2023 Books

Edward Biberman, Slow Curve, 1945.

Books I read in 2023. I’m probably forgetting some.

Geoffrey Ingham, The Nature of Money. One of the fundamental divides in thinking about money is whether we start from the commodity or the unit of account. Do we begin, logically and historically, with the idea of exchange and then bring in money, or do we start from an abstract unit of measurement which then, among other things, is used to value commodities? The latter view defines what’s known as chartalism; Ingham offers the most persuasive statement of the chartalist position that I know. The most visible (though, it seems to me, fading) contemporary version of chartalism is the one offered by Modern Mone(tar)y Theory. There’s a clear affinity between Ingham and MMT but also some important differences; taking Mitchell Innes rather than Knapp as its starting point, Ingham’s version emphasizes money as a measure of obligations in general, rather than taxes specifically.

Like the next five books on the list, I read this one in as I worked on Money and Things, and in conjunction with the “Alternative Perspectives on Money” course I taught this fall.

Lev Menand, The Fed Unbound: Central Banking in a Time of Crisis.  I am a big admirer of Menand’s writing on monetary policy and the Fed. He’s a good example of how many of the most interesting conversations around economics these days are happening in law schools. I am constantly pointing people to his short piece on the “The Fed’s Sole Mandate,” which does a brilliant job reframing debates around monetary policy. I would love to see that argument developed at book length. Unfortunately, this is not really that. The book falls a bit awkwardly between two sets of stools — between a general history of the Fed and a comment on pandemic-era interventions, on the one hand, and between a popularization and original argument on the other. I’m sympathetic – these are both tensions I also struggle with. (Despite some encouragement from me, Lev also has not been quite able to give up the idea of a definite quantity of money.) I will certainly continue to draw on and assign his work in the future, but I think I’ll look more to his law review articles rather than this book. 

David McNally, Blood and Money: War, Slavery, Finance, and Empire. I would also put this in the broad category of chartalism, again emphasizing the role of money as an abstract unit of measurement rather than as a specific commodity.  This is a more eclectic and Marx-influenced version, focusing on money as quantification as such rather than of obligations. The most importnat things being reduced to commensurable quantities, in McNally’s telling, are human bodies — for him, money is the obverse of slavery, and of coercive violence more broadly. The book’s title should be taken literally.

The historical material here makes an interesting complement to Ingham. Most chartalist writing, in my experience, draws from a relatively short list of historical parables — ancient Babylon, colonial Madagascar. Ingham mostly sticks to the canon, but McNally ranges more widely. As with many books of this kind (Graeber’s Debt is the notorious example) the analysis starts glitching a bit when the story reaches the modern world. It’s not surprising. When you are writing about a general topic like money or debt, there is nothing wrong with picking whatever particular examples from the vast palette of the past that work best for the picture you’re trying to paint. But when you are writing about recent history, you are stuck with the specific things that actually happened.

Stefan Eich, The Currency of Politics: The Political Theory of Money from Aristotle to Keynes. The subject of this book is the question — one which motivates so many debates about money — of how, and to what extent, the form and management of money shapes broader social relations. It’s the question of whether money is, in the broadest sense, neutral, or whether changes in the terms on which money is created can transform politics and relations of production. The book, to be clear, is not framed this way; it’s set up, rather as six distinct essays, on particular thinkers and milieus, from classical Athens through Locke, Fichte, Marx and Keynes to the “political theory of money after Bretton Woods.” As Colin Drumm suggests, the book is best understood (and perhaps read) backward. To make sense of current debates about money, we need to go back to the early 20th century Years of High Theory, and then back to the thinkers that influenced them, and on back to Aristotle. Personally, I learned the most from the Athens and Marx chapters; but the whole thing is very worth reading

Merijn Knibbe, Macroeconomic Measurement Versus Macroeconomic Theory.  This is a book-length struggle with a question dear to my heart, the disconnect  between the categories of economic theory and measurement. Concepts like output, employment, the price level or the capital stock can be defined unambiguously within a formal economic model. But when we use them to describe developments in the real world, their meaning depends on a whole host of specific decisions about what exactly to count, what to impute and where to draw various more or less arbitrary lines. The data we look at is highly sensitive to these choices —  a full third of US consumption, for instance, consists of non cash items like the notional rent paid by homeowners to themselves, services provided gratis by nonprofits and government, and the notional value of financial services provided by low-interest bank accounts. Mainstream economists — and, I’m afraid to say, many heterodox ones — are blissfully unconcerned with these choices. But it is impossible to make any meaningful statements about real economies except in the terms that they are actually observed.

Many economists will acknowledge this problem in principle but Knibbe’s book is a rare attempt to address it head on. It is brilliant, perceptive and original, but also digressive, a bit of a ramble. One of its strengths is the author’s less academic background — he has a deep knowledge of topics, like exactly how milk prices are set in the Netherlands, that are not taught in any economics program. A challenge for any book like this is how much work it takes to explain the intricate fantasies of orthodox theory as a prelude to dismantling them; I don’t know what the solution to this problem is, if one is going to write critically about economics at all.

I provided comments on early chapters of the book, and at one point we discussed coauthoring it. That didn’t happen, obviously, but he did just fine on his own.

Anitra Nelson, Marx on Money: The God of Commodities. The most thorough and convincing account of Marx’s (incomplete and sometimes contradictory) writing on money that I have read. I won’t attempt to summarize Nelson’s arguments here; perhaps I’ll do so in a future post.

