The Slack Wire

What Do Changing Estimates of Potential Output Tell Us?

I want to revisit the question we were debating last spring, about the space for additional expansionary policy in the US. How far is the economy from potential, in whatever relevant sense? This post will be the first in a series, and there will be a paper sometime in the fall.

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One way to approach the question is to ask another one: How much of the shortfall in output relative to the pre-2008 trend is the result of the recession, as opposed to “structural” factors that would have led to slower growth in any case? The two questions are somewhat independent: Even if demographic factors, let’s say, were tending to reduce laborforce growth, there’s no reason in principle that couldn’t be overcome by stronger demand. On the other hand, even if we reject the idea that the recession itself resulted from a decline in productive capacity, it’s possible that a persistent demand shortfall could over time damage capacity in a way that can’t subsequently be repaired by restoring demand. Still, an output shortfall that is due to the collapse in spending in 2008-2009 is more likely to be reversed by increased spending, than one that is due to other causes.

Laurence Ball, DeLong and Summers, and Fatas and Summers, among others, try to answer the question of how much the decline in output is due to the recession, by comparing pre-recession estimates of potential output with more recent ones. A change in potential output attributable to changes in current output is often referred to as “hysteresis.” Changing forecasts are a reasonable measure of hysteresis: If predictable that structural factors like the changing age mix of the population were going to lead to slower growth, then it should in fact have been predicted; so systematic deviations from the forecasts must reflect something else. Now, if you are committed to the view that demand effects are strictly short-run, then a persistent deviation from trend necessarily reflects supply-side developments of some kind. But as long as we have no strong priors either way, the evolution of estimated potential over time should be informative about how much of the output shortfall is the result of the recession and how much is due to other causes.

The three papers do different versions of this exercise and all find that (1) the bulk of the slowdown in growth since 2008 is due to the recession, or at least was not predicted prior to it; and (2) there is no tendency for output to return to potential, rather, changes in current output are fully passed through to later estimates of potential. Here’s a simple version. The figure shows the CBO’s 10-year forecasts of potential GDP from 2002 through this year, along with historical GDP. (All are in 2009 dollars.)

potentialGDPThe horizontal axis shows the year the estimate is for. The different lines show estimates made in different years. So the purple line at the top is the ten-year forecast of potential output published in January 2002, while the pink line at the bottom is the ten-year forecast published in January of this year. What do we see?

First, there has been a systematic reduction in estimates of potential. While there are some upward adjustment in the early years, more recently all the adjustments have been downward. The estimates of 2015, for example, first made in 2005, has been reduced every year since then. Same goes for 2016 and all future years. These are not random errors. And they are not small: the estimate of 2016 potential GDP made by the CBO in 2016 was more than 10 percent greater than the estimate this year.

Second, there is no tendency for output to return to earlier estimates of potential. While the official output gap has gotten much smaller since 2009, this is entirely a result of the downward adjustment of potential; there has been no closing of the gap between output and potential estimated in 2009 or earlier years.

On the other hand, these revisions can’t be all due to the recession, since the CBO significantly reduced its forecasts of potential output growth over 2005-2007. The largest revision comes in 2009, after the first year of recession. (Again, these are January forecasts.) But there had already been significant downward adjustments at that point. (Especially, as we’ll see in the net post, in predicted laborforce growth.) Still, most of the deviation from trend reflects post-recession adjustments in potential.

It breaks down like this. Current GDP is 12 percent below what you would have predicted based on long-run growth rates up to 2008. The CBO puts the current output gap at around 2 percent. This reflects the fact that the CBO currently considers full employment to be 4.8 percent unemployment, slightly below the current level. The remainder of the 12-point gap represents a slowdown in potential output growth. How much of that was predicted in 2005? Less than none – at that time, the CBO’s forecast for 2015 output was 1.5 percent above the long run trend. By January 2008 — the last pre-recession forecast — the CBO had revised its 2015 forecast down by about 4 percent, to 3 percent below trend. In 2009, after the first year of the recession, it revised it down another 3 points, to 6 percent below trend. And over the past seven years it’s been revised down seven more times for a total of 5 points, to reach the current estimate of potential of around 10 percent below trend. So about a quarter of the 12 point gap between current GDP and its long-run trend was predicted before the recession.

Now the fact that the slowdown was not predicted before the recession, doesn’t prove that it is due to the recession. It does, I think, allow us to reject things like “aging of the baby boomers” as the main explanation for the shortfall: Something that easily predictable, would have been predicted. (And as we’ll see in a later post, demographic changes cannot in fact explain the slowdown in output growth— the effect of aging on labor force participation, while real, is too small to explain the actual decline, and it’s offset by a comparable but less-discussed shift in the other direction — the declining share of households with young children.) It is, however, possible that some new development (a “shock” in the jargon, but I don’t like this term) just happened to reduce the economy’s productive capacity at the same time it was recovering from the recession.

In their 2012 article, DeLong and Summers argue that the absence of wage and price growth is strong evidence against this latter explanation:

It is possible that these revisions reflect not … hysteresis but merely the recognition that previous forecasts of potential output were too high. However, an elementary signal extraction point rebuts this interpretation. … one should not reduce one’s estimate of potential output if lower-than-previously-expected levels of production are associated with lower-than-previously-expected levels of inflation. … Typically, the bad news that leads to a marking down of potential output is not news that output is lower than, but rather news that output and inflation together are above, their anticipated co-movement line. Such news is not in evidence.

Over the past four years inflation has only fallen further, so the point presumably still holds.

So if we take the unpredicted decline in potential as a measure of the effects of the recession, we’re left with something like this: Of the gap between actual US GDP and its pre-2008 trend, 75 percent is due to the continuing effects of the recession, 25 percent to other factors. That seems like a reasonable place to start.

I Don’t See Any Method At All

I’ve felt for a while that most critiques of economics miss the mark. They start from the premise that economics is a systematic effort to understand the concrete social phenomena we call “the economy,” an effort that has gone wrong in some way.

I don’t think that’s the right way to think about it. I think McCloskey was right to say that economics is just what economists do. Economic theory is essentially closed formal system; it’s a historical accident that there is some overlap between its technical vocabulary and the language used to describe concrete economic phenomena. Economics the discipline is to the economy the sphere of social reality as chess theory is to medieval history: The statement, say, that “queens are most effective when supported by strong bishops” might be reasonable in both domains, but studying its application in the one case will not help at all in applying it in in the other. A few years ago Richard Posner said that he used to think economics meant the study of “rational” behavior in whatever domain, but after the financial crisis he decided it should mean the study of the behavior of the economy using whatever methodologies. (I can’t find the exact quote.) Descriptively, he was right the first time; but the point is, these are two different activities. Or to steal a line from my friend Suresh, the best way to think about what most economists do is as a kind of constrained-maximization poetry. Makes no more sense to ask “is it true” than of a haiku.

