The Slack Wire

In The American Prospect: The Collapse of Austerity Economics

(This review is coauthored with Arjun Jayadev, and appears in the Fall 2019 issue of the The American Prospect. The version below includes a few passages that were cut from the published version for space reasons.)

Review of Albert Alesina, Carlo Faverro and Francesco Giavazzi,  Austerity: When It Works and When It Doesn’t
With Arjun Jayadev

A decade ago, Alberto Alesina was one of the most influential economists in the world. His theory of ‘expansionary austerity’ – the paradoxical notion that reducing public expenditure would lead to an increase in economic activity — was one of the hottest ideas in macroeconomics. He claimed to have shown that government surpluses could actually boost growth, but only if they were achieved via spending cuts rather than tax increases. At a moment when many governments were seeking Keynesian remedies to a global recession, his work (along with fellow Harvard economist Silvia Ardagna) reassured conservatives that there was no conflict between keeping up demand in a crisis, and the longer-term goal of reining in the public sector.

Not surprisingly, his ideas were taken up by right-wing politicians both in Europe and in the US, where he was widely cited by the Republicans who took control of the House in 2010. Along with the work of Reinhart and Rogoff on the supposed dangers of excessive government debt, Alesina’s work provided one of the key intellectual props for the shift among elite policymakers towards fiscal consolidation and austerity.

 Right from the outset, other economists pointed to serious flaws in the case for expansionary austerity, and challenged virtually aspect of the statistical exercises underlying it. A partial list of criticisms includes: using inappropriate measures of fiscal balance; misapplying lessons from boom times to periods of crisis; misclassifying episodes of fiscal expansion as austerity; and generalizing from the special conditions of small open economies, where exchange rate moves could cushion the effects of austerity. Even the most cherished result— that expenditure based austerity worked better than tax-based austerity — has been convincingly challenged.

In 2009, Alesina suggested that Europe was likely to see faster growth because it was cutting public spending in response to the crisis, while the US had embraced conventional Keynesian stimulus. He was right about the difference in responses to the crisis; about economic growth, not so much. The US recovery was weak by historical standards, but in Europe there was hardly a recovery at all. In the countries that cut public spending the most, such as Spain, Portugal, and Ireland, GDP remained below its 2008 peak four, five, even six years after the crisis. By 2013 the financial journalist Jim Tankersley could offer an unequivocal verdict: “No advanced economy has proved Alesina correct in the wake of the Great Recession.”  

Macroeconomic debates have moved on since then. A large new empirical literature on fiscal policy has emerged over the past decade, the great majority of it confirming the old Keynesian wisdom that in a depressed economy, increased public spending can raise output by perhaps $1.50 for each dollar spent. New questions have been raised about central banks’ ability to stabilize the economy, whether with conventional monetary policy or with new tools like forward guidance and quantitative easing. The seemingly permanent reality of low interest rates has changed the debate over the sustainability of government finances, with prominent mainstream economists suggesting that public debt no longer poses the dangers it was once thought to. The revived idea of secular stagnation has suggested that economic stimulus may not be a problem for occasional downturns, but an ongoing necessity. And the urgency of climate change has created big new tasks for the public sector. 

It’s a very different conversation from a decade ago. Can Alesina’s ideas adapt to this new environment? 

That’s the challenge for his new book, Austerity: When It Works and When It Doesn’t, which offers a summing-up of work on government budgets that goes back now almost three decades. Through the years, Alesina has had a rotating case of co-authors, often from Bocconi University in Italy; this book is co-authored with Carlo Ferro and Francisco Giavazzi, both professors there. Given the way that the book has been advertised and promoted (“towering”, a “counterblast”), one might expect a thorough response to the new arguments that have developed over the past decade about aggregate demand management and the appropriate size of the public sector.

Disappointingly, this is not the case. There has been no marking of beliefs to market. For the most part, the book restates the same arguments that were made a decade ago: countries with high public debt must adopt austerity, and this will not hurt growth if it takes the form spending cuts rather than tax increases. Alesina and his coauthors do make some effort to respond to specific methodological criticisms of the earlier work. But they don’t engage with – or even acknowledge – the larger shifts in the landscape. Tellingly, all the book’s formal analysis and almost all of its text (as well as the online data appendix) stop in 2014. For what is supposed to be a definitive statement, it’s an odd choice. Why ignore everything we might learn about austerity and government budgets from the experiences of the past five years?

The book also operates at an odd mix of registers, which makes it hard to understand who the audience is. Exoteric chapters seemingly intended for a broad readership are interspersed with math-heavy esoteric chapters that will be read only by professional economists. You get the feeling this is mostly material that sat in a drawer for a long time before being fished out and stapled together into a book.

To be fair, there are some advances from the previous iterations. Alesina’s earlier work had been criticized for ignoring problems of causality – when high growth and government surpluses are found together, how do we know which is causing which?  Now, instead of relying on purely statistical measures of association, there is more extensive attention given to what has been called the “narrative” approach, with periods of austerity defined by the stated intentions of policy makers rather than simply by changes in the budget position. This approach– pioneered by Romer and Romer to understand US policy actions and expanded by economists at the IMF — does have advantages over the naive statistical approach. By including only tax increases and spending cuts made for reasons other than current economic conditions, it avoids, in principle at least, the problem of fiscal adjustments resulting from changes in economic activity, rather than causing them. But it is still no substitute for a real historical analysis that considers the whole complex of factors influencing both budget positions and growth. Gesturing towards the need for more substantive narrative, the later chapters include several case studies on various OECD countries which undertook austerity measures. These are rather thin and have a Wikipedia air about them; in any case the great bulk of the argument is still based on statistical exercises.

Those who are not convinced by the econometrics in Alesina’s earlier work will not be convinced here either. Even people who share the authors’ commitment to rolling back the public sector may suspect that they are in the presence of what is politely called motivated reasoning. 

To those who don’t share that commitment, it is clear from the opening pages that we are dealing with ideological fiction, not objective analysis. Per Alesina and co, most austerity episodes reflect countries persistently spending beyond their means, with debt rising until a tipping point is reached. But in Europe – surely ground zero in any discussion of contemporary austerity – this story lacks even superficial plausibility. On the eve of their crises, Ireland, Spain and even Portugal had debt-GDP ratios below that of unscathed France; Spain and Ireland were well below Germany. (The fact that Germany consistently ran large deficits in the decade before the crisis is not mentioned here.) Indeed, until 2011 Ireland, now an austerity poster child, had the lowest debt ratio of any major Western European country.

The book asserts that episodes of austerity triggered by outside pressures – as opposed to a government’s own mismanagement of its finances – are rare exceptions. But in Europe they were the rule. The crisis came first, then the turn to austerity; the rising debt ratios came last, driven mainly by falling GDP; budget deficits were an effect, not a cause. Even Greece, perhaps the one country where public finances were a genuine problem before the crisis, is a case in point: From 2010 to 2015, deep cutbacks in public services successfully reduced public debt by about $15 billion euros, or 5 percent — but the debt-GDP ratio still rose by 30 points, thanks to a collapse in GDP.

It would be easy to debate the book point by point. But it’s more useful to take a step back, and think about the larger argument. While the book shifts erratically in tone and subject, underlying all of its arguments – and the larger pro-austerity case – is a rigid logical skeleton. First, a government’s fiscal balance (surplus or deficit) over time determines its debt-GDP ratio. If a country has a high debt to GDP, that is “almost always … the result of overspending relative to tax revenues.” (2) Second, the debt ratio leads markets to be confident in the government’s debt – private investors do not want to buy the debt of a country that has already issued too much. Third, the state of market confidence determines the interest rate the government faces, or whether it can borrow at all. Fourth, there is a clear line where high debt and high interest rates make debt unsustainable; austerity is the unavoidable requirement once that line is passed. And finally, when austerity restores debt sustainability that contributes – via lower interest rates and “confidence” more broadly – to economic growth, especially if the austerity involves spending cuts. 

Individually, these claims are in keeping with the conventional wisdom of the business press and the maxims of “sound finance.” Together, they make a causal story that’s a one-way track with no side branches: Any problems that a government encounters with debt are the result of its fiscal choices in the past. And any solution must involve a different set of fiscal choices – higher taxes or, better, less public spending. 

If you accept the premises, the conclusions follow logically. Even better, they offer the satisfying spectacle of public-sector hubris meeting its nemesis. 

But real-world debt dynamics don’t run along such well-oiled tracks. At every step, there are forks, sidings and roundabouts, that leave the link from fiscal misconduct to well-deserved austerity much less direct than the book suggests.

First of all, as a historical matter, differences in growth, inflation and interest rates are at least as important as the fiscal position in determining the evolution of the debt ratio over time. Where debt is already high, moderately slower growth or higher interest rates can easily raise the debt ratio faster than even very large surpluses can reduce it – as many countries subject to austerity have discovered.

Conversely, rapid economic growth and low interest rates can lead to very large reductions in the debt ratio without the government ever running surpluses, as in the US and UK after World War II. More recently, Ireland reduced its debt-GDP ratio by 20 points in just five years in the mid-1990s while continuing to run substantial deficits, thanks to very fast growth of the “Celtic tiger” period. In situations like the European crisis, extraordinary actions like public assumptions of private debt or writedowns by creditors (as in Cyprus and Greece) can also produce large changes in the stock of debt, without any changes in spending or taxes. Ireland again is an example: The decision to assume the liabilities of private banks catapulted its debt-GDP ratio from 27 percent to over 100 percent practically overnight. Cases like this make a mockery of the book’s central claim that a country’s debt burden reliably reflects its past fiscal choices.

At the second step, market demand for government clearly is not an “objective” assessment of the fiscal position, but reflects crowd psychology, self-confirming conventional expectations, and all the other pathologies of speculative markets. The claim that the interest rates facing a country are directly and reliably linked to the state of its public finances is critical to the book’s argument; rising interest rates are the channel by which high debt creates pressure for austerity, while falling interest rates are the channel by which austerity supports renewed growth. But the claim that interest rates reflect the soundness or otherwise of public budgets runs up against a glaring problem: The financial markets that recoil from a country’s bonds one day were usually buying them eagerly the day before. The same markets that sent interest rates on Spanish, Portuguese and Greek bonds soaring in 2010 were the ones snapping up their public and private debt at rock-bottom rates in the mid-2000s. And they’re the same markets that are setting interest rates for those countries at historical low levels today (Greece now pays less to borrow than the US!), even as their debt ratios, in many cases, remain extremely high.

The authors get hopelessly tangled on this point. They want to insist both that post-crisis interest rates reflect the true state of public finances, and that the low rates before the crisis were the result of a speculative bubble. But they can’t have it both ways: If low rates in 2005 were not a sign that the state of public finances was sound, then high rates in 2010 can’t be a sign that they were unsound.

If the analysis had extended beyond 2014, this problem would only have gotten worse. What’s really striking about interest rates in Europe in recent years is how uniformly they have declined. Ireland, which has managed to reduce its debt ratio by 50 points since 2010, today borrows at less than 1 percent. But so does Spain, whose debt ratio increased by 40 points over the same period. The claim that interest rates are mainly a function of a country’s fiscal position just doesn’t fit the historical experience. It’s hard to exaggerate how critical this is for the whole argument. Rising interest rates are the only cost Alesina and his coauthors ever mention for high debt, and hence the only reason for austerity; and reducing interest costs is the only intelligible mechanism they offer for the supposed growth-boosting effects of austerity – vague invocations of “confidence” don’t count.

