interest.) What kinds of productive activity are possible depends, in particular, on the terms on which money is available to finance it and the ease with which its results can be converted back into money. It is for this reason, as Keynes great American successor Hyman Minsky emphasized, that money can never be neutral.

If the monetary production view rejects the idea that what is scarce is material means, it also rejects the idea that economic life is organized around the meeting of human needs. The pursuit of money for its own sake is the organizing principle of private production. On this point, Keynes recognized his affinity with Karl Marx. Marx, he wrote, “pointed out that the nature of production in the actual world is not, as economists seem often to suppose, a case of C-M-C’, i. e., of exchanging commodity (or effort). That may be the standpoint of the private consumer. But it is not the attitude of business, which is the case of M-C-M’, i. e., of parting with money for commodity (or effort) in order to obtain more money.”

Ignoring or downplaying money, as economic theory has historically done, requires imagining the “real” world is money-like. Conversely, recognizing money as a distinct social institution requires a reconception of the social world outside of money. We must ask both how monetary claims and values evolve independently of the  real activity of production, and how money builds on, reinforces or undermines other forms of authority and coordination. And we must ask how the institutions of money and credit both enable and constrain our collective decision making. All these questions are unavoidably political.

For Keynes, modern capitalism is best understood through the tension between the distinct logics of money and of production.  For the orthodox economics both of Keynes’s day and our own, there is no such tension. The model is one of “real exchange” in which a given endowment of goods and a given set of preferences yielded a vector of relative prices. Money prices represent the value that goods already have, and money itself merely facilitates the process of exchange without altering it in any important way.

Keynes of course was not the first to insist on a deeper role for money. Along with Marx, there is a long counter tradition that approaches economic problems as an open ended process of transformation rather than the allocation of existing goods, and that recognizes the critical role of money in organizing this process. These include the “Army of brave heretics and cranks” Keynes acknowledges as his predecessors.

One of the pioneers in this army was John Law. Law is remembered today mainly for the failure of his fiat currency proposals (and their contribution to the fiscal troubles of French monarchy), an object lesson for over-ambitious monetary reformers. But this is unfair. Unlike most other early monetary reformer, Law had a clearly articulated theory behind his proposals. Schumpeter goes so far as to put him “in the front rank of monetary theorists of all times.” 

Law’s great insight was that money is not simply a commodity whose value comes from its non-monetary uses. Facilitating exchange is itself a very important function, which makes whatever is used for that purpose valuable even if it has no other use. 

“Money,” he wrote, “is not the Value for which goods are exchanged, but the Value by which goods are exchanged.” The fact that money’s value comes from its use in facilitating exchange, and not merely from the labor and other real resources embodied in it, means that a scarcity of money need not reflect any physical scarcity. In fact, the scarcity of money itself may be what limits the availability of labor: “’tis with little success Laws are made, for Employing the Poor or Idle in Countries where Money is scarce.”

Law here is imagining money as a way of organizing and mobilizing production.

If the capacity to pay for things — and make commitments to future payments — is valuable, then the community could be made better off by providing more of it. Law’s schemes to set up credit-money issuing banks – in Scotland before the more famous efforts in France – were explicitly presented as programs for economic development.

Underlying this project is a recognition that is central to the monetary production view; the organization of production through exchange is not a timeless fact of human existence, but something that requires specific institutional underpinning — which someone has to provide. Like Alexander Hamilton’s similar but more successful  interventions a half century later, Law envisioned the provision of abundant liquidity as part of a broader project of promoting commerce and industry.

This vision was taken up a bit later by Thornton and the anti-bullionists during the debates over suspension of gold convertibility during and after the Napoleonic Wars. A subsequent version was put forward by the mid-19th century Banking School and its outstanding figure, Thomas Tooke — who was incidentally the only contemporary bourgeois economist who Karl Marx seems to have admired — and by thinkers like Walter Bagehot, who built their theory on first hand experience of business and finance.

A number of lines divide these proto-Keynesian writers from the real-exchange orthodoxy.

To begin with, there is a basic difference in how they think of money – rather than a commodity or token that exists in a definite quantity, they see it as a form of record-keeping, whose material form is irrelevant. In other words credit, the recording of promises, is fundamental; currency as just one particular form of it.

Second, is the question of whether there is some simple or “natural” rule that governs the behavior of monetary or credit, or whether they require active management. In the early debates, these rules were supposed to be gold convertibility or the real bills doctrine; a similar intellectual function was performed by Milton Friedman’s proposed money-supply growth rule in the 20th century or the Taylor Rule that is supposed to govern monetary policy today. On the other side, for these thinkers, “money cannot manage itself,” in Bagehot’s famous phrase.

Third, there is the basic question of whether money is a passive reflection of an already existing real economy, or whether production itself depends on and is organized by money and credit. In other words, the conception of money is inseparable from how the non-monetary economy is imagined. In the real-exchange vision, there is a definite quantity of commodities already existing or potentially producible, which money at best helps to allocate. In the monetary production view, goods only come into existence as they are financed and paid for, and the productive capacity of the economy comes into being through an open-ended process of active development.

It’s worth quoting Bagehot’s Lombard Street for an example:

The ready availability of credit for English businesses, he writes, 

gives us an enormous advantage in competition with less advanced countries — less advanced, that is, in this particular respect of credit. In a new trade English capital is instantly at the disposal of persons capable of understanding the new opportunities… In countries where there is little money to lend, … enterprising traders are long kept back, because they cannot borrow the capital without which skill and knowledge are useless. … The Suez Canal is a curious case of this … That London and Liverpool should be centres of East India commerce is a geographic anomaly … The main use of the Canal has been by the English not because England has rich people … but because she possesses an unequalled fund of floating money.

The capacity for reorganization is what matters, in other words. The economic problem is not a scarcity of material wealth, but of institutions that can rapidly redirect it to new opportunities. For Bagehot as for Keynes, the binding constraint is coordination.

It is worth highlighting that there is something quietly radical in Bagehot’s argument here. The textbooks tell us that international trade is basically a problem of the optimal allocation of labor, land and other material resources, according to countries’ inherent capacities for production. But here it’s being claimed is not any preexisting comparative advantage in production, but rather the development of productive capacities via money; financial power allows a country to reorganize the international division of labor to its own advantage.