One consequence of this is, as I say, that radical criticism of the realism or logical consistency of orthodox economics do nothing to get us closer to a positive understanding of the economy. How is a raven unlike a writing desk? An endless number of ways, and enumerating them will leave you no wiser about either corvids or carpentry. Another consequence, the topic of the remainder of this post, is that when we turn to concrete economic questions there isn’t really a “mainstream” at all. Left critics want to take academic orthodoxy, a right-wing political vision, and the economic policy preferred by the established authorities, and roll them into a coherent package. But I don’t think you can. I think there is a mix of common-sense opinions, political prejudices, conventional business practice, and pragmatic rules of thumb, supported in an ad hoc, opportunistic way by bits and pieces of economic theory. It’s not possible to deduce the whole tottering pile from a few foundational texts.

More concretely: An economics education trains you to think in terms of real exchange — in terms of agents who (somehow or other) have come into possession of a bundle of goods, which they trade with each other. You can only use this framework to make statements about real economic phenomena if they are understood in terms of the supply side — if economic outcomes are understood in terms of different endowments of goods, or different real uses for them. Unless you’re in a position to self-consciously take another perspective, fitting your understanding of economic phenomena into a broader framework is going to mean expressing it as this kind of story, about the limited supply of real resources available, and the unlimited demands on them to meet real human needs. But there may be no sensible story of that kind to tell.

More concretely: What are the major macroeconomic developments of the past ten to twenty years, compared, say, with the previous fifty? For the US and most other developed countries, the list might look like:

– low and falling inflation

– low and falling interest rates

– slower growth of output

– slower growth of employment

– low business investment

– slower growth of labor productivity growth

– a declining share of wages in income

If you pick up an economics textbook and try to apply it to the world around you, these are some of the main phenomena you’d want to explain. What does the orthodox, supply-side theory tell us?

The textbook says that lower inflation is normally the result of a positive supply shock — an increase in real resources or an improvement in technology. OK. But then what do we make of the slowdown in output and productivity?

The textbook says that, over the long run interest rates must reflect the marginal product of capital — the central bank (and monetary factors in general) can only change interest rates in the short run, not over a decade or more. In the Walrasian world, the interest rate and the return on investment are the same thing. So a sustained decline in interest rates must mean a decline in the marginal product of capital.

OK. So in combination with the slowdown in output growth, that suggests a negative technological shock. But that should mean higher inflation. Didn’t we just say that lower inflation implies a positive technological shock?

Employment growth in this framework is normally determined by demographics, or perhaps by structural changes in labor markets that change the effective labor supply. Slower employment growth means a falling labor supply — but that should, again, be inflationary. And it should be associated with higher wagess: If labor is becoming relatively scarce, its price should rise. Yes, the textbook combines a bargaining mode of wage determination for the short run with a marginal product story for the long run, without ever explaining how they hook up, but in this case it doesn’t matter, the two stories agree. A fall in the labor supply will result in a rise in the marginal product of labor as it’s withdrawn from the least productive activities — that’s what “marginal” means! So either way the demographic story of falling employment is inconsistent with low inflation, with a falling wage share, and with the showdown in productivity growth.

Slower growth of labor productivity could be explained by an increase in labor supply  — but then why has employment decelerated so sharply? More often it’s taken as technologically determined. Slower productivity growth then implies a slowdown in innovation — which at least is consistent with low interest rates and low investment. But this “negative technology shock” should again, be inflationary. And it should be associated with a fall in the return to capital, not a rise.

On the other hand, the decline in the labor share is supposed to reflect a change in productive technology that encourages substitution of capital for labor, robots and all that. But how is this reconciled with the fall in interest rates, in investment and in labor productivity? To replace workers with robots, someone has to make the robots, and someone has to buy them. And by definition this raises the productivity of the remaining workers.

Which subset of these mutually incompatible stories does the “mainstream” actually believe? I don’t know that they consistently believe any of them. My impression is that people adopt one or another based on the question at hand, while avoiding any systematic analysis through violent abuse of the ceteris paribus condition.

To paraphrase Leijonhufvud, on Mondays and Wednesdays wages are low because technological progress has slowed down, holding down labor productivity. On Tuesdays and Thursdays wages are low because technological progress has sped up, substituting capital for labor. Students may come away a bit confused but the main takeaway is clear: Low wages are the result of inexorable, exogenous technological change, and not of any kind of political choice. And certainly not of weak aggregate demand.

Larry Summers in this actually quite good Washington Post piece, at least is no longer talking about robots. But he can’t completely resist the supply-side lure: “The situation is worse in other countries with more structural issues and slower labor-force growth.” Wait, why would they be worse? As he himself says, “our problem today is insufficient inflation,” so what’s needed “is to convince people that prices will rise at target rates in the future,” which will “require … very tight markets.” If that’s true, then restrictions on labor supply are a good thing — they make it easier to generate wage and price increases. But that is still an unthought.

I admit, Summers does go on to say:

In the presence of chronic excess supply, structural reform has the risk of spurring disinflation rather than contributing to a necessary increase in inflation.  There is, in fact, a case for strengthening entitlement benefits so as to promote current demand. The key point is that the traditional OECD-type recommendations cannot be right as both a response to inflationary pressures and deflationary pressures. They were more right historically than they are today.

That’s progress, for sure — “less right” is a step toward “completely wrong”. The next step will be to say what his argument logically requires. If the problem is as he describes it then structural “problems” are part of the solution.

How Should We Count Debt Owed to the Fed?

How big is US government debt? If you google this question looking for a number, your first hit is likely to be a site like this, giving a figure (as of June 2016) around $19.5 trillion, or a bit over 100 percent of GDP. That’s the total public debt as reported by the US Treasury.

If you are reading this blog, you probably don’t take that number at face value. You probably know the preferred number is federal debt held by the public. As of June 2016, that’s $14 trillion, or a bit over 70 percent of GDP. That’s the number more likely to be used in academic papers or by official bodies. (Wikipedia seems to mix the two numbers at random.)

Debt held by the public is meant to exclude debt the federal government owes to itself.  For the US, that means subtracting the $2.8 trillion in debt held by the Social Security trust fund, the $1.7 trillion held by by federal employee retirement funds, and $1 trillion various other federal trust funds. It leaves in, however, the debt held by the Federal Reserve.

I wonder how many people, the sort of people who read this blog, know that. I wonder how many people know that today, one fifth of the federal debt “held by the public” is actually held by the Fed. I certainly didn’t, until recently.

Here’s a breakdown of federal debt by who owns it. Total public debt is the whole thing. Debt held by the public is the heavy black line. Debt held by the Fed is the blue area just below that line. (Source is various series from the Financial Accounts.)

debt-holdingsAs you can see, the Fed accounts for quite a bit of federal debt holdings — $2.5 trillion, 16 percent of GDP, or 19 percent of debt “held by the public”.