And this brings us to the third step. One of the clearest macroeconomic lessons of the past decade is that market confidence doesn’t matter: A determined central bank can set interest rates on public borrowing at whatever level it chooses. In the years before 2007, there were endless warnings that if the US did not get its fiscal house in order, it would be faced with rising interest rates, a flight from the dollar and eventually the prospect of default. (In 2005, Nouriel Roubini and Brad Setser were bold enough to predict that unsustainable deficits would lead to a collapse in the dollar within the next two years.) Today, with the debt much higher than even the pessimistic forecasts of that period, the federal government borrows more cheaply than ever in history. And there hasn’t been even a hint of the Fed losing control of interest rates.

Similar stories apply around the world. Perhaps the clearest illustration of central banks’ power over financial markets came in 2011-2012, when a series of interventions by the European Central bank – culminating in Mario Draghi’s famous “whatever it takes” — stopped the sharp spike in southern European interest rates in its tracks. With an implicit guarantee from their central banks – which other developed countries like the US and UK also enjoy – governments simply don’t need to worry about losing access to credit. To the extent that governments like Greece remained locked out of the markets after Draghi’s announcement, this was a policy choice by the ECB, not a market outcome. 

If countries can face financial crises even when their debt ratio is low, and can enjoy ultra-low interest rates even when they are high, then it’s hard to see why the debt ratio should be a major object of policy. Alesina and colleagues’ central question – whether expenditure-based or tax-based austerity is better for growth – is irrelevant, since there’s no good reason for austerity at all. 

In a world of chronically low interest rates and active central banks, government debt just isn’t a problem. At one point, this was a fringe position but today it’s been accepted by economists with as impeccable mainstream credentials as Olivier Blanchard, Lawrence Summers and Jason Furman – the former chief economist of the IMF, Treasury Secretary and chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, respectively. But not by Alesina, who just goes on singing the same old songs.

The pro-austerity arguments in this book will therefore face more of a headwind than they did when Alesina made them a decade ago. “Sound finance” is no longer the pillar of elite opinion it once was. As we write this, Christine Lagarde, the new head of the European Central Bank, is calling for European governments to spend more during downturns – something hard to imagine when Alesina’s ideas were in vogue. In the US, meanwhile, concerns about the federal debt seem almost passe.

This is progress, from our point of view. The intellectual case for austerity has collapsed, and this book will do little to rebuild it. But that has not yet led to an expansion of public spending – let alone one large enough to restore genuine full employment and meet the challenge of climate change and other urgent social needs. The austerity machinery of the euro system and IMF still churns away, grinding out misery and unemployment across southern Europe and elsewhere, even if it no longer commands the general assent that it once did. At the level of ideas, Keynesian economists can point to real gains in the decade since the crisis. At the level of concrete policy, the work has barely begun.

Can We Afford a Green New Deal?

[I was at an event the other night bringing together people from the economic-policy and climate activism worlds. I was asked to talk about the macroeconomic case for a Green New Deal, and the question of “how do we pay for it?” Here is a somewhat extended and edited version of my remarks.]

Most of the Democratic candidates now have plans for major public investment programs to deal with the challenge of climate change. These involve spending on the order of 2 percent of GDP on average, ranging from half a percent for Beto O’Rourke up to 4 percent for Bernie Sanders.  

A question that will get asked about any of these plans is, how do we pay for it? Can we afford it?

We might simply reject the question, on the grounds that what we cannot afford is to continue dumping carbon into the atmosphere. Any plan to substantially reduce carbon emissions will pass any reasonable cost-benefit test.

But I think we should answer the “pay for it” question. It has a good answer!

The question is really two questions:

– How can federal government finance it? – what new money coming in will match the new money going out?

– Are the real resources available, or will we have to sacrifice production in other areas?

On first question, given that low interest rates now seem to be a permanent feature of our world, it is very hard to make a an argument that additional borrowing on the scale of 2, 3 or even 4 percent of GDP would be economically costly. When interest rates are below GDP growth rates, the debt-to-GDP ratio stabilzies on its own, even if you run deficits forever. Unlike in the 1980s and 1990s, when interest rates were higher, today it is impossible for public debt to snowball out of control.

If it has no effect on growth, additional debt-financed spending of 2 percent of GDP would bring the debt-GDP ratio to about 105 percent in 2030. Debt-financed spending of 4 percent of GDP would bring the ratio to 125 percent. Looking around the world, or at history, there is just no evidence that debt at that level has any economic costs. The US ended World War II with a debt ratio of about 120 percent of GDP, the UK over 200 percent. Japan today has a debt ratio of 250 percent of GDP, while France and Belgium have debt ratios around 100 percent. None of these countries have seen any of the negative consequences – spiking interest rates, rising inflation, a collapsing exchange rate — that are supposed to follow from excessive government debt. Quite the opposite, in fact.

And if there is any boost to growth from additional spending – any role for what economists call called hysteresis — then the debt ratio would be even smaller. If we take a standard estimate of the multiplier — the boost to GDP from an additional dollar of public spending — of 1.5, and assume half of that effect is permanent, then debt-financed public spending can actually leave the debt ratio lower than it would be otherwise. In which case the new spending would fully pay for itself, even without any new revenue. Of course there is a lot of uncertainty around these questions – I wouldn’t promise an effect on growth that large. But it doesn’t seem crazy to think that a program public investment could substantially raise the economy’s productive potential. 

If we do want to raise revenue, there is also plenty of space for taxes on very high incomes and wealth, or a carbon tax, or other taxes that are socially desirable for their own sake, to finance some substantial portion of a decarbonization program. A recent very thorough study of the space for high-end income and wealth taxes by a couple of professors at NYU identified taxes that could raise over 2 percent of GDP on a very targeted base of the highest incomes. A wealth tax, again targeted at the very richest households, could raise another 2 percent or so. These are taxes we would like to raise anyway, because great concentrations of income and wealth are bad for our democracy and for our society. (There’s even evidence they are bad for our health.) So if we can finance decarbonization this way, we shouldn’t see it as a cost.

We often hear that it’s a fantasy to say that decarbonization will be economically costless, that it isn’t realistic to talk about spending on this scale without broad-based tax increases, without sacrifices by the middle class households. But this is crackpot realism. Of course there will be costs in particular carbon-intensive sectors of the economy. But the notion that investing in decarbonization necessarily requires sacrifices by working people in general, or painful choices about the federal budget, is just not borne out by the numbers. 

On the real resources side, the critical point is that by any measure, the US economy has operated below potential for the large majority of the time in recent decades. Taking official statistics at face value, since 1980 there have been 192 months when the unemployment rate was more than one point above the NAIRU – the unemployment rate targeted by the Fed. There have been only 18 months when it was more than one point below. It took a full seven years after the last downturn for output to return to official estimate of potential. The total shortfall equaled 25 percent of GDP. 

Even the most ambitious climate plan would have been barely enough spending to fill that gap.

And there are lots of reasons to think that these official measure understates economic potential. GDP today is more than 10 percent below what was forecast a decade ago. Labor force participation still significantly down from a decade, even among those 25-54 – prime working-age adults. Inflation is still below target. Wage growth is still slow. Almost any alternative measure you can think of suggests that the economy is running well below potential even today, and that there is enough slack for a substantial program of public investment without the need to reduce production of anything else.

Even if we think the economy is operating at normal capacity today, there are major social benefits to letting demand push up against capacity – to running the economy hot. There is strong evidence that the only way you get a rise in the wage share and especially a rise in wages at the lower end, is with sustained very low unemployment – what people call a high-pressure economy. Consistent with that, we’ve begun to see some recovery in wages at the bottom of the distribution in the past couple years. This is welcome, but it’s nowhere enough to make up for losses in previous years. For that, we still need more spending, stronger demand.

And that’s today. In a few years, we are likely to want more spending much more. 

Today many people are talking about the possibility of recession within next year or so. Nobody except for a few cranks is talking about a sudden surge of inflation, or sudden takeoff of wages.

If there is a recession, the ability of the Fed and other central banks to offset a fall in demand is gong to be even more limited this time than it was in the last recession. In past recessions, the Fed has typically reduced rates by 5 points, and this has still not been enough to stabilize demand. Now we will be starting from a federal funds rate of only 2 percent, giving room for only 2 points of cuts. And there is good reason to think that the economy is less sensitive to changes in the policy rate than we used to believe. Central bankers themselves are quite clear that we will need more public spending in a recession. When Fed chair Jay Powell testified before Congress earlier this summer, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez asked him what he would do in the event of another deep recession. He said monetary policy would not be enough, that the Fed would need help from fiscal policy – from the federal government spending more. Christine Lagarde, in her first public comments after being appointed head of the European Central Bank, said the same thing, that governments in the eurozone needed to spend more to boost demand. The central bank can’t be “the only game in town,” she said.

One of the big lessons of the stimulus debates in the last recession is that it is very hard to ramp up public spending in a hurry. There are not a lot of “shovel ready” projects out there waiting for someone to just start writing checks. So if we think we are going to need a big boost to public spending in the near future, we had better begin ramping it up now. 

Many discussions of the cost of responding to climate change start from the idea that we are fully using our resources. If this were true, we’d have to ask how much consumption is worth giving up today in order to maintain a habitable planet in the future. Obviously the answer should be: A lot! But we don’t have to ask the question, because it isn’t true. We are living in a world where we are not using all our real resources, because of a lack of demand. Some people call this secular stagnation.  We are living in a world where the central macroeconomic problem is that there is too little spending to fully utilize the economy’s productive potential – not just occasionally in recessions, but all the time, or at least on average. 

Some people will say to this: Ok, we agree that the economy is running below capacity. We agree there is space to add more federal debt, and to raise taxes on the rich. Still, you could use that space for anything. It’s not a case for Green New Deal specifically.

This sounds superficially reasonable, but I don’t think it’s right. Because the evidence of recent history suggests that we won’t use that space.

Almost everyone today agrees that stimulus in last recession was too small — and that even if it might have been big enough in the abstract, it was offset by massive anti-stimulus at the state-local level. The situation in Europe is even worse, with deep austerity almost everywhere, with the result that countries like Italy have lower GDP than a decade ago. Even when mainstream economists say there is actually a case for deficit spending and not to worry about balanced budgets, it turns out to be very hard to get the political system to listen.

If we don’t use our productive capacity and our financial capacity for a Green New Deal, it’s very likely we won’t use it for anything.

The discussion  of public budgets, among economists and much of the media and policy world, has not caught up to reality. We still talk about governments being subject to deficit bias – that’s a term of art in the macroeconomics literature, used to justify all kinds of rules to restrict government spending. We have this idea that without some sort of hard external constraint, elected officials are going to declare it’s Christmas every day and shovel money out the door on anything popular. We assume that you need some sort of disciplining device to force policymakers to make hard choices, or else they will just try to spend without limit. But governments today don’t suffer from deficit bias. On the contrary: The problem is austerity bias. For whatever reason governments refuse to spend even when the economic case for it is overwhelming. 

This isn’t just a wasted opportunity for all sorts of valuable public spending. It imposes real costs in slower growth, fewer jobs, lower wages. And slow growth and low employment and wages have political costs too, as we know. 

In this environment, it’s wrong to think about tradeoffs and making hard choices. This may sound strange coming from an economists, but it’s wrong to think about opportunity costs. The question is not, why should we do this rather than that? The question is, how do we break through the logjam that stops us from doing anything at all?

One of the unique things about climate change is that it may be a crisis urgent enough to overcome the entrenched austerity bias of governments, and to push public spending up toward the level needed to get true full employment. It may be the only thing urgent enough other than a major war — which we certainly do not want. 

So when we look at the cost of the climate proposals out there against today’s macroeconomic background, the question should not be, are they too expensive? The question should be: Are they expensive enough? 

