At Barron’s: With the Debt Ceiling Deal, the Administration Takes a Step Backward

(I write a monthly-ish opinion piece for Barron’s. This is my most recent one. You can find earlier ones here.)  

Since the onset of the pandemic, policy makers in the U.S. and elsewhere have embraced a more active role for government in the economy. The extraordinary scale and success of pandemic relief, the administration’s embrace of the expansive Build Back Better program, and the revived industrial policy of the Inflation Reduction Act and the Chips and Science Act all stand in sharp contrast with the limited-government orthodoxy of the past generation. 

The debt ceiling deal announced this weekend looks like a step back from this new path – albeit a smaller one than many had feared. Supporters of industrial policy and more robust social insurance have reason to be disappointed – especially since the administration, arguably, had more room for maneuver than it was willing to use. 

To be fair, the agreement in part merely anticipates the likely outcome of budget negotiations. Regardless of the debt ceiling, the administration was always going to have to compromise with the House leadership to pass a budget. The difference is that in a normal negotiation, most government spending continues as usual until a deal is reached. Raising the stakes of failure to reach a deal shifts the balance in favor of the side more willing to court disaster. Allowing budget negotiations to get wrapped up with the debt ceiling may have forced the administration to give up more ground than it otherwise would. 

The Biden team’s major nonbudget concession was to accept additional work requirements for some federal benefits. The primary effect of work requirements, with their often onerous administrative burdens, will be to push people off these programs. This might be welcome, if you would prefer that they not exist in their current form at all. But it’s a surprising concession from an administration that, not long ago, was pushing in the other direction

In a bigger sense this change directly repudiates one of the main social-policy lessons of recent years. Pandemic income-support programs were an extraordinary demonstration of the value of simple, universal social insurance programs, compared with narrowly targeted ones. The expiration of pandemic unemployment benefits gave us the cleanest test we are ever likely to see of the effect of social insurance and employment. States that ended pandemic benefits early did not see any faster job growth than ones that kept it longer – despite the fact that these programs gave their recipients far stronger incentives against work than those targeted in the budget deal. 

These compromises are all the more disappointing since there were routes around the debt ceiling that the administration, for whatever reason, chose not to explore. The platinum coin got a healthy share of attention. But there were plenty of others. 

The Treasury Department, for example, could have looked into selling debt at a premium. The debt ceiling binds the face value, or principal, of federal debt. There is no reason that this has to be equal to the amount the debt sells for – this is simply how auctions are currently structured. For much of U.S. history, government debt was sold at a discount or premium to its face value. Fixing an above-market interest rate and selling debt at more than face value would allow more funds to be raised without exceeding the debt ceiling. 

The administration might also have asked the Federal Reserve to prepay future remittances. In most years, the Fed makes a profit, which it remits to the Treasury. But it can also report a loss, as it has since September. When that happens, the Fed simply creates new reserves to make up the shortfall, offsetting these with a “deferred asset” representing future remittances. (Currently, the Fed is carrying a deferred asset of $62 billion.) The same device could be used to finance public spending without issuing debt. In a report a decade ago, Fed staff suggested that deferred assets could be used in this way to give the Treasury department “more breathing room under the debt ceiling.” (To be clear, they were not saying that this was a good idea, just noting the possibility.) 

Another route around the debt ceiling might come from the fact that about one-fifth of the federal debt – some $6 trillion – is held by federal trust funds like Social Security, rather than by the public. (Another $5 trillion is held by the Federal Reserve.) This debt has no economic function. It is a bookkeeping device reflecting the fact that trust fund contributions to date have been higher than payments. Retiring these bonds, or replacing them with other instruments that wouldn’t count against the ceiling, would have no effect on either the government’s commitment to pay scheduled benefits or its ability to do so. But it would reduce the notional value of debt outstanding. 

None of these options would be costless, risk-free, or even guaranteed to work. But there is little evidence they were seriously considered. This is a bit disheartening for supporters of the administration’s program. It’s hard to understand why you would go into negotiations with one hand tied behind your backs, and not have a plan B in case negotiations break down.

Tellingly, the one alternative the Biden team did consider was invoking the 14th Amendment to justify issuing new debt in defiance of the ceiling. The amendment refers specifically to the federal government’s debt obligations. But of course, hitting the debt ceiling would not only endanger the government’s debt service. It would threaten all kinds of payments that are legally mandated and economically vital. The openness to the 14th Amendment route, consistent with other public statements, suggests that decision-makers in the administration saw the overriding goal as protecting the financial system from the consequences of a debt default – as opposed to protecting the whole range of public payments. 