There’s some other interesting stuff in there. Most obviously, the dramatic fall in the share of debt held by households and nonfinancial businesses (the orange area), and rise of the foreign share (yellow). In the 1950s Abba Lerner could talk with some plausibility about the demand-boosting effects of federal interest payments to households; but it’s silly to suggest — as some modern Lernerians do — that higher rates might boost demand through this channel today. The declining share of the financial sector (red) is also interesting. I’ve suggested that this was a factor in rising liquidity premiums and financial fragility. If, as Zoltan Pozsar argues, we’re seeing a lasting shift from “market liquidity” to “base liquidity” this may include a permanently larger share of federal debt on bank balance sheets.

But what about the Fed share? Should it be counted in debt held by the public, or not? I can’t find the reference at the moment, but I believe there is no consistent rule on this between countries. (As I recall, the UK excludes it.) In any case, the phenomenon of large central bank holdings of government debt is not unique to the US. Here, from the OECD (p. 41), are the shares of government debt held by central banks in various countries:

Screen Shot 2016-06-02 at 9.33.51 AM

If you want to say that debt held by the Fed definitely shouldn’t be counted, I won’t object. After all, any interest earnings on the debt are simply returned to the Treasury at the end of the year, so this debt literally represents payments the government is making to itself. But that’s not what I want to say. To be honest, I can see valid arguments on both sides — yes, the Fed is a part of government just as much as the Social Security Administration; but on the other hand, the Fed’s holdings were acquired in market purchases from the private sector, while the holdings of the various trust funds are nonmarketable securities that exist only as bookkeeping devices for future payments to beneficiaries. And if you think the Fed will reduce its holdings in the near future, then it makes sense to count them for any target you might have for holdings by the private sector. But of course, in that case how much you count them will depend on whether, when and how much you think the Fed will unwind its 2009-2013 balance sheet expansions. And this is my point: There is no true level of the federal debt. The “debt” is not an object out in the world. It is a way of talking about some set of the payment commitments by some set of economic units, sets whose boundaries are inherently arbitrary.

Again, debt “held by the public” does not include the notional debt in the Social Security Trust Fund, or in the various retirement funds for  federal employees. But what about the debt (currently about 5 percent of GDP) held by state and local governments in similar trust funds? Fundamentally, these represent commitments by the federal government to help with pension payments to retired state and local government employees. But this is the same commitment embodied in the Social Security Trust Fund. And on the other hand, the federal government has a vast number of payment commitments to state and local governments — transfers from the federal government make up more than a quarter of total state government revenue. Why count the commitments that happen to be recorded as debt holding in retirement funds as federal debt but not the rest of them?

For that matter, what about the future claims of Social Security recipients? They certainly represent payment commitments by the federal government. Lawrence Kotlikoff thinks there is no difference between the commitment to make future Social Security payments and the commitment to make payments on the debt, so we should add them up and say debt held by the public is over 200 percent of GDP. Other people want to add in public pensions of all kinds. Why not throw in Medicare, too? True, retirement benefits are not marketable, but checking your expected benefits at https://www.ssa.gov/myaccount is not much harder than checking your bank balance online. And for the MMT-inclined, don’t future Social Security benefits have as good a claim to be “net wealth” for the private sector as federal debt, maybe better?

One takeaway from all this is the point eloquently made by Merijn Knibbe, that one of the big problems in the economics profession today is the complete disconnect between theory and measurement. Most public discussions and economic models — and a lot of empirical work for that matter — treat “debt”  as an object that simply exists in the world. (It’s worth noting that the question of how exactly debt is defined, and who it is owed to, does get some attention in undergraduate econ textbooks, but none at all in graduate ones.) It seems to me that the large share of debt held by central banks is a case in point of how we have to make a conscious choice about which commitments we classify as “debt”, and recognize that the best place to draw the line is going to depend on the question we’re asking. We need to treat economic categories like debt not as primitives but as provisional shorthand, and we need to be constantly walking back and forth between our abstractions and the concrete phenomena they are trying to describe. You can’t, it seems to me, do useful scholarship on something like government debt, except on the basis of a deep engagement with the concrete practices and public debates that the term is part of.

More concretely: Whenever you take a functional finance line, someone is going to stand up and start demanding in a prosecutorial tone whether you really think government debt could rise to 10 times or 100 times GDP. How about 1,000 times? a million times? — until you say something noncommittal and move on to the next question (or mute them on Twitter). But of course the answer is, it depends. It depends, first, on the concrete institutional arrangements under which debt is held, which determine both economic impacts and financial constraints, if any.  (For example, whether the debt held by central banks should be counted as held by the public depends on when or if those positions will be unwound.) And it depends, second, on how we are counting debt.

Consider a trust fund holding federal debt. What the federal government has actually committed to is a stream of payments in the future which in turn will allow the fund to fulfill its own payment commitments. Converting that flow of future payments to a liability stock in the present depends on the discount rate we assign to them. But we can follow that same procedure for any future spending, whether or not it is officially recognized as someone’s asset. As Dean Baker likes to say, given that we don’t prefund education, the military, etc., pretty much all government spending could be called an unfunded liability for the federal government. How big a liability depends on the discount rate. If the discount rate is less than the nominal growth rate, then the present value of future spending grows without limit as we consider longer periods.

Here’s an exercise. Let’s go full Kotlikoff and call all future government spending a liability of taxpayers today. Say that federal spending is a constant 20 percent of GDP and nominal growth is 5 percent per year.  If we use the current 10-year Treasury rate of around 2 percent as our discount rate, then the present value of federal spending over the next 20 years works out to, let’s see, $10 quadrillion, or 55,000 percent of GDP. That’s $30 million per person. Whoa. Can I have a Time magazine cover story now? [No I cannot, because I am bad at math. See below.]

So yeah. 20 percent of debt “held by the public” is actually owed to the Fed. An interesting fact which perhaps you did not know.

 

UPDATE: As commenter Matt points out below, the math in the next-to-last paragraph is wrong. The calculation as given yields $110  trillion, a measly 600 percent of GDP. On the other hand, if we stretch it out to the next 30 years, we get nearly $200 trillion, which is 1,000 percent of GDP or more than $600,000 per person. I guess that will do.

Links for June 15, 2016

“Huge foreign demand for Treasuries”. Via Across the Curve, here’s the Wall Street Journal:

The global hunger for U.S. government debt is intensifying as investors seek better returns from the negative yields and record-low rates found in Japan and Europe. On Thursday, an auction of 30-year Treasury debt attracted some of the highest demand ever from overseas buyers…

Thirty-year bonds typically attract a specialized audience, largely pension funds and other investors trying to buy assets to match long-term liabilities. There are few viable alternatives for such buyers around the world. The frenzy of buying has sparked warnings about the potential of large losses if interest rates rise. …

One auction is hardly dispositive, but that huge foreign demand is worth keeping in mind when we think about the US fiscal and external deficits. A point that Ryan Cooper also makes well.