A Baker’s Dozen of Reasons Not to Worry about Government Debt

(EDIT: It’s not sufficiently clear in the original post, but I wrote this as a sort of compendium of arguments one might use in response to claims that the federal debt is a binding constraint on new spending. I’m not saying these are the best or only reasons to reject the idea that federal government cannot borrow more. I’m saying that these are arguments that seem to have some traction in the mainstream policy world, such that you could use them in a newspaper op-ed or conversation with a congress member’s staff. Also, a premise here is that there are urgent needs we want the public sector to spend more on. Apart from the last couple, these are not arguments for more public dbet as an end in itself.)

 

Why might larger budget deficits be ok?

There are a number of reasons why economists, policymakers and advocates believe that increased public borrowing is not something to be afraid of. As I’ll discuss below, the fundamental factor linking most of these reasons is the idea that the US economy is generally operating below capacity.

When we think about the fiscal balance – the difference between government spending and government revenue – we always have to keep in mind that it has two sides: the real side and the financial side. Whenever the government increases spending, it has two kinds of effects. First, all else equal, it increases the amount of government debt in circulation. And second, it increases demand for goods and services, both directly when the government buys them and indirectly as government spending creates incomes for private businesses and households. 

To put it another way, for government to successfully raise spending without raising taxes, two things have to be true. First, someone – banks, wealthy families, foreign countries – has to be willing to hold the additional debt that the government issues. And second, someone has to be prepared to sell whatever it is that the government is trying to buy. If we are asking what kinds of limits there might be to deficit spending, we have to think about both sides. A government’s spending may face financial constraints, if people are unwilling to hold more of its debt; or real constraints, if the economy cannot produce the additional goods and services it is trying to buy.

Some people who think higher deficits are not a problem – particularly those associated with Modern Monetary Theory – believe that the US federal government never faces financial constraints, so only the real constraints matter. Others believe that the federal government might in principle face financial constraints, but there are good reasons to think that they are not an issue today. For policy purposes, the difference between these positions may not be very important.

On the real constraint side, the essential question is how close the economy is to potential output, or full employment. (The two terms are used interchanegably.) In an economy operating at potential, government can only increase its spending f the private sector reduces its spending. This “crowding out” is the real cost of increased public spending. In an economy below potential, on the other hand, the goods and services purchased by increased public spending come from mobilizing unused productive capacity, so there is no crowding out. In. fact, if the fiscal multiplier is big enough (greater than one) then increased purchases of goods and services by the public sector will result in more goods and services being purchased by the private sector as well.

Below, I lay out a baker’s dozen of related arguments for why, from a macroeconomic perspective, we should welcome increased debt-financed public spending. Some people who believe in greater public borrowing would accept all of these arguments; some only some of them. 

Real-economy arguments for more public borrowing

1. The economy generally operates below potential. Over the past 30 years, there have been three recessions, each followed by a long period of weak growth and high unemployment. By official measures, in 10 of the past 30 years GDP has been at least two points below potential; there have been only six months when it was more than two points above potential. And there has been no periods of high inflation. This suggests that in general, the economy is not running at full capacity; there is additional productive potential that could be mobilized by higher public spending, without crowding out private spending. In that sense, there is no real cost to higher public spending, and no need top offset it with higher taxes. Even better, higher public spending will help close the output gap and raise private spending as well.

2. There are long run forces pushing down demand. Larry Summers famously reintroduced into the economic conversation the idea of secular stagnation – that there is a long-run tendency for private spending to fall short of the economy’s productive potential. There are many reasons we might expect private spending to be lower, relative to national income, in the future than in the past. Among these: increased monopoly power; the shift toward information-based rather than resource-intensive production; increased shareholder power; a more unequal distribution of income; slower population growth; and the satiation of demand for market consumption, in favor of leisure and nonmarket activities. (The first three of these factors tend to reduce investment spending, the last  three consumption spending.)  If this idea is correct, the demand shortfalls of the past thirty years are not an anomaly, and we should expect them to grow larger in the future.

3. Potential output is mismeasured; we are still well below it. Even by the conventional measures of unemployment and potential output, the US economy has spent far more time in recent decades below target than above it. But if the target is mismeasured, the problem may be even worse. There are good reasons to think that both productivity and laborforce growth over the past decade have been depressed by weak demand. If this is the case, the US economy even at the height of a supposed boom, may in fact be operating well below potential today. The fact that  even with measured unemployment below 4 percent wage growth has accelerated only modestly, and inflation has not accelerated at all, is important evidence for this view.

4. Recessions and jobless recoveries have occurred repeatedly in past, will occur again in the future. Whether or not the US economy is at potential today, the current expansion will not continue forever. Recessions have occurred in the past and will occur in the future. Many forecasts believe there is a high risk of recession is likely in the relatively near future; the fact that the Fed is moving toward cutting rates suggests that they share this view. When thinking about what fiscal balance is appropriate, we need to consider not just where the economy is today but where it is likely to be in coming years.

5. Monetary policy is not effective at maintaining full employment. In the past, weak demand and recessions weren’t considered an argument for more public spending because it was assumed that a central bank following the correct policy rule could quickly return the economy to full employment. But it is increasingly clear that central banks do not have the tools (and perhaps the willingness) to precent extended periods of weak demand. It is increasingly recognized that fiscal policy is also required to stabilize demand. In his July testimony before Congress, Fed chair Jerome Powell said explicitly that in the event of another deep recession, the Fed would need help from fiscal policy. One important reason for this is the problem of the zero lower bound – since the policy interest rate cannot be set below zero, there is a limit to how far the Fed can lower it in a recession.

6. It’s hard to ramp up public spending quickly in recession. Orthodox opinion has long been that fiscal policy is not as effective as monetary policy in a recession because it takes much longer to ramp up public spending than to cut interest rates. While the experience of the Great Recession undermined conventional wisdom on many points, it supported it on this one. The ARRA stimulus bill was supposed to direct spending to “shovel-ready” projects, but in fact the majority of the infrastructure spending funded by the bill came several years after it passed. There are many institutional obstacles to increasing public spending rapidly. This means that if we need higher public spending in a recession, the best thing is to have higher spending all the time. If that leads to an overheating economy in the boom, that is an easier problem for the Fed to solve then a deep recession.

7. The costs of getting demand wrong are not symmetrical. Traditionally policymakers have defined their goal as keeping output as close to potential as possible. But it is increasingly clear that the costs of demand falling short are greater than the costs of demand overshooting potential. One reason for this is the previous point – that conventional policy has an easier time reining in excessive demand than stimulating weak demand. (As the old saying has it, “you can’t push on a string.”) A second reason is that demand has effects that go beyond the level of output. In particular, strong demand and low unemployment redistribute income toward workers from owners, and toward lower-wage workers in particular. Periods of weak demand, conversely, reduce the share of income going to workers. If we think the upward redistribution of income over the past generation is a problem, we should prefer to let demand overshoot potential than fall short of it.

8. Weak demand may have permanent effects on potential output. Traditionally, economists saw the economy’s long-term growth as being completely independent of demand conditions. People spending more money might raise production and employment today, but the long-term growth of potential output depended on structural factors – demographics, technological change, and so on. More recently, however, there has been renewed interest in the idea that weak demand can reduce potential output, an effect known as hysteresis. high unemployment may lead more people to drop out of the laborforce, while low unemployment may lead more people to enter the laborforce (or immigrate from abroad.) Strong demand may also lead to faster productivity growth. If hysteresis is real, then demand shortfalls don’t reduce output and employment this year, but potentially many years in the future as well. This is another reason to be more worried about demand falling short than overshooting, hence another reason to prefer a more expansionary fiscal stance, which normally implies more public borrowing.

Financial arguments for more public borrowing

9. With low interest rates, debt does not snowball. Traditionally, concerns about the financing of government spending have focused on whether debt is “sustainable” – whether debt levels will stabilize as a fraction of GDP, or rise without limit. When interest rates are greater than GDP growth rates, this implies a hard limit to government borrowing – to keep the debt-GDP ratio on a stable path, a deficit in one year must be made up for by a larger surplus in a future year. Otherwise, the interest on the existing debt will imply more and more borrowing, with the debt-GDP ratio rising without limit. But when interest rates on government debt are below growth rates, as they have been for the past 25 years, the debt ratio will stabilize on its own – deficits do not have to be offset with surpluses. This makes much of the earlier concern with debt sustainability obsolete.

10. There is good reason to think interest rates will remain low. There are a number of reasons to think that interest rates on public debt are likely to remain low, even if debt ratios rise considerably higher. First, low interest rates reflect the conditions of chronic weak demand discussed above, for two reasons. First, low investment means less demand for borrowed funds. And second, weak demand means that the interest rate set by the central bank is likely to be low. A second reason to expect low interest rates to continue is that the past ten years have repeatedly falsified predictions of bond vigilantes driving up the rates on government debt. Prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, many observers expected a catastrophic flight by investors away from US government debt and the dollar, but in fact, the crisis saw a steep fall interest rates on government debt and a rise in the dollar, as investors all over the world rushed to the safety of Treasury debt. Similarly, in Europe, even in the worst crisis-hit countries like Greece, interest rates are at their lowest point in history. Similarly Japan, with one of the highest debt0-GDP ratios ever recorded (about triple that of the US) continues to borrow at very low rats. Third, the experience of the past ten years have made it clear that even if investors were to demand higher interest rates on government debt, modern central banks can easily overcome this. The most dramatic illustration of this came in the summer of 2012, when a public statement by European Central bank chief Mario Draghi “we will do whatever it takes, and believe me, it will be enough”) reversed the spike in interest rates in countries like Italy, Spain and Portugal practically overnight. Finally, the prices of bonds — with hardly any premium for 30 year bonds over 5 and 10 year maturities — show that private investors do not expect a rise in interest rates any time in the foreseeable future.

11. With hysteresis, higher public borrowing can pay for itself. Even if we are concerned about lowering the debt-GDP ratio, the existence of hysteresis (point 8 above) means that cutting public borrowing is necessarily the right way to get there. In a world where the long-term path of GDP depends on aggregate demand, austerity can be self-defeating even in its own narrow financial terms. If lower public spending reduces demand, then it can lead to lower GDP, potentially raising the debt to GDP ratio even if it succeeds in reducing debt. Greece offers a clear example of this – the fiscal surpluses between 2010 and 2015 succeeded in reducing government debt by 5 percent, but the deep austerity contributed to a fall in GDP of 25 percent. So the debt-GDP ratio actually rose. Similarly, if debt-financed public spending leads to faster growth, the debt-GDP ratio may end up lower than otherwise. 

12. Federal debt is an important asset for financial markets. The points up to now have been arguments for why higher public debt is acceptable. But there is also an argument that increased public debt would be a positive good. Financial markets depend on Treasury debt as a safe, liquid asset. Federal government debt offers an absolutely safe asset that can always be sold quickly and at a predictable price – something that is extremely valuable for banks and other financial institutions. There is a strong argument that the growth of the mortgage-backed security market in the 2000s was fundamentally driven by a scarcity of government debt – many financial institutions wanted (or were compelled by regulation) to hold a substantial amount of ultrasafe, liquid debt, and there was not enough government debt in circulation to meet this demand. So financial markets came up with mortgage-backed securities as a supposed alternative – with disastrous results. Similarly, after the recession, one argument for why the recovery was so slow was a “safe asset shortage” – financial institutions were unwilling to make risky loans without  holdings of ultrasafe assets to balance them. While these concerns have receded today, there is still good reason to expect a “flight to safety” toward Treasury debt in the event of a new crisis, and government debt remains important for settling many financial contracts and pricing other assets. So strange as it may sound, there is a serious argument – made by, among others, Nobel prize winner Jean Tirole in his book on financial liquidity — that increased government borrowing would make the financial system more stable and increase access to credit for other borrowers.