What looks like a myopic focus on the dangers to banks recalls one of the worst failures of the Obama administration. 

In the wake of the collapse of the housing market, Congress in 2009 authorized $46 billion in assistance for homeowners facing foreclosure through the Home Affordable Modification Program. But the Obama administration spent just a small fraction of this money (less than 3%) in the program’s first two years, helping only a small fraction of the number of homeowners originally promised. 

The failure to help homeowners was not due to callousness or incompetence. Rather, it was due to the overriding priority put on the stability of the banking system. As Obama’s Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner later explained, they saw the primary purpose of HAMP not as assisting homeowners, but as a way to “foam the runway” for a financial system facing ongoing mortgage losses.

Geithner and company weren’t wrong to see shoring up the banks as important. The problem was that this was allowed to take absolute priority over all other goals — with the result that millions of families lost their homes, an important factor in the slow growth of much of the 2010s.

One wouldn’t want to push this analogy too far. The debt ceiling deal is not nearly as consequential – or as clear a reflection of administration priorities – as the abandonment of underwater homeowners was. But it does suggest similar blinders: too much attention to the danger of financial crisis on one side, not enough to equally grave threats from other directions.

It’s clear that Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and the rest of the Biden administration are very attuned to the dangers of a default. But have they given enough thought to the other dangers of failing to reach a debt-ceiling deal — or of reaching a bad one? Financial crises are not the only crises. There are many ways that an economy can break down.

 

At Substack: The End of Laissez Faire

(I wrote this post about two weeks ago, but then took a while getting the Substack actually launched. Going forward, hopefully the content will be more timely. All substack content is free; you can subscribe to the newsletter version here. Hopefully the content will be more timely in the future!)

Sometimes I think being a normal economist must be like one of those classic office jobs. You drive to work, park in the garage, take the elevator up to your office. You take some papers from your inbox and put them in your outbox. There’s the research frontier; ok, we’ve advanced it a little bit. Then the bell rings, quitting time. Whereas here in the heterodox world, it’s like you’ve let yourself in through a gap in the fence and you’re wondering, is this place a construction site, or is something being demolished, or is it an archaeological dig? I think this is my desk, but it could be some weird art object, or possibly part of the ventilation system. This person in the hallway — are they the boss, or a customer, or maybe someone in need of emergency medical assistance? Am I sure I have a job? Am I even supposed to be in here?

Well then. Back to work!

The question of the moment is industrial policy. Not so long ago, the consensus on climate policy, at the high table at least, was that carbon pricing was it. Government provides the public interest with an abstract monetary representation, and then private businesses (or “markets”) will translate that representation into whatever concrete changes to production are called for. In recent years, though, the debate seems to have been shifting rather rapidly towards what I have called an investment-focused approach. The passage of the Inflation Reduction Act (along with other similar measures) seems to mark a decisive turn toward industrial policy, in the US at least. This is not only about climate — the disruptions to global supply chains during the pandemic and, more worryingly, a renewed sense of rivalry with China, have strengthened the case for support for key sectors of the economy.

(Full disclosure: When someone mentioned to me early in the Biden administration that there was interest in dealing with the chip shortage by fostering a US industry, I thought it was a silly idea that would go nowhere. This was, it seemed to me, about the worst case for policy — a problem that was at once both extraordinarily hard for government to solve, and likely to take care of itself on its own before long. Shows you how much I know! — or perhaps, how much things have changed.)

The case for industrial policy, obviously, involves a reevaluation of the capacity of government and the problems it is expected to solve — what Keynes, in an essay whose title can be repurposed today, called the line between agenda and non-agenda. But it also, a bit less obviously, involves a shift in how we think about the economy. An economy where industrial policy makes sense is not one that can be usefully described in terms of a unique, stable equilibrium toward which decentralized decisionmakers will converge. Industrial policy only makes sense in a world where increasing returns and learning by doing create significant path dependence — what we are good at today depends on what we were doing yesterday — and where an uncertain future and the need for large, irreversible investments, and the prevalence of complementarity rather than substitution, creates coordination problems that markets are unable to solve. I don’t know that the drafters of the IRA were conscious of it, but they were implicitly endorsing a very different model of the economy than the one that one finds in textbooks.