Enzo Traverso, Fire and Blood: The European Civil War 1914-1945. This book presents itself as a history of Europe’s second thirty years war. It is organized not chronologically but thematically, around various concepts that structured what Traverso presents as fundamentally an intra-European rather than international conflict — dual power, the partisan, the trauma of industrial violence, the new legal concept of war crimes, and so on. At its heart is an effort to reclaim anti-fascism as positive political project. Resistance to fascism required, and called forth, a creative fusion of socialist and Enlightenment values. Antifascism, in Traverso’s telling, was not merely a negative reaction to right-wing authoritarianism. It was a “civil religion of humanity, democracy and socialism”; it was “a “shared ethos that, in a historical context that was exceptional and necessarily transitory, made it possible to hold together Christians and atheist Communists, liberals and collectivists.” Traverso amasses a great range of historical, artistic and literary material to flesh out this view of antifascism as a positive political program. Anti-fascism is not just resistance to movement in the fascist direction; it is pressure for movement  away from the status quo in the other direction. It’s a timely reminder that one cannot effectively defend democratic values and practices where they already exist without also fighting to extend them where they currently do not. 

This is very much an intellectual history — personally, I wouldn’t have minded if Traverso had included a few less reproductions of paintings and introduced some quantitative material. Its antagonists are liberal historians — Francois Furet in particular — who see “the West” following a steady path toward liberal democracy as a kind of technical progress, with the violent conflicts between Left and Right as a friction or distraction. Traverso’s argument – not stated in so many words, but the overarching theme of the book — is that there was no technological inevitability to universal suffrage, civil liberties or the rest of it. Human progress, such as it is, is the result of active struggle. The battle against fascism yielded something quite different from a  straight line projection from the years before 1914. 

Luciano Canfora, Democracy in Europe. Another book by an Italian historian, developing many of the same themes as Traverso, though on a broader canvass. The central argument is that if democracy means “rule by the people,” then we should think of this not as an institution but an event, as the rare episodes in which the propertyless majority are able to collectively exercise power against the interests of the rich. Democracy, in his words, means “the temporary ascendancy of the poorer classes in the course of an endless struggle for equality”. Elections with broad suffrage are at best an enabling condition of democracy, not a definition of it. They create an arena in which the mass of people may sometimes be mobilized if the conditions are right. As Friedrich Engels put it, elections are important because they offer “a means to make contact with the masses where they are still distant from us,” not so much as a direct route to power. 

By the late 19th century, Engels believed, democratic politics offered an open road toward socialism. In Canfora’s view, however, he underestimated the ability of elites to mobilize mass support for their own programs. The development of mass political participation in the early 20th century owed as much, he argues, to efforts by conservative government to inoculate the population against socialism, as to any advance of democratic values. Conservatives were nonetheless hostile to universal suffrage right down to World War One. The book quotes the British writer George Cornwall Lewis urging that “the attempt to attain perfect equality in … the powers of government seems … as absurd as the attempt to attain perfect equality in the distribution of property.” Canfora accepts this equivalence but turns it around — sustained equality in government has never been compatible with concentrated property ownership. Historically, expansion of formal democracy was either a step toward broader social equality, or a defense against it.

Like Traverso, Canfora emphasizes how “antifascism was widened from a negative concept — rejection — to a positive one. … the forces that had fought fascism … could by definition transform society in a progressive direction.” He sees a fundamental parallel between developments in eastern and western Europe after war. On both sides, the upheavals of war and and popular mobilizations created new opening for demands from the masses. In the immediate postwar period, governments gave ground to pressure from below both substantively and in terms of public participation; but as they became more established, genuine popular involvement was displaced by self-confirming legality. The relationship of the US to Italy was not fundamentally different from that of the USSR to Poland or Hungary, even if military intervention was only prepared and not carried out. To drive this point home, he notes that it was Churchill, not Stalin, who proposed the division of Europe into spheres of influence; while the latter, for his part, urged an acceptance of liberal norms by communists in Western Europe.

Moving to the present, Canfora firmly rejects the idea that the countries of “the West” are democratic simply by virtue of their electoral arrangements. At the same time he insists that changes to electoral systems are important for either narrowing or widening the possibilities for substantive democracy.  In particular, he sees the shift from proportional representation to single-member districts or hybrid systems (as occurred in both France and Italy in recent decades) as a way of closing off space for democracy. In his view, steps away from proportional representation are no different from outright restrictions of the franchise. They “combine the electoral principle … with the reality of the protected ascendancy of the … upper classes.”

Rebecca Karl, Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World: A Concise History. This is a sympathetic but not uncritical account of Mao’s life and the surrounding history. One of the book’s big virtues — besides providing the basic narrative of events that I knew much less about than I should — is that its perspective is always the situation and context in which Mao himself operated. It tries to understand why he made the choices he did in the circumstances that he faced. This is partly a matter of how the book is written, but it also requires the writer (and reader) to be able to imagine themselves as part of the revolutionary project Mao was engaged in. 

I learned a great deal from this book. Here are a few general points that stand out. First,  Mao’s formative political experiences involved China’s political disintegration and subordination to outside powers and, interestingly, the subordination of women in the traditional Chinese family (the subject of his first significant political writings.) His embrace of class politics and Marxism came afterwards, as a response to the practical problems of national independence and revival. (And to the savage repression by the nationalists.) Second, despite being an early leader of the Communist Party, he was, in Karl’s telling, almost constantly in conflict with it. He never had the unquestioned  authority of a Stalin, and for much of the period after 1960 or so he was effectively excluded from day to day leadership. The cult of personality — the Little Red Book and so on — were real enough, but they reflected relative marginalization rather than dominance; they arose from, on the one side, his efforts to pressure from the outside a government he no longer dominated, and from the other, the Party’s efforts to claim his legacy even while rejecting his positions substantively. Conversely, the “reforms” after his death don’t represent a repudiation of the Revolution so much as a reassertion of tendencies that were there all along. Third, Mao’s worst mistakes were in large part overreactions to correctly perceived problems with the Soviet model. The Great Leap Forward — disastrous as it was — is in no way comparable to the great famines under Stalin. It was the result rather of a search for a form of industrialization that would not favor the cities at the expense of the peasants. The problem was a breakdown in the systems of coordination, communication and transport rather than — as under Stalin — a systematic extraction of grain from the countryside. The Cultural Revolution, meanwhile, came from the conflicts between Mao and the party leadership mentioned earlier — it was intended by Mao as a revolution against the party,  as an effort to prevent the consolidation of a new ruling class or stratum as he believed had happened in the USSR. 