13. Federal debt is an important asset for the rest of the world. Federal debt is an important asset not just for the US financial system, but for the rest of the world. In today’s dollar-based international system, the great majority of international trade and investment is denominated in dollars, and most foreign-exchange transactions involve dollars. As a result, central banks (and private financial institutions) all over the world hold foreign-exchange reserves primarily in the form of dollars. These dollar reserves are mainly held in the form of Treasury debt. Close to half of federal debt is now held abroad, mainly as reserves by foreign governments. These holdings are essential for the stability of the international financial system – without adequate reserves, countries are vulnerable to sudden flows of “hot money” out of their countries. As Barry Eichengreen – perhaps the leading economic historian of the international financial system, — has noted, a deep market for government is an essential requirement for a currency to serve as the global reserve currency. If the US is going to be a responsible partner for the rest of the world — and continue reaping the benefits of being at the center of the global economy — it needs to provide an adequate supply of safe government debt for the rest of the world to hold as reserves.

 (I wrote this document for internal use at the Roosevelt Institute. Figured I might as well put it up here as well. Obviously it would benefit from links to supporting material, which I may add at some point.)

The Return of the Renter

Every month, the Census releases new numbers on new housing construction. As an indicator of current economic conditions, June’s numbers didn’t give any dramatic news one way or another. But they did highlight a trend that I think should get more attention: the decline of single-family housing in the US.

To market watchers, housing is an important sign of business cycle turning points. A well-known article argues that Housing Is the Business Cycle.  From this point of view, June’s numbers were not very informative. They told the same story the last several months’ did: After steadily rising from the end of the recession, housing construction has stabilized — housing starts and permits issued have been basically unchanged since early 2017. Last month’s housing starts were almost exactly the same as last summer’s. The fact that housing construction is no longer rising might perhaps be seen as a sign of economic weakness; but it’s hard to take it as a sign of a crisis or imminent downturn.But pulling back from the month by month variation, the most recent numbers reflect two related trends that may be more important than the ups and downs of the business cycle.

The first trend is the secular decline in housing construction. Housing starts, while higher than  a few years ago, are still very low by historical standards — not just compared with the boom period of the 2000s, but with most earlier periods as well. On a per capita basis, new housing construction is at a level seen only at the bottom of the worst recessions before 2007.  Compared with an annual average of 6.5 new units per thousand people in the 1980s and 1990s, the current rate is less than 4 per thousand, and shows no sign of returning to the old rate.

It’s hard to say how much this decline in new housing construction is a specifically post-bubble-and-crisis phenomenon, and how much it reflects longer-term trends. People sometimes suggest that low rates of housing construction are the flipside of the housing boom of the 2000s. There was a strong case for this in the years immediately after the recession, when the fraction of vacant houses was well above historical levels. But since then, the inventory of vacant houses has come down toward more normal levels.

Meanwhile, if we look at new housing construction per capita over a longer period, there is a fairly steady long-term decline – it’s not clear that the most recent period is exceptional. If you draw an exponential trend from 1959 through 1999 (the start of the housing bubble), as shown in the figure below, the current level of housing starts falls right on that trend. And relative to the shortfall in new construction during 2008-2015 is not too much greater than the excess of new construction during 1999-2007. To put it another way, the percentage decline in housing starts per capita over the past 20 years, is not much bigger than the average decline over any 20 year period since the 1950s. 

Of course, this is just one way of looking at the numbers. There are many ways to draw a trend! And one might argue that, historically, the top of a boom should see new housing starts well above trend, suggesting that the recent decline is something new after all. You might also reasonably wonder whether the long term trend has any substantive meaning at all. The political economy of housing the 1950s and 1960s was different from today on all sorts of levels. It wouldn’t be hard to look at the same data in terms of a structural break, rather than — or in addition to — a downward trend.

For macroeconomic purposes, though, it doesn’t necessarily matter. Whether it reflects the ongoing effects of the subprime crisis  or whether it reflects longer-term factors — slowing population growth, an aging population, the end of suburbanization – or whether it’s some mix of both, the decline in new housing construction remains an important economic fact.

Among other things, it is important for macroeconomic policy. Mortgage lending is central to the financial system: Housing accounts for over 70 percent of household debt, and housing finance plays a central role in financial instability. Conversely, residential construction is the economic sector most sensitive to financial conditions, and to monetary policy in particular. So the shrinking weight of housing in the economy may be a factor in the Federal Reserve’s inability to restore growth and full employment after the crisis. Looking forward, if conventional monetary policy works primarily through residential construction, and residential construction is a permanently smaller part of the economy, that is another argument for broadening the Fed’s toolkit.

Housing construction may be down for the count, at least compared with historical levels. But — and this is the second trend – it is not down across the board. The recent decline is limited to single family housing. Multifamily construction has been quite strong, at least by the standards of the post-1990 period. Compared with the two decades before 2007, single-unit housing starts in the past year are down by a third. Multifamily starts are up by a third. Per capita multifamily housing starts are actually higher than they were at the height of the housing boom. These divergent trends imply a major shift in the composition of new housing. Through much of the 1990s, less than 10 percent of new housing was in multifamily projects. Today, the share is more like 30 percent. This is a dramatic change in the mix of housing being added, a shift change visible across much of the country in the form of suddenly-ubiquitous six-story woodframe apartment buildings. The most recent housing data released suggests that, if anything, this trend is still gathering steam: A full third of new housing in June was in multifamily buildings, an even higher proportion than we’ve seen in recent years. In the areas that the Census designates as metropolitan cores, the shift is even more dramatic, with the majority of new housing units now found in multifamily buildings. 

The shift in new construction away from single-family houses is consistent with the decline in homeownership. At 64 percent of households, the share of homeowners is 5 points lower than it was in the mid-2000s. In fact it’s back almost exactly where it was 30 years ago, before the big expansion in homeownership of the 1990s and 2000s. 

To be sure, multifamily housing and rental housing are not the same thing. But there is a very substantial overlap. Over 80 percent of detached single-family homes are owned by their occupants. Less than 20 percent of units in larger buildings are, and the share drops as the number of units in the building rises. While homeownership rates have fallen across the board over the past decade, these relative patterns have not changed. (See the figure below.) So it’s fair to say that the decline of homeownership and the shift toward multifamily developments are, if not the same trend, at least closely linked.The aggregate figures understate the decline in homeownership, because over this period the population has also been aging, and older families are much more likely to own their homes. (For a good discussion of these trends, see here.) For younger families, homeownership rates are lower than they have been in many decades. Compared with 40 years ago, homeownership rates are substantially lower for every age group except those 65 or older. Even compared with a decade ago, there has been a substantial fall in homeownership rates in younger age groups. As a result, the typical homeowner today is much older than in the past. Only a quarter of US homeowners today are younger than 45, compared with nearly half in the 1980s.

The same pattern is visible over the post-housing crash period, as shown in the figure below. Among those aged 30-44 – the ages when most Americans are starting families – the rate of homeownership is nearly 10 points lower than it was just a decade ago. The shift in housing construction toward multifamily buildings reflects the fact that Americans in their prime working years are much more likely to be renters than they used to be. This shift is important for politics as well as the economy. Tenant organizations were once an important vehicle for mass politics in American cities. In the progressive imagination of a century ago, workers were squeezed from one side by landlords and high rents just as they were squeezed from the other by bosses and low wages.   

After World War II, the focus of housing politics shifted away from tenants’ rights, and toward broadening access to home ownership. This shift reflected a genuine expansion of homeownership to middle class and working class families, thanks to a range of public supports — supports, it should be noted, from from which African-Americans were largely excluded. But it also reflected a larger vision of democratic politics in terms of a world of small property owners. Homeowners were expected — not without reason — to be more conservative, more ready to imagine themselves on the side of property owners in general. As William Levitt, developer of the iconic Long Island suburb, is supposed to have said: “No man who owns his own house and lot can be a communist.”

The idea of a property-owning democracy has deep roots in the American political imagination, and can be part of a progressive vision as well as a conservative one. Baby bonds – an endowment or grant given to everyone at the start of their life — are supposed to be a way to broaden property ownership in a way that opens up rather than shuts down possibilities for radical change. Here for example is Darrick Hamilton in his 2018 TED Talk. “Wealth,” he says, 

is the paramount indicator of economic security and well-being. It provides financial agency, economic security… We use words like choice, freedom to describe the benefits of the market, but it is literally wealth that gives us choice, freedom and optionality. Wealthier families are better positioned to finance an elite, independent school and college education, access capital to start a business, finance expensive medical procedures, reside in neighborhoods with higher amenities… Basically, when it comes to economic security, wealth is both the beginning and the end.

Descriptively, there’s certainly some truth to this. And with homes by far the most important form of middle-class wealth, policies to promote homeownership have been supported on exactly these grounds. Homeowners enjoy more security, stability, a cushion against financial setbacks, and the ability to pass their social position on to their children. The policy problem, from this point of view, is simply to ensure that everyone gets to enjoy these benefits. 

One way to keep people secure in their homes is to allow more people to own them. This has been the focus of US housing policy for most of the past century. But another way is to give tenants more of the protections that only homeowners currently enjoy. Outside a few major cities, renting has been assumed to be a transitory stage in the lifecycle, so there was little reason to worry about security of tenure for renters. A few years ago I was a guest on a radio show on rent control, and I suggested that apart from affordability,  an important goal of rent regulation was to protect people’s right to remain in their homes. The host was genuinely startled: “I’ve never heard someone say that a person has the right to remain in their home whether they own it or not.”

There are still plenty of people who see the decline in homeownership as a problem to be solved. But the shift in the housing stock toward multifamily units suggests that the trend toward increased  renting is unlikely to be reversed any time soon. (And even many single-family homes are now owned by investors.) The experience of the past 15 years suggests that, in any case, home ownership offers less security than we used to think.

If more and more Americans remain renters through their adult lives, the relationship with the landlords may again approach the relationship with the employer in political salience. Strengthening protections for tenants may again be the basis of political mobilization. And people may become more open to the idea that living in a place, whether or not you own it, gives you a moral claim on it — as beautifully dramatized, for example, in the 2019 movie The Last Black Man in San Francisco. 

We may already be seeing this shift in the political sphere. In recent years, there has been a resurgence of support for rent regulation. A ballot measure for statewide rent control failed in California, but various bills to extend or strengthen local rent regulation have gotten significant support. Oregon recently passed the nation’s first statewide rent control measure. And in New York, Governor Cuomo signed into law a sweeping bill strengthening rent regulation where it already exists — mainly New York City – and opening the way for municipalities around the state to pass their own rent regulations.

The revival of rent regulation reflects, in the first instance, political conditions – in New York, years of dogged organizing work by grassroots coalitions, as well as the primary defeats of most of the so-called Independent Democratic Conference, nominal Democrats who caucused with Republicans and gave them control of the State Senate. But it is not diminishing the hard work by rent-regulation supporters to suggest that the housing-market shift toward rentals made the terrain more favorable for them. When nearly half the population are renters, as in New York State, there is likely to be more support for rent regulation. The same dynamic no doubt played a role in the opposition to Amazon’s new headquarters in Queens: For most residents, higher property values meant higher rents, not windfall gains. 

To be sure, the United States is not (yet) New York. The majority of American families still live in homes they own. But as the new housing numbers remind us, it’s a smaller majority than it used to be, and likely to get even smaller in the future. Which suggests that, along with measures to democratize property-ownership, there is a future for measures like rent control, to ensure that non-property owners also have a secure claim on their part of our common wealth.


(Figures 1, 3 and 4 are my analysis of series from FRED: HOUST, HOUST1F, COMPUTSA, and POPTHM. Figure 2 is from the Census Housing and Vacancy Survey. Figures 5 and 6 are my analysis of ACS data.) 