Supply constraints. My big recent publication, coauthored as usual with Arjun Jayadev, is an article in the Review of Keynesian Economics called “Rethinking Supply Constraints.” It addresses exactly this issue. The one-sentence summary is that it makes more sense to think of the productive capacity of the economy in terms of a speed limit — a limit on the rate at which output and employment can grow — rather than an absolute ceiling, as in conventional measures of potential output. This, we argue, fits better with a wide range of empirical phenomena. Equally important, it fits better with a vision of the economy as an open-ended collective transformation of the world, as opposed to the allocation of an existing basket of stuff.

There’s a summary in this blogpost, and video of my presentation of it at the University of Massachusetts is here. (I start around 47 minutes in.)  I will try to write more about it in this newsletter soon.

Low rates and bubbles. My latest Barron’s piece (I write one more or less monthly) was on whether the post-2007 decade of low interest rates can be blamed for Sam Bankman-Fried and financial bubbles and frauds more generally. As always, when the headline is a question, the answer is no.

I don’t think I quite stuck the landing with this one. The big point I should have hammered on is that if abundant credit ends up supporting projects that are socially and privately worthless, that’s a problem. But it is a problem with the institutions whose job it is to allocate credit, not with low interest rates or abundant credit as such. If banks and bank-like institutions can borrow at lower rates, it’s easy to see why they’d lend to projects with lower returns. It’s harder to see why they’d lend to projects with negative returns. The idea, evidently, is that for some reason when interest rates are too low financial-market participants will make choices that are not only socially costly but costly to themselves as well. The low rates-cause-bubbles arguments almost amount to a kind of financial terrorism — give us the risk-free returns we were counting on, or we’ll blow up our portfolios, and some chunk of the economy along with it.

The connection to industrial policy? If we don’t trust financial markets to make investment decisions, that strengthens the case for a bigger public role.

Biden, Brenner, and Benanav. Robert Brenner’s frequent collaborator Dylan Riley wrote a piece in the NLR blog Sidecar, drawing on Brenner’s work to argue that industrial policy  is hopeless because of global overcapacity; you’ve got to seize the commanding heights or stay home. I don’t agree. I think there are ways that the socialist project can be advanced via Biden administration initiatives like the IRA, and wrote a piece for Jacobin explaining why.

Some people liked it — Adam Tooze gave it a nice mention in one of his newsletters. Others did not. Aaron Benanav wrote a long and rather irritated rebuttal in New Left Review. I disagree with a lot of what he wrote, which is fine; he, as he made very clear, disagreed with what I wrote. As the protagonist of James Salter’s great Korean War novel The Hunters says, “You shoot at them, they shoot at you. What could be fairer?” But I am a little annoyed that my jaunty Hamilton reference, intended to warn against the danger of imagining that you are in a position of power, got turned into evidence that I myself dream of being in the “room where it happens.” That seems unsporting.

I talked about my piece and the larger debate with Doug Henwood on his excellent Behind the News podcast. I will also be writing a piece for NLR that will be in part a response to Benanav but mostly, I hope, an intervention to move the debate in a more positive direction.

Speaking of Korea. I was on an English-language Korean news show recently, talking about the IRA. The video is here; a twitter thread summarized the points I was trying to make is here. An implicit background point, also very relevant to my objections to the Brenner-Riley-Benanav position, is that trade flows respond mostly to income, not relative prices. How much the US imports from Korea is to a first approximation a function of US GDP growth; subsidies (and exchange rates) are distinctly secondary.

What I am reading. I just finished the novel Variations on Night and Day, by Abdelrahman Munif. It’s the third novel in the Cities of Salt trilogy, though the first chronologically. The first novel, also called Cities of Salt, is about people in a fictional Middle Eastern Country (more or less Saudi Arabia) in the early days of the oil boom. It’s an extraordinary book in many ways, including its use of mostly collective protagonists — large parts of the narration are from the point of view of “the villagers”, “the workers” and so on. The second book, The Trench, moves up the social scale, focusing on the various schemers, strivers, climbers and entrepreneurs – business and political – who accrete around the monarchy’s capital. It’s got an ensemble, rather than collective cast, with one central character and an endless number of minor ones – it would make a great tv show. (Think a gulf-monarchy version of Hillary Mantel’s Cromwell novels.) The third book — Variations on Night and Day — moves up the social scale again, and back in time, to the earlier life of the sultan whose death occurs at the very beginning of The Trench. It’s a great book, gripping as narrative and morally serious. It provides what science fiction and fantasy promise but very seldom deliver, an immersive experience of a world very different from our own. Still I have to say, I somewhat preferred the first two books. At the end of the day, sultans are just not that interesting.

