The Slack Wire

A Conversation I Don’t Want to Have

UPDATE: Aaron Benanav was sick and tested positive for covid the day of the event. So it didn’t take place. A fitting reminder, perhaps, of the context in which these debates are happening.

This Wednesday, John Jay College is hosting a debate between me and Aaron Benanav on, ostensibly, industrial policy and global overcapacity, whatever that means.

This is an event I agreed to participate in very reluctantly. To be honest, the prospect of it has been causing me considerable stress and anxiety lately. As a way of relieving this, I thought I would try to articulate why this is a conversation I don’t want to have.

1. I don’t like polemics, especially with others on the left. Doug Henwood used to quote a line from Foucault, which unfortunately I cannot locate at the moment, on the dangers of approaching intellectual debates on the model of war. I feel this strongly. We all know how unpleasant social media discussions become when everything gets reduced to which side you are on.

This is not some new development with social media. Alexander Cockburn tells this story about Lenin:

Krupskaya once tried to get him out of Zurich to take the day off, relaxing in the Alps and admiring nature. He tried but stayed fidgety, finally crying out to Krupskaya in exasperation, ‘Those bloody Mensheviks spoil everything.’

It’s very easy, once you’ve picked a side, to let those bloody other-siders spoil everything. I know I am susceptible to that tendency, I’ve given in to it too much in the past. So I’d rather avoid settings that encourage the picking of teams. I don’t like the debate format. I don’t like being on “Team Keynes” against “Team Brenner,” or however this is supposed to line up.

If one is going to have a debate, it should be with someone you respect, with a view that you can imagine holding, or perhaps have held in the past. Better than a debate is a conversation, with people whose ideas may be in tension at various points but who are genuinely interested in learning from each other. A public debate in front of an audience, by contrast, is a sort of combat where the goal is negative critique, tearing down, rather than synthesis.

2. I don’t find the overcapacity argument coherent enough to try to refute it. I’ve read a lot of Brenner’s stuff, it’s all over the map. I’ve read some of Benanav. The affect is clear enough: He really hates Keynesians. But as for a set of substantive claims about observable social reality, I don’t see it. Very smart people like Seth Ackerman and Alex Williams and Tim Barker have tried to engage with them, without much success. Experience suggests that trying to extract a coherent meaning of overcapacity to engage with will just provoke a response of “that’s not what we meant.” Debating this non-argument feels like wrestling with a cloud.

3. I don’t think that the kind of knowledge that both Brenner-Benanav and their critics are aspiring to is even possible. I don’t think the position they are taking can be replaced with a better one; the question is just not a useful one.

What I mean is this. Capitalism, or better, capital, is a game, an activity that people engage in. It has its rules, its values, its categories. Understanding its logic is important. But logic, on the level of logic, only tells us about the parameters, the dimensions, of capitalist space. It tells us nothing about what will actually happen. At best it allows us to identify tendencies, all of which have their counter-tendencies. The logic of capital tells us which ways the system can move, but nothing about how it has moved, or will move. When we turn to explaining concrete historical developments — retrospectively or prospectively — we need to do so in concrete historical terms. If we ask, let us say, why employment growth was slower in most European countries in the 1980s and 1990s compared with the 1960s and 1970s, there are a number of possible factors that might contribute, or point in the other direction. The only possible answer to the question will be a quantitative one, asking how much various factors contributed in this particular period. General tendencies of capitalism tell us nothing at all.

The academic work I feel best about is a couple of papers asking, in a concrete historical way, how we explain the changes in household debt-income ratios over the past 100 years The answers turn out to be different in different periods. The interesting thing, to me, is the key takeaway that the rise in the debt ratio in the 1980-2008 period, versus the stable ratio in the previous 20 years, is entirely explained by higher interest rates plus lower inflation. But the methodology — and this is the critical point — also reveals plenty of exceptions. During the mid 2000s, for instance, it really is true that households were borrowing more. If we want to learn about the world, we need a method of asking questions that gives answers of the form “x percent this, but also y percent that”, or “in this period mostly this, but in that period mostly that,” or “this factor was supporting the overall trend but that factor was retarding it.” These are all quantitative statements, and will be different depending on the place and time we are discussing. If you think you can reason in a purely logical way to concrete historical outcomes, you aren’t talking about the real world.

4. Continuing from 3 — to have a useful discussion, the questions have to be reframed as concrete, operational ones. Public spending on green energy will improve the bargaining power of workers, or it won’t. Chinese investment in renewable energy has reduced, or increased, manufacturing investment in the rest of the world by this much, more or less. Some more or less concretely specified central bank policy to favor green investment could reduce carbon emissions by some amount, or more, or less. Until we frame our questions in this sort of way, with answers that are numbers or clear yes-or-nos, there is nothing useful to talk about. We need to debate principles in such a way that we are learning about concrete reality. I don’t see this debate as a step towards that.

5. I am not convinced that the phenomenon of “stagnation” or “overcapacity” exists. It is true that by most measures growth appears to have been stronger in Europe in the decades after World War II than, to the extent we have comparable measures, in most other times and places. But it is not at all clear that the absence of this outstanding performance should be described as a distinct phenomenon of “stagnation” or “overcapacity”. Maybe we should instead ask what combination of institutional factors created this exceptional case. Nor is it clear that the same pattern exists if we broaden our focus — China, in the decades of so-called stagnation, has seen what is probably the greatest episode of capitalist accumulation in human history. (The problems that China poses for the Brenner argument need more attention than I am in a position to give.) 

And even if “stagnation” is valid as a descriptive historical fact, it doesn’t follow that it represents any underlying tendency. Let’s say we are in the US in 1935. Why is business investment so low, why are so many people unemployed? “Because it’s a depression” would be true in a certain descriptive sense. But, obviously, as an explanation it would get us nowhere at all. I’m not convinced that talking about overcapacity today is much different from that.

Admittedly, the question of whether some capitalist economies can be described as experiencing stagnation (and which ones, and over what period) is a concrete, empirically-tractable question, in a way that some inherent tendency toward stagnation is not. But the claim would have to be much more precisely specified before it could be disputed. And clearly neither of us is undertaking the sort of detailed, data-based analysis that would be called for.

6.  Benanav’s response to my blog post — it really was just a blog post — was dishonest and insulting. It still pisses me off that I can write, as I did, “leftists should not imagine that we control the state,” and get quoted as saying “we control the state.” It annoys me that I can suggest an analogy between the transition way from carbon and the industrial revolution and get this response: “any such comparison between the 1840s—an era of incipient French industrialization—and contemporary overcapacity, following the onset of the demand shift over a century later, is so ahistorical as to border on the absurd.” I mean, what is this? Ahistorical, absurd? Come on man. Industrialization wasn’t just a random bolt from the blue, it was the result of exactly the kind of positive feedback mechanisms I was talking about.

This blithe dismissal is simply a refusal to engage with the argument. I was trying to introduce something interesting into the conversation — is anyone else writing about the Green New Deal quoting 19th century French historians? And this guy, who is supposed to be some kind of social scientist, just pisses on it. I won’t pretend it doesn’t annoy me.

7. I have other work to do. I am trying to finish this book. I am trying to teach. (My teaching is bad, but my students are excellent.) I am trying to write opinion pieces for a general public; perhaps people will read them. All of that seems more important than this thing.

8. Finally the biggest one. The debate objectively places me in the position of a defender of the Biden Administration, something that, at this moment, I have no desire to be. Maybe, if I’m honest, this is the real reason why I am so angry about having to do this debate. Thousands of children are dead and dying under the rubble of Gaza. The bombs that killed them are marked “Made in USA.” Will I, under these circumstances, stand up and defend Bidenomics? No, I will not.

As an analytic matter, it’s certainly possible to separate the general case for industrial policy from the murderous regime that is currently its standard bearer. But in the specific context of the United States in November 2023, I don’t know that you can. Maybe my anger at Benanav, and at my colleagues who pushed me to debate him, is really anger at myself for having associated myself with a regime of child-killers. This is a possibility I must take seriously. It calls for resolute self-criticism and introspection.

There is a very complex and difficult problem here. We must sometimes take a clear stand on principle, we must stand against fascism and genocide. We must also, all the time, make an honest assessment of existing conditions, and what we can do in the concrete circumstances we find ourselves in. We must recognize that the path to a better world consists of one step after another, and starts from where we currently are.

Sometimes these two principles are consistent, sometimes they are not. It can be hard to figure out how to reconcile them. We do have to figure it out. I would be very interested in a roundtable on how socialists should relate to the state and established parties in the current moment. But one — or at least I — would have to approach it in a spirit of uncertainty, questioning and an openness to learning from others. Not a debate between opposing sides. 

However: John Jay economics is a great program! And we need students! So please do come out for this thing, and, if you’re at a suitable stage of life, please apply to our graduate program. Someday, maybe you will get all this stuff right, where I clearly have not.

URPE Statement on Gaza

I’ve been struggling to find something to say about the unfolding horror in Gaza. What is happening there is not war, but murder on an industrial scale. It is a conscious effort to bring about the deaths of tens or hundreds of thousands of human beings, and to permanently drive millions from their homes. It is the deliberate destruction of a whole society. And it is happening in full view of the world, with the enthusiastic support of the governments of the United States and most of Europe. We can’t look away from this. We have to say something, whether or not our words have any effect.

But I think they can have an effect. Israel depends on support — material and moral — from the US, and from other countries whose governments are more or less vulnerable to public pressure. (Perhaps it’s less dependent than it used to be, but less does not mean not at all.) Right now they have a free hand, but they won’t forever. Public opinion is clearly shifting, and the costs to other governments of their complicity are growing. There is a limited window within which the killing and displacement can continue, a window whose size depends on world opinion. Anyone with a public platform, however small, can try to help close it. The most important thing now is to demand an immediate ceasefire by Israel. If you can say that anywhere where people will hear you, then, in my opinion, that’s what you should say.

So I was very glad to see the Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE) put out a statement on Gaza that begins by expressing solidarity with the Palestinian people, and calls for an immediate ceasefire as its first demand. URPE is as far as you can get from being an important geopolitical player. But it’s my own professional home, so it matters to me, and I’m sure to a number of readers of this. It’s also an organization founded on the principle that economists and social scientists cannot be dispassionate technicians and observers, but have a responsibility to take sides in the struggles of our times. It’s good to see that, after some initial hesitation, they lived up that commitment here.

The statement is below. It’s a good statement. I endorse all of it.

urpe%20tote_outlined_no%20transparency.jpg

We stand in unwavering solidarity with the Palestinian people. Since October 7th, 2023, over two million people have faced a brutal onslaught by the Israeli military and state. They have been forced to flee with nowhere to go as homes, shelters, evacuation routes, border crossings, hospitals, places of worship and entire neighborhoods have been bombed.

We mourn civilian deaths in both Israel and Palestine. Israel’s retaliation for the October 7th incursion continues, however, and over 9,000 Palestinians have been killed in the ongoing assault so far.  The estimated number of children among the casualties is over 3,000 and UNICEF estimates that about 420 children have been killed or wounded daily. Even reporters have been threatened with violence or killed.

Since the Nakba 75 years ago, the Palestinian people have endured profound suffering, forced displacement, and a brutal 16-year-long inhumane siege and blockade in Gaza. Human rights organizations have characterized Gaza as ‘the largest open-air prison’.

We also condemn the role of the U.S. state in supporting the ongoing siege in Palestine, its support for the horrors inflicted on Gaza, and its refusal to support a humanitarian ceasefire. It is imperative that we do not turn our backs on the devastating impact of this violence on people’s lives. The fight for Palestinian liberation and a fair, enduring peace in the region is intricately linked with the liberation and resistance efforts spearheaded by indigenous, colonized, and oppressed communities historically and worldwide.