Good News on the Economy, Bad News on Economic Policy

(Cross-posted from the Roosevelt Institute blog. I am hoping to start doing these kinds of posts on new economic data somewhat regularly.)

On Friday, the the Bureau of Labor Statistics released the unemployment figures for May. As expected, the reported unemployment rate was very low—3.6 percent, the same as last month. Combined with the steady growth in employment over the past few years, this level of unemployment—not seen since the 1960s—suggests an exceptionally strong labor market by historical standards.  On one level this really is good news for the economy. But at the same time it is very bad news for economic policy: The fact that employment this low is possible, shows that we have fallen even farther short of full employment in earlier years than we thought.

Some skeptics, of course, will cast doubts on how meaningful the BLS numbers are. The headline unemployment rate, they will argue, understates true slack in the labor market; many of the jobs being created are low-wage and insecure; workers’ overall position is still weak and precarious by historical standards.

This is all true. But it is also true that the unemployment numbers are not an isolated outlier. Virtually every other measure also suggests a labor market that is relatively favorable to workers, at least by the standards of the past 20 years. 

The broader unemployment measures published by the BLS, while higher than the headline rate, have come down more or less in lockstep with it. (The new release shows that the BLS’s broadest measure of unemployment, U-6, continued to decline in May, thanks to a steep fall in the number of people working part-time because they can’t find full-time work.) The labor force participation rate, after declining for a number of years, has now started to trend back upward, suggesting that  people who might have given up on finding a job a few years ago are once again finding it worthwhile to look for one. The fraction of workers voluntarily quitting their jobs, at 2.3 percent, is now higher than it ever got during the previous business cycle. The quit rate is a good measure of labor market tightness—one of former Fed chair Janet Yellen’s preferred measures—because it shows you how people evaluate their own job prospects; people are much more likely to quit their current job if they expect to get a better one. Reported job openings, a longstanding measure of labor market conditions, are at their highest level on record, with employers reporting that nearly 5 percent of positions are unfilled. Wage growth, which was nowhere to be seen well into the official recovery, has finally begun to pick up, with wage growth noticeably faster since 2016 than in the first six years of the expansion. In the nonfinancial business sector—where the shares of labor and capital are most easily measured—the share of value added going to labor has finally begun to tick up, from a steady 57 percent from 2011 to 2014 up to 59 percent by 2017. Though still far short of the 65 percent of value added claimed by labor at the height of the late-1990s boom, the recent increase does suggest an environment in which bargaining power has at last begun to shift in favor of workers.

For progressives, it can be a challenge to talk about the strengthening labor market. Our first instinct is often to call attention to the ways in which workers’ position is still worse than it was a generation ago, and to all the ways that the labor market is still rigged in favor of employers. This instinct is not wrong, but it is only one side of the picture. At the same time, we need to call attention to the real gains to working people from a high-pressure economy—one where aggregate demand is running ahead of available labor.

A high-pressure economy is especially important for those at the back of the hiring queue. People sometimes say that full employment is fine, but that it doesn’t help people of color, younger people, or those without college degrees. This thinking, however, is backwards. It is educated white men with plenty of experience whose job prospects depend least on overall labor market conditions; their employment prospects are good whether overall unemployment rates are high or low. It is those at the back of the hiring queue—Black Americans, those who have received less education, people with criminal records, and others discriminated against by potential employers—who depend much more on a strong labor market. The Atlanta Fed’s useful wage tracker shows this clearly: Wage growth for lower-wage, non-white, and less-educated workers lagged behind that of college-educated white workers during the high-unemployment years following the recession. Since 2016, however, that pattern has reversed, with the biggest wage gains for nonwhite workers and those at the bottom of the wage distribution. This pattern has been documented in careful empirical work by Josh Bivens and Ben Zipperer of the Economic Policy Institute, who show that, historically, tight labor markets have disproportionately benefited Black workers and raised wages most at the bottom.

Does this mean we should be satisfied with the state of macroeconomic policy—if not in every detail, at least with its broad direction?

No, it means just the opposite. Labor markets do seem to be doing well today. But that only shows that macroeconomic performance over the past decade was even worse than we thought.

This is true in a precise sense. Macroeconomic policy always aims at keeping the economy near some target. Whether we define the target as potential output or full employment, the goal of policy is to keep the actual level of activity as close to it as possible. But we can’t see the target directly. We know how high gross domestic product (GDP) growth is or how low unemployment is, but we don’t know how high or how low they could be. Everyone agrees that the US fell short of full employment for much of the past decade, but we don’t know how far short. Every month that the US records an unemployment rate below 4 percent suggests that these low unemployment rates are indeed sustainable. Which means that they should be the benchmark for full employment. Which also means that the economy fell that much further short of full employment in the years after the 2008-2009 recession—and, indeed, in the years before it.

For example: In 2014, the headline unemployment rate averaged 6.2 percent. At that time, the benchmark for full employment (technically, the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, or NAIRU) used by the federal government was 4.8 percent, suggesting a 1.4 point shortfall, equivalent to 2.2 million excess people out of work. But let’s suppose that today’s unemployment rate of 3.6 percent is sustainable—which it certainly seems to be, given that it is, in fact, being sustained. Then the unemployment rate in 2014 wasn’t 1.4 points too high but 2.6 points too high, which is nearly twice as big of a gap as policymakers thought at the time. Again, this implies that the failure of demand management after the Great Recession was even worse than we thought.

And not just after it. For most of the previous expansion, unemployment was above 5 percent, and the labor share was falling. At the time, this was considered full employment – indeed, the self-congratulation over the so-called Great Moderation and “amazing success” of economic policy reached a crescendo in this period. But if a perofrmance like today’s was possible then — and why shouldn’t it have been? — then what policymakers were actually presiding over was an extended stagnation. As Minnesota Fed chair Narayan Kocherlakota – one of the the few people at the economic-policy high table who seems to have learned something from the past decade – points out, the US “output gap has been negative for almost the entirety of the current millenium.”

These mistakes have consequences. For years now, we have been repeatedly told that the US is at or above full employment—claims that have been repeatedly proved wrong as the labor market continues to strengthen. Only three years ago, respectable opinion dismissed the idea that, with sufficient stimulus, the unemployment could fall below 4 percent as absurd. As a result, we spent years talking about how to rein in demand and bring down the deficit, when in retrospect it is clear that we should have been talking about big new public spending programs to boost demand.

This, then, is a lesson we can draw from today’s strong unemployment numbers. Strong economic growth does improve the bargaining position of workers relative to employers, just as it has in the past. The fact that the genuine gains for working people over the past couple years have only begun to roll back the losses of the past 20 doesn’t mean that strong demand is not an important goal for policy. It means that we need much more of it, sustained for much longer. More fundamentally, strong labor markets today are no grounds for complacency about the state of macroeconomic policy. Again, the fact that today’s labor market outcomes are better than people thought possible a few years ago shows that the earlier outcomes were even worse than we thought. The lesson we should take is not that today’s good numbers are somehow fake; they are real, or at least they reflect a real shift from the position of a few years ago. Rather, the lesson we should take is that we need to set our sights higher. If today’s strong labor markets are sustainable—and there’s no reason to think that they are not—then we should not accept a macroeconomic policy consensus that has been willing to settle for so much less for so long.

Video: Monetary Policy since the Crisis

On May 30, I did a “webinar” with INET’s Young Scholar’s Intiative. The subject was central banking since the financial crisis of a decade ago, and how it forces us to rethink some long-held ideas about money and the real economy — the dstinction between a demand-determined short run and a supply-determined long run; the neutrality of money in the long run; the absence of tradeoffs between unemployment, inflation and other macroeconomic goals; the reduction of monetary policy choices to setting a single overnight interest rate based on a fixed rule.My argument is that the crisis — or more precisely, central banks’ response to it — creates deep problems for all these ideas.

The full video (about an hour and 15 minus, including Q&A) is on YouTube, and embedded below. It’s part of an ongoing series of YSI webinars on endogenous money, including ones by Daniela Gabor, Jo Mitchella nd Sheila Dow. I encourage you, if you’re interested, to sign up with YSI — anyone can join — and check them out.

I didn’t use slides, but you can read my notes for the talk, if you want to.

Populism, or Its Opposite?

[I am an occasional contributor to the roundtables in the magazine The International Economy. This month’s topic was “Why is populism on the rise?” My answer is below. While the format of the roundtables doesn’t really allow for citations, I should say here that Corey Robin has made the same point about Trump.]

As a political category, populism is uniquely slippery. Far from describing any consistent doctrine, program or form of organization, it is applied to Die Linke and Alternative for Germany, Geert Wilders and Elizabeth Warren, Podemos and Le Pen, Bernie Sanders and Jair Bolsonaro – to people and organizations whose substantive programs and bases of support are diametrically opposed on every point.

A cynic might say the word simply refers to democratic outcomes of which the speaker doesn’t approve. Even more cynically, but more precisely, one might see it as an attempt to discredit the left by linking it with the far right, via a portmanteau political category that somehow includes both outright fascists and anyone to the left of today’s established social-democratic parties.

A more charitable reading would be that populism describes the elevation of popular support over other criteria of legitimacy, such as law or business support or professional expertise. This is a reasonably clear definition that fits most common uses of the term. But does it fit developments in the real world?

It seems to me that if populism means something like illiberal democracy, then the central feature of today’s political moment is not populism but its opposite.

In the US, Trump is widely seen as populist. Certainly in his public persona he rejects established norms and expert opinion. But it’s important to remember that he lost the popular vote by a wide margin, and became president only thanks to the electoral college – one of a number of anti-democratic features of the US constitution that exist precisely to limit the power of popular majorities. To the extent Trump has advanced a policy agenda, it has been essentially the same as an establishment Republican would have. And it has been enacted into law only thanks to the non-majoritarian character of the Senate. His most lasting impact may well come through his Supreme Court appointments — which have been made in strict accordance with law and will be consequential precisely because of the Court’s power to overrule popular majorities.

In Brazil, Bolsonaro did win the popular vote — but only after the previous president was removed from office in what was effectively a soft coup, and the country’s most popular politician was banned from running by the courts. This judicial preemption of democracy is the opposite of what is usually meant by populism.

In Europe, the rise of anti-establishment parties, mainly on the right, would seem to give a stronger basis for fears of populism. It is certainly true that many countries have seen a rise in new parties, thanks to the discrediting of the established ones by a decade of economic crisis. But consider Italy. Yes, the governing League and Five Star Movement show up on many lists of populist political parties. But the real novelty in Italian politics today isn’t the election of politicians claiming a mandate from the people — which don’t? — but the fact that their proposed budget was overruled by the European Commission. The right to approve budgets has been the fundamental right of legislatures since the origin of the modern state, so its surrender is a political watershed. The projected deficits that justified the Commission’s intervention are not even exceptional by European standards; France, for instance, has had larger deficits every year for the past decade. So it’s hard to see this as anything but a shift in the center of political authority. And the new authority, framed in terms of a mathematical formula, is based on exactly the anti-populist grounds of expertise and impersonal rules.

The recent history of the EU is a series of such victories of liberalism over democracy. The takeover of Greece by the “troika” of the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF was the most dramatic example, but it was simply a continuation of the ECB’s strategy of using financial crises on the periphery to push through an agenda of deregulation, privatization and liberalization that democratically-accountable governments could not enact on their own. When the ECB intervened to stabilize the market for Spanish bonds in 2011, it was only after imposing a long list of conditions, including labor market reforms far outside the normal remit of a central bank, and even a demand that the government take “exceptional action” to hold down private sector wage growth. Other governments under bond-market pressure were subject to similar demands. What’s striking in this context is not the occasional victory of anti-European political parties, but how consistently — so far at least — they have backed down in confrontations with the European authorities.