ETA: As it happens, I went to graduate school with Munif’s son Yasser. He was in the sociology department while I was in economics and we used to hang out quite a bit, tho I haven’t seen him in some years.

At Substack: Hello World

I barley keep up this blog any more; do I really need a new format for (not) writing online? The problem, from my point of view, is that, these days, the only way people see blogs (or most other things one writes) is via twitter. And relying on twitter does not, at this point, see like a great idea. I’m moderately hopeful that an email newsletter can offer an alternative way.

In any case, my new substack is here. It’s pretty no-frills at the moment. I’ve pasted the first post below. For the moment I plan on cross-posting everything, but depending on how the substack goes I may revisit that.


What is this? This is an email newsletter, delivered through Substack. You probably get some others like it already. This one is from me, Joshua William Mason, or J. W. Mason as I usually write it. It’s called Money and Things. This specific email or post is the first one.

Why am I getting this? Either you signed up for it, or I added you. I subscribed a few people who I thought might be interested in hearing from me now and then. I hope you don’t mind! If you do, there’s an unsubscribe button somewhere. I promise I won’t add you again.

Thanks for reading Money and Things! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.

What’s the point of it? My main goal with this is to share things I’ve said or written in other settings, along with some interesting things I have read. I write a fair amount in a fair number of venues, and am in the news now and then. So it seems worth having one place to share it all with people who might like to see it. And then, despite the firehouse of content constantly aimed at each of our heads, it still can be nice to have someone point out something worth reading that you might not have run across otherwise.

The other goal is to have a structure for comments on things that are happening in the world. There are always things going on that I don’t have the time or energy or confidence to write about at length, but might have something interesting to say about in a more informal setting. Will a substack be any better for this than the blog I’ve been keeping for the past dozen years? I don’t know, but it seems worth a try.

So, a lot like a twitter feed, then? Yes, very much. I want to use the newsletter to share material that right now I use twitter for. Not everyone is on twitter, after all. And while I can’t see myself getting off twitter entirely – there are still too many interesting people there – I would like to spend less time on it, for all the familiar reasons.

How often will you be sending these? I’m vaguely hoping for once a week. I’m sure it won’t be more often than that; it could be much less. I will at least try to send one out whenever I publish something.

Why is the newsletter called Money and Things? Well, that captures the range of my interests. I write a lot about money, finance, central banks, credit and debt, inflation and other money-related and money-adjacent topics. But I also write about other things.

Also, Money and Things is the working title of the book that Arjun Jayadev and I are working on. This book has been in progress for longer than I care to think about, but it’s now mostly written and should be coming out from the University of Chicago Press  sometime in the next year. So I also want to use this email to share material from the book, and, down the road, to encourage people to read it.

What is the book about? Oof, I hoped you wouldn’t ask that. Well, it’s about money … and things.

Can you be more specific? The book is an effort to pull together some different strands of thinking around money that Arjun and I have been grappling with since we were students at the University of Massachusetts 20 years ago. One place to start is the tendency — both in economics and everyday common sense — to think of money either as just one useful object among others, or as a faithful reflection of a material world outside itself. Whereas to us it seems clear we should think of it as constituting its own self-contained world, a game or a logic, that in some ways responds to external material and social reality, but also evolves autonomously, and reshapes that external world in its turn. Economists like to think that when we measure things in terms of money, that is capturing some pre-existing “real” value or quantity. (Like, when you see a figure like GDP, you assume in some sense it reflects a quantity of stuff that was produced.) But in fact — our argument goes — while money is a yardstick that allows all sorts of things to be numerically compared, it doesn’t reflect any underlying quantity except money itself.

Keynesians have been criticizing the idea that money is neutral, just a veil, for decades. But we think there’s still space to spell out what the positive alternative looks like, and why it matters. You might say it’s an attempt to elevate the argument of our “Fisher dynamics” papers — where we argued that movements in debt-income ratios have more to do with interest rates and inflation than change in borrowing behavior — into a worldview or paradigm.

What we’re mainly interested in is the interface or boundary between money-world and the concrete world outside of it. (One jokey summary is that we’re starting from Keynes’ General Theory of Money, Interest and Employment, and writing about the “and”.) The idea is that by focusing there, we can connect some long-standing theoretical questions around the nature of money with contemporary debates about policy and politics, and with historical developments like the shareholder revolution or the euro crisis. We’re aiming for a spot in intellectual space somewhere between Jim Crotty, Perry Mehrling, Doug Henwood and David Graeber, if that makes sense.