We stand in support of efforts by the Palestinian people to sustain themselves economically through control over their land and their labor. We stand in solidarity with the anti-Zionist Jewish communities that have been raising their voices against the carpet bombing of Gaza, for the liberation of the Palestinian people, and who are working for a just, equitable, and durable peace.

We urgently call for:

(1)    An immediate ceasefire

(2)    Immediate restoration of food, fuel, water, and electricity to the Gaza Strip

(3)    Cessation of all settlement activity and disarmament of all settlers

(4)    Immediate delivery of humanitarian aid on the scale required

(5)    Respect towards the Geneva Conventions by all parties concerned

(6)    An end to apartheid and strident moves toward a democratic future for all people regardless of race, religion, gender identity and nationality

In addition, we strongly uphold the principle of academic freedom, especially in light of the current global climate where individuals in educational institutions worldwide face termination, doxing, and harassment for speaking up against the atrocities of the Israeli state and in support of the civilian population in Gaza. Neglecting this commitment would be a betrayal of our scholarly and moral obligations.

In Praise of Profiteering

Of the usefulness of the concept, that is.1

 In my comments on inflation, I’ve emphasized supply disruptions more than market power. But as I’ll explain in this post, I think the market power or profiteering frame is also a valid and useful one.

Thanks in large part to Lindsay Owens and her team at the Groundwork Collaborative, the idea that corporate profiteering is an important part of today’s inflation is getting a surprising amount of traction, including from the administration. So it’s no surprise that it’s attracted some hostile pushback. This sneering piece by Catherine Rampell in the Washington Post is typical, so let’s start from there.

For critics like Rampell, the profiteering claim isn’t just wrong, but “conspiracy theory”, vacuous and incoherent:

The theory goes something like this: The reason prices are up so much is that companies have gotten “greedy” and are conspiring to “pad their profits,” “profiteer” and “price-gouge.” No one has managed to define “profiteering” and “price-gouging” more specifically than “raising prices more than I’d like.” 

The problem with this narrative is that it’s just a pejorative tautology. Yes, prices are going up because companies are raising prices. Okay. This is the economic equivalent of saying “It’s raining because water is falling from the sky.” 

The interesting thing about the profiteering story, to me, is precisely that it’s not a tautology. As a matter of logic, one might just as easily say “prices are going up because consumers are paying more.” It is not an axiomatic truth that businesses are who decide on prices. It is not a feature of textbook economics (where firms are price takers) nor is it an empirically true of all markets. As for profiteering, there is a straightforward definition — price increases that don’t reflect any change in the costs of production. Both economically and in the common-sense morality that terms like “price gouging” appeal to, there’s a distinction between price increases that reflect higher costs and ones that do not. And there’s nothing novel or strange about policies to limit the latter.

These two points are related. If prices were set straightforwardly as a markup over marginal costs, it wouldn’t make sense to say that “companies are raising prices.” And there wouldn’t be any question of price-gouging. The starting point here is, that’s not necessarily how prices are set. And once we agree that prices are a decision variable for firms, rather than an automatic market outcome, it’s not obvious why there shouldn’t be a public interest in how that decision gets made.

Think about water. It’s a commonplace that big increases in the price of bottled water in a disaster zone should not be allowed. The marginal cost of selling a bottle of water already on the shelf is no higher than in normal times. Nor are high prices for bottled water serving a function as signals — the premise is precisely that the quantity available is temporarily fixed. And everyone agrees that in these settings, willingness to pay is not a good measure of need. 

What about water in normal times? In most of the United States, piped water is provided by local government. But in some places, it is provided by private water companies. And in those cases, invariably, its price is tightly regulated by a public utility commission, with price increases limited to cases where an increase in costs has been established. According to this recent GAO report, states with private water utilities all “rely on the same standard formula … to set private for-profit water rates. The formula relies on the actual costs of the utility …. including capital invested in its facilities, operations and maintenance costs, taxes, and other adjustments.” 

The principle in these types of regulations — which, again, are ubiquitous and uncontroversial — is that in the real world prices may or may not track costs of production. Price increases that reflect higher costs are legitimate, and should be permitted; ones that do not are not, and should not.

Rent control is very controversial, both among economists and the general public. But I have never heard “water rate control” brought up as an example of an illegitimate government interference in the market, or seen a study of how much more water would be provided if utilities could charge what the market would bear. (Maybe some enterprising young economist will take that on.)

The same goes for many other public utilities — electricity, gas, and so on. Here in New York, a utility that wants to raise its electricity rates has to submit a filing to the Public Service Commission documenting the its operating and capital costs; if the proposed increase doesn’t reflect the company’s costs, it is not allowed. Obviously this isn’t so simple in practice, and the system certainly has its critics. But the point is, no one thinks that electricity — an industry that combines very high fixed costs, concentration and very inelastic demand, and which is an essential input to all kinds of other activity — is something where prices can be left to the market.

So the the question is not: Should prices be regulated or controlled? Nor is it whether some price increases are unreasonable. The answers to those questions are obviously, uncontroversially Yes. The question is whether the price regulation of utilities, and the economic analysis behind it, should be extended to other areas, or to prices in general.

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People like Rampell are not thinking in terms of our world of production by large organizations using specialized tools and techniques. They are imagining an Econ 101 world where there is a fixed stock of stuff, and the market price is the one where people just want to buy that much. There are, to be sure, cases where this is a reasonable first approximation — used car dealers, say. But it is not a good description of most of the economy. Markets are not allocating a given stock of stuff, but guiding production. This production is carried out by large enterprises with substantial market power. They are not price takers. For most goods and services, price is a decision variable for producers, involving tradeoffs on a number of margins.2 

In the models taught in introductory microeconomics, producers are price takers; they choose a quantity of output which they will sell at the going price. Given rising marginal costs — each additional unit of output costs more to produce than the last one — firms will carry out production just to the point where marginal cost equals the market price. This model is in principle consistent with the existence of fixed as well as marginal costs: Free entry and exit ensures that revenue at the market price just covers fixed costs, plus the normal profit (whatever that is). 

The usual situation in a modern economy, however, is flat or declining marginal costs. Non-increasing marginal costs, nonzero fixed costs, and competitive pricing cannot coexist: In the absence of increasing marginal costs, a price equal to marginal cost leaves nothing to cover fixed costs. Modern industries, which invariably involve substantial fixed costs and flat or declining marginal costs at normal levels of output, require some degree of monopoly power in order to survive. This is the economic logic behind patents and copyrights — developing a new idea is costly, but disseminating it is cheap. So if we are relying on private businesses for this, they must be granted some degree of monopoly.3

The problem is, once we agree that some degree of market power is necessary in order for industries without declining returns to cover their fixed costs, how do we know how much market power is enough? Too much market power, and firms can make super-normal profits by holding prices above the level required to cover their costs, reducing access to whatever social useful thing they supply. Too little market power, and competing firms will be inefficiently small, drive each other to bankruptcy, or simply decline to enter, depriving society of the useful thing entirely. Returning to the IP example: To the extent that copyrights and patents serve an economic function, it is possible for them to be either too long or too short.

The problem gets worse when we think about what fixed costs men concretely. On the one hand, the decision to pay for a particular long-lived means of production is irreversible and taken in historical time; producers don’t know in advance whether their margins over costs of production will be enough to recoup the outlay. But on the other hand, the form these costs take is financial: A company has, typically, borrowed to pay for its plant, equipment and intellectual property; the concrete ongoing costs it faces are debt service payments.  These may change after the fact, by, for example, being discharged in bankruptcy — which does not in general prevent the firm from continuing to operate. So there may be a very wide space between a price high enough to induce new firms to enter and a price low enough to induce existing firms to exit.

In addition, concerns over market share, public opinion, financing constraints,  strategic interaction with competitors and other considerations mean that the price chosen within this space will not necessarily be the one that maximizes short-term profits (to the extent that this can even be known.) A lower price might allow a firm to gain market share, but risk retaliation from competitors. A higher price might allow for increased payments to shareholders, but risk a backlash from regulators or bad press. Narrowly economic factors may set some broad limits to pricing, but within them there is a broad range for strategic choices by sellers.

*

These issues were central to economic debates around the turn of the last century, particularly in the context of railroads. In the second half of the 19th century, railroads were the overwhelmingly dominant industrial businesses. And they clearly did not fit the models of competitive producers pricing according to marginal cost that the economics profession was then developing.

Railroads provided an essential function, for which there were no good alternatives. A single line on a given route had an effective monopoly, while two lines in parallel were almost perfect substitutes. The largest part of costs were fixed. But on the other hand, a firm that failed to meet its fixed costs would see its debt discharged in bankruptcy and then continue operating under new ownership. The result was cycles of price gouging and ruinous competition, in which farmers and small businesses could (much of the time) reasonably complain that they were being crushed by rapacious railroad owners, and railroads could (some of the time) reasonably complain they were being driven to the wall by cutthroat competition. Or as Alfred Chandler puts it,

Railroad competition presented an entirely new business phenomenon. Never before had a very small number of very large enterprises competed for the same business. And never before had competitors been saddled with such high fixed costs. In the 1880s fixed costs…averaged two-thirds of total cost. The relentless pressure of such costs quickly convinced railroad managers that uncontrolled competition of through traffic would be “ruinous”. As long as a road had cars available to carry freight, the temptation to attract traffic by reducing rates was always there. … To both the railroad managers and investors, the logic of such competition would be bankruptcy for all.4

As Michael Perelman explains in his excellent books The End of Economics and Railroading Economics (from which the following quotes are drawn), the problem of the railroads was the problem for the first generation of American professional economists. As these economists were developing models in which prices set in competitive markets would guarantee both a rational allocation of society’s resources and a normatively fair distribution of incomes, it was clear that in the era’s dominant industry, market prices did not work at all.

Already in the 1870s, Charles Francis Adams could observe:

The traditions of political economy,…notwithstanding, there are functions of modern life, the number of which is also continually increasing, which necessarily partake in their essence of the character of monopolies…. Now it is found that, whenever this characteristic exists, the effect of competition is not to regulate cost or equalize production, but under a greater or less degree of friction to bring about combination and a closer monopoly. This law is invariable. It knows no exceptions. 

Arthur Hadley, an early president of the American Economic Association, made a similar argument. Where railroads competed, prices fell to a level that was too low to recover fixed costs, eventually sending one or both lines into bankruptcy. In the absence of competition, railroads could charge monopoly prices, which might be much higher than fixed costs. Equating prices to marginal costs made sense in an economy of small farmers or artisans. But in industries where most costs took the form of large, irreversible investments in fixed capital, there was no automatic process that would bring prices in line with costs. In Perelman’s summary:

 In order to attract new capital into the business, rates must be high enough to pay not merely operating expenses, but fixed charges on both old and new capital. But, when capital is once invested, it can afford to make rates hardly above the level of operating expenses rather than lose a given piece of business. This “fighting rate” may be only one-half or one-third of a rate which would pay fixed charges. Based on his knowledge of the railroads, [Hadley] concluded that “survival of the fittest is only possible when the unfittest can be physically removed—a thing which is impossible in the case of an unfit trunk line.”

Perelman continues:

The root of the problem, for Hadley, was that to build a new line, owners had to expect rates high enough to cover not only the costs of operating it but the costs of constructing it, the financing charges, and a premium for risk; while to continue running an existing line, rates only had to cover operating costs. And these costs were essentially invariant to the volume of traffic on the line. 

Or as John Bates Clark  put it in 1901: “There is often a considerable range within which trusts can control prices without calling potential competition into positive activity.”