Thinkers like Bagehot, Thornton or Hamilton certainly had some success on policy level. For the development of central banking, in particular, these early expressions of of monetary production view played an important role.  But it was Keynes who developed these insights into a systematic theory of monetary production. 

Let’s talk first about the monetary side of this dyad.

The nature and management of money were central to Keynes’ interventions, as a list of his major works suggests – from Indian Currency Questions to the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. The title of the latter expresses not just a list of topics but a logical  sequence: employment is determined by the interest rate, which is determined by the availability of money.

One important element Keynes adds to the earlier tradition is the framing of the services provided by money as liquidity. This reflects the ability to make payments and satisfy obligations of all kinds, not just the exchange of goods focused on by Law and his successors. It also foregrounds the need for flexibility in the face of an unknown future.

The flip side of liquidity —  less emphasized in his own writings but very much by post Keynesians like Hyman Minsky — is money’s capacity to facilitate trust and promises. Money as a social technology provides offers flexibility and commitment.

The fact that bank deposit — an IOU — will be accepted by anyone is very desirable for wealth owner who wants to keep their options open. But also makes bank very useful to people who want to make lasting commitments to each other, but who don’t have a direct relationship that would allow them to trust each other. Banks’ fundamental role is “acceptance,” as Minsky put it – standing in as a trusted third party to make all kinds of promises possible. 

Drawing on his experience as a practitioner, Keynes also developed the idea of self-confirming expectations in financial markets. Someone buying an asset to sell in the near term is not interested in its “fundamental” value – the long-run flow of income it will generate – but in what other market participants will think is its value tomorrow. Where such short-term speculation dominates, asset prices take on an arbitrary, self-referential character. This idea is important for our purposes not just because it underpins Keynes’ critique of the “insane gambling casinos” of modern financial markets, but because it helps explain the autonomy of financial values. Prices set in asset markets — including, importantly, the interest rate — are not guide to any real tradeoffs or long term possibilities. 

Both liquidity and self-confirming conventions are tied to a distinctive epistemology , which emphasizes the fundamental unknowability of the future. In Keynes’ famous statement in chapter 12 of the General Theory,

By ‘uncertain’ knowledge … I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable.  The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, … About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know!

Turning to the production side, taking the he monetary-production view means that neither the routine operation of capitalist economies nor the choices facing us in response to challenges like climate change should be seen in terms of scarcity and allocation.

The real-exchange paradigm sees production as non-monetary process of transforming inputs into outputs through a physical process we can represent as a production function. We know if we add this much labor and this much “capital” at one end, we’ll get this many consumption goods at the other end; the job of market price is to tell us if it is worth it.  Thinking instead in terms of monetary production does not just mean adding money as another input. It means reconceiving the production process. The fundamental problem is now coordination — capacity for organized cooperation. 

I’ve said that before. Let me now spell out a little more what I mean by it. 

To say that production is an open ended collective activity  of transforming the world, means that its possibilities are not knowable in advance. We don’t know how much labor and machinery and raw materials it will take to produce something new — or something old on an increased scale — until we actually do it. Nor do we know how much labor is potentially available until there’s demand for it.

We see this clearly in a phenomenon that has gotten increasing attention in macroeconomic discussions lately — what economists call hysteresis. In textbook theories, how much the economy is capable of producing — potential output — does not depend on how much we actually do produce There are only so many resources available, whether we are using them or not. But in reality, it’s clear that both the labor force and measured productivity growth are highly sensitive to current demand. Rather than a fixed number of people available to work, so that employing more in one area requires fewer working somewhere else, there is an immense, in practice effectively unlimited fringe of people who can be drawn into the labor force when demand for labor is strong. Technology, similarly, is not given from outside the economy, but develops in response to demand and wage growth and via investment. 

All this is of course true when we are asking questions like, how much of our energy needs could in principle be met by renewable sources in 20 years? In that case, it is abundantly clear that the steep fall in the cost of wind and solar power we’ve already seen is the result of increased demand for them. It’s not something that would have happened on its own. But increasing returns and learning by doing are ubiquitous in real economies. In large buildings, for instance, the cost of constructing later floors is typically lower than the cost of constructing earlier ones. 

In a world where hysteresis and increasing returns are important, it makes no sense to think in terms of a fixed amount of capacity, where producing more of one thing requires producing correspondingly less of something else. What is scarce, is the capacity to rapidly redirect resources from one use to a different one.

A second important dimension of the Keynesian perspective on production is that it is not simply a matter of combining material inputs, but happens within discrete social organisms. We have to take the firm seriously as ongoing community embodying  multiple social logics. Firms combine the structured cooperation needed for production; a nexus of payments and incomes; an internal hierarchy of command and obedience; and a polis or imagined community for those employed by or otherwise associated with it.

While firms do engage in market transactions and exist — in principle at least — in order to generate profits, this is not how they operate internally. Within the firm, the organization of production is consciously planned and hierarchical. Wealth owners, meanwhile,  do not normally own capital goods as such, but rather financial claims against these social organisms.

When we combine this understanding of production with Keynesian insights into money and finance , we are likely to conclude, as Keynes himself did, that an economy that depends on long-lived capital goods (and long-lived business enterprises, and scientific knowledge) cannot be effectively organized through the pursuit of private profit. 

First, because the profits from these kinds of activities depend on developments well off in the future that cannot cannot be known with any confidence. 

Second, because these choices are irreversible — capital goods specialized and embedded in particular production processes and enterprises. (Another aspect of this, not emphasized by Keynes, but one which wealth owners are very conscious of, is that wealth embodied in long-lived means of production can lose its character as wealth. It may effectively belong to the managers of the firm, or even the workers, rather than to its notional owners.) Finally, uncertainty about the future amplifies and exacerbates the problems of coordination. 

The reason that many potentially valuable  activities are not undertaken is not that they would require real resources that people would prefer to use otherwise. It is that people don’t feel they can risk the irreversible commitment those activities would entail. Many long-lived projects that would easily pay for themselves in both private and social terms are not carried out, because an insufficient capacity for trustworthy promises means that large-scale cooperation appears too risky to those in control of the required resources, who prefer to keep their their options open. 