All this may change. But for the moment concerns about “populism” seem like an evasion of the actual political realities — perhaps a sign of bad conscience by an elite whose authority, more than in many years, lacks a basis in popular consent.

The Economic Case for the Green New Deal

(Co-authored with Sue Holmberg and Mark Paul, and cross-posted from Forbes. This is a teaser for a project the three of us are working on at the Roosevelt Institute on the economics of the Green New Deal.)

Almost overnight, the idea of a Green New Deal has won over environmental activists and many lawmakers. An all-out national mobilization to decarbonize the economy has a natural appeal to those who see climate change as an immediate, existential threat. But others have doubts. Why can’t markets guide the transition from carbon? Do we really need an expansion of the public sector on the scale of the New Deal or World War II? Can we afford it?

As economists, we think the answer is Yes.

To many economists, the obvious alternative to a Green New Deal is a carbon tax. Make the tax high enough, and businesses and consumers will figure the best ways to reduce emissions. A group of eminent economists from both parties, including Nobel Laureates and former Federal Reserve chairman, recently endorsed this approach to climate change. They argue that markets, rather than regulation or public spending, are best at spurring investments in clean energy.

Carbon pricing definitely has a role to play, but market approaches have limits. Markets are effective at allocating resources when the required adjustments are small and the outcomes clear and immediate. Yet, there’s a reason that during World War II, the government built aircraft factories and allocated scarce materials like steel and rubber through the War Production Board. Closer to home, there’s a reason that large businesses have professional managers to plan their operations, and don’t rely on internal markets.

The limits of leaving large-scale planning to markets should be even clearer today, especially after the experience of the housing bubble and crash, which demonstrated a colossal failure of financial markets to direct investment to productive uses. We shouldn’t count on the same financial system that so mismanaged the housing market to guide the shift away from fossil fuels on its own.

Instead, the government needs to mobilize our collective productive capacities through a mix of tools: directly through public investments and credit policy; through regulations that enforce key climate goals, in the same way that harmful chemicals are banned and not just taxed; and through taxes and subsidies that ensure that what consumers and businesses pay for goods and services reflects their true social cost.

What about the fact that the Green New Deal bill includes seemingly unrelated issues, like health coverage and a jobs guarantee? Is there a danger of weighing down a climate program with perhaps worthy but unrelated social goals?  If we were talking about small-bore regulatory changes, this criticism might have merit. But we may be looking at five or ten percent of GDP, sustained over many years. Action on this scale is going to have major effects on labor markets and income distribution, one way or another. The question is only whether these impacts come haphazardly, or openly and deliberately.

A Green New Deal that didn’t address social justice would risk reinforcing existing inequities of education, geography, race and gender, as certain workers and regions found their labor in much greater demand and others much less. The fact that the authors of the bill have addressed these impacts directly does not mean they are getting distracted or being disingenuous. It means they are taking the project seriously. As recent events in France demonstrate, environmental policy that ignores existing inequities invites a ferocious backlash.

Perhaps the most common question about the Green New Deal approach is “How do we pay for it?” That is, where will the money come from for new public spending? And where will the real resources come from, for both public and private investment in decarbonization?

Supporters of the Green New Deal, like most Americans, also favor higher taxes on very high incomes and wealth. But these will not cover all the increased public spending. So, yes, the government will borrow more, but this shouldn’t worry us.

In recent years, there has been a remarkable shift among economists on the dangers of high public debt. The big runup in U.S. debt over the past decade has not been accompanied by any of the disasters that we used to fear—runaway inflation, sky-high interest rates. Neither has rising debt in Japan, which has now reached 250 percent of GDP with no obvious ill effects.

In a world of low interest rates, which seem to be here for the foreseeable future, there is no danger of a runaway debt spiral. The idea that low interest rates make deficits less worrisome has been forcefully argued by people like former IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard and former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers and Council of Economic Advisors Chair Jason Furman. Even if the government runs deficits year after year, the debt will eventually stabilize.

On the productivity side, there is good reason to think that our economy is still operating well below full capacity. Real GDP today is more than 10 percent below the level predicted a decade ago, and at least some of this gap reflects lingering weak demand following the Great Recession. Despite the low headline unemployment rate, the fraction of working-age adults in the labor market is substantially lower than it was a decade ago — let alone than in the late 1990s, or in many other rich countries. Meanwhile, flat productivity suggests that many of the Americans who have jobs are underemployed. A truly strong labor market would bring discouraged workers back into the labor force, shift currently employed workers into more high-yielding work, and boost wage growth – something that still hasn’t happened despite today’s supposedly tight labor markets.

We won’t know for sure how much space there is exactly until we reach the limits, but there’s every reason to push them – if a deficit-funded Green New Deal causes the economy to run hot for a while, that’s a benefit, not a cost. Faster wage growth will help workers regain the ground they have lost in the last 50 years. And if the Fed has to raise rates to step on the brakes, that gives them more room to cut them again in the next recession.

There is no silver bullet to address climate change, but history shows us that market approaches alone are not enough –  public investment and other, more direct government action are necessary to provide an effective, robust response. The costs of a Green New Deal are affordable, but the costs of inaction are literally beyond calculation.

As economists, we see a Green New Deal as eminently reasonable. As human beings, we see it as a necessity.

Could Trump Have a Point about Rate Hikes?

(Cross-posted from The Next New Deal at The Roosevelt Institute.)

At its December meeting, the Federal Reserve raised its benchmark interest rate a quarter point. The move, while widely expected, represented a clear rebuke to President Trump, who has repeatedly urged the Fed to keep rates low. He took to Twitter after the move to attack Fed head Jerome Powell as a golfer who has no touch (“he can’t putt”)—strong words in the president’s social circle.

Trump’s critics on the left may be tempted to cheer the Fed’s decision as a welcome triumph of the separation of powers. But opposing him on the grounds that the labor market is already great may end up weakening the case for a progressive agenda. We need to consider the possibility that, in this one case, the president is right.

By raising rates, the Fed is signaling that it thinks that the economy is now operating at potential, or full employment. Conventional economic theory says that when the economy is below potential, more spending will bring unemployed and underemployed people to work, and more fully utilize structures and equipment, but once potential is reached, additional spending will just lead to higher prices. So when output is below potential, anything that raises spending—whether it is tax cuts, increased federal spending, a more favorable trade balance, or lower interest rates—is macroeconomically useful. But once the economy is at potential, and there are no more unemployed people or underused buildings and machines, the same policies will lead only to more inflation.

By this standard, the case for the most recent rate increase was plausible, though not a slam dunk. By the official measures produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), 2018 was the first year since 2007 that GDP reached potential, and at 3.7 percent, the headline unemployment rate is quite low by historical standards. So textbook logic suggests that if demand growth does not slow, inflation is likely to rise.

The past decade, however, has given us reason to doubt the textbook models. As I argued in the Roosevelt report What Recovery?, it is far from clear that the BEA’s measure does a good job capturing the productive potential of the economy. Similarly, the headline unemployment rate may no longer be a good measure of the economically relevant category of people available for work; many people move directly between being out of the laborforce and being employed. The behavior of inflation has defied any mechanical linkage with GDP growth, wages, or unemployment. And even if one accepts that output is nearing potential, a higher interest rate may not be necessary to slow it. (This is related to the idea of r*, the “neutral” rate of interest, which neither raises nor lowers demand—something that many people, including Powell himself, have suggested we don’t actually know.) Given these uncertainties, many people—across the political spectrum—have argued that it’s foolish for the central bank to try to make policy based on guesses of where inflation is heading. Instead, they should wait to raise rates until it is clear that inflation is above target.

More broadly, the question of whether the economy is at full employment implies a judgement on whether this is the best we can do, economically. Are the millions of people who have dropped out of the laborforce over the past decade really unable or unwilling to engage in paid work? Is the decline of American manufacturing the inevitable result of a lack of competitiveness? Are the millions of people working at low-wage, dead-end jobs incapable of doing anything more rewarding? The decision to raise rates implicitly assumes that the answers are yes. People who think that the economy could work better for ordinary people should hesitate to agree.

We live in a country filled with energetic, talented, creative people, many of whom are forced to spend their days doing tedious busywork. Personally, I find it offensive to claim that a job at McDonald’s or in a nail salon or Amazon warehouse is the fullest use of anyone’s potential. When John Maynard Keynes said “we will build our New Jerusalem out of the labour which in our former vain folly we were keeping unused and unhappy in enforced idleness,” he didn’t only mean literal idleness, but wasted labor more broadly. In a society in which aggregate expenditure was constantly pushing against supply constraints, millions of people today who spend their working hours in menial, unproductive activities would instead be developing their capacities as engineers, artists, electricians, doctors, and scientists.

Progressives concerned about the distribution of income should also pause before cheering an interest rate hike. The textbook model assumes that wage changes are passed more or less one for one to prices (that’s why the Fed pays so much attention to unemployment). But we know that this is not true. Slow wage growth may simply mean a lower share of income going to workers, rather than lower inflation, and high wages may lead to an increase in labor share rather than to higher inflation. Indeed, as a matter of math, the labor share of income cannot rise unless wages rise faster than the sum of productivity growth and inflation. For most of the past decade—and much of the decade before—wages have risen more slowly than this. As a result, labor compensation has fallen to 58 percent of value added in the corporate sector (where it is most reliably measured), down from 60 percent a decade ago and 66 percent in 2000. The only way that this shift from labor to capital can be reversed is if we see an extended period of “excessive” wage growth. This recent hike suggests that the Fed will not tolerate that.

The alternative is to deliberately foster what is sometimes called a “high-pressure” economy. Allowing the unemployment rate to remain low enough for sustained rapid wage growth won’t just help restore the ground that workers have lost over the past decade. It could also boost laborforce participation, as discouraged workers return to the labor market. And it could boost productivity, as scarce workers and strong demand encourage businesses to undertake labor-saving investment. An increasing number of economists think that these kinds of effects, called hysteresis, mean that weak demand conditions can reduce the economy’s productive potential—and strong demand can increase it.

We are already seeing some signs of this. The fall in the laborforce participation over the past decade was, according to most studies, was much larger than can be explained by aging and other demographic factors. Now, as the labor market gets stronger, people who dropped out of the laborforce are reentering it. Some businesses in low-unemployment areas are now paying for English lessons so they can hire non-English speaking immigrants, who are normally among the last to be employed. After years of stagnation, wages are beginning to rise fast enough to produce a modest rise in the hare of output going to workers—the predictable result of a strong labor market. A recent study by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta confirmed that a high-pressure economy, with unemployment well below normal levels, can boost earnings and strengthen attachment to the laborforce. The effects are long-lasting and strongest for those at the back of the hiring queue, such as Black Americans and those with less-formal education. Labor productivity has yet to pick up, but business investment is now quite strong, so it is likely that productivity may soon start rising as well. None of these gains will be realized if the Fed acts too quickly to rein in a boom.

Critics of the president who argue that the economy is already at full employment risk replaying the 2016 election, where the Democrats were perceived—fairly or not—as defenders of the status quo, while Trump spoke to and for those left behind by the recovery. And they risk throwing away one of the best arguments for a progressive program in 2021 and beyond. The next Democratic president will enter office with an ambitious agenda. Whether the top priority is Medicare for All, a Green New Deal, universal childcare, or free higher education, realizing this agenda will require a substantial increase in government spending. Making the case for this will be much easier if there is broad agreement that the economy still suffers from a demand shortfall that public spending can fill.