These broad brush summaries don’t do justice to the book, which is much more concrete and historically grounded. One question that it does not answer, however — that it does not even pose, given its choice to write largely from Mao’s own perspective — is, how and to what extent did the Chinese revolution lay the groundwork for China’s astonishing success — maybe the greatest in history — as a late industrializer. (Isabella Weber’s book, while also very good, only addresses a small part of this question.) But I still found it extremely informative and worth reading. One other virtue: it is very short. I would love to see more books in this format. There are a lot of big topics on which I would be happy to read 150 pages, but probably would not manage 700. 

Fintan O’Toole, We Don’t Know Ourselves: A Personal History of Modern Ireland.  A charming and very readable first-person account of Ireland since 1960, seamlessly interweaving historical and autobiographic material. When I picked this book up (at The Lofty Pigeon, a lovely new bookstore in my corner of Brooklyn) I knew a bit about the Irish war of independence and of course about the euro-era financial bubble and crisis, but but not much about the period in between. It’s a fascinating  story — 20th century Ireland has to be one of the outstanding cases of cultural transformation in just a generation or two, from a closed semi-theocracy to a fully “modern” country, for better or worse. O’Toole has an appealing ambivalence about this transformation. He is unflinching in his descriptions of the stifling cruelty of mid-century Irish schools and the treatment of women who violated sexual norms; it’s interesting how, in his telling even features of this society that might seem appealing — big multi-generational families with neighbors constantly present — could seem oppressive to those living in it. But neither does he whitewash the Irish modernization project or the politicians who led it. 

Edward Burrows and Mike Wallace, Gotham. A massive, comprehensive history of New York from the first European arrival to consolidation in 1898. I consumed this as an audiobook intermittently over the past year or so. Its episodic structure works well in that format, though not so much its profusion of names, dates, and places. (Someone should make a geographic concordance from it, if there isn’t one.)  What is there to say about it? If you want to learn about the history of New York City, this is the book. 

Adam Hochschild, American Midnight: The Great War, a Violent Peace, and Democracy’s Forgotten Crisis.  A history of US politics and political repression in the period around and immediately after World War One. As Hochschild makes clear, nothing in Donald Trump’s dreams comes close to the institutionalized racism, nativism and criminalization of dissent under Woodrow Wilson. If you’ve read some labor history, you won’t be shocked at the stories of the violent suppression of the IWW. But what about the movie director sentenced to four years in prison for making a film about the American Revolution that depicted the British in too negative a light? Or the Swiss-born orchestra conductor whose lynching on suspicion of German sympathies was hailed by The Washington Post as a “healthful and wholesome awakening” of patriotic sentiment? Or the mass roundups of young men suspected of evading the draft by vigilante squads? It’s an important reminder that fascism is a long-established and central strand in American politics, not something introduced by Trump or Newt Gingrich. 

Johannes Krause and Thomas Trappe, A Short History of Humanity: A New History of Old Europe.  I enjoy books about ancient history and paleantology, especially ones that, like this one, are as much about how we know what we know, as about what we do know. The specific focus here is the new information from the reconstruction of genomes from ancient human remains, something that has only recently become possible; one of the authors is a pioneer in the technique. There is a rather serious problem, which is visible in the juxtaposition of the title and subtitle: Europe and humanity are quite different things. (The authors are hardly the only ones to have trouble remembering this.) Still, it’s fascinating how much detail is now known about ancient population movements. 

Thomas Lin, ed., Alice and Bob Meet the Wall of Fire. Essays from online science magazine Quanta. I enjoy their podcasts, but this collection was underwhelming. This is the one book on this list that I do not recommend.

Abdelrahman Munif, The Trench and Variations of Night and Day. These are the second and third novels in the Cities of Salt trilogy telling the story of a fictional gulf monarchy over the first half of the 20th century. (At least, it’s a trilogy in English; I believe there are further volumes that haven’t been translated.) I wrote a bit about these books at the end of this post.

Annie Ernaux, A Man’s Place. A short, beautiful book about the author’s father, about class, education and the the distance between the center and the periphery, and about the irreversible passage of time. It’s one of those in-between-genres books that gets shelved with the novels in France and with memoirs in the United States.

Roberto Bolaño, By Night in Chile. An allegory of the position of intellectuals under right-wing dictatorships, how you simultaneously know and don’t know what is going on — metaphorically, but in the allegory literally — beneath the floors of your literary get-togethers.  It’s the story of a well-meaning priest, “the most liberal member of Opus Dei in Chile,” who, improbably … well, I won’t spoil it.

Natalie Ginsburg, The Dry Heart; Happiness, as Such; and Voices in the Evening. Sad, occasionally political, and very occasionally violent family conflicts in small-town Italy from the 1940s through the 1960s. They are good.

Previous editions:

2020 books

2019 books

2017 Books

2016 books

2015 books

2013 books

2012 books I

2012 books II

2010 books I

2010 books II

Eich on Marx on Money

I’ve been using some of Stefan Eich’s The Currency of Politics in the graduate class I’m teaching this semester. (I read it last year, after seeing a glowing mention of it by Adam Tooze.) This week, we talked about his chapter on Marx, which reminded me that I wrote some notes on it when I first read it. I thought it might be worthwhile turning them into a blogpost, incorporating some points that came out in the discussion in today’s class.

Eich begins with one commonly held idea of Marx’s views of money: that he was “a more or less closeted adherent of metallism who essentially accepted … gold-standard presumptions” — specifically, that the relative value of commodities is prior to whatever we happen to use for units of account and payments, that the value of gold (or whatever is used for money) is determined just like that of any other commodity, and that changes to the monetary system can’t have any effects on real activity (or at least, only disruptive ones). Eich’s argument is that while Marx’s theoretical views on money were more subtle and complex than this, he did share the operational conclusion that monetary reform was a dead end for political action. In Eich’s summary, while at the time of the Manifesto Marx still believed in a public takeover of the banking system as part of a socialist program, by the the 1860s he had come to believe that “any activist monetary policy to alter the level of investment, let alone … shake off exploitation, was futile.”