Or as Keynes put it: “That the world after several millennia of steady individual saving, is so poor as it is in accumulated capital-assets, is to be explained neither by the improvident propensities of mankind, nor even by the destruction of war, but by the high liquidity- premiums formerly attaching to the ownership of land and now attaching to money.”

The problem, Keynes is saying, is that wealth owners prefer land and money to claims on concrete productive processes. Monetary production means production organized by money and in pursuit of money. But also identifies conflict between production and money.

We see this clearly in a development context, where — as Joe Studwell has recently emphasized — the essential first step is to break the power of landlords and close off the option of capital flight so that private wealth owners have no option but to hold their wealth as claims on society in the form of productive enterprises. 

The whole history of the corporation is filled with conflicts between the enterprise’s commitment to its own ongoing production process, and the desire of shareholders and other financial claimants to hold their wealth in more liquid, monetary form. The expansion or even continued existence of the corporation as an enterprise requires constantly fending off the demands of the rentiers to get “their” money back, now. The “complaining participants” of the Dutch East India Company in the 1620s, sound, in this respect, strikingly similar to shareholder activists of the 1980s. 

Where privately-owned capital has worked tolerably well — as Keynes thought it had in the period before WWI, at least in the UK — it was because private owners were not exclusively or even mainly focused on monetary profit.

“Enterprise,” he writes, “only pretends to itself to be mainly actuated by the statements in its own prospectus, however candid and sincere. Only a little more than an expedition to the South Pole, is it based on an exact calculation of benefits to come. Thus if the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters, leaving us to depend on nothing but a mathematical expectation, enterprise will fade and die.” 

(It’s a curious thing that this iconic Keynesian term is almost always used today to describe financial markets, even though it occurs in a discussion of real investment. This is perhaps symptomatic of the loss of the production term of the monetary production theory from most later interpretations of Keynes.)

The idea that investment in prewar capitalism had depended as much on historically specific social and cultural factors rather than simply opportunities for profit was one that Keynes often returned to. “If the steam locomotive were to be discovered today,” he wrote elsewhere, “I much doubt if unaided private enterprise would build railways in England.”

We can find examples of the same thing in the US. The Boston Associates who pioneered textile factories in New England seem to have been more preserving the dominant social position of their interlinked families as in maximizing monetary returns. Schumpeter suggested that the possibility of establishing such “industrial dynasties” was essential to the growth of capitalism. Historians like Jonathan Levy give us vivid portraits of early American industrialists Carnegie and Ford as outstanding examples of animal spirits — both sought to increase the scale and efficiency of production as a goal in itself, as opposed to profit maximization.

In Keynes’ view, this was the only basis on which sustained private investment could work. A systematic application of financial criteria to private enterprise resulted in level of investment that was dangerously unstable and almost always too low. On the other hand — as emphasized by Kalecki but recognized by Keynes as well — a dependence on wealth owners pursuit of investment for its own sake required a particular social and political climate — one that might be quite inimical to other important social goals, if it could be maintained at all.

The solution therefore was to separate investment decisions from the pursuit of private wealth.  The call for the “more or less comprehensive socialization of investment” at the end of The General Theory, is not the throwaway line that it appears as in that book, but reflects a program that Keynes had struggled with and developed since the 1920s. The Keynesian political program was not one of countercyclical fiscal policy, which he was always skeptical of.  Rather it envisioned a number of more or less autonomous quasi-public bodies – housing authorities, hospitals, universities and so on – providing for the production of their own specific social goods, in an institutional environment that allowed them to ignore considerations of profitability.

The idea that large scale investment must be taken out of private hands was at the heart of Keynes’ positive program.

At this point, some of you may be thinking that that I have said two contradictory things. First,  I said that a central insight of the Keynesian vision is that money and credit are essential tools for the organization of production. And then, I said that there is irreconcilable conflict between the logic of money and the needs of production. If you are thinking that, you are right. I am saying both of these things.

The way to reconcile this contradiction is to see these as two distinct moments in a single historical process. 

We can think of money as a social solvent. It breaks up earlier forms of coordination, erases any connection between people.As the Bank of International Settlements economist Claudio Borio puts it: “a well functioning monetary system …is a highly efficient means of ‘erasing’ any relationship between transacting parties.” A lawyers’ term for this feature of money is privity, which “cuts off adverse claims, and abolishes the .. history of the account. If my bank balance is $100 … there is nothing else to know about the balance.”

In his book Debt, David Graeber illustrates this same social-solvent quality of money with the striking story of naturalist Ernest Thompson Seton, who was sent a bill by his father for all the costs of raising him. He paid the bill — and never spoke to his father again. Or as Marx and Engels famously put it, the extension of markets and money into new domains of social life has “pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors”, and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash payment”.

But what they neglected to add is that social ties don’t stay torn asunder forever. The older social relations that organized production may be replaced by the cash nexus, but that is not the last step, even under capitalism. In the Keynesian vision, at least, this is a temporary step toward the re-embedding of productive activity in new social relationships. I described money a moment ago as a social solvent. But one could also call it a social catalyst.  By breaking up the social ties that formerly organized productive activity, it allows them to be reorganized in new and more complex forms.

Money, in the Keynesian vision, is a tool that allows promises between strangers. But people who work together do not remain strangers. Early corporations were sometimes organized internally as markets, with “inside contractors” negotiating with each other. But reliance on the callous cash payment seldom lasted for long.  Large-scale production today depends on coordination through formal authority. Property rights become a kind of badge or regalia of the person who has coordination rights, rather than the organizing principle in its own right.

Money and credit are critical for re-allocating resources and activity, when big changes are needed. But big changes are inherently a transition from one state to another. Money is necessary to establish new production communities but not to maintain them once they exist. Money as a social solvent frees up the raw material — organized human activity —  from which larger structures, more extensive divisions of labor, are built. But once larger-scale coordination established, the continued presence of this social solvent eating away at it, becomes destructive.

This brings us to the political vision. Keynes, as Jim Crotty emphasizes, consistently described himself as a socialist. Unlike some of his American followers, he saw the transformation of productive activity via money and private investment as being a distinct historical process with a definite endpoint.

There is, I think, a deep affinity between the Keynes vision of the economy as a system of monetary production, and the idea that this system can be transcended. 