 

EDIT: The one thing I did not mention here and should have is that the principle of central bank indpedence is also not something that anyone on the left should be defending. Like the various countermajoritarian features of the US political system, it will be wielded more aggressively against any kind of progressive program. And as Mike Konczal and I have argued, both financial crises and extended periods of weak demand have forced central banks to broaden their mandate, making it much harder to mark off “monetary policy” proper from economic policy in general.

“On money, debt, trust and central banking”

The central point of my Jacobin piece on the state of economics was meant to be: Whatever you think about mainstream macroeconomic theory, there is a lot of mainstream empirical and policy work that people on the left can learn from and engage with — much more than there was a decade ago. 1 

Some of the most interesting of that new work is from, and about, central banks. As an example, here is a remarkable speech by BIS economist Claudio Borio. I am not sure when I last saw such a high density of insight-per-word in a discussion of money and finance, let alone in a speech by a central banker. I could just say, Go read it. But instead I’m going to go through it section by section, explaining what I find interesting in it and how it connects up to a larger heterodox vision of money. 

From page one:

My focus will be the on the monetary system, defined technically as money plus the transfer mechanisms to execute payments. Logically, it makes little sense to talk about one without the other. But payments have too often been taken for granted in the academic literature, old and new. In the process, we have lost some valuable insights.

… two properties underpin a well functioning monetary system. One, rather technical, is the coincidence of the means of payment with the unit of account. The other, more intangible and fundamental, is trust. 

This starting point signals three central insights about money. First, the importance of payments. You shouldn’t fetishize any bit of terminology, but I’ve lately come to feel that the term “payments system” is a fairly reliable marker for something interesting to say about money. We all grow up with an idealized model of exchange, where the giving and receiving just happen, inseparably; but in reality it takes a quite sophisticated infrastructure to ensure that my debit coincides with your credit, and that everyone agrees this is so. Stefano Ugolini’s brilliant book on the prehistory of central banking emphasizes the central importance of finality – a binding determination that payment has taken place. (I suppose this was alsso the point of the essay that inaugurated Bitcoin.) In any case it’s a central aspect of “money” as a social institution that the mental image of one person handing a token to another entirely elides.

Second: the focus on money as unit of account and means of payment. The latter term mean money as the thing that discharges obligations, that cancels debts. It’s not evenb included in many standard lists of the functions of money, but for Marx, among others, it is fundamental. Borio consciously uses this term in preference to the more common medium of exchange, a token that facilitates trade of goods and services. He is clear that discharging debt and equivalent obligations is a more central role of money than exchanging commodities. Trade is a special case of debt, not vice versa. Here, as at other points through the essay, there’s a close parallel to David Graeber’s Debt. Borio doesn’t cite Graeber, but the speech is a clear example of my point in my debate with Mike Beggs years ago: Reading Graeber is good preparation for understanding some of the most interesting conversation in economics.

Third: trust. If you think of money as a social coordination mechanism, rather than a substance or quantity, you could argue that the scarce resource it’s helping to allocate is precisely trust.  More on this later.

Borio:

a key concept for understanding how the monetary system works is the “elasticity of credit”, ie the extent to which the system allows credit to expand. A high elasticity is essential for the system’s day-to-day operation, but too high an elasticity (“excess elasticity”) can cause serious economic damage in the longer run. 

This is an argument I’ve made before on this blog. Any payments system incorporate some degree of elasticity — some degree to which payments can run ahead of incomes. (As my old teacher David Kotz observes, the expansion of capital would be impossible otherwise.) But the degree of elasticity involves some unresolvable tensions. The logic of the market requires that every economic units expenditure eventually be brought into line with its income. But expansion, investment, innovation, requires eventually to be not just yet. (I talked a bit about this tension here.) Another critical point here is the impossibility of separating payments and credit – a separation that has been the goal of half the monetary reform proposals of the past 250 years.2

Along the way, I will touch on a number of sub-themes. .. whether it is appropriate to think of the price level as the inverse of the price of money, to make a sharp distinction between relative and absolute price changes, and to regard money (or monetary policy) as neutral in the long run.

So much here! The point about the non-equivalence of a rise in the price level and a fall in the value of money has been made eloquently by Merijn Knibbe.  I don’t think Borio’s version is better, but again, it comes with the imprimatur of Authority.

The fact that inflation inevitably involves relative as well as absolute price changes is made by Leijonhufvud (who Borio cites) and Minsky (who he surprisingly doesn’t); the non-neutrality of money is the subject (and the title) of what is in my opinion Minsky’s own best short distillation of his thought. 

Borio: 

Compared with the traditional focus on money as an object, the definition [in terms of means of payment] crucially extends the analysis to the payment mechanisms. In the literature, there has been a tendency to abstract from them and assume they operate smoothly in the background. I believe this is one reason why money is often said to be a convention, much like choosing which hand to shake hands with: why do people coordinate on a particular “object” as money? But money is much more than a convention; it is a social institution. It is far from self-sustaining. Society needs an institutional infrastructure to ensure that money is widely accepted, transactions take place, contracts are fulfilled and, above all, agents can count on that happening. 

Again, the payments mechanism is a complex, institutionally heavy social arrangement; there’s a lot that’s missed when we imagine economic transactions as I hand you this, you hand me that. Ignoring this social infrastructure invites the classical idea of money as an arbitrary numeraire, from which its long-run neutrality is one short step. 

The last clause introduces a deep new idea. In an important sense, trust is a kind of irrational expectation. Trust means that I am sure (or behave as if I am sure) that you will conform to the relevant rules. Trust means I believe (or behave as if I believe) this 100 percent. Anything less than 100 percent and trust quickly unravels to zero.  If there’s a small chance you might try to kill me, I should be prepared to kill you first; you might’ve had no bad intentions, but if I’m thinking of killing you, you should think about killing me first; and soon we’re all sprawled out on the warehouse floor. To exist in a world of strangers we need to believe, contrary to experience, that everyone around us will follow the rules.

a well functioning monetary system … will exploit the benefits of unifying the means of payment with the unit of account. The main benefit of a means of payment is that it allows any economy to function at all. In a decentralised exchange system, it underpins the quid-pro-quo process of exchange. And more specifically, it is a highly efficient means of “erasing” any residual relationship between transacting parties: they can thus get on with their business without concerns about monitoring and managing what would be a long chain of counterparties (and counterparties of counterparties).

Money as an instrument for erasing any relationship between the transacting parties: It could not be said better. And again, this is something someone who has read Graeber’s Debt understands very well, while someone who hasn’t might be a bit baffled by this passage. Graeber could also take you a step farther. Money might relieve you of the responsibility of monitoring your counterparties and their counterparties but somebody still has to. Graeber compellingly links the generalized use of money to strong centralized states. In a Graeberian perspective, money, along with slavery and bureaucracy, is one of the great social technologies for separating economic coordination from the broader network of mutual obligations.

The central banks’ elastic supply of the means of payment is essential to ensure that (i) transactions are settled in the interbank market and (ii) the interest rate is controlled. The interbank market is a critical component of our two-tier monetary system, where bank customer transactions are settled on the banks’ books and then banks, in turn, finally settle on the central bank’s books. To smooth out interbank settlement, the provision of central bank credit is key. The need for an elastic supply to settle transactions is most visible in the huge amounts of intraday credit central banks supply to support real- time gross settlement systems

“Two-tier monetary system” is a compressed version of Mehrling’s hierarchy of money. The second point, which Borio further develops further on, is that credit is integral to the payment system, since the two sides of a transaction never exactly coincide – there’s always one side that fulfills its part first and has to accept, however briefly, a promise in return. This is one reason that the dream of separating credit and payments is unrealizable.

The next point he makes is that a supply and demand framework is useless for thinking about monetary policy: 

The central bank … simply sets the desired interest rate by signalling where it would like it to be. And it can do so because it is a monopoly supplier of the means of payment: it can credibly commit to provide funds as needed to clear the market. … there is no such thing as a well behaved demand for bank reserves, which falls gradually as the interest rate increases, ie which is downward-sloping.

An interesting question is how much this is specific to the market for reserves and how much it applies to a range of asset markets. In fact, many markets share the two key features Borio points to here: adjustment via buffers rather than prices, and expected return that is a function of price.

On the first, there are a huge range of markets where there’s someone on one or both sides prepared to passively by or sell at a stated price. Many financial markets function only thanks to the existence of market makers – something Mehrling and his Barnard colleague Rajiv Sethi have written eloquently about. But more generally, most producers with pricing power — which is almost all of them — set a price and then passively meet demand at that price, allowing inventories and/or delivery times to absorb shifts in demand, within some range.

The second feature is specific to long-lived assets. Where there is an expected price different from the current price, holding the asset implies a capital gain or loss when the price adjusts. If expectations are sufficiently widespread and firmly anchored, they will be effectively self-confirming, as the expected valuation changes will lead the asset to be quickly bid back to its expected value. This dynamic in the bond market (and not the zero lower bound) is the authentic Keynesian liquidity trap.

To be clear, Borio isn’t raising here these broader questions about markets in general. But they are a natural extension of his arguments about reserves. 

Next come some points that shouldn’t be surprising to to readers of this blog, but which are nice, for me as an economics teacher, to see stated so plainly. 

The monetary base – such a common concept in the literature – plays no significant causal role in the determination of the money supply … or bank lending. It is not surprising that … large increases in bank reserves have no stable relationship with the stock of money … The money multiplier – the ratio of money to the monetary base – is not a useful concept. … Bank lending reflects banks’ management of the risk-return tradeoff they face… The ultimate anchor of the monetary system is not the monetary base but the interest rate the central bank sets.

We all know this is true, of course. The mystery is why so many textbooks still talk about the supply of high-powered money, the money multiplier, etc. As the man says, they just aren’t useful concepts.

Next comes the ubiquity of credit, which not only involves explicit loans but also any transaction where delivery and payment don’t coincide in time — which is almost all of them. Borio takes this already-interesting point in an interestingly Graeberian direction:  

A high elasticity in the supply of the means of payment does not just apply to bank reserves, it is also essential for bank money. … Credit creation is all around us: some we see, some we don’t. For instance, explicit credit extension is often needed to ensure that two legs of a transaction are executed at the same time so as to reduce counterparty risk… And implicit credit creation takes place when the two legs are not synchronised. ….

In fact, the role of credit in monetary systems is commonly underestimated. Conceptually, exchanging money for a good or service is not the only way of solving the problem of the double coincidence of wants and overcoming barter. An equally, if not more convenient, option is to defer payment (extend credit) and then settle when a mutually agreeable good or service is available. In primitive systems or ancient civilisations as well as during the middle ages, this was quite common. … It is easier to find such examples than cases of true barter.

The historical non-existence of barter is the subject of the first chapter of Debt . Here again, the central banker has more in common with the radical anthropologist than with orthodox textbooks, which usually make barter the starting point for discussions of money.

Borio goes on:

the distinction between money and debt is often overplayed. True, one difference is that money extinguishes obligations, as the ultimate settlement medium. But netting debt contracts is indeed a widespread form of settling transactions.

Yes it is: remember Braudel’s Flanders fairs? “The fairs were effectively a settling of accounts, in which debts met and cancelled each other out, melting like snow in the sun.”

At an even deeper level, money is debt in the form of an implicit contract between the individual and society. The individual provides something of value in return for a token she trusts to be able to use in the future to obtain something else of value. She has a credit vis-à-vis everyone and no one in particular (society owes a debt to her).

In the classroom, one of the ways I suggest students think about money is as a kind of social scorecard. You did something good — made something somebody wanted, let somebody else use something you own, went to work and did everything the boss told you? Good for you, you get a cookie. Or more precisely, you get a credit, in both senses, in the personal record kept for you at a bank. Now you want something for yourself? OK, but that is going to be subtracted from the running total of how much you’ve done for the rest for us.