Marx’s arguments on money of course developed in response to the arguments of Proudhon and similar socialists like Robert Owen. For these socialists (in Eich’s telling; but it seems right to me) scarcity of gold and limits on credit were “obstacles to reciprocal exchange,” preventing people from undertaking all kinds of productive activity on a cooperative basis and creating conditions of material scarcity and dependence on employers. “A People’s Bank,” as Eich writes channeling Proudhon, “was the only way to guarantee the meaningfulness of the right to work.” Ordinary people are capable of doing much more socially useful (and remunerative) work than whatever jobs they were offered. But under the prevailing monopoly of credit, we have no way to convert our capacity to work into access to the means of production we would need to realize it.

Why, we can imagine Proudhon asking, do you need to work for a boss? Because he owns the factory. And why does he own the factory? Is it because only he had the necessary skills, dedication, and ambition to establish it? No, of course not. It’s because only he had the money to pay for it. Democratize money, and you can democratize production.

Marx turned this around. Rather than money being the reason why a small group of employers control the means of production, it is, under capitalism, simply an expression of that fact. And if we are going to attribute this control to a prior monopoly, it should be to land and the productive forces of nature, not money. The capitalist class inherits its coercive power from the landlord side of its family tree, not the banker side.

In Marx’s view, Proudhon had turned the fundamental reality of life under capitalism — that people are free to exchange their labor power for any other commodity — into an ideal. He attributed the negative  consequences of organizing society around market exchange to monopolies and other deviations from it. (This is a criticism that might also be leveled against many subsequent reformers, including the ”market socialists” of our own time.) 

That labor time is the center of gravity for prices is not a universal fact about commodities. It is a tendency — only a tendency — under capitalism specifically, as a result of several concrete social developments. First, again, production is carried out by wage labor. Second, wage labor is deskilled, homogenized, proletarianized. The equivalence of one hour of anyone’s labor for one hour of anyone else’s is a sociological fact reflecting that fact that workers really are interchangeable. Just as important, production must be carried out for profit, because capitalists compete both in the markets for their product and for the means of production. It is the objective need for them to produce at the lowest possible cost, or else cease being capitalists, that ensures that production is carried out with the socially necessary labor time and no more.

The equivalence of commodities produced by the same amount of labor is the result of proletarianization on the one side and the hard budget constraint on the other. The compulsion of the market, enforced by the “artificial” scarcity of money, is not an illegitimate deviation from the logic of equal exchange but its precondition. The need for money plays an essential coordinating function. This doesn’t mean that no other form of coordination is possible. But if you want to dethrone money-owners from control of the production process, you have to first create another way to organize it.

So one version of Marx’s response to Proudhon might go like this. In a world where production was not organized on capitalist lines, we could still have market exchange of various things. But the prices would be more or less conventional. Productive activity, on the other side, would be embedded in all kinds of other social relationships. We would not have commodities produced for sale by abstract labor, but particular use values produced by particular forms of activity carried out by particular people. Given the integration of production with the rest of life, there would be no way to quantitatively compare the amount of labor time embodied in different objects of exchange; and even if there were, the immobility of embedded labor means there would be no tendency for prices to adjust in line with those quantities. The situation that Proudhon is setting up as the ideal — prices corresponding to labor time, which can be freely exchanged for commodities of equal value — reflects a situation where labor is already proletarianized. Only when workers have lost any social ties to their work, and labor has been separated from the rest of life, does labor time become commensurable. 

In the real world, the owners of the means of production have harnessed all our collective efforts into the production of commodities by wage labor for sale in the market, in order to accumulate more means of production – that is to say, capital. In this world, and only in this world, quantitative comparisons in terms of money must reflect the amount of labor required for production. Changes to the money system cannot change these relative values. At the same time, it’s only the requirement to produce for the market that ensures that one hour of labor really is equivalent to any other. Proudhon’s system of labor chits, in which anyone who spent an hour doing something could get a claim on the product of an hour of anyone else’s labor, would destroy the equivalence that the chits are supposed to represent. (A similar criticism might be made of job guarantee proposals today.)

For the mature Marx, money is merely “the form of appearance of the measure of value which is immanent in commodities, namely labor time.” There is a great deal to unpack in a statement like this. But the conclusion that changes in the quantity or form of money can have no effect on relative prices does indeed seem to be shared with the gold-standard orthodoxy of his time (and of ours). 

The difference is that for Marx, that quantifiable labor time was not a fact of nature. People’s productive activities become uniform and homogeneous only as work is proletarianized, deskilled, and organized in pursuit of profit. It is not a general fact about exchange. Money might be neutral in the sense of not entering into the determination of relative prices, which are determined by labor time. But the existence of money is essential for there to be relative prices at all. The possibility of transforming authority over particular production processes into claims on the social product in general is a precondition for generalized wage labor to exist. 

While Marx does look like commodity money theorist in some important ways, he shared with the credit-money theorists, and greatly developed, the  idea — mostly implicit until then — that the productive capacities of a society are not something that exist prior to exchange, but develop only through the generalization of monetary exchange. Much more than earlier writers, or than Keynes and later Keynesians, he foregrounded the qualitative transformation of society that comes with the organization of production around the pursuit of money. 

You could get much of this from any number of writers on Marx. What is a bit more distinctive in the Eich chapter is the links he makes between the theory and Marx’s political engagement. When Marx was writing his critique of Proudhon’s monetary-reform proposals in the 1840s, Eich observes, he and Engels  still believed that public ownership of the banks was an important plank in the socialist program. Democratically-controlled banks would “make it possible to regulate the credit system in the interest of the people as a whole, and … undermine the dominion of the great money men. Further, by gradually substituting paper money for gold and silver coin, the universal means of exchange … will be cheapened.” At this point they still held out the idea that public credit could both alleviate monetary bottlenecks on production and be a move toward the regulation of production “according to the general interest of society as represented in the state.”