These were some of the leading figures in the economics profession around the turn of the century, so it’s striking how unambiguously they rejected the  Marshallian orthodoxy of equilibrium prices. When the American Economics Association met for the first time, its proposed statement of principles included the line: “While we recognize the necessity of individual initiative in industrial life, we hold that the doctrine of laissez-faire is unsafe in politics and unsound in morals.” Politically, they were not socialists or radicals. They rejected competitive markets, but not private ownership. That however left the question, how should prices be regulated? 

For a conservative economist like Hadley, the answer was social norms:

This power [of the trusts] is so great that it can only be controlled by public opinion—not by statute…. There are means enough. Don’t let him come to your house. Disqualify him socially. You may say that it is not an operative remedy. This is a mistake. Whenever it is understood that certain practices are so clearly against public need and public necessity that the man who perpetrates them is not allowed to associate on even terms with his fellow men, you have in your hands an all-powerful remedy.

Unfortunately, in practice, the withholding of dinner party invitations is not always an operative remedy.

In principle, there are many other ways to solve the problem. Intellectually, one can assume it away by simply insisting on declining returns to scale; or one can allow constant returns but have firms rent the services of undifferentiated capital, so there are no fixed costs. If the problem is not assumed away — a more practical option for theorists than for policymakers — it could in principle be solved by somehow ensuring that producers enjoy just the right degree of monopoly. This is what patents and copyrights are presumably supposed to do. Another possible answer is to say that where competition is not possible, that is an activity that should be carried out by the public. That was, of course, where urban rail systems ended up. For someone like Oskar Lange, it was a decisive argument for socializing production more broadly.5

Alternatively, one can accept cartels or monopolies (perhaps under the tutelage of dominant banks) in the hopes that social pressure or norms will limit prices, or on the grounds that a useful service provided at monopoly prices is still better than it not being provided at all. This was, broadly, the view of figures like Hadley, Ely and Clark, and arguably a big part of how things worked out. 

But the main resolution to the problem, at least in the case of railroads, came from the increasing public pressure to regulate prices. The Interstate Commerce Commission was established to regulate railroad rates in 1887; its authority was initially limited, and it faced challenges from hostile Gilded-Age courts. But it was strengthened over the ensuing decades. The guiding principle was that rates should be high enough to cover a railroad’s full costs and a reasonable return, but no higher. This required railroads, among other things, to adopt more systematic and consistent accounting for capital costs.

Indeed, there’s a sense in which the logic of Langean socialism describes much of the evolution of private markets over the 20th century. The spread of cost-based price regulation forced firms to systematically measure and account for marginal  costs in a way they might not have done otherwise. Mark Wilson, in his fascinating Destructive Creation, describes how the use of cost-plus contracts during World War II rationalized accounting in a broad range of industries. Systems of railroad-like rate regulation were applied to a number of more or less utility-like businesses both before and after the war, imposing from above the rational relationship between costs and prices that the market could not. Many of these regulations have been rolled back since the 1970s, but as noted earlier, many others remain in place. 

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Late 19th-century debates over railroad regulation might not be the most obvious place to look for guidance to today’s inflation debates. But as Axel Leijonhufvud points out in a beautiful essay on “The Uses of the Past,” economics is not progressive in the way that physical sciences are — we can’t assume that the useful contributions of the past are all incorporated into today’s thought. Economists’ thinking often changes for reasons of politics or fashion, while the questions posed by reality are changing as well as well, often in quite different ways. Older ideas may be more relevant to new problems than the current state of the art. History of economic thought becomes useful, Leijonhufvud writes,

when the road that took you to the ‘frontier of the field’ ends in a swamp or blind alley. A lot of them do. … Back there, in the past, there were forks in the road and it is possible, even plausible, that some roads were more passable than the one that looked most promising at the time.

The road I want to take from those earlier debates is that in a setting of high fixed costs and pervasive market power, how businesses set prices is a legitimate question, both as an object of inquiry and target for policy. One of the central insights of the railroad economists is that in modern capital-intensive industries, there is a wide range over which prices are, in an economic sense, indeterminate. Depending on competitive conditions and the strategic choices of firms, prices can be persistently too high or too low relative to costs. This indeterminacy means that pricing decisions are, at least potentially, a political question. 

It’s worth emphasizing here that in empirical studies of how firms actually set prices — which admittedly are rather rare in the economics literature — an important factor in these decisions often seems to be norms around price-setting. In a classic paper on sticky prices, Alan Blinder surveyed business decision-makers on why they don’t change prices more frequently. The most common answer was, “it would antagonize customers.” In a recent ECB survey, one of the top two answers to the same question from businesses selling to the public was, similarly, that “customers expect prices to remain roughly the same.” (The other one was fear that competitors would not follow suit.)

This kind of survey data supports the idea, relied on by the Groundwork team, that businesses with substantial market power might be reluctant to use it in normal times. Those inhibitions would be lifted in an environment like that of the pandemic recovery, where individual price hikes are less likely to be seen as norm violations, or to be noticed at all. (And are more likely to be matched by competitors.)

Even more: It suggests that the moralizing language that critics like Rampell object to can, itself, be a form of inflation control. If fear of antagonizing customers is normally an important restraint on price increases then maybe we need to stoke up that antagonism! The language of “greedflation,” which I admit I didn’t originally care for, can be seen as an updated version of Arthur Hadley’s proposal to “disqualify socially” any business owner who raised prices too much. It is also, of course, useful in the fight for more direct price regulation, which is unlikely to get far on the basis of dispassionate analysis alone.

And this, I think, is a big source of the hostility toward Groundwork and toward others making the greedflation argument, like Isabella Weber.6 They are taking something that has been understood as a neutral, objective market outcome and reframing it as a moral and political question. This is, in Keynes’ terms, a question about the line between the Agenda and the Non-Agenda of political debates; and these are often more acrimonious than disputes where the legitimacy of the question itself is accepted by everyone, however much they may disagree on the answer.

By the same token, I think this line-shifting is a central contribution of the profiteering work. The 2022-23 inflation seems on its way to coming to an end on its own as supply disruptions gradually revolve themselves, just as (albeit more slowly than) Team Transitory always predicted. But even if the aggregate price level is behaving itself, rising prices can remain burdensome and economically costly in all kinds of areas (as can ruinous competition and underinvestment in others). Prices will remain an important political question, even if inflation is not.

My neighbor Stephanie Luce, who spent many years working in the Living Wage movement, often points out that the direct impact of those measures was in general quite small. But that does not mean that all the hard work and organizing that went into them was wasted. A more important contribution, she argues, is that they establish a moral vision and language around wages. Beyond their direct effects, living wage campaigns help shift discussions of wage-setting from economic criteria to questions of fairness and justice. In the same way, establishing price setting as a legitimate part of the political agenda is a step forward that will have lasting value even after the current bout of inflation is long over.

 

Remembering Jim Crotty

Last weekend I went up to Amherst, for an event — half conference, half memorial — in honor of Jim Crotty.

Jim was a very important presence for me when I was at a graduate student at the University of Massachusetts, as he was for many people who passed through the economics program there in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. His approach to economics, drawing on the traditions of Marx and Keynes, was for us almost the definition of heterodox macroeconomics. He was also a model for us as a human being. He never wavered from his political commitments, and he was — as many speakers at the event testified — a wonderful person, down to earth, warm and outgoing.

Some years ago, Arjun Jayadev and I recorded a long interview with Jim. INET has put video of the interview online. (The videos are somewhat abridged; you can read the full transcript here. ) I think the interview managed to capture Jim’s broader outlook as well as his economics interests. (Well, some of them — his interests were very broad!) He also has some very interesting things to say about the origins of radical economics as a distinct body of thought in the 1970s. I think the videos are well worth watching, if you want to get a sense (or a reminder) of what Jim Crotty was all about.

I wrote a piece on his work in 2016, to go along with the interviews. That piece focuses on his argument for taking Keynes seriously as a socialist, the argument which later became his last published work, Keynes against Capitalism. (There is an earlier draft that circulated within the UMass economics department, which I think makes the argument more clearly than the published book does.)

For this event, Arjun and I wrote an article on Jim, talking more about what his teaching meant for us and how one might carry his vision forward. It will be published in an upcoming special issue of the Review of Radical Political Economics, along with a number of other pieces on Jim’ thought and work. Here are some excerpts from our contribution. You can read the whole thing here, if you’re interested.

 

 

“If Keynes were Alive Today…”: Reflections on Jim Crotty

by Arjun Jayadev and J. W. Mason

Jim Crotty’s ECO 710 was for us, as for hundreds of UMass grad students over the past 40 years, the starting point for systematic thought about the economy as a whole. In this he was, like all the great teachers, presenting not so much any particular technique or ideas as himself as a model – a touchstone to go back to when you hit a dead end, and a living example of how to be a serious economist-in-the-world. The content of the class varied over the years, but it usually involved a close reading of The General Theory, with a focus on its three great advances— fundamental uncertainty, liquidity preference and effective demand.

Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of Jim’s pedagogy and scholarship, almost alone among economists we have known, was his ability to synthesise these two thinkers in ways that gave equal weight to both, that placed them in conversation rather than in tension. Crotty’s Marx anticipates Minsky, while his Keynes is a political radical – a socialist – in ways that few others have recognized.

Perhaps his most profound contribution to both traditions was the brilliant 1985 article “The Centrality of Money, Credit, and Financial Intermediation in Marx’s Crisis Theory” (Crotty 1985). There, he developed the idea that the Marxian vision of capitalist crises could only be understood in terms of the development of the credit and the financial system – that it was only via financial commitments that a fall in the profit rate could lead to an abrupt crisis rather than just a slower pace of accumulation. His reconstruction of a vision of the credit system that may either dampen or amplify disruptions to the underlying process of production suggests that Marx anticipated the ideas about financial fragility later developed in the Post Keynesian tradition. With a critical difference: While Minsky has finance calling the tune, in the Marx-Crotty version the ultimate source of instability is in the real world of labor and capital.

For us, Jim’s most important work came in four areas. The first was the interplay of real and financial instability in capitalist crises, as in the 1985 article and his work after 2008. Second was the shifting relationship between shareholders and managers in the governance of corporations. Third was his insistence on the importance of fundamental uncertainty for macroeconomic theory – if we imagine one phrase in Jim’s voice, it is “we simply do not know.” Last, chronologically, but certainly not least, was his rehabilitation of Keynes’ socialist politics – a socialist Keynes to go with his Minskyan Marx.

Most of Crotty’s published work fits within the broad post-Keynesian tradition. But his earlier and stronger commitment was to Marx. In a series of papers in the 1970s with Raford Boddy he put class conflict and imperialism front and centre in the analysis of contemporary capitalism, exploring Marxian crisis theory and what it could illuminate about contemporary macroeconomic problems. From the mid-1980s onward, his published work no longer used an explicitly Marxist framework, and the name Keynes appears much more often than that of Marx. But this was a matter of shifting focus and circumstances rather than any more fundamental re-evaluation. In a conversation with us in 2016, he described Marx as: “clearly the more brilliant social scientist and thinker and philosopher” of the two, “with a much more ambitious project, with clearer and deeper political roots.” And yet, he added: “I am writing a book about Keynes.”

Inflation Came Down, and Team Transitory Was Right

Line goes down, and up. Last week, I wrote out a post arguing that the inflation problem is largely over, and the Fed had little to do with it. Yesterday, the new CPI numbers were released and they showed a sharp rise in inflation — a 4 percent rate over the past three months, compared with 2 percent when I wrote the piece.