If money is merely a veil, as orthodox economics imagines, that implies that social reality must resemble money. It is composed of measurable quantities with well-defined ownership rights, which can be swapped and combined to yield discrete increments of human wellbeing. That’s just the way the world is.  But if we see money as a distinct institution, that frees us to imagine the rest of life in terms of concrete human activities, with their own logics and structures. It opens space for a vision of the good life as something quite different from an endless accumulation of commodities – a central strand of Keynes’ thinking since his early study of the philosopher G. E. Moore.

 In contemporary debates – over climate change in particular – a “Keynesian” position is often opposed to a degrowth one. But as Victoria Chick observes in a perceptive essay, there are important affinities between Keynes and anti-growth writers like E. F. Schumacher. He looked forward to a world in which accumulation and economic growth had come to an end, daily life was organized around “friendship and the contemplation of beautiful objects,” and the pursuit of wealth would be regarded as “one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease.”

This vision of productive activity as devoted to its own particular ends, and of the good life as something distinct from the rewards offered by the purchase and use of commodities, suggests a deeper  affinity with Marx and the socialist tradition. 

Keynes was quite critical of what he called “doctrinaire State Socialism.” But his objections, he insisted, had nothing to do with its aims, which he shared. Rather, he said, “I criticize it because it misses the significance of what is actually happening.” In his view, “The battle of Socialism against unlimited private profit is being won in detail hour by hour … We must take full advantage of the natural tendencies of the day.” 

From Keynes’ point of view, the tension between the logic of money and the needs of production was already being resolved in favor of the latter.  In his 1926 essay “The End of Laissez Faire,” he observed that “one of the most interesting and unnoticed developments of recent decades has been the tendency of big enterprise to socialize itself.” As shareholders’ role in the enterprise diminishes, “the general stability and reputation of the institution are more considered by the management than the maximum of pro

A shift from production for profit to production for use — to borrow Marx’s language — did not necessarily require a change in formal ownership. The question is not ownership as such, but the source of authority of those managing the production process, and the ends to which they are oriented. Market competition creates pressure to organize production so as to maximize monetary profits over some, often quite short, time horizon. But this pressure is not constant or absolute, and it is offset by other pressures. Keynes pointed to the example of the Bank of England, still in his day a private corporation owned by its shareholders, but in practice a fully public institution.

Marx himself had imagined something similar:

As he writes in Volume III of Capital, 

Stock companies in general — developed with the credit system — have an increasing tendency to separate … management as a function from the ownership of capital… the mere manager who has no title whatever to the capital, … performs all the real functions pertaining to the functioning capitalist as such, … and the capitalist disappears as superfluous from the production process. 

The separation of ownership from direction or oversight of production in the corporation is, Marx argues, an important step away from ownership as the organizing principle of production.  “The stock company,” he continues, “is a transition toward the conversion of all functions… which still remain linked with capitalist property, into mere functions of associated producers.” 

In short, he writes, the joint stock company represents as much as the worker-owned cooperative “the abolition of the capitalist mode of production within the capitalist mode of production itself.” 

It might seem strange to imagine the tendency toward self-socialization of the corporation when examples of its subordination to finance are all around us. Sears, Toys R Us, the ice-cream-and-diner chain Friendly’s – there’s a seemingly endless list of functioning businesses purchased by private equity funds and then hollowed out or liquidated while generating big payouts for capital owners. Surely this is as far as one could get from Keynes’ vision of an inexorable victory of corporate socialism over private profit? 

But I think this is a one-sided view. I think it’s a mistake — a big mistake — to identify the world around us as one straightforwardly organized by markets, the pursuit of profit and the logic of money.

As David Graeber emphasized, there is no such thing as a capitalist economy, or even a capitalist enterprise.  In any real human activity, we find distinct social logics, sometimes reinforcing each other, sometimes in contradiction. 

We should never imagine world around us — even in the most thoroughly “capitalist” moments — is simply the working out of a logic pdf property, prices and profit. Contradictory logics at work in every firm — even the most rapacious profit hungry enterprise depends for its operations on norms, rules, relationships of trust between the people who constitute it. The genuine material progress we have enjoyed under capitalism is not just due to the profit motive but perhaps even more so in spite of it. 

One benefit of this perspective is it helps us see broader possibilities for opposition to the rule of money. The fundamental political conflict under capitalism is not just between workers and owners, but between logic of production process and of private ownership and markets. Thorstein Veblen provocatively imagined this latter conflict taking the form of a “soviet of engineers” rebelling against “sabotage” by financial claimants. A Soviet of engineers may sound fanciful today, but conflicts between the interests of finance and the needs of productive enterprise — and those who identify with them — are ongoing. 

Teaching and nursing, for example, are the two largest occupations that require professional credentials.But teachers and nurses are also certainly workers, who organize as workers — teachers have one of the highest unionization rates of any occupation. In recent years, this organizing can be quite adversarial, even militant. We all recall waves of teacher strikes in recent years — not only in California but in states with deeply anti-union politics like West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona and Kentucky. The demands in these strikes have been  workers’ demands for better pay and working conditions. But they have also been professionals’ demands for autonomy and respect and the integrity of their particular production process. From what I can tell, these two kinds of demands are intertwined and reinforcing.

This struggle for the right to do one’s job properly is sometimes described as “militant professionalism.” Veblen may have talked about engineers rather than teachers, but this kind of politics is, I think, precisely what he had in mind. 

More broadly, we know that public sector unions are only effective when they present themselves as advocates for the public and for the users of the service they provide, and not only for their members as workers. Radical social service workers have fought for the rights of welfare recipients. Powerful health care workers unions, like SEIU 1199 in New York, are successful because they present themselves as advocates for the health care system as a whole. 

On the other side, I think most of us would agree that the decline or disappearance of local news outlets is a real loss for society. Of course, the replacement of newspapers with social media and search engines isn’t commodification in the straightforward sense. This is a question of one set of for-profit businesses being displaced by another. But on the other hand, newspapers are not only for-profit businesses. There is a distinct professional ethos of journalism, that developed alongside journalism as a business. Obviously the “professional conscience” (the phrase is Michelet’s) of journalists was compatible with the interests of media businesses. But it was not reducible to them. And often enough, it was in tension with them. 