 

You get the debt, I get the cash. When I pointed out Minsky’s take on Trump on this blog a few months ago, there were some doubts. How exactly, did Trump extract equity from his businesses? Why didn’t the other investors sue?  In its fascinating long piece on Trump’s adventures in Atlantic City, the Times answers these questions in great detail. Rread the whole thing. But if you don’t, Trump himself has the tl;dr:

“Early on, I took a lot of money out of the casinos with the financings and the things we do,” he said in a recent interview. “Atlantic City was a very good cash cow for me for a long time.”

 

 

Unto the tenth generation. If you are going to make an argument for Britain leaving the euro, it seems to me that Steve Keen has the right one. The fundamental issue is not the direct economic effects of membership in the EU (which are probably exaggerated in any case.) The issue is the political economy. First, the EU lacks democratic legitimacy, it effectively shifts power away from elected national governments, while Europe-wide democracy remains an empty shell. And second, European institutions are committed to an agenda of liberalization and austerity.

From the other side, we get this:

Screen Shot 2016-06-15 at 9.52.44 PM

I wish I knew where this sort of thing came from. Maybe Brexit would reduce employment in the UK, maybe it wouldn’t — this is not the sort of thing that can be asserted as an unambiguous matter of fact. Whether it’s EU membership or taxes or trade or the minimum wage, everyone claims their preferred policy will lead to higher living standards than the alternatives. Chris Bertram seems like a reasonable person, I doubt that, in general, he wishes suffering on the children of people who see policy questions differently than he does. But on this one, disagreement is impermissible. Why?

 

I like hanging out in coffeehouses. Over at Bloomberg, Noah Smith offers a typology of macroeconomics:

The first is what I call “coffee-house macro,” and it’s what you hear in a lot of casual discussions. It often revolves around the ideas of dead sages — Friedrich Hayek, Hyman Minsky and John Maynard Keynes.

The second is finance macro. This consists of private-sector economists and consultants who try to read the tea leaves on interest rates, unemployment, inflation and other indicators in order to predict the future of asset prices (usually bond prices). It mostly uses simple math, … always includes a hefty dose of personal guesswork.

The third is academic macro. This traditionally involves professors making toy models of the economy — since the early ’80s, these have almost exclusively been DSGE models … most people outside the discipline who take one look at these models immediately think they’re kind of a joke.

The fourth type I call Fed macro…

It’s fair to say a lot of us here in the coffeehouses were pleased by this piece. Obviously, you can quibble with the details of his list. But it gets a couple of big things right. First, the fundamental problem with academic macroeconomics is not that it’s a  study of the concrete phenomena of “the economy” that has gone wrong in some way, but a self-contained activity. The purpose of models isn’t to explain anything, it’s just to satisfy the aesthetic standards of the profession. As my friend Suresh put it once, the best way to think about economics is a kind of haiku with Euler equations. I think a lot of people on the left miss this — they think that you can criticize economic by pointing out some discrepancy with the real world. But that’s like saying that chess is flawed because in medieval Europe there were many more knights than bishops.

The other thing I think Noah’s piece gets right is there is no such thing as “economic orthodoxy.” There are various different orthodoxies — the orthodoxy of the academy, the orthodoxy of business and finance, the orthodoxy of policymakers — and they don’t agree with each other. On some important dimensions they hardly even make contact.

Merijn Knibbe also likes the Bloomberg piece. (He’s doing very good work exploring these same cleavages.) Noah follows up on his blog. Justin Wolfers rejects basically everything taught as macroeconomics in grad school. DeLong makes a distinction between good and bad academic economics which to me, frankly, looks like wishful thinking. Brian Romanchuk has some interesting thoughts on this conversation.

 

Are there really excess reserves? I’ve just been reading Zoltan Pozsar’s Global Money Notes for Credit Suisse. Man they are good. If you’re interested in money, finance, central banks, monetary policy, any of that, you should be reading this guy. Anyway, in this one he makes a provocative argument that I think is right:

Contrary to conventional wisdom, there are no excess reserves – not one penny. Labelling the trillions of reserves created as a byproduct of QE as “excess” was appropriate only until the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) went live, but not after. …

Before the LCR, banks were required to hold reserves only against demand deposits issued in the U.S. … As banks went about their usual business of making loans and creating deposits, they routinely fell short of reserve requirements. To top up their reserve balances, banks with a shortfall of reserves … borrowed fed funds from banks with a surplus of reserves… These transactions comprised the fed funds market.

Under the LCR, banks are required to hold reserves (and more broadly, high-quality liquid assets) not only against overnight deposits, but all short-term liabilities that mature in less than 30 days, regardless of whether those liabilities were issued by a bank subsidiary, a broker-dealer subsidiary or a holding company onshore or offshore …

The idea is this: Under the new Basel III rules, which the US has adopted, banks are required to hold liquid assets equal to their total liabilities due in 30 days or less. This calculation is supposed to include liabilities of all kinds, across all the bank’s affiliates and subsidiaries, inside and outside the US. Most of this requirement must be satisfied with a short list of “Tier I” assets, which includes central bank reserves. So reserves that are excess with respect to the old (effectively moot) reserve requirements, will not be to the extent that they are held to satisfy these new rules.

Pozsar’s discussion of these issues is extremely informative. But his “no one penny” language may be a bit exaggerated. While the exact rules are still being finalized, it looks like current reserve holdings could still be excessive under LCR. Whie banks have to hold unencumbered liquid assets equal to thier short-term liabilities, the fraction that has to be reserves specifically is still being determined — Pozsar suggests the most likely fraction is 15 percent. He gives data for six big banks, four of which hold more reserves than required by that standard — though on the other hand, five of the six hold less total Tier I liquid assets than they will need. (That’s the “max” line in the figure — the “min” line is 15 percent.) But even if current reserve holdings turn out to be more than is required by LCR, it’s clear that there are far less excess reserves than one would think using the old requirements.

Liquid assets as a share of short-term liabilities. Source: Credit Suisse
Liquid assets as a share of short-term liabilities, selected banks. Source: Credit Suisse

Pozsar draws several interesting conclusions from these facts. First, the Federal Funds rate is dead for good as a tool of policy. (I wonder how long it will take textbook writers to catch up.) Second, central bank balance sheets are not going to shrink back to “normal” any time in the foreseeable future. Third, this is a step along the way to the Fed becoming the world’s central bank, de facto in even in a sense de jure. (Especially in conjunction with the permanent swap lines with other central banks, another insitutional evolution that has not gotten the attention it deserves.) A conclusion that he does not draw, but perhaps should have, is that this is another reason not to worry about demand for Treasury debt. There are good prudential reasons for requiring banks to hold government liabilities, but in effect it is also a form of financial repression.