Obviously, I’m not thrilled about this. It would be easier to make the arguments I would like to make if inflation were still coming down. But it doesn’t really change the story. Given that the spike last month is entirely energy, with growth in other prices continuing to slow, almost everyone seems to agree that it has nothing to do with demand conditions in the US, or anything the Fed has been doing or ought to do.

Here is an updated version of the main figure from the piece. You can see the spike at the far right – that’s the numbers released yesterday. You can also see that it is all energy costs (the pink bar). Everything else is still coming down.

Here is a table presenting the same data, but now comparing the high inflation of June 2021-June2022 with the lower inflation of the past yer. The last column shows how much each category has contributed to the change in inflation between the two periods. As you can see, the fall in inflation is all about goods, especially energy and cars. Services, which is where you’d expect to see any effects of a softening labor market, have not so far contributed to disinflation.

One thing the figure brings out is that we have not simply had a rise and then fall in inflation over the past couple of years. We’ve had several distinct episodes of rising prices. The first, in the second half of 2020, was clearly driven by reopening and pandemic-related shifts in spending. (One point Arjun and I make in our supply-constraints article is that big shifts in the composition of spending lead to higher prices on average.) The next episode, in the second half of 2021, was all about motor vehicles. The third episode, in the first half of 2022, was energy and food prices, presumably connected to the war in Ukraine. Finally, in later 2022 and early this year, measured inflation was all driven by rising housing costs.

Even though they may all show up as increases in the CPI, these are really four distinct phenomena. And none of them looks like the kind of inflation the Fed claims to be fighting. Energy prices may continue to rise, or they may not — I really have no idea.  But either way, that’s not a sign of an overheated economy.

It’s the supply side. Of course I am not the only one making this point. Andrew Elrod had a nice piece in Jacobin recently, making many of the same arguments. I especially like his conclusion, which emphasizes that this is not just a debate about inflation and monetary policy. If you accept the premise that spending in the economy has been too high, and workers have too much bargaining power, that rules out vast swathes of the progressive political program. This is something I also have written about.

Mike Konczal makes a similar argument in a new issue brief, “Inflation is Down. It’s a Supply-Side Story.” He looks at two pieces of evidence on this: different regression estimates of the Phillips curve relationship between unemployment and inflation, and second, expenditure and price changes across various categories of spending. I admit I don’t find the regression analysis very compelling. What it says is that a model that used past inflation to predict future inflation fit the data pretty well for 2020-2022, but over predicted inflation this year. I’m not sure this tells us much except that inflation was rising in the first period and falling in the second.

The more interesting part, to me, is the figure below. This shows quantities and prices for a bunch of different categories of spending. What’s striking about this is the negative relationship for goods (which, remember, is where the disinflation has come from.)

It is literally economics 101 that when prices and quantities move together, that implies a shift in demand; when they move in opposite directions, that implies a shift in supply. To put it more simply, if auto prices are falling even while people are buying more automobiles, as they have been, then reduced demand cannot be the reason for the price fall.

Larry Summers, in a different time, called this an “elementary signal identification point”: the sign the price increases are driven by demand is that “output and inflation together are above” their trend or previous levels. (My emphasis.) Summers’ point in that 2012 article (coauthored with Brad DeLong) was that lower output could not, in itself, be taken as a sign of a fall in potential. But the exact same logic says that a rise in prices cannot, by itself, be attributed to faster demand growth. The demand story requires that rising prices be accompanied by rising spending. As Mike shows, the opposite is the case.

In principle, one might think that the effect of monetary policy on inflation would come through the exchange rate. In this story, higher interest rates make a country’s assets more attractive to foreign investors, who bid up the price of its currency. A stronger currency makes import prices cheaper in terms of the domestic currency, and this will lower measured inflation. This is not a crazy story in principle, and it does fit a pattern of disinflation concentrated in traded goods rather than services. As Rémi Darfeuil points out in comments, some people have been crediting the Fed with US disinflation via this channel. The problem for this story is that the dollar is up only about 4 percent since the Fed started hiking — hardly enough to explain the scale of disinflation. The deceleration in import prices is clearly a matter of global supply conditions — it is also seen in countries whose currencies have gotten weaker (as the linked figure itself shows).

Roaring out of recession. I’ve given a couple video presentations on these questions recently. One, last Friday, was for Senate staffers. Amusingly —to me anyway — the person they had to speak on this topic  last year was Jason Furman. Who I imagine had a rather different take. The on Monday I was on a panel organized by the Groundwork Collaborative, comparing the economic response to the pandemic to the response to the financial crisis a decade ago. That one is available on zoom, if you are interested. The first part is a presenation by Heather Boushey of the Council of Economic Advisors (and an old acquaintance of mine from grad school). The panel itself begins about half an hour in, though Heather’s presentation is of course also worth listening to.

 

[Thanks to Caleb Crain for pointing out a mistake in an earlier version of this post.]

At Barron’s: Inflation Is Falling. Don’t Thank the Fed

(I write a monthly opinion piece for Barron’s. This one was published there in September. My previous pieces are here.)

You wouldn’t necessarily guess it from the headlines, but we may soon be talking about inflation in the past tense. After peaking at close to 10% in the summer of 2022, inflation has fallen even faster than it rose. Over the past three months inflation, as measured by the CPI, has been slightly below the Federal Reserve’s 2% target. Nearly every other measure tells a similar story.

Predicting the future is always risky. But right now, it seems like the conversation about how to fix the inflation problem is nearing its end. Soon, we’ll be having a new debate: Who, or what, should get credit for solving it?

The Fed is the most obvious candidate. Plenty of commentators are already giving it at least tentative credit for delivering that elusive soft landing. And why not? Inflation goes up. The central bank raises interest rates. Inflation goes back down. Isn’t that how it’s supposed to work? 

The problem is, monetary policy does not work through magic. The Fed doesn’t simply tell private businesses how much to charge. Higher interest rates lead to lower prices only by reducing demand. And so far, that doesn’t seem to have happened – certainly not on a scale that could explain how much inflation has come down.  

In the textbook story, interest rates affect prices via labor costs. The idea is that businesses normally set prices as a markup over production costs, which consist primarily of wages. When the Fed raises rates, it discourages investment spending — home construction and business spending on plant and equipment — which is normally financed with credit. Less investment means less demand for labor, which means higher unemployment and more labor market slack generally. As unemployment rises, workers, with less bargaining power vis-a-vis employers, must accept lower wages. And those lower wages get passed on to prices.

Of course this is not the only possible story. Another point of view is that tighter credit affects prices through the demand side. In this story, rather than businesses producing as much as they can sell at given costs, there is a maximum amount they can produce, often described as potential output. When demand rises above this ceiling, that’s when prices rise. 

Either way, the key point — which should be obvious, but somehow gets lost in macro debates — is that prices are determined by real conditions in individual markets. The only way for higher rates to slow down rising prices, is if they curtail someone’s spending, and thereby production and employment. No business — whether it’s selling semiconductors or hamburgers — says “interest rates are going up, so I guess I’ll charge less.” If interest rates change their pricing decisions, it has to be through some combination of fall in demand for their product, or in the wages they pay.

Over the past 18 months, the Fed has overseen one of the fast increases in short-term interest rates on record. We might expect that to lead to much weaker demand and labor markets, which would explain the fall in inflation. But has it?

The Fed’s rate increases have likely had some effect. In a world where the Federal Funds rate was still at zero, employment and output might well be somewhat higher than they are in reality. Believers in monetary-policy orthodoxy can certainly find signs of a gently slowing economy to credit the Fed with. The moderately weaker employment and wage growth of recent months is, from this point of view, evidence that the Fed is succeeding.

One problem with pointing to weaker labor markets as a success story, is that workers’ bargaining power matters for more than wages and prices. As I’ve noted before, when workers have relatively more freedom to pick and choose between jobs, that affects everything from employment discrimination to productivity growth. The same tight labor markets that have delivered rapid wage growth, have also, for example, encouraged employers to offer flexible hours and other accommodations to working parents — which has in turn contributed to women’s rapid post-pandemic return to the workplace. 

A more basic problem is that, whether or not you think a weaker labor market would be a good thing on balance, the labor market has not, in fact, gotten much weaker.

At 3.8%, the unemployment rate is essentially unchanged from where it was when at the peak of the inflation in June 2022. It’s well below where it was when inflation started to rise in late 2020. It’s true that quits and job vacancy rates, which many people look to as alternative measures of labor-market conditions, have come down a bit over the past year. But they still are extremely high by historical standards. The prime-age employment-population ratio, another popular measure of labor-market conditions, has continued to rise over the past year, and is now at its highest level in more than 20 years. 

Overall, if the labor market looks a bit softer compared with a year ago, it remains extremely tight by any other comparison. Certainly there is nothing in these indicators to explain why prices were rising at an annual rate of over 10% in mid-2022, compared with just 2% today.

On the demand side, the case is, if anything, even weaker. As Employ America notes in its excellent overview, real gross domestic product growth has accelerated during the same period that inflation has come down. The Bureau of Economic Analysis’s measure of the output gap similarly shows that spending has risen relative to potential output over the past year. For the demand story to work, it should have fallen. It’s hard to see how rate hikes could be responsible for lower inflation during a period in which people’s spending has actually picked up. 

It is true that higher rates do seem to have discouraged new housing construction. But even here, the pace of new housing starts today remains higher than at any time between 2007 and the pandemic. 

Business investment, meanwhile, is surging. Growth in nonresidential investment has accelerated steadily over the past year and a half, even as inflation has fallen. The U.S. is currently seeing a historic factory boom — spending on new manufacturing construction has nearly doubled over the past year, with electric vehicles, solar panels and semiconductors leading the way. That this is happening while interest rates are rising sharply should raise doubts, again, about how important rates really are for business investment. In any case, no story about interest rates that depends on their effects on investment spending can explain the recent fall in inflation. 

A more disaggregated look at inflation confirms this impression. If we look at price increases over the past three months compared with the period of high inflation in 2021-2022, we see that inflation has slowed across most of the economy, but much more so in some areas than others.

Of the seven-point fall in inflation, nearly half is accounted for by energy, which makes up less than a tenth of the consumption basket. Most of the rest of the fall is from manufactured goods. Non-energy services, meanwhile, saw only a very modest slowing of prices; while they account for about 60% of the consumption basket, they contributed only about a tenth of the fall in inflation. Housing costs are notoriously tricky; but as measured by the shelter component of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, they are rising as fast now as when inflation was at its peak.

Most services are not traded, and are relatively labor-intensive; those should be the prices most sensitive to conditions in U.S. product and labor markets. Manufactured goods and especially energy, on the other hand, trade in very internationalized markets and have been subject to well-publicized supply disruptions. These are exactly the prices we might expect to fall for reasons having nothing to do with the Fed. The distribution of price changes, in other words, suggests that slowing inflation has little to do with macroeconomic conditions within the US, whether due to Fed action or otherwise.

If the Fed didn’t bring down inflation, what did? The biggest factor may be the fall in energy prices. It’s presumably not a coincidence that global oil prices peaked simultaneously with U.S. inflation. Durable-goods prices have also fallen, probably reflecting the gradual healing of pandemic-disrupted supply chains. A harder question is whether the supply-side measures of the past few years played a role. The IRA and CHIPS Act have certainly contributed to the boom in manufacturing investment, which will raise productive capacity in the future. It’s less clear, at least to me, how much policy contributed to the recovery in supply that has brought inflation down.

But that’s a topic for another time. For now it’s enough to say: Don’t thank the Fed.


(Note: Barron’s, like most publications I’ve worked with, prefers to use graphics produced by their own team. For this post, I’ve swapped out theirs for my original versions.)

At Barron’s: Who Is Winning the Inflation Debate?