By the 1850s, however, Marx had grown skeptical of the relevance of money and banking for a socialist program. In a letter to Engels, he wrote that the only way forward was to “cut himself loose from all this ‘money shit’”; a few years later, he said, in an address to the First International, that “the currency question has nothing at all to do with the subject before us.” In the Grundrisse he asked rhetorically, “Can the existing relations of production and the relations of distribution which correspond to them be revolutionized by a change in the instrument of circulation…? Can such a transformation be undertaken without touching the existing relations of production and social relations which rest on them?” The answer, obviously, is No.

The reader of Marx’s published work might reasonably come away with something like this understanding of money: Generalized use of money is a precondition of wage labor, and leads to qualitative transformations of human life. But control over money is not the source of capitalists’ power, and the logic of capitalism doesn’t depend on the specific workings of the financial system. To understand the sources of conflict and crises under capitalism, and its transformative power and development over time, one should focus on the organization of production and the hierarchical relationships within the workplace. Capitalism is essentially a system of hierarchical control over labor. Money and finance are at best second order. 

Eich doesn’t dispute this, as a description of what Marx actually he wrote.. But he argues that this rejection of finance as a site of political action was based on the specific conditions of the times. Today, though, the power and salience of organized labor has diminished. Meanwhile, central banks are more visible as sites of power, and the allocation of credit is a major political issue. A Marx writing now, he suggests, might take a different view on the value of monetary reform to a socialist program. I’m not sure, though, if this is a judgment that many people inspired by Marx would share. 

Inflation Came Down, and Team Transitory Was Right

Line goes down, and up. Last week, I wrote out a post arguing that the inflation problem is largely over, and the Fed had little to do with it. Yesterday, the new CPI numbers were released and they showed a sharp rise in inflation — a 4 percent rate over the past three months, compared with 2 percent when I wrote the piece.

Obviously, I’m not thrilled about this. It would be easier to make the arguments I would like to make if inflation were still coming down. But it doesn’t really change the story. Given that the spike last month is entirely energy, with growth in other prices continuing to slow, almost everyone seems to agree that it has nothing to do with demand conditions in the US, or anything the Fed has been doing or ought to do.

Here is an updated version of the main figure from the piece. You can see the spike at the far right – that’s the numbers released yesterday. You can also see that it is all energy costs (the pink bar). Everything else is still coming down.

Here is a table presenting the same data, but now comparing the high inflation of June 2021-June2022 with the lower inflation of the past yer. The last column shows how much each category has contributed to the change in inflation between the two periods. As you can see, the fall in inflation is all about goods, especially energy and cars. Services, which is where you’d expect to see any effects of a softening labor market, have not so far contributed to disinflation.

One thing the figure brings out is that we have not simply had a rise and then fall in inflation over the past couple of years. We’ve had several distinct episodes of rising prices. The first, in the second half of 2020, was clearly driven by reopening and pandemic-related shifts in spending. (One point Arjun and I make in our supply-constraints article is that big shifts in the composition of spending lead to higher prices on average.) The next episode, in the second half of 2021, was all about motor vehicles. The third episode, in the first half of 2022, was energy and food prices, presumably connected to the war in Ukraine. Finally, in later 2022 and early this year, measured inflation was all driven by rising housing costs.

Even though they may all show up as increases in the CPI, these are really four distinct phenomena. And none of them looks like the kind of inflation the Fed claims to be fighting. Energy prices may continue to rise, or they may not — I really have no idea.  But either way, that’s not a sign of an overheated economy.

It’s the supply side. Of course I am not the only one making this point. Andrew Elrod had a nice piece in Jacobin recently, making many of the same arguments. I especially like his conclusion, which emphasizes that this is not just a debate about inflation and monetary policy. If you accept the premise that spending in the economy has been too high, and workers have too much bargaining power, that rules out vast swathes of the progressive political program. This is something I also have written about.

Mike Konczal makes a similar argument in a new issue brief, “Inflation is Down. It’s a Supply-Side Story.” He looks at two pieces of evidence on this: different regression estimates of the Phillips curve relationship between unemployment and inflation, and second, expenditure and price changes across various categories of spending. I admit I don’t find the regression analysis very compelling. What it says is that a model that used past inflation to predict future inflation fit the data pretty well for 2020-2022, but over predicted inflation this year. I’m not sure this tells us much except that inflation was rising in the first period and falling in the second.

The more interesting part, to me, is the figure below. This shows quantities and prices for a bunch of different categories of spending. What’s striking about this is the negative relationship for goods (which, remember, is where the disinflation has come from.)

It is literally economics 101 that when prices and quantities move together, that implies a shift in demand; when they move in opposite directions, that implies a shift in supply. To put it more simply, if auto prices are falling even while people are buying more automobiles, as they have been, then reduced demand cannot be the reason for the price fall.

Larry Summers, in a different time, called this an “elementary signal identification point”: the sign the price increases are driven by demand is that “output and inflation together are above” their trend or previous levels. (My emphasis.) Summers’ point in that 2012 article (coauthored with Brad DeLong) was that lower output could not, in itself, be taken as a sign of a fall in potential. But the exact same logic says that a rise in prices cannot, by itself, be attributed to faster demand growth. The demand story requires that rising prices be accompanied by rising spending. As Mike shows, the opposite is the case.

In principle, one might think that the effect of monetary policy on inflation would come through the exchange rate. In this story, higher interest rates make a country’s assets more attractive to foreign investors, who bid up the price of its currency. A stronger currency makes import prices cheaper in terms of the domestic currency, and this will lower measured inflation. This is not a crazy story in principle, and it does fit a pattern of disinflation concentrated in traded goods rather than services. As Rémi Darfeuil points out in comments, some people have been crediting the Fed with US disinflation via this channel. The problem for this story is that the dollar is up only about 4 percent since the Fed started hiking — hardly enough to explain the scale of disinflation. The deceleration in import prices is clearly a matter of global supply conditions — it is also seen in countries whose currencies have gotten weaker (as the linked figure itself shows).