This is also a good illustration of Noah’s point about the disconnect between academic economics and policy/finance economics. Academic economists are obsessed with “the” interest rate, which they map to the entirely unrelated intertemporal price called “interest rate” in the Walrasian system. Fundamentally what central banks do is determine the pace of credit expansion, which historically has involved a great variety of policy tools. Yes, for a while the tool of choice was an overnight interbank rate. But not anymore. And whatever the mix of immediate targets and instruments will be going forward, it’s a safe bet it won’t return to what it was in the past.

Books You Could Read

Here are some books I’ve read recently.

 

W. Arthur Lewis, The Evolution of the World Economic Order

This little book may have the highest insights-per-page density of any economics book I’ve read. This isn’t an unmixed blessing — what you’re getting here are the distilled conclusions of a lifetime’s work in development economics, without any of the concrete material that led to them. The central theme — among many fascinating side-trips — is a basically Ricardian vision of a three-class society in which conditions in agriculture fundamentally determine the possibilities for capitalist development, and landlords are the great enemies of progress.

Among the book’s many virtues is the way it demonstrates how Ricardo’s theories of trade has much more radical implications than the free-trade-is-good bromides it’s usually deployed in support of. As Lewis points out, the Ricardian model clearly shows that it is in the interests of the rich countries that poor countries develop their capacity to produce goods they are already specialized in (i.e. follow their comparative advantage). But it is in the interest of the poor countries themselves (except for the landlords) to develop their capacity to produce the goods currently produced by the rich countries.

 

Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution

Originally I’d picked up  some other history of the pre-Civil War United States. It referred dismissively to the idea that resistance to wage labor and to production for profit had been important to political and social developments in the early United States, and referenced The Market Revolution as the leading example of this now-discredited view. Ah, I thought, that’s the book I should be reading. I was not disappointed. The transition from use-value production by family units to market production by wage (and slave) labor turns out to be a very effective tool for organizing a general political and social history of the US from the end of the War of 1812 to the 1840s.

 

Richard Dawkins, The Ancestor’s Tale

I’d had this sitting around for ages and for some reason picked it up when I was unpacking a box of books. It’s a history of evolution, told through the conceit of a pilgrimage from modern humans back to the origins of life. Each pilgrim represents the last common ancestor of us and some other group of organisms. It may not be obvious at first but there is a definite number of such meeting points, no more than a few dozen, though obviously there is quite a bit of uncertainty about the more distant ones. It’s a very effective device for telling the story of evolution in an unfamiliar way, and, thankfully, Dawkins’ cranky politics are confined to a few footnotes.

 

Richard Werner, Princes of the Yen

Someone recommend this book to me in comments on this blog. It’s an original retelling of the story of Japan’s long postwar boom and long post-1980s stagnation that puts monetary policy at the center of both.

The basic argument is that the distinctive features of Japanese capitalism are a product of wartime mobilization, not some ancient features of Japanese culture; Werner’s claim that 1920s Japan was as liberal as the US or UK on most economic dimensions is consistent with other things I’ve read. The central feature of wartime planning that was preserved after 1945 was direct allocation of credit by the state — not officially, but via “window guidance” to banks on the desired volume and direction of lending. Initially this was controlled by the Ministry of Finance but in the 1980s, Werner argues, the Bank of Japan became increasing independent, and the key decisionmakers there — the “princes of the yen” of the title — saw their control over credit as a tool to dismantle the distinctive features of postwar Japanese capitalism. His claim that the crisis was deliberately provoke and prolonged in order to push through a broader agenda of liberalization is highly relevant as a precedent for what’s happening in Europe today — though I have to admit that his evidence for it is more suggestive than dispositive.

 

Ray Madoff, Immortality and the Law

I stole this from Mike Konczal when I was visiting him last year; he was using it for a piece in The Nation. It’s a fascinating discussion of a question I’d never thought about much before — the legal status of dead people.

The argument is that the US is an outlier, in that it grants dead people no rights over their bodies — instructions about the disposal of remains have no legal force — but grants wealthowners almost unlimited freedom to dispose of their property however they wish. In most European countries, by contrast, children and other family members are entitled to a substantial share of the estate regardless of the wishes of the deceased. Piketty, incidentally, is critical of these rules, on the grounds that they reinforce inherited wealth, but the US has its own ways of maintaining fortunes across generations. As Madoff points out, the “rule against perpetuities” now exists only in law school classrooms. While at one time it was possible to leave wealth in trust only for named individuals, it is now perfectly possible to set up a trust to benefit your decendents unto the last generation. Even better, you can keep your property itself in the trust, allowing your heirs only an income, or the use of it (as with a house); this protects it from the taxman, your children’s creditors, and their own spendthrift ways. Of course the law is not the whole story here; whether the US has the norms and institutions to actually maintain such perpetual wealth remains to be seen.

 

Elizabeth Kolbert, The Sixth Extinction

If you’ve read Kolbert’s pieces on climate change in the New Yorker then you know what this book is like. It’s a good, readable summary of what we know about the mass extinction currently underway. There’s nothing really new here, but one thing I did learn from it is how much of what’s happening is due to factors other than warming per se. Ocean acidification is responsible for the extinction of coral, which may be completely gone by the end of the century; invasive species and the dissemination of pathogens is the main factor in the decline of bats and amphibians. No matter how familiar you think you are with this stuff there’s always something that hits you. I remember my fascination and disgust as a child when I learned there were frogs that swallowed their eggs and hatched the tadpoles in their stomachs. It turns out there aren’t anymore.

 

Christopher Boehm, Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism and Shame

The central claim of Boehm’s previous book is that all the small bands of foragers we know of — the closest analogues to the societies that existed for 99 percent of human history — are strictly egalitarian, with no one (among adult males) allowed to assume authority over anyone else. This contrasts with the modern world of kings, cops and bosses, and even more so with the rigid dominance hierarchies of our nearest primate relatives. And yet there is a striking parallel between the alliances that dominant chimpanzees form to defend their top spot, and the alliances that entire groups of human beings form to prevent anyone from occupying the top spot in the first place.

Boehm’s idea — which I like a lot, though I don’t have any expertise — is that the same basic behavioral patterns, presumably with the same genetic underpinnings, can produce dramatically different kinds of society. An intense dislike of having people above you, plus the ability to form alliances against anyone who tries to move up in the ranks, are the ingredients for a world of chimpanzees, baboons, mafiosos and orcs, where everyone is jealously guarding their spot in the hierarchy and ready to violently retaliate against usurpers who try to cut ahead of them. But the same vigilance against anyone trying to put themselves above you can equally give rise to the absolute democracy of hunter-gatherer bands, or today to political movements like Occupy Wall Street.