(I write a monthly opinion piece for Barron’s. This one was published there in July. My previous pieces are here.)

Is inflation fundamentally a macroeconomic problem – a sign of an overheated economy, an excess of aggregate demand over supply? Or is it – at least sometimes – better understood in microeconomic terms, as the result of producers in various markets setting higher prices for their own reasons? 

Not long ago, almost all economists would have picked door No. 1. But in the postpandemic world the choice isn’t so clear.

The answer matters for policy. If the problem is too much spending, then the solution is to bring spending down — and it doesn’t matter which spending. This is what interest rate hikes are intended to do. And since wages are both the largest source of demand and the biggest single component of costs, bringing down spending entails higher unemployment and slower wage growth. Larry Summers – perhaps the most prominent spokesman for macroeconomic orthodoxy – predicted that it would take five years of above-5% unemployment to get inflation under control. He was widely criticized for it. But he was just giving the textbook view.

If inflation is driven by dynamics in particular markets, on the other hand, then an across-the-board reduction in demand isn’t necessary, and may not even be helpful. Better to address the specific factors driving price increases in those markets – ideally through relieving supply constraints, otherwise through targeted subsidies or administrative limits on price increases. The last option, though much maligned as “price controls,” can make sense in cases where supply or demand are particularly inelastic. If producers simply cannot increase output (think, automakers facing a critical chip shortage) then prices have little value as a signal, so there’s not much cost to controlling them.

The debate between these perspectives has been simmering for some time. But it’s reached a boil around Isabella Weber, a leading exponent of the microeconomic perspective. Her recent work explores the disproportionate importance of a few strategic sectors for inflation. Weber has probably done more than any other economist to bring price controls into the inflation-policy conversation.

A recent profile of Weber in the New Yorker describes how she has become a lightning rod for arguments about unconventional inflation policy, with some of her critics going well beyond the norms of scholarly debate.  

This backlash probably owes something to the fact that Weber is, biographically, a sort of anti-Summers. While he is a former Treasury secretary and Harvard president who comes from academic royalty (two of his uncles won economics Nobels), she is young, female, and teaches at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, a department best-known for harboring heterodox, even radical, thinkers. (Full disclosure: I got my own economics doctorate there, though well before Weber was hired.) Some prominent economists embarrassed themselves in their rather obvious professional jealousy, as the New Yorker recounts.

But even more than jealousy, what may explain the ferocity of the response is the not unjustified sense that the heterodox side is winning.

Yes, central banks around the world are hiking interest rates – the textbook response to rising prices. But the debate about inflation policy is much broader than it used to be, in both the U.S. and Europe.

Weber herself served on the committee in Germany that devised the country’s “price brake” for natural gas, which is intended to shield consumers and the broader economy from rising energy prices while preserving incentives to reduce consumption. In the wake of the New Yorker piece, there was a furious but inconclusive debate about whether a “brake” is the same as a “control.” But this misses the point. The key thing is that policy is targeted at prices in a particular market rather than at demand in general.

Such targeted anti-inflation measures have been adopted throughout Europe. In France, after President Emmanuel Macron pledged to do “whatever it takes” to bring down inflation, the country effectively froze the energy prices facing households and businesses through a mix of direct controls and subsidies. Admittedly, such an approach is easier in France because a very large share of the energy sector is publicly owned. In effect, the French measures shifted the burden of higher energy costs from households and businesses to the government. The critical point, though, is that measures like this don’t make sense as inflation control unless you see rising prices as coming specifically from a specific sector (energy in this case), as opposed to an economy-wide excess of demand over supply. 

Even economists at the International Monetary Fund – historically the world’s biggest cheerleader for high rates and austerity in response to inflation – acknowledge that these unconventional policies appear to have significantly reduced inflation in Europe. This is so even though they have boosted fiscal deficits and GDP, which by orthodox logic should have had the opposite effect.

The poster child for the “whatever it takes” approach to inflation is probably Spain, which over the past two years has adopted a whole raft of unconventional measures to limit price increases. Since June 2022, there has been a hard cap on prices in the  wholesale electricity market; this “Iberian exception” effectively decouples electricity prices in Spain from the international gas market. Spain has also adopted limits on energy price increases to retail customers, increased electricity subsidies for low-income households, reduced the value-added tax for energy, and instituted a windfall profits tax on energy producers. While the focus has been on energy prices (not surprisingly, given the central role of energy in European inflation) they have also sought to protect households from broader price increases with measures like rent control and reduced transit fares. Free rail tickets aren’t the first thing that comes to mind when you think of anti-inflation policy, but it makes sense if the goal is to shift demand away from scarce fossil fuels.

This everything-plus-the-kitchen-sink approach to inflation is a vivid illustration of why it’s so unhelpful to frame the debate in terms of conventional policy versus price controls. While some of the Spanish measures clearly fit that description, many others do not. A more accurate, if clunkier, term might be “targeted price policy,” covering all kinds of measures that seek to influence prices in particular markets rather than the economy-wide balance of supply and demand.

More important than what we call it is the fact that it seems to be working. Through most of the postpandemic recovery, inflation in Spain was running somewhat above the euro-area average. But since summer 2022 – when the most stringent energy-price measures went into effect – it has been significantly below it. Last month, Spain saw inflation fall below 2%, the first major European country to do so.

Here in the U.S., direct limits on price rises are less common. But it’s not hard to find examples of targeted price policy. The more active use of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, for example, is a step toward managing energy prices more directly, rather than via economy-wide spending. The Russian sanctions regime — though adopted, obviously, for other reasons — also has a significant element of price regulation. 

The Inflation Reduction Act is often lampooned as having nothing to do with its name, but that’s not quite right. Instead, it reflects a very different vision of inflation control than what you’d get from the textbooks. Rather than seeking to reduce aggregate demand through fiscal contraction, it envisions massive new public outlays to address problems on the supply side. It’s a sign of the times that a closely divided Congress could pass a vast expansion in federal spending as an anti-inflation measure. 

Meanwhile, there’s growing skepticism about how much rate hikes have actually achieved. Inflation has declined steeply without Summers’ prescribed three years of over-5% unemployment, or indeed any noticeable rise in unemployment at all. By connventional measures, demand is no weaker than it was a year ago. If it’s interest rates that brought down inflation, how exactly did they do so?

To be sure, hardly anyone in either camp correctly predicted the 2021 surge in inflation, or its equally dramatic decline over the past year. So it’s too soon to declare victory yet. But for the moment, it’s Team Weber and not Team Summers that seems to be gaining ground.

 

Revisiting the Euro Crisis

The euro crisis of the 2010s is well in the past now, but it remains one of the central macroeconomic events of our time.  But the nature of the crisis remains widely misunderstood, not only by the mainstream but also — and more importantly from my point of view — by economists in the heterodox Keynesian tradition. In this post, I want to lay out what I think is the right way of thinking about the crisis. I am not offering much in the way of supporting evidence. For the moment, I just want to state my views as clearly as possible. You can accept them or not, as you choose. 

During the first 15 years of the euro, a group of peripheral European countries experienced an economic boom followed by a crash, with GDP, employment and asset prices rising and then falling even more rapidly. As far as I can tell, there are four broad sets of explanations on offer for the crises in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain starting in 2008. 

(While the timing is the same as the US housing bubble and crash, that doesn’t mean they are directly linked — however different they are in other respects, most of the common explanations for the European crisis I’m aware of locate its causes primarily within Europe.s)

The four common stories are:

1. External imbalances. The fixed exchange rate created by the euro, plus some mix of slow productivity growth in periphery and weak demand growth in core led to large trade imbalances within Europe. The financial expansion in the periphery was the flip side of a causally prior current account deficit.

2. Monetary policy. Both financial instability and external imbalances were result of Europe being far from an optimal currency area. Trying to carry out monetary policy for the whole euro area inevitably produced a mix of stagnation in the core and unsustainable credit expansion in the periphery, since a monetary stance that was too expansionary for Greece, Spain etc. was too tight for Germany.

3. Fiscal irresponsibility. The root of the crisis in peripheral countries was the excessive debt incurred by their own governments. The euro was a contributing factor since it led to an excessive convergence of interest rates across Europe, as markets incorrectly believed that peripheral debt was now as safe as debt of core countries.

4. Banking crises. The booms and busts in peripheral Europe were driven by rapid expansions and then contractions of credit from the domestic banking systems, with dynamics similar to that in credit booms in other times and places. The specific features of the euro system did not play any significant role in the development of the crisis, though they did importantly shape its resolution. 

In my view, the fourth story is correct, and the other three are wrong. In particular, trade imbalances within Europe played no role in the crisis. In this post, I am going to focus on why I think the external balances story is wrong, since that’s the one that people who are on my side intellectually seem most inclined toward.

As I see it, there were two distinct causal chains at work, both starting with a credit boom in the peripheral countries.

easy credit —> increased aggregate spending —> increased output and income —> increased imports —> growing trade deficit —> net financial inflows

easy credit —> rising asset prices —> bubble and/or fraud —> asset price crash —> insolvent banks —> financial crisis

That the two outcomes — external imbalances and banking crisis — went together is not a coincidence. But there is no causal link from the first to the second. Both rather are results of the same underlying cause. 

Yes, in the specific conditions of the late-2000s euro area, a credit boom led to an external deficit. But in principle it is perfectly possible to have a a credit-financed asset bubble and ensuing crisis in a country with a current account surplus, or one with current account balance, or in a closed economy. What was specific to the euro system was not the crisis itself, but the response to it. The reason the euro made the crisis worse because it prevented national governments from taking appropriate action to rescue their banking systems and stabilize demand. 

This understanding is, I think, natural if we take a “money view” of the crisis, thinking in terms of balance sheets and the relationship between income and expenditure. Here is the story I would like to tell.

Following the introduction of the euro in 1998, there were large credit expansions in a number of European countries. In Spain, for example, bank credit to the non-financial economy increased from 80 percent of GDP in 1997 to 220 percent of GDP in 2010. Banks were more willing to make loans, at lower rates, on more favorable terms, with less stringent collateral requirements and other lending standards. Borrowers were more willing to incur debt. The proximate causes of this credit boom may well have been connected to the euro in various ways. European integration offered a plausible story for why assets in Spain might be valued more highly. The ECB might have followed a less restrictive policy than independent central banks would have (or not — this is just speculation). But the euro was in no way essential to the credit boom. Similar booms have happened in many other times and places in the absence of currency unions — including, of course, in the US at roughly the same time.

In most of these countries, the bulk of the new credit went toward speculative real estate development. (In Greece there was also a big increase in public-sector borrowing, but not elsewhere.) The specifics of this lending don’t matter too much. 

Now for the key point. What happens when a a Spanish bank makes a loan? In the first step the bank creates two new assets – a deposit for the borrower, and the loan for itself. Notice that this does not require any prior “saving” by a third party. Expansion of bank credit in Spain does not require any inflow of “capital” from Germany or anywhere else.

Failure to grasp is an important source of confusion. Many people with a Keynesian background talk about endogenous money, but fail to apply it consistently. Most of us still have a commodity money or loanable-funds intuition lodged in the back of our brains, especially in international contexts. Terms like “capital flows” and “capital flight” are, in this respect, unhelpful relics of a gold standard world, and should probably be retired.

Back to the story. After the deposits are created, they are spent, i.e. transferred to someone else in return, in return for title to an asset or possession of a commodity or use of a factor of production. If the other party to this transaction is also Spanish, as would usually be the case, the deposits remain in the Spanish banking system. At the aggregate level, we see an increase in bank credit, plus an increase in asset prices and/or output, depending on what the loan finances, amplified by any ensuing wealth effect or multiplier.