People get very excited about China’s social credit system, a sort of generalization of the “permanent record” we use to intimidate schoolchildren. And ok, it does sound kind of dystopian. If your rating is too low, you aren’t allowed to fly on a plane. Think about that — a number assigned to every person, adjusted based on somebody’s judgement of your pro-social or anti-social behavior. If your number is too low, you can’t on a plane. If it’s really low, you can’t even get on a bus. Could you imagine a system like that in the US?

Except, of course, that we have exactly this system already. The number is called a bank account. The difference is simply that we have so naturalized the system that “how much money you have” seems like simply a fact about you, rather than a judgement imposed by society.

Back to Borio:

All this also suggests that the role of the state is critical. The state issues laws and is ultimately responsible for formalising society’s implicit contract. All well functioning currencies have ultimately been underpinned by a state … [and] it is surely not by chance that dominant international currencies have represented an extension of powerful states… 

Yes. Though I do have to note that it’s at this point that Borio’s fealty to policy orthodoxy — as opposed to academic orthodoxy — comes into view. He follows up the Graeberian point about the link between state authority and money with a very un-Graeberian warning about the state’s “temptation to abuse its power, undermining the monetary system and endangering both price and financial stability.”

Turning now to the policy role of the central bank, Borio  starts from by arguing that “the concepts of price and financial stability are joined at the hip. They are simply two ways of ensuring trust in the monetary system…. It is no coincidence that securing both price and financial stability have been two core central bank functions.” He then makes the essential point that what the central bank manages is at heart the elasticity of the credit system. 

The process underpinning financial instability hinges on how “elastic” the monetary system is over longer horizons… The challenge is to ensure that the system is not excessively elastic drawing on two monetary system anchors. One operates on prices – the interest rate and the central bank’s reaction function. … The other operates on quantities: bank regulatory requirements, such as those on capital or liquidity, and the supervisory apparatus that enforces them.

This is critical, not just for thinking about monetary policy, but as signpost toward the heart of the Keynesian vision. (Not the bastard — but useful  — postwar Keynesianism of IS-LM, but the real thing.) Capitalism is not a system of real exchange — it shouldn’t be imagined as a system in which people exchange pre-existing stuff for other stuff they like better. Rather, it is a system of monetary production — a system in which payments and claims of money, meaningless themselves, are the coordinating mechanism for human being’s collective, productive activity. 

This is the broadest sense of the statement that money has to be elastic, but not too elastic. If it is too elastic, money will lose its scarcity value, and hence its power to organize human activity. Money is only an effective coordinating mechanism when its possession allows someone to compel the obedience of others. But it has to be flexible enough to adapt to the concrete needs of production, and of the reproduction of society in general. (This is the big point people take form Polanyi.) “You can’t have the stuff until you give me the money” is the fundamental principle that has allowed capitalism to reorganize vast swathes of our collective existence, for better or worse. But applied literally, it stops too much stuff from getting where it needs to go to to be compatible with the requirements of capitalist production itself. There’s a reason why business transactions are almost always on the basis of trade credit, not cash on the barrelhead. As Borio puts it, “today’s economies are credit hungry.” 

The talk next turns to criticism of conventional macroeconomics that will sound familiar to Post Keynesians. The problem of getting the right elasticity in the payments system — neither too much nor too little — is “downplayed in the current vintage of macroeconomic models. One reason is that the models conflate saving and financing.“ In reality,

Saving is just a component of national income – as it were, just a hole in overall expenditures, without a concrete physical representation. Financing is a cash flow and is needed to fund expenditures. In the mainstream models, even when banks are present, they imply endowments or “saving”; they do not create bank deposits and hence purchasing power through the extension of loans or purchase of assets. There is no meaningful monetary system, so that any elasticity is seriously curtailed. Financial factors serve mainly to enhance the persistence of “shocks” rather than resulting in endogenous booms and busts.

This seems right to me. The point that there is no sense in which savings finance or precede or investment is a key one for Keynes, in the General Theory and even more clearly in his subsequent writing.3 I can’t help noting, also, that passages like this are a reminder that criticism of today’s consensus macro does not come only from the professionally marginalized.

The flipside of not seeing money as social coordinating mechanism, a social ledger kept by banks, is that you do  see it as a arbitrary token that exists in a particular quantity. This latter vision leads to an idea of inflation as a simple imbalance between the quantity of money and the quantity of stuff. Borio:

The process was described in very simple terms in the old days. An exogenous increase in the money supply would boost inflation. The view that “the price level is the inverse of the price of money” has probably given this purely monetary interpretation of inflation considerable intuitive appeal. Nowadays, the prevailing view is not fundamentally different, except that it is couched in terms of the impact of the interest rate the central bank sets.

This view of the inflation process has gone hand in hand with a stronger proposition: in the long run, money (monetary policy) is neutral, ie it affects only prices and no real variables. Again, in the classical tradition this was couched in terms of the money supply; today, it is in terms of interest rates. … Views about how long it takes for this process to play itself out in calendar time differ. But proponents argue that the length is short enough to be of practical policy relevance.

The idea that inflation can be thought of as a decline in the value of money is effectively criticized by Merijn Knibbe and others. It is a natural idea, almost definitionally true, if you vision starts from a world of exchange of goods and then adds money as facilitator or numeraire. But if you start, as Borio does, and as the heterodox money tradition from Graeber to Minsky to Keynes to Marx and back to Tooke and Thornton does, from the idea of money as entries in a social ledger, then it makes about as much sense as saying that a game was a blowout because the quantity of points was too high.  

once we recognise that money is fundamentally endogenous, analytical thought experiments that assume an exogenous change and trace its impact are not that helpful, if not meaningless. They obscure, rather than illuminate, the mechanisms at work. … [And] once we recognise that the price of money in terms of the unit of account is unity, it makes little sense to think of the price level as the inverse of the price of money. … any financial asset fixed in nominal terms has the same property. As a result, thinking of inflation as a purely monetary phenomenon is less compelling.

“Not that helpful”, “makes little sense,” “is less compelling”: Borio is nothing if not diplomatic. But the point gets across.

Once we recognise that the interest rate is the monetary anchor, it becomes harder to argue that monetary policy is neutral… the interest rate is bound to affect different sectors differently, resulting in different rates of capital accumulation and various forms of hysteresis. … it is arguably not that helpful to make a sharp distinction between what affects relative prices and the aggregate price level…., not least because prices move at different speeds and differ in their flexibility… at low inflation rates, the “pure” inflation component, pertaining to a generalised increase in prices, [is] smaller, so that the distinction between relative and general price changes becomes rather porous.

In part, this is a restatement of Minsky’s “two-price” formulation of Keynes. Given that money or liquidity is usefulat all, it is presumably more useful for some things more than for others; and in particular, it is most useful when you have to make long-lived commitments that expose you to vagaries of an unknown future; that is, for investment. Throttling down the supply of liquidity will not just reduce prices and spending across the board, it will reduce them particularly for long-lived capital goods.

The second point, that inflation loses its defintion as a distinct phenomenon at low levels, and fades into the general mix of price changes, is something I’ve thought myself for a while but have never seen someone spell out this way. (I’m sure people have.) It follows directly from the fact that changes in the prices of particualr goods don’t scale proportionately with inflation, so as inflation gets low, the shared component of price changes over time gets smaller and harder to identify. Because the shared component is smaller at low inflation, it is going to be more sensitive to the choice of basket and other measurement issues. 20 percent inflation clearly (it seems to me) represents a genuine phenomenon. But it’s not clear that 2 percent inflation really does – an impression reinforced by the proliferation of alternative measures.

The Minskyan two-price argument also means that credit conditions and monetary policy necessarily affect the directiona s well as the level of economic activity.

financial booms tend to misallocate resources, not least because too many resources go into sectors such as construction… It is hard to imagine that interest rates are simply innocent bystanders. At least for any policy relevant horizon, if not beyond, these observations suggest that monetary policy neutrality is questionable.

This was one of the main points in Mike Konczal’s and my monetary toolkit paper.

In the next section, which deserves a much fuller unpacking, Borio critiques the fashionable idea that central banks cannot control the real rate of interest. 

 Recent research going back to the 1870s has found a pretty robust link between monetary regimes and the real interest rate over long horizons. By contrast, the “usual suspects” seen as driving saving and investment – all real variables – do not appear to have played any consistent role. 

This conflation of the “real”  (inflation-adjusted) interest rate with a rate determined by “real” (nonmonetary) factors, and therefore beyond the central bank’s influence, is one of the key fissure-points in economic ideology.4 The vision of economics, espcially its normative claims, depend on an idea of ecnomic life as the mutually beneficial exchange of goods. There is an obvious mismatch between this vision and the language we use to talk about banks and market interest rates and central banks — it’s not that they contradict or in conflict as that they don’t make contact at all. The preferred solution, going from today’s New Keynesian consensus back through Friedman to Wicksell, is to argue that the “interest rate” set by the central bank must in some way be the same as the “interest rate” arrived at by agents exchanging goods today for goods later. Since the  terms of these trades depend only on the non-monetary fundamentals of preferences and technology, the same must in the long run be true of the interest rate set by the financial system and/or the central bank. The money interest rate cannot persistently diverge from the interest rate that would obtain in a nonmonetary exchange economy that in some sense corresponds to the actual one.

But you can’t square the circle this way. A fundamental Keynesian insight is that economic relations between the past and the future don’t take the form of trades of goods now for goods later, but of promises to make money payments at some future date or state of the world. Your ability to make money promises, and your willingness to accept them from others, depends not on any physical scarcity, but on your confidence in your counterparties doing what they promised, and in your ability to meet your own commitments if some expected payment doesn’t come through. In short, as Borio says, it depends on trust. In other words, the fundamental problem for which interest is a signal is not allocation but coordination. When interest rates are high, that reflects not a scarcity of goods in the present relative to the future, but a relative lack of trust within the financial system. Corporate bond rates did not spike in 2008 because decisionmakers suddenly wished to spend more in the present relative to the future, but because the promises embodied in the bonds were no longer trusted.

Here’s another way of looking at it: Money is valuable. The precursor of today’s “real interest rate” talk was the idea of money as neutral in the long run, in the sense that a change in the supply of money would eventually lead only to a proportionate change in the price level.5  This story somehow assumes on the one hand that money is useful, in the sense that it makes transactions possible that wouldn’t be otherwise. Or as Kocherlakota puts it: “At its heart, economic thinking about fiat money is paradoxical. On the one hand, such money is viewed as being inherently useless… But at the same time, these barren tokens… allow society to implement allocations that would not otherwise be achievable.” If money is both useful and neutral, evidently it must be equally useful for all transactions, and its usefulness must drop suddenly to zero once a fixed set of transactions have been made. Either there is money or there isn’t. But if additional money does not allow any desirable transaction to be carried out that right now cannot be, then shouldn’t the price of money already be zero? 

Similarly: The services provided by private banks, and by the central bank, are valuable. This is the central point of Borio’s talk. The central bank’s explicit guarantee of certain money commitments, and its open ended readiness to ensure that others are fulfilled in a crisis, makes a great many promises acceptable that otherwise wouldn’t be. And like the provider of anything of value, the central bank — and financial system more broadly — can affect its price by supplying more or less of it. It makes about as much sense to say that central banks can influence the interest rate only in the short run as to say that public utilities can only influence the price of electricity in the short run, or that transit systems can only influence the price of transportation in the short run. The activities of the central bank allow a greater degree of trust in the financial system, and therefore a lesser required payment to its professional promise-accepters.6 Or less trust and higher payments, as the case may be. This is true in the short run, in the medium run, in the long run. And because of the role money payments play in organizing productive activity, this also means a greater or lesser increase in our collective powers over nature and ability to satisfy our material wants.