The main thing the newer book adds to the story is a more explicit argument that egalitarian norms arose through natural selection, along the same lines as people like Bowles and Gintis. I am not sure this evolutionary turn is a step forward. Like all evolutionary psychology, this consists largely of speculative just-so stories. And it loses one of the most interesting ideas in the earlier work, that the same behavioral building blocks can give rise to both hierarchical and egalitarian forms of society.

 

As for fiction, I’ve recently read:

It’s a Battlefield, by Graham Greene

Q, by Luther Blissett

The First Bad Man, by Miranda July

The Lists of the Past, by Julie Hayden. (See Laura Tanenbaum’s review here.)

The Member of the Wedding, by Carson McCullers

The Progress of Love, by Alice Munro

Going after Caciatto, by Tim O’Brien

The Hunters, by James Salter

Cities of Salt, by Adulrahman Munif

Crow Fair, by Tom McGuane

My Brilliant Friend, The Story of a New Name, and Those Who Leave and Those Who Stay, by Elana Ferrante

I liked all of them a lot, would recommend them all. Maybe I’ll write mini-reviews in an another post. Or maybe not.

What to Do about the Trade Deficit: Nothing

Roosevelt Institute has a new roundup of policy advice for the next administration. There is a lot of useful stuff in there, which perhaps I’ll post more on later. My own contribution is on international trade. Here’s the summary:

It is natural to look to measures to improve the trade balance — through a weaker dollar, or through tariffs or other direct limits on imports — as a way to raise demand and boost output and employment. While the U.S. has done little to boost net exports in recent decades, there is increasing public discussion of such measures today…

We argue that while the orthodox view is wrong about trade being macroeconomically neutral, measures to improve the U.S. trade balance would nonetheless be a mistake. All else equal, a more favorable trade balance will raise demand and boost employment. But all else
is not equal, thanks to the special role of the U.S. in the world economy. The global economy today operates on what is effectively a dollar standard: The U.S. dollar serves as the international currency, the way gold did under under the gold standard. In part for this reason, the U.S. can finance trade deficits indefinitely while most other countries cannot. For many of our trade partners, any reduction of net exports would imply unsustainable trade deficits. So policies intended to improve the U.S. trade balance are likely to instead lead to lower growth elsewhere, imposing large costs on the rest of the world with little or no benefits here.

We do not deny that the trade deficit has negative effects on demand and employment in the U.S., but we argue this is only a reason to redouble efforts to boost domestic demand. The solution to the contractionary effects of the trade deficit is not a costly, and probably futile, effort to move toward a trade surplus, but rather measures to boost investment in both the public and private sector.

You can read the rest of my piece here.

There were a couple figures that didn’t make it into the final piece. Here is one, showing the stability of the international role of the dollar over the past 20 years.

dollars

The dotted line shows the share of central bank reserves held in dollars (source). The heavy line shows the share of foreign-exchange transactions that involve the dollar (source). About two-thirds of foreign exchange reserves are held in dollars, and close to 90 percent of foreign-exchange transactions involve the dollar and some other currency. These shares have not diminished at all over the past 20 years, despite continuous US trade deficits.

In my opinion, the international role of the dollar makes it exceedingly unlikely that the US could face a sudden outflow of foreign investment. (And given that US liabilities are overwhelmingly dollar-denominated, it is not clear what the costs of such an outflow would be.) It also makes it highly unlikely that the US can achieve balanced trade through conventional measures, unless we come up with some other mechanism to provide the rest of the world with dollar liquidity.

Links for May 25, 2016

Deliberately. The IMF has released its new Debt Sustainability Analysis for Greece. Frances Coppola has the details, and they are something. Per the IMF,

Demographic projections suggest that working age population will decline by about 10 percentage points by 2060. At the same time, Greece will continue to struggle with high unemployment rates for decades to come. Its current unemployment rate is around 25 percent, the highest in the OECD, and after seven years of recession, its structural component is estimated at around 20 percent. Consequently, it will take significant time for unemployment to come down. Staff expects it to reach 18 percent by 2022, 12 percent by 2040, and 6 percent only by 2060.

Frances adds:

For Greece’s young people currently out of work, that is all of their working life. A whole generation will have been consigned to the scrapheap. …

The truth is that seven years of recession has wrecked the Greek economy. It is no longer capable of generating enough jobs to employ its population. The IMF estimates that even in good times, 20 percent of adults would remain unemployed. To generate the jobs that are needed there will have to be large numbers of new businesses, perhaps even whole new industries. Developing such extensive new productive capacity takes time and requires substantial investment – and Greece is not the most attractive of investment prospects. Absent something akin to a Marshall Plan, it will take many, many years to repair the damage deliberately inflicted on Greece by European authorities and the IMF in order to bail out the European banking system.

For some reason, that reminds me of this. Good times.

Also, here’s the Economist, back in 2006:

The core countries of Europe are not ready to make the economic reforms they so desperately need—and that will change, alas, only after a diabolic economic crisis. … The sad truth is that voters are not yet ready to swallow the nasty medicine of change. Reform is always painful. And there are too many cosseted insiders—those with secure jobs, those in the public sector—who see little to gain and much to lose. … One reason for believing that reform can happen … is that other European countries have shown the way. Britain faced economic and social meltdown in 1979; there followed a decade of Thatcherite reform. … The real problem, not just for Italy and France but also for Germany, is that, so far, life has continued to be too good for too many people.

I bet they’re pretty pleased right now.

 

 

Polanyism. At Dissent, Mike Konczal and Patrick Iber have a very nice introduction to Karl Polanyi. One thing I like about this piece is that they present Polanyi as a sort of theoretical back-formation for the Sanders campaign.

The vast majority of Sanders’s supporters … are, probably without knowing it, secret followers of Karl Polanyi. …

One of the divides within the Democratic primary between Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton has been between a social-democratic and a “progressive” but market-friendly vision of addressing social problems. Take, for example, health care. Sanders proposes a single-payer system in which the government pays and health care directly, and he frames it explicitly in the language of rights: “healthcare is a human right and should be guaranteed to all Americans regardless of wealth or income.” … Sanders offers a straightforward defense of decommodification—the idea that some things do not belong in the marketplace—that is at odds with the kind of politics that the leadership of the Democratic Party has offered … Polanyi’s particular definition of socialism sounds like one Sanders would share.

 

Obamacare and the insurers. On the subject of health care and decommodification, I liked James Kwak’s piece on Obamacare.

The dirty not-so-secret of Obamacare … is that sometimes the things we don’t like about market outcomes aren’t market failures—they are exactly what markets are supposed to do. …  at the end of the day, Obamacare is based on the idea that competition is good, but tries to prevent insurers from competing on all significant dimensions except the one that the government is better at anyway. We shouldn’t be surprised when insurance policies get worse and health care costs continue to rise.