Roaring out of recession. I’ve given a couple video presentations on these questions recently. One, last Friday, was for Senate staffers. Amusingly —to me anyway — the person they had to speak on this topic  last year was Jason Furman. Who I imagine had a rather different take. The on Monday I was on a panel organized by the Groundwork Collaborative, comparing the economic response to the pandemic to the response to the financial crisis a decade ago. That one is available on zoom, if you are interested. The first part is a presenation by Heather Boushey of the Council of Economic Advisors (and an old acquaintance of mine from grad school). The panel itself begins about half an hour in, though Heather’s presentation is of course also worth listening to.

 

[Thanks to Caleb Crain for pointing out a mistake in an earlier version of this post.]

Keynes on Newton and the Methods of Science

I’ve just been reading Keynes’ short sketches of Isaac Newton in Essays in Biography. (Is there any topic he wasn’t interesting on?) His thesis is that Newton was not so much the first modern scientist as “the last of the magicians” — “a magician who believed that by intense concentration of mind on traditional hermetics and revealed books he could discover the secrets of nature and the course of future events, just as by the pure play of mind on a few facts of observation he had unveiled the secrets of the heavens.”

The two pieces are fascinating in their own right, but they also crystallized something I’ve been thinking about for a while about the relationship between the methods and the subject matter of the physical sciences.

It’s no secret that Newton had an interest in the occult, astrology and alchemy and so on. Keynes’ argument is that this was not a sideline to his “scientific” work, but was his project, of which his investigations into mathematics and the physical world formed just a part. In Keynes’ words,

He looked on the whole universe and all that is in it as a riddle, as a secret which could be read by applying pure thought to … mystic clues which God had laid about the world to allow a sort of philosopher’s treasure hunt to the esoteric brotherhood. He believed that these clues were to be found partly in the evidence of the heavens and in the constitution of elements… but also partly in certain papers and traditions … back to the original cryptic revelation in Babylonia. …

In Keynes’ view — supported by the vast collection of unpublished papers Newton left after his death, which Keynes made it his mission to recover for Cambridge — Newton looked for a mathematical pattern in the movements of the planets in exactly the same way as one would look for the pattern in a coded message or a secret meaning in a ancient text. Indeed, Keynes says, Newton did look in the same way for secret messages in ancient texts, with the same approach and during the same period in which he was developing calculus and his laws of motion.

There was extreme method in his madness. All his unpublished works on esoteric and theological matters are marked by careful learning, accurate method and extreme sobriety of statement. They are just as sane as the Principia, if their whole matter and purpose were not magical. They were nearly all composed during the same twenty-five years of his mathematical studies. 

Even in his alchemical research, which superficially resembled modern chemistry, he was looking for secret messages. He was, says Keynes, “almost entirely concerned, not in serious experiment, but in trying to read the riddle of tradition, to find meaning in cryptic verses, to imitate the alleged but largely imaginary experiments of the initiates of past centuries.”

There’s an interesting parallel here to Foucault’s discussion in The Order of Things of 16th century comparative anatomy. When someone like Pierre Belon carefully compares the structures of a bird’s skeleton to a human one, it superficially resembles modern biology, but really “belongs to the same analogical cosmography as the comparison between apoplexy and tempests,” reflecting the idea that man “stands in proportion to the heavens just as he does to animals and plants.”

Newton’s “scientific” work was, similarly, an integral part of his search for ancient secrets and, perhaps, for him, not the most important part. Keynes approvingly quotes the words that George Bernard Shaw (drawing on some of the same material) puts in Newton’s mouth:

There are so many more important things to be worked at: the transmutations of matter, the elixir of life, the magic of light and color, above all the secret meaning of the Scriptures. And when I should be concentrating my mind on these I find myself wandering off into idle games of speculation about numbers in infinite series, and dividing curves into indivisibly short triangle bases. How silly!

None of this, Keynes insists, is to diminish Newton’s greatness as a thinker or the value of his achievements. His scientific accomplishments flowed from this same conviction that the world was a puzzle that would reveal some simple, logical, in retrospect obvious solution if one stared at it long enough. His greatest strength was his power of concentration, his ability to

hold a problem in his mind for hours and days and weeks until it surrendered to him its secret. Then being a supreme mathematical technician he could dress it up… for purposes of exposition, but it was his intuition which was pre-eminent … The proofs … were not the instrument of discovery. 

There is the story of how he informed Halley of one of his most fundamental discoveries of planetary motion. ‘Yes,’ replied Halley, ‘but how do you know that? Have you proved it?’ Newton was taken aback—’Why, I’ve known it for years,’ he replied. ‘ If you’ll give me a few days, I’ll certainly find you a proof of it’—as in due course he did. 

This is a style of thinking that we are probably all familiar with — the conviction that a difficult problem must have an answer, and that once we see it in a flash of insight we’ll know that it’s right. (In movies and tv shows, intellectual work is almost never presented in any other way.) Some problems really do have answers like this. Many, of course, do not. But you can’t necessarily know in advance which is which. 

Which brings me to the larger point I want to draw out of these essays. Newton was not wrong to think that if the motion of the planets could be explained by a simple, universal law expressible in precise mathematical terms, other, more directly consequential questions might be explained the same way. As Keynes puts it,

He did read the riddle of the heavens. And he believed that by the same powers of his introspective imagination he would read the riddle of the Godhead, the riddle of past and future events divinely fore-ordained, the riddle of the elements…, the riddle of health and of immortality. 

It’s a cliché that economists suffer from physics envy. There is definitely some truth to this (though how much the object of envy resembles actual physics I couldn’t say.)  The positive content of this envy might be summarized as follows: The techniques of physical sciences have yielded good results where they have been applied, in physics, chemistry, etc. So we should expect similar good results if we apply the same techniques to human society. If we don’t have a hard science of human society, it’s simply because no one has yet done the work to develop one. (Economists, it’s worth noting, are not alone in believing this.)

