(EDIT: It’s not sufficiently clear in the original post, but I wrote this as a sort of compendium of arguments one might use in response to claims that the federal debt is a binding constraint on new spending. I’m not saying these are the best or only reasons to reject the idea that federal government cannot borrow more. I’m saying that these are arguments that seem to have some traction in the mainstream policy world, such that you could use them in a newspaper op-ed or conversation with a congress member’s staff. Also, a premise here is that there are urgent needs we want the public sector to spend more on. Apart from the last couple, these are not arguments for more public dbet as an end in itself.)
Why might larger budget deficits be ok?
There are a number of reasons why economists, policymakers and advocates believe that increased public borrowing is not something to be afraid of. As I’ll discuss below, the fundamental factor linking most of these reasons is the idea that the US economy is generally operating below capacity.
When we think about the fiscal balance – the difference between government spending and government revenue – we always have to keep in mind that it has two sides: the real side and the financial side. Whenever the government increases spending, it has two kinds of effects. First, all else equal, it increases the amount of government debt in circulation. And second, it increases demand for goods and services, both directly when the government buys them and indirectly as government spending creates incomes for private businesses and households.
To put it another way, for government to successfully raise spending without raising taxes, two things have to be true. First, someone – banks, wealthy families, foreign countries – has to be willing to hold the additional debt that the government issues. And second, someone has to be prepared to sell whatever it is that the government is trying to buy. If we are asking what kinds of limits there might be to deficit spending, we have to think about both sides. A government’s spending may face financial constraints, if people are unwilling to hold more of its debt; or real constraints, if the economy cannot produce the additional goods and services it is trying to buy.
Some people who think higher deficits are not a problem – particularly those associated with Modern Monetary Theory – believe that the US federal government never faces financial constraints, so only the real constraints matter. Others believe that the federal government might in principle face financial constraints, but there are good reasons to think that they are not an issue today. For policy purposes, the difference between these positions may not be very important.
On the real constraint side, the essential question is how close the economy is to potential output, or full employment. (The two terms are used interchanegably.) In an economy operating at potential, government can only increase its spending f the private sector reduces its spending. This “crowding out” is the real cost of increased public spending. In an economy below potential, on the other hand, the goods and services purchased by increased public spending come from mobilizing unused productive capacity, so there is no crowding out. In. fact, if the fiscal multiplier is big enough (greater than one) then increased purchases of goods and services by the public sector will result in more goods and services being purchased by the private sector as well.
Below, I lay out a baker’s dozen of related arguments for why, from a macroeconomic perspective, we should welcome increased debt-financed public spending. Some people who believe in greater public borrowing would accept all of these arguments; some only some of them.
Real-economy arguments for more public borrowing
1. The economy generally operates below potential. Over the past 30 years, there have been three recessions, each followed by a long period of weak growth and high unemployment. By official measures, in 10 of the past 30 years GDP has been at least two points below potential; there have been only six months when it was more than two points above potential. And there has been no periods of high inflation. This suggests that in general, the economy is not running at full capacity; there is additional productive potential that could be mobilized by higher public spending, without crowding out private spending. In that sense, there is no real cost to higher public spending, and no need top offset it with higher taxes. Even better, higher public spending will help close the output gap and raise private spending as well.
2. There are long run forces pushing down demand. Larry Summers famously reintroduced into the economic conversation the idea of secular stagnation – that there is a long-run tendency for private spending to fall short of the economy’s productive potential. There are many reasons we might expect private spending to be lower, relative to national income, in the future than in the past. Among these: increased monopoly power; the shift toward information-based rather than resource-intensive production; increased shareholder power; a more unequal distribution of income; slower population growth; and the satiation of demand for market consumption, in favor of leisure and nonmarket activities. (The first three of these factors tend to reduce investment spending, the last three consumption spending.) If this idea is correct, the demand shortfalls of the past thirty years are not an anomaly, and we should expect them to grow larger in the future.