To the extent that the loans finance production – of beach houses in Galicia say — they generate incomes. Some fraction of new income is spent on imported consumption goods. Probably more important, production requires imported intermediate and capital goods. By both these channels, an increase in Spanish output results in higher imports. If the credit boom leads Spain to grow faster relative to its trade partners — which it will, unless they are experiencing similar booms — then its trade balance will move toward deficit.

(That changes in trade flows are primarily a function of income growth, and not of relative prices, is an important item in the Keynesian catechism.)

Now let’s turn to the financial counterpart of this deficit. A purchase of a German good by a Spanish firm requires a bank deposit to be transferred from the Spanish firm to the German firm. Since the German firm presumably doesn’t hold deposits in a Spanish bank, we’ll see a reduction in deposits in the Spanish banking system and an equal increase in deposits in the German banking system. The Spanish banks must now replace those deposits with some other funding, which they will seek in the interbank market. So in the aggregate the trade deficit will generate an equal financial inflow — or, better said, a new external liability for the Spanish banking system. 

The critical thing to notice here is that these new financial positions are generated mechanically by the imports themselves. It is simply replacing the deposit funding the Spanish banks lost via payment for the imports. The financial inflow must take place for the purchase to happen — otherwise, literally, the importer’s check won’t clear. 

But what if there is an autonomous inflow – what if German wealth owners really want to hold more assets in Spain? Certainly that can happen. These kinds of cross-border flows may well have contributed to the credit boom in the periphery. But they have nothing to do with the trade balance. By definition, autonomous financial flows involve offsetting financial transactions, with no implications for the current account. 

Suppose you are a German pension fund that would like to lend money to a Spanish firm, to take advantage of the higher interest rates in Spain. Then you purchase, let’s say, a bond issued by Spanish construction company. That shows up as a new liability for Spain in the international investment position. But the Spanish firm now holds a deposit in a German bank, and that is an equal new asset for Spain. (If the Spanish firm transfers the deposit to a Spanish bank in return for a deposit there, as I suppose it probably would, then we get an asset for Spain in the interbank market instead.) The overall financial balance has not changed, so there is no reason for the current account to change either. Or as this recent BIS paper puts it, “the high correlations between gross capital inflows and outflows are overwhelmingly the result of double-entry bookkeeping”. (The importance of gross rather than net financial positions for crises is a pint the bIS has emphasized for many years.)

It may well happen that the effect of these offsetting financial transactions is to raise incomes in Spain (the contractor got better terms than it would at home) and/or banking-system liquidity (thanks to the fact that the Spanish banking system gets the deposits without the illiquid loan). This may well contribute to a rise in incomes in Spain and thus to a rise in the trade deficit. But this seems to me to be a second-order factor. And in any case we need to be clear about the direction of causality here — even if the financial inflows did indirectly cause the higher deficit, they did not in any sense finance it. The trade balances of Germany and Spain in no way affect the ability of German institutions to buy Spanish debt, any more than a New Yorker’s ability to buy a house in California depends on the trade balance between those states.

At this point it’s important to bring in the TARGET2 system. 

Under normal conditions, when someone wants to take a cross-border position within the euro systems the other side will be passively accommodated somewhere in the banking system. But if a net position develops for whatever reason, central banks can accommodate it via TARGET2 balances. Concretely, let’s say soon in Spain wants to make a payment to someone in Germany, as above. This normally involves the reduction of a Spanish bank’s liability to the Spanish entity and the increase in a German bank’s liability to the German entity. To balance this, the Spanish bank needs to issue some other liability (or give up an asset) while the German bank needs to acquire some asset. Normally, this happens by the Spanish bank issuing some new interbank liability (commercial paper or whatever) which ends up, perhaps via various intermediaries, as an asset for a German bank. But if foreign banks are unwilling to hold the liabilities of Spanish banks (as happened during the crisis) the Spanish bank can instead borrow from its own central bank, which in turn can create two offsetting positions through TARGET2 — a liability to the euro system, and a reserve asset (a deposit at the ECB). Conceptually, rather than the transfer of the despot being offset by a liability fro the Spanish to the German bank the interbank market, it’s now offset by a debt owed by the Spanish bank to its own national central bank, a debt between the central banks in the TARGET2 system, and a claim by the German bank against its own national central bank.

In this sense, within the euro system TARGET2 balances stand at the top of the hierarchy of money. Just as non financial actors settle their accounts by transfers of deposits at commercial banks, and banks settle their balances by transfers of deposits at the central bank, central banks settle any outstanding balances via TARGET2. It plays the same role as gold in the old gold standard system. Indeed, I sometimes think it would be better to describe the euro system as the “TARGET2 system.” 

There is however a critical difference between these balances and gold. Gold is an asset for central bank; TARGET2 balances are a liability. When a payment is made from country X to country Y in the euro area, with no offsetting private payment, the effect on central bank balance sheets is NOT a decrease in the assets of the central bank of X (and increase in the assets of the central bank of Y) but an increase in the liabilities of the central bank of X. This distinction is critical because assets are finite and can be exhausted, but new liabilities can be issued indefinitely. The automatic financing of payments imbalances through the TARGET2 system seems like an obscure technical detail but it transforms the functioning of the system. Every national central bank in the euro area is in effect in the situation of the Fed. It can never be financially constrained because all its obligations can be satisfied with its own liabilities. 

People are sometimes uncomfortable with this aspect of the euro system and suggest that there must be some limit on TARGET2 balances. But to me, this fundamentally misunderstands the nature of a single currency. What makes “the euro” a single currency is not that it has the same name, or that the bills look the same in the various countries, or even that it trades at a fixed ratio of one for one. What makes it a single currency is that a bank deposit in any euro-area country will settle a debt in any other euro-area country, at par. TARGET2 balances have to be unlimited to guarantee the this will be the case — in other words, for there to be a single currency at all.

(In this sense, we should not have been so fixed on the question of being “in” versus “out” of the euro. The relevant question is the terms on which payments can be made from one bank account another, for settlement of which obligations.)

The view of the euro crisis in which trade imbalances finance or somehow enable credit expansion is dependent on a loanable-funds perspective in which incomes are fixed, money is exogenous and saving is a binding constraint. It’s implicitly based on a model of the gold standard in which increased lending impossible without inflow of reserves — something that was not really true in practice even in the high gold standard era and isn’t true even in principle today. What’s strange is that many people who accept this view would reject those premises – if they realized they were applying them.

Meanwhile, on the domestic side, abundant credit was bidding up asset prices and encouraging investment that was, ex post, unwise (and in some case fraudulent, though I have no idea how important this was quantitatively). When asset prices collapsed and the failure of investment projects to generate the expected returns became clear, many banks faced insolvency. There was a collapse in activity in the real-estate development and construction activity that had driven the boom and, as banks tightened credit standards across the board, in other credit-dependent activity; falling asset values further reduced private spending; all these effects were amplified by the usual multiplier. The result was a steep fall in output and employment.

I don’t believe there’s any sense in which a sudden stop of cross-border lending precipitated the crisis. Rather, the “nationalization” of finance came after. Banks tried to limit their cross-border positions came only once the crisis was underway, as it became clear that there would be no systematic euro-wide response to insolvent banks, so that any rescues or bailouts would be by national governments for their own banks.

Credit-fueled asset booms and crashes have happened in many times and places. There was nothing specific to the euro system about the property booms of the 2000s. What was specific to the euro system was what happened next. Thanks to the euro, the affected governments could not respond as developed country governments have always responded to financial crises since World War II — by recapitalizing insolvent banks and shifting public budgets toward deficit until private demand recovers. 

The constraints on euro area governments were not an inevitable feature of system, in this view. Rather, they were deliberately imposed through discretionary choices by the authorities in order to use the crisis to advance a substantive political agenda.

 

Industrial Policy: Further Thoughts

(Cross-posted from my Substack. If you like this blog, why not subscribe to that too?)

I just returned from Bangalore, where Arjun and I spent an intense 10 days working on our book, and on another project which I’ll be posting about in due time. I’d never been to India before, and it was … a lot. It took me a while to put my finger on the overarching impression: not chaos, or disorder, but incongruity — buildings and activities right on top of each other that, in an American context, you’d expect to be widely separated in space or time. That, and the constant buzz of activity, and crowds of people everywhere. In vibes, if not in specifics, it felt like a city of back-to-back Times Squares. I imagine that someone who grew up there would find an American city, even New York, rather dull.

It’s a city that’s gone from one million people barely a generation ago to 8 million today, and is still growing. There’s a modern subway, clean, reliable and packed, with the open-gangway cars New York is supposed to switch to eventually. It opened 15 years ago and now has over 60 stations — I wish we could build like that here. But the traffic is awesome and terrifying. Every imaginable vehicle — handpainted trucks, overloaded and dangling with tassels and streamers; modern cars; vans carrying sheep and goats; the ubiquitous three-wheeled, open-sided taxis; the even more ubiquitous motorbikes, sometimes carrying whole families; and of course the wandering cows — with no stoplights or other traffic control to speak of, and outside the old central city, no sidewalks either. Crossing the street is an adventure.

I realize that I am very far from the first person to have this reaction to an Indian city. Some years ago Jim Crotty was here for some kind of event, and the institution he was visiting provided him with a driver. Afterwards, he said that despite all the dodging and weaving through the packed roads he never felt anything but safe and comfortable. But, he added, “I would never get into a car with that guy in the United States. He’d be so bored, he’d probably fall asleep.”

Varieties of industrial policy. The panel I moderated on industrial policy is up on YouTube, though due to some video glitch it is missing my introductory comments. Jain Family Institute also produced a transcript of the event, which is here.

It was a very productive and conversation; I thought people really engaged with each other, and everyone had something interesting to contribute. But it left me a bit puzzled: How could people who share broad political principles, and don’t seem to disagree factually about the IRA, nonetheless arrive at such different judgements of it?

I wrote a rather long blog post trying to answer this question.

The conclusion I came to was that the reason Daniela Gabor (and other critics, though I was mostly thinking of Daniela when I wrote it) takes such a negative view of the IRA is that she focuses on the form of interface between the state and production it embodies: subsidies and incentives to private businesses. This approach accepts, indeed reinforces, the premise that the main vehicle for decarbonization is private investment. Which means that making this investment attractive to private business owners, for which profitability is a necessary but not sufficient condition. If you don’t think the question “how do we solve this urgent social problem” should be immediately translated into “how do we ensure that business can make money solving the problem,” then the IRA deserves criticism not just on the details but for its fundamental approach.

I am quite sympathetic to this argument. I don’t think anyone on the panel would disagree with it, either normatively as a matter of principle or descriptively as applied to the IRA. And yet the rest of us, to varying degrees, nonetheless take a more positive view of the IRA than Daniela does.

The argument of the post was that this is because we focus more on two other dimensions. First, the IRA’s subsidies are directed to capital expenditure itself, rather than financing; this already distinguishes it from what I had thought of as derisking. And second the IRA’s subsidies are directed toward narrowly specified activities (e.g. battery production) rather than to some generic category of green or sustainable investment, as a carbon tax would be. I called this last dimension “broad versus fine-grained targeting,” which is not the most elegant phrasing. Perhaps I would have done better to call it indicative versus imperative targeting, tho I suppose people might have objected to applying the latter term to a subsidy. In any case, if you think the central problem is the lack of coordination among private investment decisions, rather than private ownership s such, this dimension will look more important.

Extending the matrix. The post got a nice response; it seems like other people have been thinking along similar lines. Adam Tooze restated the argument more gracefully than I did:

Mason’s taxonomy focuses attention on two axes: how far is industrial policy driven by direct state engagement v. how far does it operate at arms-length through incentives? On the other hand, how far is green industrial policy broad-brush offering general financial incentives for green investment, as opposed to more fine-grained focus on key sectors and technologies?