It’s too bad so many intra-Democratic policy debates are conducted in terms of the radical-incremental binary, it’s not really meaningful. You can do more or less of anything. Would be better to focus on this non-market vs market question.

In this context, I wish there’d been some discussion in the campaign of New York’s new universal pre-kindergarten, which is a great example incremental decommodification in practice. Admittedly I’m a bit biased — I live in New York, and my son will be starting pre-K next year. Still: Here’s an example of a social need being addressed not through vouchers, or tax credits, or with means tests, but through a universal public services, provided — not entirely, but mainly and increasingly — by public employees. Why isn’t this a model?

 

The prehistory of the economics profession. I really liked this long piece by Marshall Steinbaum and Bernard Weisberger on the early history of the American Economics Association. The takeaway is that the AEA’s early history was surprisingly radical, both intellectually and in its self-conception as part of larger political project. (Another good discussion of this is in Michael Perelman’s Railroading Economics.) This is history more people should know, and Steinbaum and Weisberger tell it well. I also agree with their conclusion:

That [the economics profession] abandoned “advocacy” under the banner of “objectivity” only raises the question of what that distinction really means in practice. Perhaps actual objectivity does not require that the scholar noisily disclaim advocacy. It may, in fact, require the opposite.

The more I struggle with this stuff, the more I think this is right. A field or discipline needs its internal standards to distinguish valid or well-supported claims from invalid or poorly supported ones. But evaluation of relevance, importance, correspondence to the relevant features of reality can never be made on the basis of internal criteria. They require the standpoint of some outside commitment, some engagement with the concrete reality you are studying distinct from your formal representations of it. Of course that engagement doesn’t have to be political. Hyman Minsky’s work for the Mark Twain Bank in Missouri, for example, played an equivalent role; and as Perry Mehrling observes in his wonderful essay on Minsky, “It is significant that the fullest statement of his business cycle theory was published by the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress.” But it has to be something. In economics, I think, even more than in other fields, the best scholarship is not going to come from people who are only scholars.

 

Negative rates, so what. Here’s a sensible look at the modest real-world impact of negative rates from Brian Romanchuk. It’s always interesting to see how these things look from the point of view of market participants. The importance of a negative policy rate has nothing to do with the terms on which present consumption trades off against future consumption, it’s about one component of the return on some assets relative to others.

 

I’m number 55. Someone made a list of the top 100 economics blogs, and put me on it. That was nice.

Links for May 11

My dinner with Axel. Last fall, Arjun Jayadev and I had a series of conversations with Axel Leijonhufvud at his home in California; videos and transcript are now up at the INET site, along with a collection of his writings. I’m very grateful to have had this chance to talk with him; Leijonhufvud is one of two or three economists who’ve most influenced my thinking. He’s also a charming and delightful storyteller, which I hope comes through in the interviews. I’ll be writing something soon, I hope, about Axel’s work and its significance, but in the meantime, check out the interview.

 

The mind of Draghi. This speech by Mario Draghi offers a nice glimpse into the thinking of central bankers circa 2016. The fundamental point is the idea of a long run “real” or “natural” rate of interest, which policy cannot affect. This idea, and the corollary that the economic world we actually observe is in some sense a false, unreal, artificial or “distorted” sublunary version of the true ideal, is, I think, the central site of tension between economic ideology and economic reality today. But there are other particular points of interest in the speech. First, the frank acknowledgement that the big problem with zero rates is that they reduce the profitability of financial institutions. (By the same logic, Draghi should want to do away with public education since  it reduces the profitability of private schools, and with law enforcement since it reduces the profitability of private security firms.) And second, the claim that one reason for the problem of low interest rates is … excessive government debt!

A temporary period of policy rates being close to zero or even negative in real terms is not unprecedented by any means. Over the past decades, however, we have seen long-term yields trending down in real terms as well, independent of the cyclical stance of monetary policy.

The drivers behind this have been, among others, rising net savings as ageing populations plan for retirement, relatively less public capital expenditure in a context of high public indebtedness, and a slowdown in productivity growth reducing the profitability of investment.

Yes, for years we have been warned that excessive government debt is that interest rates will get too high, increasing borrowing costs for the government and crowding out of private investment. But now it turns out that excessive government debt is also responsible for rates that are too low. Truly, to be a central banker in these times one must be a Zen master.

 

Business cycle measurement ahead of theory … or heading in an entirely different direction. I’m very excited about a series of posts Merijn Knibbe is doing for the World Economics Association. They are on the incompatibility of the concepts used in the construction of national accounts and other macroeconomic data, with the concepts used in macroeconomic theory. I’ve wanted for a while to make the case for a consistent economic nominalism, meaning that we should treat the money payments we actually observe as fundamental or primitive, and not merely as manifestations of some deeper “real” economy. Knibbe is now doing it. The first installment is here.

 

Kaminska on “deglobalization”. Izabella Kaminska is always worth reading, but this piece from last week is even more worth reading than usual. I particularly like her point that the international role of the dollar means that the US is to the world as Germany is to the eurozone:

the dollarisation of the global economy … has created a sort of worldwide Eurozone effect, wherein every country whose own currency isn’t strong or reputable enough to be used for trade settlement with commodity producers is at the mercy of dollar flows into its own country. Just like Greece, they can’t print the currency that affords them purchasing power on the global market.

The logical corollary, which she doesn’t quite spell out, is that the US, thanks to its willingness to run trade deficits that supply dollars to the rest of the world, has fulfilled its international role much more responsibly than Germany has.

Only the Debt Is National

Imagine this set of transactions.

1. A bank in rich country A makes a loan of X to the government of poor country B. Let’s say for concreteness that A is the United States, B is Nigeria, and X is $1 billion. So now we have a liability of $1 billion of the Nigerian government to the US bank, and deposit of $1 billion at the US bank owned by the government of Nigeria.

(Nigeria might just as well be Egypt or Mexico or Argentina or Greece or Turkey or Indonesia. And the United States might just as well be Germany or the UK. )

2. The deposit at the bank is transferred from ownership of the government to ownership of some private individual. It’s easy to imagine ways this can be done.

3. The residents of Nigeria, via their government, still have a liability of $1 billion to the bank, obliging them to make annual payments equal to the interest rate times the principal. In this case, let’s say the interest rate is 5%, so debt service is $50 million.

4. The payments can be met by running an annual export surplus of $50 million. As long as this $50 million annual payment is maintained, interest payments can be made and the principal rolled over; the debt will remain forever.