In Robert Solow’s critical but hardly uniformed judgement,

the best and the brightest in the profession proceed as if economics is the physics of society. There is a single universal model of the world. It only needs to be applied. You could drop a modern economist from a time machine … at any time in any place, along with his or her personal computer; he or she could set up in business without even bothering to ask what time and which place. In a little while, the up-to-date economist will have maximized a familiar-looking present-value integral, made a few familiar log-linear approximations, and run the obligatory familiar regression. 

It’s not hard to find examples of this sort of time-machine economics. David Romer’s widely-used macroeconomics textbook, for example, offers pre-contact population density in Australia and Tasmania (helpfully illustrated with a figure going back to one million BC) as an illustration of endogenous growth theory. Whether you’re asking about GDP growth next year, the industrial revolution or the human population in the Pleistocene, it’s all the same equilibrium condition.

Romer’s own reflections on economics methodology (in an interview with Snowdon and Vane) are a perfect example of what I am talking about. 

As a formal or mathematical science, economics is still very young. You might say it is still in early adolescence. Remember, at the same time that Einstein was working out the theory of general relativity in physics, economists were still talking to each other using ambiguous words and crude diagrams. 

In other words, people who studied physical reality embraced precise mathematical formalism early, and had success. The people who studied society stuck with “ambiguous words and crude diagrams” and did not. Of course, Romer says, that is now being corrected. But it’s not surprising that with its late start, economics hasn’t yet produced as definite and useful knowledge as the physical science have.  

This is where Newton comes in. His occult interests are a perfect illustration of why the Romer view gets it backward. The same techniques of mathematical formalization, the same effort to build up from an axiomatic foundation, the same search for precisely expressible universal laws, have been applied to the whole range of domains right from the beginning — often, as in Newton’s case, by the same people. We have not, it seems to me, gained useful knowledge of orbits and atoms because that’s where the techniques of physical science happen to have been applied. Those techniques have been consistently applied there precisely because that’s where they turned out to yield useful knowledge.

In the interview quoted above, Romer defends the aggregate production function (that “drove Robinson to distraction”) and Real Business Cycle theory as the sort of radical abstraction science requires. You have “to strip things down to their bare essentials” and thoroughly grasp those before building back up to a more realistic picture.

There’s something reminiscent of Newton the mystic-scientist in this conviction that things like business cycles or production in a capitalist economy have an essential nature which can be grasped and precisely formalized without all the messy details of observable reality. It’s tempting to think that there must be one true signal hiding in all that noise. But I think it’s safe to say that there isn’t. As applied to certain physical phenomena, the idea that apparently disparate phenomena are united by a single beautiful mathematical or geometric structure has been enormously productive. As applied to business cycles or industrial production, or human health and longevity, or Bible exegesis, it yields nonsense and crankery. 

In his second sketch, Keynes quotes a late statement of Newton’s reflecting on his own work:

I do not know what I may appear to the world; but to myself I seem to have been only like a boy, playing on the sea-shore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me. 

I’m sure this quote is familiar to anyone who’s read anything about Newton, but it was new and striking to me. One way of reading it as support for the view that Newton’s scientific work was, in his mind, a sideshow to the really important inquiries which he had set aside. But another way is as a statement of what I think is arguably the essence of a scientific mindset – the willingness to a accept ignorance and uncertainty. My friend Peter Dorman once made an observation about science that has always stuck with me – that what distinguishes scientific thought is the disproportionate priority put on avoiding Type I errors (accepting a false claim) over avoiding Type II errors (rejecting a true claim). Until an extraordinary degree of confidence can be reached, one simply says “I don’t know”.

It seems to me that if social scientists are going to borrow something from the practices of Newton and his successors,  it shouldn’t be an aversion to “ambiguous words,” the use calculus or geometric proofs, or the formulation of universal mathematical laws. It should be his recognition of the vast ocean of our ignorance. We need to accept that on most important questions we don’t know the answers and probably cannot know them. Then maybe we can recognize the small pebbles of knowledge that are accessible to us.

2020 books

(I wrote this list at the beginning of 2021 but for some reason never posted it. I figured it’s worth putting up now – they’re all still good books.)

Books I read in 2020. None of them were life-changing, but several were very good.

Weather, by Jenny Offill. A small graceful novel about middle-class life against the background of climate change. 

The Mirror and the Light, by Hilary Mantel. Final installment of the Thomas Cromwell trilogy. Better than the second, not as good as the first, in my opinion. Gripping as the others as a story, and shifts our perspective on the central character in some interesting ways, but much of the most interesting history of the period (like the Pilgrimage of Grace) happens oddly offstage, and the central conflict between Cromwell and Henry VIII is never properly motivated. Was Archbishop Cranmer’s protege really a true-believing Protestant reformer all along?

Poor Numbers: How We Are Misled by African Development Statistics and What to Do about It, by Morten Jerven. GDP and other national accounts numbers for poor countries (and for the distant past everywhere) are bullshit. Sorry but it’s true. I read this because I was thinking of assigning it; I ultimately didn’t, but it’s a good book.

The Causality Mixtape, by Scott Cunningham. Another one I read in order to use in a class. Good, clear, accessible, but it also reinforced my sense that there’s something fundamentally wrong with econometrics. I think there is a deep reason why so many textbook examples are about how much of pay differences are due to differences in innate ability – that is the kind of question econometrics is designed to answer. Anyway, if you’re teaching (or taking) a class on statistics or econometrics, you might well want to look at this.  Otherwise, not.

The Histories, by Herodotus (Landmark edition). I’m trying to think of a way to not sound like an asshole when I say that I read all this to 8-year old Eli, and that we are now reading Thucydides. Nope, no luck. (ETA: We finished Thucydides and moved on to Xenophon.)