3. Potential output is mismeasured; we are still well below it. Even by the conventional measures of unemployment and potential output, the US economy has spent far more time in recent decades below target than above it. But if the target is mismeasured, the problem may be even worse. There are good reasons to think that both productivity and laborforce growth over the past decade have been depressed by weak demand. If this is the case, the US economy even at the height of a supposed boom, may in fact be operating well below potential today. The fact that even with measured unemployment below 4 percent wage growth has accelerated only modestly, and inflation has not accelerated at all, is important evidence for this view.
4. Recessions and jobless recoveries have occurred repeatedly in past, will occur again in the future. Whether or not the US economy is at potential today, the current expansion will not continue forever. Recessions have occurred in the past and will occur in the future. Many forecasts believe there is a high risk of recession is likely in the relatively near future; the fact that the Fed is moving toward cutting rates suggests that they share this view. When thinking about what fiscal balance is appropriate, we need to consider not just where the economy is today but where it is likely to be in coming years.
5. Monetary policy is not effective at maintaining full employment. In the past, weak demand and recessions weren’t considered an argument for more public spending because it was assumed that a central bank following the correct policy rule could quickly return the economy to full employment. But it is increasingly clear that central banks do not have the tools (and perhaps the willingness) to precent extended periods of weak demand. It is increasingly recognized that fiscal policy is also required to stabilize demand. In his July testimony before Congress, Fed chair Jerome Powell said explicitly that in the event of another deep recession, the Fed would need help from fiscal policy. One important reason for this is the problem of the zero lower bound – since the policy interest rate cannot be set below zero, there is a limit to how far the Fed can lower it in a recession.
6. It’s hard to ramp up public spending quickly in recession. Orthodox opinion has long been that fiscal policy is not as effective as monetary policy in a recession because it takes much longer to ramp up public spending than to cut interest rates. While the experience of the Great Recession undermined conventional wisdom on many points, it supported it on this one. The ARRA stimulus bill was supposed to direct spending to “shovel-ready” projects, but in fact the majority of the infrastructure spending funded by the bill came several years after it passed. There are many institutional obstacles to increasing public spending rapidly. This means that if we need higher public spending in a recession, the best thing is to have higher spending all the time. If that leads to an overheating economy in the boom, that is an easier problem for the Fed to solve then a deep recession.
7. The costs of getting demand wrong are not symmetrical. Traditionally policymakers have defined their goal as keeping output as close to potential as possible. But it is increasingly clear that the costs of demand falling short are greater than the costs of demand overshooting potential. One reason for this is the previous point – that conventional policy has an easier time reining in excessive demand than stimulating weak demand. (As the old saying has it, “you can’t push on a string.”) A second reason is that demand has effects that go beyond the level of output. In particular, strong demand and low unemployment redistribute income toward workers from owners, and toward lower-wage workers in particular. Periods of weak demand, conversely, reduce the share of income going to workers. If we think the upward redistribution of income over the past generation is a problem, we should prefer to let demand overshoot potential than fall short of it.
8. Weak demand may have permanent effects on potential output. Traditionally, economists saw the economy’s long-term growth as being completely independent of demand conditions. People spending more money might raise production and employment today, but the long-term growth of potential output depended on structural factors – demographics, technological change, and so on. More recently, however, there has been renewed interest in the idea that weak demand can reduce potential output, an effect known as hysteresis. high unemployment may lead more people to drop out of the laborforce, while low unemployment may lead more people to enter the laborforce (or immigrate from abroad.) Strong demand may also lead to faster productivity growth. If hysteresis is real, then demand shortfalls don’t reduce output and employment this year, but potentially many years in the future as well. This is another reason to be more worried about demand falling short than overshooting, hence another reason to prefer a more expansionary fiscal stance, which normally implies more public borrowing.
Financial arguments for more public borrowing
9. With low interest rates, debt does not snowball. Traditionally, concerns about the financing of government spending have focused on whether debt is “sustainable” – whether debt levels will stabilize as a fraction of GDP, or rise without limit. When interest rates are greater than GDP growth rates, this implies a hard limit to government borrowing – to keep the debt-GDP ratio on a stable path, a deficit in one year must be made up for by a larger surplus in a future year. Otherwise, the interest on the existing debt will imply more and more borrowing, with the debt-GDP ratio rising without limit. But when interest rates on government debt are below growth rates, as they have been for the past 25 years, the debt ratio will stabilize on its own – deficits do not have to be offset with surpluses. This makes much of the earlier concern with debt sustainability obsolete.