Will you have a better answer to this question by the time the book comes out? I hope so!

Getting back to the newsletter — will there be free and paid versions? No, there will not. If someone wanted to give me money for it, I wouldn’t say no. If I got a little, I’d buy my kids ice cream. If I got a significant amount, which seems unlikely, then I might put more time into writing it. If I get none at all, that’s perfectly fine.

My personal view – which I know not everyone shares – is that if you are a tenure-track academic, it’s a bit unethical to charge money for a newsletter or similar product. The job of an academic is not just teaching; we are being paid to think about the world and share what we learn. So to me – again, I know many people feel differently – when you turn your work as a scholar into a kind of private business venture, that’s almost a form of embezzlement. Perhaps you saw Inside Job, that movie about economists and the financial crisis. Remember how eagerly someone like Frederic Mishkin turned his stature as a big-name monetary economist into big checks for himself? I don’t want to be that guy. Of course I’m not under any illusion that my integrity carries anything like the market price of a Mishkin’s. But it’s still worth something to me.

To be clear, this doesn’t apply to people who make a living as journalists or writers. If you are a professional writer your readers need to be paying you one way or another, and subscriber-only newsletter content is a legitimate way to make that happen. But as an academic, I’m already being compensated for this kind of work.

Does this mean your book will also be distributed for free? Well, no. The publishers will charge whatever they normally do for a book like this, and Arjun and I will get whatever (presumably small) royalties we’re entitled to out of that.

So how is that different? I don’t know. I feel like it’s different? Of course producing a physical book is costly, and the publisher has their own employees, whose services are valuable, and other costs that have to be paid. On the other hand, it would be technically feasible to just put the book up online as a pdf, and let anyone download it. So making people pay is in some sense a choice we are making. Still, if Inside Job had merely caught Mishkin admitting he’d published a book about financial crises, I don’t think that would have been much of a gotcha. Although then again, on the other hand, the textbook-writing business does seem a bit morally compromised. (Personally I try not to assign anything I can’t distribute a free pdf of.) I do hope our book will be used in the classroom. But I wish students could get excerpts of it in xeroxed course packets, they way I did when I was in college.

Anyway. Money and Things, the newsletter, will always be entirely free. Money and Things, the book, will not be.

You seem to have strong feelings on this topic. Do you have anything else to say about it? Yes, I do. I’ve always found it infuriating that so much scholarly work is hidden behind paywalls. It goes against the whole idea of scholarship, especially if you think of your academic work as part of some political project or as otherwise useful. During the six-seven years between my two stints in graduate school, I was intermittently engaged in online economics discussions, and I found it deeply frustrating that there were so many interesting articles that, without an academic affiliation, I was not permitted to read. I hope someday we recognize IP as applied to academic work for what it is, a comprehensive regime of censorship. (And Alexandra Elbakyan, the creator of sci-hub, as one of humanity’s heroes.)

A bit more recently, but still some years ago, I joined the steering committee of the Union for Radical Political Economics in large part to see if I could convince them to convert URPE’s journal, the Review of Radical Political Economics, to open access. Here you are, I thought, doing work that’s supposed to be part of a larger transformative project, that is relevant not just for other academics but for workers and activists. So why are you enlisting the power of the state to stop people from reading it?

As is often the case, what seemed unanswerable in principle turned out to be less straightforward in practice. The leadership of URPE the organization is largely separate from that of the journal; there’s a multi-year contract with the publisher; and even if open access were allowed, URPE’s share of the subscription revenue is basically the organization’s entire budget. If we went open-access, how would we pay the editor, or award fellowships to students in heterodox programs, or fly people out for the steering committee meetings? Maybe, I suggested, allowing people to read the journal is more important than flying people to meetings. Easy for you to say, someone replied, you live in New York; for others, if they can’t come out and meet in person, they won’t be part of this community at all. Besides, are there really so many non-academics who want to read RRPE?

Maybe if I’d pushed harder I could have got somewhere. But the obstacles were real, and no one seemed to agree with me, so I gave up, and eventually left the steering committee. (Life is too short to be on too many committees.) But I still think I was right.

Anything else? No, I think that’s it for now. But don’t worry – there will be another post coming shortly after this one.