Skeptics like Daniel Gabor, Mason suggests, can be seen as placing the focus on the form of policy action, prioritizing the question of direct versus indirect state action. Insofar as the IRA operates by way of tax incentives it remains within the existing, hands-off paradigm. A big green state would be far more directly involved. Those who see more promise in the IRA would not disagree with this judgment as to form but would insist that what makes the IRA different is that it engages in relatively fine-grained targeting of investment in key sectors.

My only quibble with this is that I don’t think it’s just two dimensions — to me, broad versus narrow and capital expenditure versus financing are two independent aspects of targeting.

I should stress that I wrote the post and the table to clarify the lines of disagreement on the panel, and in some similar discussions that I’ve been part of. They aren’t intended as a general classification of industrial policy, which — if it can be done at all — would require much more detailed knowledge of the range of IP experiences than I possess.

Tooze offers his own additional dimensions:

  • The relationship of economic policy to the underlying balance of class forces.
  • The mediation of those forces through the electoral system …
  • The agenda, expertise & de facto autonomy of state institutions…

These are certainly interesting and important questions. But it seems to me that they are perhaps questions for a historian rather than for a participant. They will offer a very useful framework for explaining, after the fact, why the debate over industrial policy turned out the way that it did. But if one is engaged in politics, one can’t treat the outcome one is aiming at as a fact to be explained. Advocacy in a political context presumes some degree of freedom at whatever decision point it is trying to influence. One wouldn’t want to take this too far: It’s silly to talk about what policies “should” be if there is no one capable of adopting them. But it seems to me that by participating in a political debate within a given community, you are accepting the premise, on some level, that the outcome depends on reason and not the balance of forces.

That said, Tooze’s third point, about state institutions, I think does work in an advocacy context, and adds something important to my schema. Though it’s not entirely obvious which way it cuts. Certainly a lack of state capacity — both administrative and fiscal — was an important motivation for the original derisking approach, and for neoliberalism more broadly. But as Beth Popp Berman reminds us, simple prohibitions and mandates are often easier to administer than incentives. And if the idea is to build up state capacity, rather than taking it as a fact, then that seems like an argument for public ownership.

I’ve thought for years that this was a badly neglected question in progressive economics. We have plenty of arguments for public goods — why the government should ensure that things are provided in different amounts or on different terms than a hypothetical market would. We don’t have so many arguments for why, and which, things should be provided by the public. The same goes for public ownership versus public provisions, with the latter entailing non-market criteria and intrinsic motivation, with the civil service protections that foster it.

The case for public provisioning. One group of people who are thinking about these questions seriously are Paul Williams and his team at  the Center for Public Enterprise. (Full disclosure: I sit on CPE’s board.) Paul wrote a blog post a couple weeks ago in response to some underinformed criticisms of public housing, on why public ownership is an important part of the housing picture. Looking at the problem from the point of view of the local government that are actually responsible for housing in the US, the problem looks a bit different than the perspective of national governments that I implicitly adopted in my post.

The first argument he makes for public ownership is that it economizes on what is often in practice the binding constraint on affordable housing, the fixed pot of federal subsidies. A public developer doesn’t need the substantial profit margin a private developer would expect; recovering its costs is enough. Public ownership also allows for, in my terms, more fine-grained targeting. A general program of subsidies or inclusionary zoning (like New York’s 421a tax credits) will be too lax in some cases, leaving affordable units on the table, and too stringent in others, deterring construction. A public developer can assess on a case by case basis the proportion and depth of affordable units that a given project can support. A third argument, not emphasized here but which Paul has made elsewhere, is that developing and operating public housing builds up the expertise within the public sector that is needed for any kind of transformative housing policy.

It’s telling but not surprising to see the but-this-one-goes-to-11 response to Paul’s post that all we need for more housing is land-use deregulation. Personally, I am quite sympathetic to the YIMBY position, and I know Paul is too. But it doesn’t help to oversell it. The problems of “not enough housing” and “not enough affordable housing” do overlap, but they are two distinct problems.

A somewhat different perspective on these questions comes from this report by Josh Wallack at Roosevelt, on universal childcare as industrial policy. Childcare doesn’t have some of the specific problems that industrial policy is often presented as the solution to – it doesn’t require specialized long-lived capital goods, or coordination across multiple industries. But, Wallack argues, it shares the essential element: We don’t think that demand on its own will call forth sufficient capacity, even with subsidies, so government has to intervene directly on the supply side, building up the new capacity itself. I’ve always thought that NYC’s universal pre-K was a great success story (both my kids benefited from it) that should be looked to as a model of how to expand the scope of the public sector. So I’m very glad to see this piece, which draws general lessons from the NYC experience. Wallack himself oversaw implementation of the program, so the report has a lot more detail on the specifics of implementation than you normally get. Very worth reading, if you’re at all interested in this topic.

One area where Wallack thinks the program could have done better is democratic participation in the planning process. This could be another dimension for thinking about industrial policy. A more political practice-oriented version of Tooze’s bullets would be to ask to what extent a particular program broadens or narrows the space for popular movements to shape policy. Of course the extent to which this is feasible, or even desirable, depends on the kind of production we’re talking about. In Catalyst, Matt Huber and Fred Stafford argue, persuasively in my view, that there is a tension between the need for larger-scale electricity transmission implied by the transition away from carbon, and the preference of some environmentalists for a more decentralized, locally-controlled energy system. I am less persuaded by their argument that the need for increased transmission and energy storage rule out a wholesale shift toward renewables; here as elsewhere, it seems to me, which obstacles you regard as insurmountable depend on where you want to end up.

The general point I would make is that politics is not about a final destination, but about a direction of travel. Whether or not we could have 100 percent renewable electricity — or 100 percent public ownership of housing, or whatever — is not so important. What matters is whether we could have substantially more than we have now.

On other topics.

Showing the inconsistencies between conservative free-market economics and actual conservative politics is, in my experience, much harder in practice than it seems like it ought to be, at least if you want to persuade people who actually hold one or both. So it’s fun to see Brian Callaci’s (excellent) arguments against non-compete agreements in ProMarket, the journal of the ur-Chicago Stigler Center.

Garbriel Zucman observes that the past few years have seen very large increases in the share of income at the very top, which now seems to have passed its gilded age peak.  Does this mean that I and others have been wrong to stress the gains for low-wage workers from tight post-pandemic labor markets? I don’t think so — both seem to be true. According to Realtime Inequality, the biggest income gains of the past two years have indeed gone to the top 1 percent and especially its top fractiles. But the next biggest gains have gone to the bottom half, which has outpaced the top 10 percent and comfortably outpaced the middle 40 percent. Their income numbers don’t further break out the bottom half, but given that the biggest wage gains have come a the very bottom, I suspect this picture would get even stronger if we looked further down the distribution.

This may well be a general pattern. The incomes that rise fastest in an economic boom are those that come from profits, on the one hand, and flexible wages that are strongly dependent on labor-market conditions on the other. People whose income comes from less commodified labor, with more socially embedded wage-setting, will be relatively insulated from swings in demand, downward but also upward. This may have something to do with the negative feeling about the economy among upper-middle class households that Emily Stewart writes about in Vox.

I’m still hoping to write something more at length about the debates around “greedflation” and price controls. But in the meantime, this from Servaas Storm is very good.

What I’ve been reading. On the plane to Bangalore, I finished Enzo Traverso’s Fire and Blood. I suppose it’s pretty common now to talk about the period from 1914 to 1945 as a unit, a second Thirty Years War. Traverso does this, but with the variation of approaching it as a European civil war — a war within a society along lines of class and ideology, rather than a war between states. A corollary of this, and arguably the animating spirit of the book, is the rehabilitation of anti-fascism as a positive political program. It’s a bit different from the kind of narrative history I usually read; the organization is thematic rather than chronological, and the focus is on culture — there are no tables and hardly any numbers, but plenty of reproductions of paintings. It reads more like a series of linked essays than a coherent whole, but what it lacks in overarching structure in makes up with endless fascinating particulars. I liked it very much.

 

Varieties of Industrial Policy

I was on a virtual panel last week on industrial policy as derisking, in response to an important new paper by Daniela Gabor. For me, the conversation helped clarify why people who have broadly similar politics and analysis can have very different feelings about the Inflation Reduction Act and similar measures elsewhere. 

There are substantive disagreements, to be sure. But I think the more fundamental issue is that while we, inevitably, discuss the relationship between the state, the organization of production and private businesses in terms of alternative ideal types, the actual policy alternatives are often somewhere in the fuzzy middle ground. When we deal with a case that resembles one of our ideal types in some ways, but another in other ways, our evaluation of it isn’t going to depend so much on our assessment of each of these features, but on which of them we consider most salient.

I think this is part of what’s going on with current discussions of price controls. There has been a lot of heated debate following Zach Carter’s New Yorker profile of Isabella Weber on whether the energy price regulation adopted by Germany can be described as a form of price controls. Much of this criticism is clearly in bad faith. But the broad space between orthodox inflation-control policy, on the one hand, and comprehensive World War II style price ceilings, on the other, means that there is room for legitimate disagreement about how we describe policies somewhere in the middle. If you think that the defining feature of price regulation is that government is deciding how much people should pay for particular commodities, you will probably include the German policy. If you’re focused on other dimensions of it, you might not.

I am not going to say more about this topic now, though I hope to return to it in the future. But I think there is something parallel going on in the derisking debate.

People who talk about industrial policy mean some deliberate government action to shift the sectoral composition of output — to pick winners and losers, whether at the industry or firm level. But of course, there are lots of ways to do this. (Indeed, as people sometimes point out, governments are always doing this in some way — what distinguishes “industrial policy” is that it is visible effort to pick different winners.) Given the range of ways governments can conduct industrial policy, and their different implications for larger political-economy questions, it makes sense to try to distinguish different models. Daniela Gabor’s paper was a very helpful contribution to this.

The problem, again, is that models are ideal types — they identify discrete poles in a continuous landscape. We need abstractions like this — there’s no other way to talk about all the possible variation on the multiple dimensions on which we can describe real-world situations. If the classification is a good one, it will pick out ways in which variation on one dimension is linked to variation on another. But in the real world things never match up exactly; which pole a particular point is closer to will depend on which dimension we are looking at.

In our current discussions of industrial policy, four dimensions seem most important — four questions we might ask about how a government is seeking to direct investment to new areas. Here I’ll sketch them out quickly; I’ll explore them in a bit more detail below.

First is ownership — what kind of property rights are exercised over production? This is not a simple binary. We can draw a slope from for-profit private enterprises, to non-profits, to publicly-owned enterprises, to direct public provision.

Second is the form of control the government exercises over investment (assuming it is not being carried out directly by the public sector). Here the alternatives are hard rules or incentives, the latter of which can be positive (carrots) or negative (sticks).

The third question is whether the target of the intervention is investment in the sense of creation of new means of production, or investment in the sense of financing. 

The last question is how detailed or fine-grained the intervention is — how narrowly specified are the activities that we are trying to shift investment into and out of?

“Derisking” in its original sense had specific meaning, found in the upper right of the table. The idea was that in lower-income countries, the binding constraint on investment was financing. Because of limited fiscal capacity (and state capacity more generally), the public sector should not try to fill this gap directly, but rather to make projects more attractive to private finance. Offering guarantees to foreign investors would make efficient use of scarce public resources, while trusting profit motive to guide capital to socially useful projects.

In terms of my four dimensions, this combines private ownership and positive incentives with broad financial target.