10. There is good reason to think interest rates will remain low. There are a number of reasons to think that interest rates on public debt are likely to remain low, even if debt ratios rise considerably higher. First, low interest rates reflect the conditions of chronic weak demand discussed above, for two reasons. First, low investment means less demand for borrowed funds. And second, weak demand means that the interest rate set by the central bank is likely to be low. A second reason to expect low interest rates to continue is that the past ten years have repeatedly falsified predictions of bond vigilantes driving up the rates on government debt. Prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, many observers expected a catastrophic flight by investors away from US government debt and the dollar, but in fact, the crisis saw a steep fall interest rates on government debt and a rise in the dollar, as investors all over the world rushed to the safety of Treasury debt. Similarly, in Europe, even in the worst crisis-hit countries like Greece, interest rates are at their lowest point in history. Similarly Japan, with one of the highest debt0-GDP ratios ever recorded (about triple that of the US) continues to borrow at very low rats. Third, the experience of the past ten years have made it clear that even if investors were to demand higher interest rates on government debt, modern central banks can easily overcome this. The most dramatic illustration of this came in the summer of 2012, when a public statement by European Central bank chief Mario Draghi “we will do whatever it takes, and believe me, it will be enough”) reversed the spike in interest rates in countries like Italy, Spain and Portugal practically overnight. Finally, the prices of bonds — with hardly any premium for 30 year bonds over 5 and 10 year maturities — show that private investors do not expect a rise in interest rates any time in the foreseeable future.
11. With hysteresis, higher public borrowing can pay for itself. Even if we are concerned about lowering the debt-GDP ratio, the existence of hysteresis (point 8 above) means that cutting public borrowing is necessarily the right way to get there. In a world where the long-term path of GDP depends on aggregate demand, austerity can be self-defeating even in its own narrow financial terms. If lower public spending reduces demand, then it can lead to lower GDP, potentially raising the debt to GDP ratio even if it succeeds in reducing debt. Greece offers a clear example of this – the fiscal surpluses between 2010 and 2015 succeeded in reducing government debt by 5 percent, but the deep austerity contributed to a fall in GDP of 25 percent. So the debt-GDP ratio actually rose. Similarly, if debt-financed public spending leads to faster growth, the debt-GDP ratio may end up lower than otherwise.
12. Federal debt is an important asset for financial markets. The points up to now have been arguments for why higher public debt is acceptable. But there is also an argument that increased public debt would be a positive good. Financial markets depend on Treasury debt as a safe, liquid asset. Federal government debt offers an absolutely safe asset that can always be sold quickly and at a predictable price – something that is extremely valuable for banks and other financial institutions. There is a strong argument that the growth of the mortgage-backed security market in the 2000s was fundamentally driven by a scarcity of government debt – many financial institutions wanted (or were compelled by regulation) to hold a substantial amount of ultrasafe, liquid debt, and there was not enough government debt in circulation to meet this demand. So financial markets came up with mortgage-backed securities as a supposed alternative – with disastrous results. Similarly, after the recession, one argument for why the recovery was so slow was a “safe asset shortage” – financial institutions were unwilling to make risky loans without holdings of ultrasafe assets to balance them. While these concerns have receded today, there is still good reason to expect a “flight to safety” toward Treasury debt in the event of a new crisis, and government debt remains important for settling many financial contracts and pricing other assets. So strange as it may sound, there is a serious argument – made by, among others, Nobel prize winner Jean Tirole in his book on financial liquidity — that increased government borrowing would make the financial system more stable and increase access to credit for other borrowers.
13. Federal debt is an important asset for the rest of the world. Federal debt is an important asset not just for the US financial system, but for the rest of the world. In today’s dollar-based international system, the great majority of international trade and investment is denominated in dollars, and most foreign-exchange transactions involve dollars. As a result, central banks (and private financial institutions) all over the world hold foreign-exchange reserves primarily in the form of dollars. These dollar reserves are mainly held in the form of Treasury debt. Close to half of federal debt is now held abroad, mainly as reserves by foreign governments. These holdings are essential for the stability of the international financial system – without adequate reserves, countries are vulnerable to sudden flows of “hot money” out of their countries. As Barry Eichengreen – perhaps the leading economic historian of the international financial system, — has noted, a deep market for government is an essential requirement for a currency to serve as the global reserve currency. If the US is going to be a responsible partner for the rest of the world — and continue reaping the benefits of being at the center of the global economy — it needs to provide an adequate supply of safe government debt for the rest of the world to hold as reserves.