5. The private individual from step 2 moves from Nigeria to the United States, eventually becoming a citizen there.

The result of this: a family in the United States has wealth of $1 billion (plus whatever they already had, of course). Meanwhile, the people of Nigeria make payments of $50 million each year to the United States forever, in the form of uncompensated exports. In their important book Africa’s Odious Debts and related work, Boyce and Ndikumana demonstrate that this story describes much of sub-Saharan Africa’s foreign debt. It applies elsewhere in the world as well.

I wonder how various people evaluate this scenario. Do we agree there is something wrong here? And if so, what, and what is the solution?

The orthodox view, as far as I can tell, is: what’s the problem? People should pay their debts. Nigeria (or Argentina etc.) is a person, it has borrowed, it must pay. The fact that some private individual chooses to hold their wealth in one country rather than another has nothing to do with it.

More generally, the dominant view today is that the ability to carry transactions like those describe above is an unmixed blessing; in fact it’s the whole point of the international system. The three pillars of the European union are free movement of people, free movement of goods, and free movement of finance.  Argentina’s Macri is hailed as a hero — by Obama among others — for removing capital controls.  If you are committed to capital mobility, then it’s hard to see where the objection would be. Third World governments and New York banks are consenting adults and can contract on any terms they choose. And of course the fact that a possessor of wealth happens to be located in one country cannot, in a liberal order, be an objection to them owning an asset somewhere else.

Maybe it’s the last step that is the issue? Outside of Europe, the free movement of people does not have the same place in the economic catechism as the free movement of money or goods. And even in Europe it’s a bit shaky. Still, most governments are happy enough to welcome rich immigrants. (A few months ago, my FT dislodged a glossy pamphlet, a racially ambiguous woman in a bikini on the cover, advertising citizenship by investment in various Caribbean countries.)  This post was provoked by a Crooked Timber post by Chris Bertram; I’d be curious what he, or other open-borders advocates like my friend Suresh Naidu, would say about this scenario. Does an unrestricted right of human beings to cross borders imply an unrestricted right to transfer property claims across them also?

If the solution is not limits on movement of people, perhaps it is limits on cross-order transfers of financial claims, that is, capital controls. This used to be common sense. It’s not entirely straightforward where capital controls would operate in the sequence above; the metaphor of “capital” as a substance that moves across borders is unhelpful. But in some way or other capital controls would prevent the individual in country B from coming into possession of the bank deposit in country A.

There are two problems with this solution, one practical and the other more fundamental. The practical problem is that many routine transactions — payment for imports say — involve the creation of bank deposits in one country payable to some entity in another. It is hard to distinguish prohibited financial transactions from permitted payments for goods and services — and as Boyce and Ndikumana document, capital flight is usually disguised as current account transactions, for instance by over-invoicing for imports. Eric Helleiner [1] quotes Jacob Viner: “Because of the difficulty of distinguishing between capital account and current account transactions, capital controls could be made effective only by ‘censorship of communications and by crushing penalties for violation.'” [2]

The more fundamental problem is that these transactions — and capital flight in general – may be perfectly legal by the rules in force when they take place. Or if formally illegal, they are usually carried out by high government officials and/or members of the country’s elite. So the government of the poor country is unlikely to aggressively apply any restrictions that do exist. A subsequent government might well feel differently — but what claim do they have on a private bank account in a foreign country?

The problems with making capital controls effective were recognized clearly in the runup to Bretton Woods. In White’s 1942 draft for the agreements — again quoting Helleiner — “governments were required (a) not to accept or permit deposits or investments from any member country except with the permission of the government of that country, and (b) to make available to the government of any member country at its request all property in form of deposits, investments or securities of the nationals of the member country.” Even this wouldn’t be enough, of course, in the case where the wealthowner ceases to be a national. And it might not help in the case of a corrupt government that doesn’t want to repatriate private funds — though it might, if (as was also discussed) countries with balance of payments problems were required to draw on foreign exchange in private hands before being granted official assistance. In any case, it seems challenging to impose effective capital controls without granting the government control of all foreign assets — which will often require the cooperation of the country where those assets are held.

Needless to say nothing like this was included in the Bretton Woods agreements as signed. The US government would not even accept its allies’ pleas to assist in repatriating flight capital to help with the acute balance of payments difficulties following the war. Now it’s true, Second Circuit Judge Griesa recently claimed even more extensive authority that the government of Argentina would have had under White’s proposals, seizing the US assets of third parties who’d received payments from the Argentine government. But that was strictly to make payments to creditors. No such access to foreign assets is generally available.

This situation can arise even if governments themselves don’t even have to borrow abroad. As we recently saw in the case of Ireland, a government can strictly limit its debt and still find itself with unmanageable foreign liabilities. If private institutions — especially banks, but potentially nonfinancial corporations as well — borrow abroad, government that wishes to keep them operational  in a crisis may have to assume their liabilities. Or at least, they will be strongly urged to do so by all the guardians of orthodoxy. What, are you going to just let the banks fail? Meanwhile, any foreign claims generated by the activities of the banks before they failed are out of reach.

Financial commitments create obligations; when circumstances change, sometimes they can’t be met. Someone isn’t going to get what they were promised. In modern economies, the state (often in the guise of the central bank) steps in to assume or redenominate claims, to impose an ex post consistency on the inconsistent contracts signed by private agents. But with foreign-currency commitments to foreigners the authorities’ usual tools aren’t available. And just as important, there are other authorities — the ECB in the case of Greece, the US federal court system in the case of Argentina — that are ready to use their privileged position in the larger payments system to enforce the claims of creditors. In effect, while domestic contracts are always subject to political renegotiation, foreign contracts are — or can be made to seem — objective fact.

What we’ve ended up with is a situation in which private parties have an absolute right to make whatever financial commitments they choose, and national governments have an absolute duty to honor the resulting balance sheet commitments. Wealth belongs to individuals, but debt belongs to the people. They are bound by past government commitments forever.

Or as Marx observed, “The only part of the so-called national wealth that actually enters into the collective possession of modern peoples is their national debt. …in England all public institutions are designated ‘royal’; as compensation for this, however, there is the ‘national’ debt. ” 

 

 

[1] The Helleiner book, along with Fred Block’s Origins of International Economic Disorder, is still the best thing I know on the evolution of international monetary arrangements since World War II. Has anything better been written in the 20 years since it came out?

[2] This brings out two general points on financial regulation that I’d like to develop more. First, it is one thing to establish different rules for different kinds of activity, but the classification has to actually match up with the legal and accounting categories in which actual economic transactions are organized. The category of “banks” is a currently relevant example. This is part of the larger issue of what I call the money view, or economic nominalism — we need a perspective that regards money payments and the labels they bear as fundamental, rather than seeing them as reflections of some underlying structure. Second, and relatedly, it is hard for individual regulations to be effective in a setting in which anything that is not explicitly forbidden is permitted, since for any regulated transaction there will normally be unregulated ones that are economically equivalent.