I am very much in favor of new models of employee-owned, public and non-profit journalism. Certainly there is an important role for government ownership, and for models like Wikipedia. But I also think — and this is the distinct contribution of the Keynesian socialist — that we should not be thinking only in terms of payments and ownership. The development of a distinct professional norms for today’s information sector is independently valuable and necessary, regardless of who owns new media companies. It may be that creating space for those norms is the most important contribution that alternative ownership models can make 

For a final example of this political possibilities of the monetary-production view, we can look closer by, to higher education, where most of us in this room make our institutional home. We have all heard warnings about how universities are under attack, they’re being politicized or corporatized, they’re coming to be run more like businesses. Probably some of us have given such warnings. 

I don’t want to dismiss the real concerns behind them. But what’s striking to me is how much less often one hears about the positive values that are being threatened. Think about how often you hear people talk about how the university is under attack, is in decline, is being undermined. Now think about how often you hear people talk about the positive values of intellectual inquiry for its own sake that the university embodies. How often do you hear people talk about the positive value of academic freedom and self-government, either as specific values of the university or as models for the broader society? If your social media feed is like mine, you may have a hard time finding examples of that second category at all.

Obviously, one can’t defend something from attack without at some point making the positive case that there is something there worth defending. But the point is broader than that. The self-governing university dedicated to education and scholarship and as ends in themselves, is not, despite its patina of medieval ritual, a holdover from the distant past. It’s an institution that has grown up alongside modern capitalism. It’s an institution that, in the US especially, has greatly expanded within our own lifetimes. 

If we want to think seriously about the political economy of the university, we can’t just talk about how it is under attack. We must also be able to talk about how it has grown, how it has displaced social organization on the basis of profit. (We should note here the failure of the for-profit model in higher education.) We should of course acknowledge the ways in which higher education serves the needs of capital, how it contributes to the reproduction of labor power. But we also should acknowledge all the ways that is more than this.

When we talk about the value of higher education, we often talk about the products — scholarship, education. But we don’t often talk about the process, the degree to which academics, unlike most other workers, manage our own classrooms according to our own judgements about what should be taught and how to effectively teach it. We don’t talk about how, almost uniquely in modern workplaces, we the faculty employees make decisions about hiring and promotion collectively and more or less democratically. People from all over the world come to study in American universities. It’s remarkable — and remarkably little discussed — how this successful export industry is, in effect, run by worker co-ops.

 At this moment in particular, it is vitally important that we make the case for academic freedom as a positive principle. 

Let me spell out, since it may not be obvious, how this political vision connects to the monetary production vision of the economy that I was discussing earlier. 

The dominant paradigm in economics — which shapes all of our thinking, whether we have ever studied economics in the classroom — is what Keynes called, I distinction to his own approach, the real exchange vision. From the real-exchange perspective, money prices  and payments are a superficial express of pre-existing qualities of things — that they are owned by someone, that they take a certain amount of labor to produce and have a definite capacity to satisfy human needs. From this point of view, production is just a special case of exchange. 

It’s only once we see money as an institution in itself, a particular way of organizing human life, that we can see production as something distinct and separate from it. That’s what allows us to see the production process itself, and the relationships and norms that constitute it, as a site of social power and a market on a path toward a better world. The use values we socialists oppose to exchange value exist in the sphere of production as well as consumption. The political demands that teachers make as teachers are not legible unless we see the activity they’re engaged in in terms other than equivalents of money paid and received.

I want to end by sketching out a second political application of this vision, in the domain of climate policy. 

First, decarbonization will be experienced as an economic boom. Money payments, I’ve emphasized, are an essential tool for rearranging productive activity, and decarbonizing will require a great deal of our activity to be rearranged. There will be major changes in our patterns of production and consumption, which in turn will require substantial changes to our means of production and built environment. These changes are brought about by flows money. 

Concretely: creating new means of production, new tools and machinery and knowledge, requires spending money. Abandoning old ones does not. Replacing existing structures and tools and techniques faster than they would be in the normal course of capitalist development, implies an increase in aggregate money expenditure. Similarly, when a new or expanding business wants to bid workers away from other employment, they have to offer a higher wage than an established business needs to in order to retain its current workers. So a rapid reallocation of workers implies a faster rise in money wages.

So although decarbonization will substantively involve a mix of expansions of activity in some areas and reduction of activity in others, it will increase the aggregate volume of money flows. A boom in this sense is not just a period of faster measured growth, but a period in which demand is persistently high relative to the economy’s productive potential and tight labor markets strengthen the bargaining position of workers relative to employers – what is sometimes called a “high-pressure economy.” 

Second. There is no tradeoff between decarbonization and current living standards. Decarbonization is not mainly a matter of diverting productive activity away from other needs, but mobilizing new production, with positive spillovers toward production for other purposes.

Here again, there is a critical difference between the monetary-production and the real-exchange views of the economy. In the real-exchange paradigm, we possess a certain quantity of “means.” If we choose to use some of them to reduce our carbon emissions, there will be less available for everything else. But when we think in terms of social coordination organized in large part through money flows, there is no reason to think this. There is no reason to believe that everyone who is willing and able to work is actually working, or people’s labor is being used in anything like its best possible way for the satisfaction of real human needs. Nor are relative prices today a good guide to long-run social tradeoffs. 

Third.  If we face a political conflict involving climate and growth, this will come not because decarbonization requires accepting a lower level of growth, but because it will entail faster economic growth than existing institutions can handle. Today’s neoliberal macroeconomic model depends on limiting economic growth as a way of managing distributional conflicts. Rapid growth under decarbonization will be accompanied by disproportionate rise in wages and the power of workers. Most of us in this room will probably see that as a desirable outcome. But it will inevitably create sharp conflicts and resistance from wealth owners, which need to be planned for and managed. Complaints about current “labor shortages” should be a warning call on this front.

Fourth. There is no international coordination problem — the countries that move fastest on climate will reap direct benefits.

An influential view of the international dimension of climate policy is that “free riding … lies at the heart of the failure to deal with climate change.” (That is William Nordhaus, who won the Nobel for his work on the economics of climate change.) Individual countries, in this view, bear the full cost of decarbonization measures but only get a fraction of the global benefits, and countries that do not engage in decarbonization can free-ride on the efforts of those that do.