(I wrote this document for internal use at the Roosevelt Institute. Figured I might as well put it up here as well. Obviously it would benefit from links to supporting material, which I may add at some point.)
Would argument 1 – 8 actually increase the level of govt debt held by the public ?
As long as they were used only while the economy is below NAIRU couldn’t they be financed by either direct new money creation with no debt issued, or by first issuing-debt that is then fully bought back by the CB with new money?
They are arguments that we should be looking for more expansionary policy, or to put it another way, why we should not worry about real-resource constraints on public spending. It is true that this does not imply a higher debt ratio as a logical necessity. But it certainly points in that direction, and removes a central argument *against* higher public debt.
The decisive reason to worry about government debt
Comment on J. W. Mason on ‘A Baker’s Dozen of Reasons Not to Worry about Government Debt’
Arguments 1. to 8. and 11. boil down to unemployment is bad for multiple reasons and government deficit-spending can effectively reduce unemployment. This is widely accepted since Keynes but tacitly implies budget-balancing over the business cycle. So, there are two cases, temporary and permanent deficit spending. Not many people worry any longer about temporary deficit-spending. But the fact that the self-regulating and self-optimizing free market economy is on the permanent life support of the government tells one that the system is not sustainable over the long run. And this is the life-and-dead reason to worry about growing government debt. Permanently growing debt is an indicator that the system is dysfunctional.#1 This is the real problem to worry about.#2
Arguments 9. and 10. say that with low interest rates the growth of public debt is slower in relation to GDP growth. This is trivially true, of course, and suggests that the problem will go away by itself. This is pure optics, though, that crucially depends on the tacit assumption that GDP will grow. If it does not, the debt/GDP ratio explodes and low interest rates only dampen the process.
Argument 12 is circular. The macroeconomic Profit Law boils down to Public Deficit = Private Profit. So, the government continuously fills the coffers of the Oligarchy which, in turn, is looking out for some safe and juicy assets. Again, the government jumps in and offers Treasuries to consolidate its overdrafts at the central bank. This is a case of simultaneous supply/demand creation.#3
What J. W. Mason misses altogether is the distributional effects of a permanently growing public debt. Deficit-spending/money-creation benefits the Oligarchy because it increases macroeconomic profit according to the Profit Law. MMT is a free lunch program for the Oligarchy. Financial wealth and public debt grow in lockstep and the fabulous financial wealth in the USA is roughly equal to humongous public debt ($22 trillion and counting). The Profit Law explains how billionaires are able to accumulate that much money and why they can buy all the bonds the Treasury issues and cash in the ultra-safe interest that is reliably taxed from WeThePeople as long as the debt is rolled over which can be very long indeed. This Ponzi scheme creates the extremely skewed distribution of income and wealth and this works as long as public debt grows. But infinite growth is impossible on a finite planet. This holds also for public debt. Eventually, debt-growth slows down and even reverses and then macroeconomic profit turns into loss and the so-called free market economy breaks down.
This is the decisive reason to worry about government debt. What J. W. Mason is doing is doling out an overdose of argumentative placebos.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
#1 Just one more day: How MMT delays the breakdown of Capitalism
https://axecorg.blogspot.com/2019/05/just-one-more-day-how-mmt-delays.html
#2 How to pay for the war and to be bamboozled by economists
https://axecorg.blogspot.com/2019/05/how-to-pay-for-war-and-to-be-bamboozled.html
#3 Safe assets ― how the State pampers the Oligarchy
https://axecorg.blogspot.com/2019/04/safe-assets-how-state-pampers-oligarchy.html
The first of the dozen reasons for more debt does not add up: that’s the “economy is at below potential” reason.