The opposite case is what Daniela calls the big green state. There we have public ownership and control of production, with the state making specific decisions about production on social rather than monetary criteria. 

For the four of us on the panel, and for most people on the left, the second of these is clearly preferable to the first. In general, movement from the upper right toward the lower left is going to look like progress.

But there are lots of cases that are off the diagonal. In general, variation on each of these dimensions is independent of variation on the others. We can imagine real world cases that fall almost anywhere within the grid.

Say we want more wind and solar power and less dirty power.

We could have government build and operate new power plants and transmission lines, while buying out and shutting down old ones.

We could have a public fund or bank that would lend to green producers, along with rules that would penalize banks for holding assets linked to dirty ones.

We could have regulations that would require private producers to reduce carbon emissions, either setting broad portfolio standards or mandating the adoption of specific technologies.

Or we could have tax credits or similar incentives to encourage voluntary reductions, which again could be framed in a broad, rules-based way or incorporate specific decisions about technologies, geography, timelines, etc.

As we evaluate concrete initiatives, the hard question may not be where we place them in this grid nor on where we would like to be, but how much weight we give to each dimension. 

The neoliberal consensus was in favor of private ownership and broad, rules-based incentives, for climate policy as in other areas. A carbon price is the canonical example. For those of us on the panel, again, the consensus is  that the lower left corner is first best. But at the risk of flattening out complex views, I think the difference between let’s say Daniela on one side and Skanda Amarnath (or me) on the other is the which dimensions we prioritize. Broadly speaking, she cares more about movement in horizontal axis, as I’ve drawn the table, with a particular emphasis on staying off of the right side. While we care more about vertical axis, with a particular preference for the bottom row. 

Some people might say it doesn’t matter how you manage investment, as long as you get the clean power. But here I am completely on (what I understand to be) Daniela’s side. We can’t look at policy in isolation, but have to see it as part of a broader political economy, as part of the relationship between private capital and the state. How we achieve our goals here matters for more than the immediate outcome, it shifts the terrain on which next battle will be fought. 

But even if we agree that the test for industrial policy is whether it moves us toward a broader socialization of production, it’s not always easy to evaluate particular instances.

Let’s compare two hypothetical cases. In one, government imposes strict standards for carbon emissions, so many tons per megawatt. How producers get there is up to them, but if they don’t, there will be stiff fines for the companies and criminal penalties for their executives. In the second case, we have a set of generous tax credits. Participation is voluntary, but if the companies want the credits they have to adopt particular technologies on a specified schedule, source inputs in a specified way, etc. 

Which case is moving us more in the direction of the big green state? The second one shifts more expertise and decision making into the public sector, it expands the domain of the political not just to carbon emissions in general but to the organization of production. But unlike the first, it does not challenge the assumption that private profitability is the first requirement of any change in the organization of production. It respects capital-owners’ veto, while the first does not. 

(Neoliberals, it goes without saying, would hate both — the first damages the business climate and discourages investment, while the second distorts market more.) 

Or what about if we have a strict rule limiting the share of “dirty” assets in the portfolios of financial institutions? This is the path Europe seems to have been on, pre IRA. In our discussion, Daniela suggested that this might have been better, since it had more of an element of discipline — it involved sticks rather than just subsidy carrots. To Skanda or me, it looks weak compared with the US approach, both because it focuses on financing rather than real investment, and because it is based on a broad classification of assets rather than trying to identify key areas to push investment towards. (It was this debate that crystallized the idea in this post for me.)

Or again, suppose we have a sovereign wealth fund that takes equity stakes in green energy producers, as Labour seems to be proposing in the UK. How close is this to direct public provision of power?

In the table, under public ownership, I’ve distinguished public provision from public enterprise. The distinction I have in mind is between a service that is provided by government, by public employees, paid for out of the general budget, on the one hand; and entities that are owned by the government but are set up formally as independent enterprises, more or less self-financing, with their own governance, on the other. Nationalizing an industry, in the sense of taking ownership of the existing businesses, is not the same as providing something as a public service. To some people, the question of who owns a project is decisive. To others, a business where the government is the majority stakeholder, but which operates for profit, is not necessarily more public in a substantive sense than a business  that isprivately owned but tightly regulated.

Moving to the right, government can change the decisions of private businesses by drawing sharp lines with regulation — “you must”; “you must not” — or in a smoother way with taxes and subsidies. A preference for the latter is an important part of the neoliberal program, effectively shifting the trading -off of different social goals to the private sector; there’s a good discussion of this in Beth Popp Berman’s Thinking Like an Economist. On the other side, hard rules are easier to enforce and better for democratic accountability — everybody knows what the minimum wage is. Of course there is a gray area in between: a regulation with weak penalties can function like a tax, while a sufficiently punitive tax is effectively a regulation.

Finally, incentives can be positive or negative, subsidies or taxes. This is another point where Daniela perhaps puts more stress than I might. Carrots and sticks, after all, are ways of getting the mule to move; either way, it’s the farmer deciding which way it goes. That said, the distinction certainly matters if fiscal capacity is limited; and of course it matters to business, who will always want the carrot.

On the vertical axis, the big distinction is whether what is being targeted is investment in the sense of the creation of new means of production, or investment in the sense of financing. Let’s step back a bit and think about why this matters.

There’s a model of business decision-making that you learn in school, which is perhaps implicitly held by people with more radical politics. Investment normally has to be financed; it involves the creation of real asset and a liability, which is held somewhere in financial system. You build a $10 million wind turbine, you issue a $10 million bond. Which real investment is worth doing, then, will depend on the terms on which business can issue liabilities. The higher the interest rate on the bond, the higher must be the income from the project it finances, to make it worth issuing.

Business, in this story, will invest in anything whose expected return exceeds their cost of capital; that cost of capital in turn is set in financial markets. From this point of view, a subsidy or incentive to holders of financial assets is equivalent to one to the underlying activity. Telling the power producer “I’ll give you 10 percent of the cost of the turbine you built” and telling the bank “I’ll give you 10 percent of the value of the bond you bought” are substantively the same thing. 

As I said, this is the orthodox view. But it also implicitly underlies an analysis that talks about private capital without distinguishing between “capital” as a quantity of money in financial form, and “capital” as the concrete means of production of some private enterprise. If you don’t think that the question “what factory should I build” is essentially the same as the question “which factory’s debt should I hold?”, then it doesn’t make sense to use the same word for both.

Alternatively, we might argue that the relevant hurdle rate for private investment is well above borrowing costs and not very sensitive to them. Investment projects must pass several independent criteria and financing is often not the binding constraint. The required return is not set in financial markets; it is well above the prevailing interest rate and largely insensitive to it. If you look at survey evidence of corporate investment decisions, financing conditions seem to have very little to do with it.  If this is true, a subsidy to an activity is very different from a subsidy to financial claims against that activity. (A long-standing theme of this blog is the pervasive illusion by which a claim on an income from something is equated with the thing itself.)

Daniela defines derisking as, among other things, “the production of inevitability”, which I think is exactly right as a description of the (genuine and important) trend toward endlessly broadening the range of claims that can be held in financial portfolios. But I am not convinced it is a good description of efforts to encourage functioning businesses to expand in certain directions. Even though we use the word “invest” for both.

Conversely, when financing is a constraint, as it often is for smaller businesses and households, it takes the form of being unable to access credit at all, or a hard limit on the quantity of financing available (due to limited collateral, etc.), rather than the price of it. One lesson of the Great Recession is that credit conditions matter much more for small businesses than for large ones. So to the extent that we want to work through financing, we need to be targeting our interventions at the sites where credit constraints actually bind. (The lower part of the top row, in terms of my table.) A general preference for green assets, as in Europe, will not achieve much; a program to lend specifically for, say, home retrofits might. 

This leads to the final dimension, what I am calling fine-grained versus broad or rules-based interventions. (Perhaps one could come up with better labels.) While for some people the critical question is ownership, for others — including me — the critical question is market coordination versus public coordination. It is whether we, as the government, are consciously choosing to shift production in specific ways, or whether we are setting out broad priorities and letting prices and the profit motive determine what specific form they will take. This — and this may be the central point of this post — cuts across the other criteria. Privately-owned firms can have their investment choices substantively shaped by the public. Publicly-owned firms can respond to the market. 

Or again, yes, one way of distinguishing incentives is whether they are positive or negative. But another is how precise they are — in how much detail they specify the behavior that is to be punished or rewarded. A fine-grained incentive effectively moves discretion about specific choices and tradeoffs to the entity offering the incentive. A broad incentive leaves it to the receiver. An incentive conditioned on X shifts more discretion to the public sector than an incentive conditioned on any of X, Y or Z, regardless of whether the incentive is a positive or negative. 

Let me end with a few concrete examples.

In her paper, Daniela draws a sharp distinction between the IRA and CHIPS Act, with the former as a clear example of derisking and the latter a more positive model. The basis for this is that CHIPS includes penalties and explicit mandates, while the IRA is overwhelmingly about subsidies.7. This is reflected in the table by CHIPS’ position to the left of the IRA. (Both are areas rather than points, given the range of provisions they include.) From another point of view, this is a less salient distinction; what matters is that they are both fairly fine-grained measures to redirect the investment decisions of private businesses. If you focus on the vertical axis they don’t look that different.

Similarly, Daniela points to things like the ECB’s climate action plan, which creates climate disclosure requirements for bank bond holdings and limits the use of carbon-linked bonds as collateral, as a possible alternative to the subsidy approach. It is true that these measures impose limits and penalties on the private sector, as opposed to the bottomless mimosas of the IRA. But the effectiveness of these measures would require a strong direct link from banks’ desired bond holdings, to the real investment decisions of productive businesses. I am very skeptical of such a link; I doubt measures like this will have any effect on real investment decisions at all. To me, that seems more salient.

The key point here is that Daniela and I agree 100% both that private profit should not be the condition of addressing public needs, and that the public sector does need to redirect investment toward particular ends. Where we differ, I think, is on which of those considerations is more relevant in this particular case.

If the EPA succeeds in imposing its tough new standards for greenhouse gas emissions from power plants, that will be an example of a rules-based rather than incentive-based policy. This is not exactly industrial policy — it leaves broad discretion to producers about how to meet the standards. But it is still more targeted than a carbon tax or permit, since it limits emissions at each individual plant rather than allowing producers to trade off lower emissions one place for higher emissions somewhere else.

Finally, consider the UK Labour Party’s proposal for a climate-focused National Wealth Fund, or similar proposals for green banks elsewhere. The team at Common Wealth has a very good discussion of how this could be a tool for actively redirecting credit as part of a broader green industrial policy. But other supporters of the idea stress ownership stakes as an end in itself. This is similar to the language one hears from advocates of social wealth funds: The goal is to replace private shareholders with the government, without necessarily changing anything about the companies that the shares are a claim on. 8 From this point of view, there’s a critical difference between whether the fund or bank has an equity stake in the businesses it supports or only makes loans.

To me, that doesn’t matter. The important question is does it acts as an investment fund, buying the liabilities (bonds or shares or whatever) of established business for which there’s already a market? Or does it function as more of a bank, lending directly to smaller businesses and households that otherwise might not have access to credit? This would require a form of fine-grained targeting, as opposed to buying a broad set of assets that fit some general criteria.9 Climate advocate showing to shape the NWF need to think carefully about whether it’s more important for it to get ownership stakes or for it to target its lending to credit-constrained businesses.

My goal in all this is not to say that I am right and others are wrong (though obviously I have a point of view). My goal is to try to clarify where the disagreements are. The better we understand the contours of the landscape, the easier it will be to find a route toward where we want to go.