A glance at the news should be enough to show you how backward this view is. Do Europeans look at US support for the wind, solar and battery industries, or the US at China’s support for them, and say, “oh, what wonderfully public-spirited shouldering of the costs of the climate crisis”? Obviously not.  Rather, they are seen as strategic investments which other countries, in their own national interest, must seek to match.

Fifth. Price based measures cannot be the main tools for decarbonization.

There is a widely held view that the central tool for addressing climate should be an increase in the relative price of carbon-intensive commodities, through a carbon tax or equivalent. I was at a meeting a few years ago where a senior member of the Obama economics team was also present. “The only question I have about climate policy,” he said, “is whether a carbon tax is 80 percent of the solution, or 100 percent of the solution.” If you’ve received a proper economics education, this is a very reasonable viewpoint. You’ve been trained to see the economy as essentially an allocation problem where existing resources need to be directed to their highest-value use, and prices are the preferred tool for that.

From a Keynesian perspective the problem looks different. The challenge is coordination — bottlenecks and the need for simultaneous advances in multiple areas. Markets can, in the long run, be very powerful tools for this, but they can’t do it quickly. For rapid, large-scale reorganization of activity, they have to be combined with conscious planning — and that is the problem. The fundamental constraint on decarbonization should not be viewed as the potential output of the economy, but of planning capacity for large-scale non-market coordination. 

If there is a fundamental conflict between capitalism and sustainability, I suggest, it is not because the drive for endless accumulation in money terms implies or requires an endless increase in material throughputs. Nor is it the need for production to generate a profit. There’s no reason why a decarbonized production process cannot be profitable. It’s true that renewable energy, with its high proportion of fixed costs, is not viable in a fully competitive market — but that’s a characteristic it shares with many other existing industries. 

The fundamental problem, rather, is that capitalism treats the collective processes of social production as the private property of individuals. It is because the fiction of a market economy prevents us from developing the forms of non-market coordination that actually organize production, and that we will need on a much larger scale. Rapid decarbonization will require considerably more centralized coordination than is usual in today’s advanced economies. Treatment of our collective activity to transform the world as if it belonged exclusively to whoever holds the relevant property rights, is a fundamental obstacle to redirecting that activity in a rational way. 

 

Demand and Productivity

I’m picking up, after some months, the project I was working on over the summer on potential output. Obviously the political context is different now. But the questions of what potential output actually means, how tightly it binds, and how close the economy is to it at any given moment, are not going away. Previous entries: onetwothreefour, and five.

*

You’ve probably heard the story about Ed Rensi, the former McDonald’s CEO who claimed the company’s move to replace cashier’s with self-serve kiosks was a response to minimum wage increases.

“I told you so,” he writes. “In 2013, when the Fight for $15 was still in its growth stage, I and others warned that union demands for a much higher minimum wage would force businesses with small profit margins to replace full-service employees with costly investments in self-service alternatives.”

Is this for real? Maybe not: The shift toward kiosks has been happening for a while, so it’s not just a response to the recent minimum wage hikes; and it may not end up reducing labor costs anyway.

But let’s say the move is as as Rensi claims. Then we should call it what it is: an increase in labor productivity. With fewer workers McDonald’s will produce just as many hamburgers; in other words, production per worker will be higher. [1]

As I’ve suggested, this sort of thing is a real problem for a certain strand of minimum wage advocacy. Advocates like to point to productivity gains in response to higher wages as an argument in their favor. (The gains are usually imagined in terms of loyalty, motivation, lower turnover, etc. rather than machines, but functionally it’s the same.) But productivity gains can only reduce the job losses from a minimum wage increase if those losses are large; they are not consistent with a story in which employment stays the same. [2]

But at the macro level, this dynamic has different implications. If the McDonald’s case is typical — if higher labor costs regularly lead to higher productivity — then we need to rethink our idea of supply constraints. There is more space for expansionary policy than we usually think.

Let’s start at the beginning. Suppose there is some policy change, or some random event, that boosts desired spending in the economy. It could be more government spending, it could be lower interest rates, it could be a rise in exports. What happens then?

In the conventional story, higher spending normally leads to greater production of goods and services, which in turn requires higher employment. This leaves fewer people unemployed. Lower unemployment increases the bargaining power of workers, forcing employers to bid up nominal wages. [3] These higher wages are passed on to prices, leading to higher inflation. When inflation reaches whatever level is considered price stability, then we say the economy is at full employment, or at potential output. (In this story the two are equivalent.) If spending continues to rise past this point, the responsible authorities (normally the central bank) will intervene to bring it back down.

This is the story you’ll find in any good undergraduate macroeconomics textbook. It’s a reasonable story, as far as these things go. In the strong form it’s usually given in, it implies a hard limit to how much demand can increase before inflation starts rising unacceptably. Once the pool of unemployed workers falls to the “full employment” level, any further increase in employment will lead to rapid increases in money wages, which will be passed on one for one to inflation.

One place this chain can break is that new workers are not necessarily drawn from the ranks of the currently unemployed — that is, if the size of the laborforce is endogenous. Insofar as people counted as out of the laborforce are in fact available for employment (or net immigration responds to demand), an increase in output doesn’t have to reduce the ranks of the officially unemployed. In other words, the official unemployment rate may underestimate the space available for raising output via increased employment. This motivates the question of how much the the fall in laborforce participation since 2007 is due to demographics, and how much is due to weak demand.

The conventional story can also break down at two other places if productivity growth is endogenous. First, output can increase without a proportionate increase in employment. And second, wages can rise without a proportionate rise in prices.

It’s useful to think about this in terms of a couple of accounting identities, which in my opinion should be part of every macroeconomics textbook. [4] The first is obvious (but worth spelling out), the second a little less so:

(1) growth in demand = percent change in labor productivity + percent change in employment + inflation

(2) percent change in nominal wages = percent change in labor productivity + percent change in labor share + inflation

The standard story is that productivity change on its own due to technology, and the labor shared is fixed and can be ignored in this context. If productivity and labor share can be taken as given, then an increase in demand (money spent on final goods and services) must lead to higher inflation if either employment fails to rise, or if it rises only with higher wages. In this story, if nominal wages rise thanks to a lower unemployment rats, that will pass on one for one to inflation. Pick up an advanced undergraduate textbook like Blanchard or Krugman or Carlin and Soskice, and you will find a Phillips curve of exactly this form, with exactly this story behind it. [5] Policy discussions at central banks conducted in same terms.