Demand can always be boosted simply by printing money, so what on Earth is the point of government BORROWING money? In fact “print and spend” is exactly what governments have done big time in recent years in the form of fiscal stimulus plus QE.
I don’t have time to look at the rest of the dozen reasons. Plus if I spot a mistake early on in an article I normally ignore the rest of it.
It’s nice that you have time to post comments on blog posts that you are ignoring.
JW,
I wouldn’t disagree with anything you said here. But under “long run forces pushing down demand” you fail to list the high level of private debt. I know this used to matter to you: In the Fisher Dynamics PDF you conclude the Abstract with the idea that “lower private leverage is a condition of acceptable growth”.
Again, I don’t disagree with any of your “reasons not to worry about government debt” in the post above. Some of those that are new to me are strikingly good. But I still have a problem with the post. Even if we imagine that all of the reasons you list are 100% true and 100% accepted by 100% of the people, this does not mean that increasing the Federal debt will solve the problem. I, at least, am not convinced that a shortage of Federal debt is the cause of the problem, except relative to the size of private (or non-Federal) debt. I see Federal debt increase as a way to cope with the problem. But this is not the same as a solution.
In #12 you say: “… financial institutions wanted (or were compelled by regulation) to hold a substantial amount of ultrasafe, liquid debt, and there was not enough government debt in circulation to meet this demand.” There was not enough government debt to meet that demand because private sector debt is already too high and much of the government debt in circulation is already used to meet existing demand. Reducing private debt would free up some of that government debt. I’m saying we need to reduce the demand for ultrasafe liquid debt, and not only increase the supply of it.
This graph shows the exponential trend of the Federal debt, based on the debt in the years 1945-1974, along with the actual path of the Federal debt out to 2015… If the 1945-1974 trend of Federal debt had continued unchanged to 2015, we would have ended up with a one-trillion-dollar debt. Instead, we got $18 trillion.
The difference, 17 trillion dollars, was the result of a four-decade attempt to boost the economy by means of big new public spending.
We tried it. It didn’t work. It didn’t work because expansion of the Federal debt leads to expansion of private-sector debt, and private-sector debt is already so big and costly that it undermines the effectiveness of the “boost” provided by the big new public spending.
This problem cannot be solved by additional government spending. It can only be solved by reducing private-sector debt.
“Why might larger budget deficits be ok?”
A counterargument:
First of all, increased budget deficits is not the same as increased government spending: it is possible to have increased deficits without increasing spending, by lowering taxes.
Furthermore, increased deficit is not the same thing than increased debt because debt is a stock, whereas deficit is a flow, so conceptually debt might be too high (relative to some hypothetical measure) while deficits are too low, or the reverse.
But my argument is this:
“for government to successfully raise spending without raising taxes”
But why don’t you want to increase taxes?
Apparently, we are in a “secular stagnation” situation, where private spending is chronically low. The only explanation I can give to this is that ex-ante saving preferencies are too high, and that this is caused by high income inequality.
In this situation the government has to deficit spend to recycle ex-ante desired savings into effective demand on the one hand, and effective savings on the other (consumption on the hone hand and on the other increased financial assets, or more issued money if you go all MMT).
This situation should be solved by:
A) having higer government spending, and
B) having higer marginal tax rates
so that the whole system is more redistributive (so less pro-cyclical in my view) and, when crises hit, there are more automatic stabilizers as tax receipts fall but government spending doesn’t, which immediately makes for counter-cyclical fiscal policies.
So the plan should be high fixed spending, high and redistributive taxation; obviously nobody likes taxes but they are like broccoli, they are needed in a healty diet.
Government deficits are still probably good in such a system, but they can’t be the whole solution.
If we instead go for an high spending, low taxes regime, the government will be forced to deficit-spend a lot (because the ex-ante desired savings are higer) and generally keep a bubbly monetary policy, but then the profit share of the economy will be still very high, the business and financial cycles will be more accentuated, rich guys might want to invest their high savings in rentier assets (e.g. by driving up the cost of housing), etc.
So while I think that higer government spending is part of the solution, and deficits also are, I’m skeptical of arguments about deficits that don’t place front and center the connection between the need for deficits and higer inequality.
increased budget deficits is not the same as increased government spending: it is possible to have increased deficits without increasing spending, by lowering taxes.