This is what underlies idea of hard supply constraints. Output growth is dictated by the fixed, exogenous growth of the laborforce and of productivity. If changes in demand push the economy off that fixed trajectory, all you’ll get is higher or lower inflation. Concretely: To keep inflation at 2 percent, unemployment must be such as to generate nominal wage growth 2 points above the technologically-determined growth of productivity.

But an alternative story is that variation in demand can lead to adjustment in one of the other terms. One possibility is that the laborforce adjusts, as participation rates vary in response to demand conditions. This is what is most often meant by hysteresis: persistent deviations in unemployment from the “natural” level lead to people entering or exiting the laborforce. That implies that even when headline unemployment rates are fairly low, further increases in employment may be possible without a rise in wages. Another possibility is that while higher employment will lead to (or require) higher wages, the wage increase is not passed on to prices but comes at the expense of profits instead. This is Anwar Shaikh’s classical Phillips curve; I’ve written about it here before.

A third possibility is that higher wages are accompanied by higher productivity. Again, this appears as a problem when we are talking about wage increases from legislation, union contracts, or similar developments. But it’s not a problem if the wage increases are thanks to low unemployment. In this case, the joint movement of wages and productivity just means that output can rise higher — that supply constraints are softer. That’s what I want to focus on now.

There are a number of reasons why productivity might rise with wages. Some of them simply amount to mismeasurement of employment — it appears that output per worker is rising but really the effective number of workers is. Others are more fundamental. If productivity responds strongly and persistently to demand, it blurs the distinction between aggregate supply and aggregate demand, to the point that it’s not clear what “potential output” even means.

*

Suppose we do find a consistent pattern where, if demand is strong, unemployment is low, and wages are rising rapidly, then productivity growth is high. What could be happening?

1. Increased hours. If we measure productivity as output per worker, as we usually do, then an increase in average hours worked will show up as an increase in productivity. There is a cyclical component to this — in recessions, employers reduce hours as well as laying off workers. According to the BLS, seasonally adjusted weekly hours fell from 34.4 prior to the recession to a low of 33.7 in summer 2009. While a 2 percent fall in hours might seem small, it’s a big change in less than two years, especially when you consider that real output per worker normally rises by less than 2 percent a year.

2. Workers moving into real jobs from pseudo-employment or disguised unemployment. In any economy there are activities that are formally classified as jobs but are not employment in any substantive sense — you can take these “jobs” without anyone making a decision to hire you, and they don’t come with a wage or any similar claim on any established production process. Joan Robinson’s examples were someone who gathers firewood in a poor country, or sells pencils on streetcorners in a richer one. You could add work in family businesses and various kinds of self-employment and commission-based work to this category. In countries with traditional rural sectors — not the US — work on a family farm is the big item here. These activities absorb people who are unable to find formal jobs; the marginal product of additional workers here is normally very low. So if higher demand draws people from this kind of disguised unemployment back into regular jobs, measured productivity will rise.

3. Workers may be more fully utilized at their existing jobs. Because hiring and firing is costly, business don’t immediately adjust staffing in response to changes in sales. when demand falls, businesses will initially keep some redundant workers because paying them is cheaper than laying them off and replacing them later; and when demand rises, businesses will first try to get more work out of existing employees rather than paying the costs of hiring more. Some of this takes the form of the hours adjustment above, but some of it simply takes the form of hiring “too little” or “too much” labor for the current level of production. These changes in the utilization of existing labor will show up as changes in labor productivity.

4. Higher wages may lead to more capital-intensive production. This is the McDonald’s story: When labor gets more expensive (or scarcer), businesses use more capital instead. This is presumably what people mean when they say “Econ 101” shows that rising wages lead to less employment (assuming they mean anything at all). This may be seen as a negative when it’s a question of raising wages through legislation or unions, but it shouldn’t be when it’s a question of rising wages due to labor scarcity. Insofar as businesses can substitute machines for labor, rising wages will not be passed on to prices, so there is more space to push unemployment down.

5. Productivity-boosting innovations may be more likely when demand is strong and wages rise. This is a variant of the previous story. Now instead of high wage leading business to adopt more capital-intensive techniques from those already available, they redirect innovation toward developing new labor-saving techniques. Conceptually this is not a big difference, but it implies a different signal in the data. In the previous case we would expect  the productivity improvements to be associated with higher investment and to be concentrated at the firms actually experiencing higher wages costs; in this case they might not be.

6. The composition of employment may shift toward higher-productivity sectors. This might happen for either of two reasons. First, higher wages will disproportionately raise costs for more labor-intensive sectors; these higher costs may be absorbed by profits or by prices, but either way they will presumably depress growth in those sectors to the benefit of less labor-intensive, more productive ones. Second, it may so happen that the more income-elastic sectors are also higher-productivity ones. In the short run this is presumably true since durables and investment goods are both capital-intensive and income-elastic. Over the longer run, the opposite is more likely — the composition of demand slowly but steadily shifts toward lower-productivity sectors.

7. The composition of employment may shift toward higher-productivity firms. This sounds similar but it’s a different story. Technical change isn’t an ineffable output-raising essence diffusing across society, it’s embodied in specific new production processes and new businesses — Schumpeter’s new plant, new firms, new men. This means that productivity increases often require new or growing firms to attract workers away from established ones. Given the “frictions” in the labor market, this will require offering a wage significantly above the going rate. And on the other side the fact that the least productive firms can’t afford to pay higher wages will cause them to decline or exit, which also raises average productivity. When wages are flat, on the other hand, low-productivity firms can continue operating. In this sense, higher wages are an integral part of productivity growth. [6]

8. There may be increasing returns in production. It may literally be the case that output per worker rises — at the firm, industry or economy-wide level — when the number of workers rises. Or this may be a more abstract version of some of the stories above. It’s worth noting that increasing returns is an area where the intuitions of people with economics training diverge sharply from people who look at the economy through other lenses. To almost anyone except an economist, it’s obvious that  costs normally fall as more of something is produced. [7]

All of these stories imply that higher demand should lead to higher measured labor productivity. But to figure out how strong this relationship is in reality, we’ll look at different data depending on which of these stories we think it works through.

Another important difference between the stories is they imply different domains over which the relationship should operate. The first three suggest a more or less immediate response of productivity to changes in demand, but also one that cannot continue indefinitely. There’s limits to how much hours per worker can rise and how much additional effort can be extracted from the existing workforce, and a limited pool of disguised unemployment to draw from. (The last is not true in developing countries, where the “latent reserve army” in subsistence agriculture may be effectively unlimited.) The other mechanisms are presumably slower, requiring a sustained “high-pressure economy.”  With these stories, increased demand may push the economy up against supply constraints, with rising inflation, bottlenecks, and so on; but if it keeps pushing against them, eventually they’ll give. In this case, potential output is a medium-term constraint — over longer periods it can adjust to actual output, rather than the reverse.  So in the opposite of conventional story, a temporary increase in inflation can lead to a permanent increase in output. People like Laurence Ball say exactly this about hysteresis, but they are usually thinking of the longer-run adjustment coming on the laborforce side.

If we follow this a step further, we could even say that in the long run, the big problem isn’t that excessively high wages do lead to the substitution of capital for labor but that excessively low wages don’t. People like Arthur Lewis argue that it’s the low wages of poor countries that have led to low productivity there, and not vice versa; there’s a well-known argument that the reason the industrial revolution happened first in Britain rather than in China or India (or Italy or France) is not that that the necessary technical innovations were present only in Britain. They were present many places; it was the uniquely high cost of British labor that made them profitable to adopt for production.

*

I think that productivity does respond to demand. I think this is a good reason to doubt whether the US economy close to “potential output” today, and to doubt what, if anything, this concept actually means. But I also think we need to be clearer about how they are linked concretely. If we want to tell a story about productivity responding to demand, it makes a difference which of the stories above we have in mind. Heterodox people, it seems to me, are too quick to just invoke Verdoorn’s law (productivity rises with output), and justify it with some vague comments about how labor is used more efficiently when it is scarce. [8] Does this apparent law work via substitution of machines for labor, or through fuller utilization of existing employees’ times, or through reallocation of labor to more productive firms and/or industries, or through a labor-saving-bias in technical change, or pure increasing returns, or what? If you’re just making a formal model it may not matter. But if we want to connect the model to concrete historical developments, it certainly does.

Personally, I am most interested in the reallocation stories. They shift our idea of the fundamental constraint on capitalist economies from biophysical resources, to coordination. The great difficulty for any program of raise or transform production —  industrialization, wartime mobilization, decarbonization — isn’t the limited supply of “real” resources, but the speed at which people’s productive activity can be redirected in a coordinated way. This connects with the historical fact that the more rapid and the larger scale is economic development, the more it requires some form of central planning. And it implies that at the most basic level, what the capitalist provides is not money or means of production, but cooperation.

To tell this story, it would be nice if big shifts in productivity growth took the form of changes in the composition of employment, rather than higher output per worker in given jobs. That may or may not be there in the data. For the more immediate question of how much space there is in the US for further expansion, it doesn’t matter as much which of these stories is at work, as long as we can show that at least some of them are. [9]

In the next post or two — which I hope to write in the next week, but we’ll see — I will ask what we can say about the link between demand and productivity based on historical US data. In particular, it’s fairly straightforward to decompose changes in output per worker into three components: within-industry output per hour, within-industry hours per worker, and shifts in the employment between industries. Splitting up productivity growth this way cannot, of course, directly establish a causal link with demand. but it can help clarify which stories are plausible and which are not.

 


 

[1] Throughout this discussion, I use “productivity” to mean labor productivity — output per worker or per hour. There is also “total factor productivity,” which purports to be a measure of output for a given input of labor and capital. This concept, which IMF chief economist Paul Romer memorably called “phlogiston,” is measured as the residual from a production function — the output growth the function does not explain. Since construction of the production function requires several unobseravable parameters, total factor productivity cannot be derived even in principle from economic data. It’s a fun toy for economic theory but useless for describing the behavior of actual economies.

Nonetheless it is widely used — for instance by the CBO as discussed here. As Nathan Tankus pointed out to me the other day, under the ARRA Medicare payments to hospitals are reduced each year based on an estimate of TFP growth for the economy as a whole. It’s a great example of the crackpot wonkery of the law’s authors.

[2] Unless productivity improvements all take the form of higher quality, rather than higher output per worker.

[3] This unemployment-money wages relationship was the original Phillips curve, but it’s better now to refer to it as a wage curve.

[4] It’s a topic for another time, but I think it would be very natural to replace the “aggregate supply” framework of the textbooks with these two identities.

[5] Other textbooks, like Mankiw, base the wage-unemployment relationship on a labor-supply curve rather than a bargaining relationship. Graduate textbooks, of course, replace the institutional detail of workers and employers with a single representative agent, in order to make more space for playing with math.

[6]  Andrew Glyn and his coauthors have a good discussion of this in the context of the postwar boom in  Capitalism Since 1945 (p. 122-123).

[7] For example, here’s Laurie Winkless in Science and the City, which happens to be sitting nearby:

Bessemer’s system rapidly began to change the world of steel manufacturing, and by 1875, costs had dropped to $32 (£23) per tonne. as always, in the supply-and-demand equation, the availability of cheap, high-quality steel made it immensely popular, leading to another huge drop in the price per tonne.

Winkless has made the mistake of studying the actual history of the steel history. If she were an economist, she would know that in the world of supply and demand, immense popularity makes prices rise, not fall!

[8] In Shaikh’s Capitalism, for example, there are a number of models that rely on the claim that productivity rises with output. It’s a big book and I may well have missed a part where he explains more fully why this is true. But as far as I can tell, all he says is that higher unit labor costs “provide a strong incentive for firms to raise productivity.”

[9] The politics of this question under Trump are for another time. But certainly Jeff Spross is right that we don’t want to oppose Trump’s (dubious) plans for a big stimulus by embracing the politics of austerity. We should not respond to Trump by reflexively insisting that the US is already at full employment, and by mocking “vulgar Keynesians” who think there might still be problems for macro policy to solve.

 

EDIT: Fixed the footnote numbering, which was garbled before.