True. The specific argument this post is part of is one in which calls for higher public sopending are defeated by concerns over financing.
An interesting question is the political logic of linking spoending to tax increases. IN general, linking them (as with “pay as you go” requiements) makes it hard to raise spending, but easier to raise taxes. So your judgement of how deisrable the link is will hinge on how importnat you think it is to raise taxes as a goal in itself (to redistribute income, or to discourage socially costly activity), and how likely you think the spending increases and tax increases are to happen on their own. If, let’s say, I thought a carbon tax was a very importnat part of the response to climate change, but that it was much less popular than public investment programs, it might make sense to insist that the public investment part of a decarbonization program be paid for by taxes, not borrowing.
I think you are generally right about the link from higher income inequality to higher desired private savings to higher required deficits to maintain full employment. Altho I must say, it seems to me that the rich in America, at least, do manage to blow a lot of money on luxury consumption. The declining marginal propensity to consume isn’t a law of nature, but has I think some specific link to the character of the capitalist class. Recall that Malthus proto-Keynsian argument in favor of the aristocracy was that unlike penny-pinching capitalists, they spent every cent they could get their hands on.
Nice post, two issues:
(1) What’s your take on the issue of whether increased debt is a burden on future generations in the absence of demand-side growth? The way I see it resources cannot transferred back in time, assuming a closed economy, however it may well represent a shift of wealth from taxpayers to bondholders, with likely regressive distributional effects. But interested to know your thoughts.
(2) Are you/we as leftists thinking through the political economy of the final two points enough? Do we really want the US to provide huge subsidies to investors and the financial system as a whole, while flooding the global market with US dollars in a way that tilts the global playing field in its favour? I appreciate the purpose of this point may be rhetorical or simply a comprehensive summary, but I’d also like to know what you think on reflection.
Well, resources certainly can be shifted back in time. If I burn down my house – or more to the point, burn up lots of coal – that is unambiguously reducing the resources available to future generations. What you mean is that resources cannot be transferred back in time *financially*. As far as a regressive transfer to bondholders goes, I think the simplest way to deal with taht is to hodl interet rates extremely low. I was just at a meeting with a very prominent debt hawk – can’t name him obviously – who has argued very strenuously that deficits unfairly burden future generations, but who immediately conceded that if interest rates stayed low there would be no problem letting public go higher.
I think the last two points are geuninely interesting as well as potential rhetorical tools. I must say however that I haven’t found them very effective at persuading people in practice. That said, I am not sure how much cheap liquidity is a subsidy to the finacnial sector. In some ways it is, of course, but at the same time it is also public provision of a good that private actors would like to be producing for profit. Just like roads and highways are in one sense subsidies to auto manufacturers and airlines, but in another sense genuine public goods.
On your last point, maintaining a dollar-based trading system (to US’ advantage) requires maintaining confidence that the US will not unduly abuse the privilege. An indiscriminate sanctions regime – as pursued against Iran, Chinese companies and others – undermines that confidence.
I generally agree with the OP, but it’s unfortunately irrelevant. This is a political problem, not an economic one.
The GOP has been using “TEH DEFACIT” as a cudgel to prevent government for decades now. It’s simple: deficits are very bad when a Democrat is President, but don’t matter when the GOP holds the White House.
Still – doffing my cynic’s hat – I hope that the economic reasoning here gets through to Democrats who have internalized the fear of deficit spending (see Stockholm Syndrome). If Democrats sweep the 2020 elections – House, Senate, & Presidency – they will have a chance to save the world, but they will need to spend a few trillion on (sustainable) infrastructure, ala Green New Deal. The US economy is likely to crash again by then, and Monetary policy alone won’t fix it. Good luck to us all!
When looking at ways to increase demand, there’s a simple alternative to more government borrowing — and that is higher taxes on the wealthy. This alternative is also more sustainable, you don’t have to worry about the potential of debt levels spiraling out of control. Tax the wealthy, and use the revenue to put more money in the hands of people who are happy to spend it, by cutting payroll taxes, by expanding medicare/medicaid, by providing more funding to states for transportation infrastructure & mass transit, by increasing Pell grants.