The Price of Peace: Money, Democracy and the Life of John Maynard Keynes, by Zach Carter. The first two thirds of this is a quite good and timely biography of Keynes. It benefits from the fact that author is a journalist rather than an economist — his interest is in how Keynes’ various writings were responding to particular political situations, rather than trying to fit them all into one coherent system. And then the last third is random gossip about postwar economists and greatest hits from the wikipedia “macroeconomic policy” page. Oh well. 

Radical Hamilton: Economic Lessons from a Misunderstood Founder, by Christian Parenti. Christian is an old friend and colleague. I read most of this in draft, but I reread it this year after it came out. It’s very good.

The Deficit Myth: Modern Monetary Theory and the Birth of the People’s Economy, by Stephanie Kelton. I reviewed it in The American Prospect. I also discussed it at more length on the Current Affairs podcast. 

Keynes against Capitalism: His Economic Case for Liberal Socialism, by Jim Crotty. Another one I read in draft, years ago in this case. The ideas in this book, and in the articles that preceded it (especially this one), and even more all the conversations with Jim over the 20 years since I first studied macroeconomics with him, have so fundamentally shaped my thinking about Keynes and about economics that honestly it’s hard to evaluate the book as a book. But I think it’s important, and very good. Maybe read the articles first?

The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism, by Edward Baptist. I used this in my economic history class last spring. It works very well in the classroom — reads like a novel, and very effectively connects concrete experiences of slavery to economic logic of the system as a whole. There have been a number of claims that the book misrepresents or distorts the material it draws on in the service of its larger narrative, at least some of which unfortunately seem to be valid. I still haven’t decided whether/to what extent these problems cancel out the book’s merits.

Labor’s War At Home: The CIO In World War II, by Nelson Lichtenstein. This was one that had been sitting on my shelves for years and years, which I finally picked up while working on my articles on WWII economic policy with Andrew Bossie (here and here). In those papers we emphasized the positive lessons from the war, but the book gives a sense of the much more radical direction wartime economic planning might have gone in, but didn’t.

Zapata and the Mexican Revolution, by John Womack. Read this after listening to the Mexican revolution series on the Revolutions podcast, which draws on it heavily. If you’re looking for a genuine hero, someone thoroughly admirable, in the history of radical politics, I don’t know that you can do better than Zapata.

American Slavery American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia, by Edmund Morgan. Another book I read in order to use in my economic history class. A classic for a reason.

Pale Horse, Pale Rider, by Katherine Anne Porter Laura was casting around for fiction dealing with the 1918 flu pandemic, which is surprisingly hard to find, and finally lighted on this. It’s a beautiful set of three linked novellas, wrestling in different ways with the ways in which one’s choices are or should be constrained by one’s personal or family past. (Only  one involves the influenza epidemic.) The middle story (“Noon Wine”) is especially striking for the fully realized interior life granted its rural, working-class characters, which you never find in writing about similar milieus by someone like Faulkner.

Freedom From the Market: America’s Fight to Liberate Itself from the Grip of the Invisible Hand, by Mike Konczal. Mike is one of the few people in the world that I agree with about almost everything, so naturally I agreed with everything in this book. Reading it felt like picking up loose ends from numerous conversations over the past five or six years: oh, that’s where that was going. Well, that’s why I liked it, but you would probably like it too. It’s a good book.

 

Previous editions:

2019 books

2017 Books

2016 books

2015 books

2013 books

2012 books I

2012 books II

2010 books I

2010 books II

 

At Jacobin: Review of Beth Popp Berman’s Thinking Like an Economist

(This review appeared in the Summer 2022 edition of Jacobin.)

After the passage of Medicare and Medicaid, universal health insurance seemed to be on its way. In 1971, the New York Times observed that “Americans from all strata of society … are swinging over to the idea that good health care, like good education, ought to be a fundamental right of citizenship.” That same year, Ted Kennedy introduced a bill providing universal coverage with no payments at the point of service, on the grounds that “health care for all our people must now be recognized as a right.” The bill didn’t pass, but it laid down a marker for future health care reform.

But when Democratic presidents and congresses took up health care in later years they chose a different path. Rather than pitching health care as a right of citizenship, the goal was better-functioning markets for health care as a commodity. From the “consumer choice health plan” proposed by Alain Enthoven in the Carter administration, though the 1993 Clinton plan down to Obama’s ACA, the goal of reform was no longer the universal provision of health care, but addressing certain specific failures in the market for health insurance.

The intellectual roots of this shift are the subject of Beth Popp Berman’s new book Thinking Like an Economist: How Efficiency Replaced Equity in U.S. Public Policy. A distinct style of thinking, she argues, reshaped ideas how about how government should work and what it could achieve. This “economic style” of thinking, originating among Democrats rather than on the Right, “centered efficiency and cost-effectiveness, choice and incentives, and competition and the market mechanism… Its implicit theory of politics imagined that disinterested technocrats could make reasonably neutral, apolitical policy decisions.” Rather than see particular domains of public life, like health care or the environment, as embodying their own distinct goals and logics, they were imagined in terms of an idealized market, where the question was what specific market failure, if any, the government should correct.

The book traces this evolution in various policy domains, focusing on the microeconomic questions of regulation, social provision and market governance rather than the higher-profile debates among macroeconomists. Covering mainly the period of the Kennedy through Reagan administrations, with brief discussions of more recent developments, the book documents how the economic style of reasoning displaced alternative ways of thinking about policy questions. The first generation of environmental regulation, for example, favored high, inflexible standards such as simply forbidding emission of certain substances. Workplace and consumer safety laws similarly favored categorical prohibitions and requirements.

But to regulators trained in economics, this made no sense. To an economist, “the optimal level of air pollution, worker illness, or car accidents might be lower than its current level, but it was probably not zero.” As economist Marc Roberts wrote with frustration of the Clean Water Act, “There is no be no case-by-case balancing of costs and benefits, no attempt at ‘fine-tuning’ the process of resource allocation.’”

The book has aroused hostility from economists, who insist that this is an unfairly one-sided portrayal of their profession. I think Berman has the better of the argument here. As anyone who has taken an economics course in college can confirm, there really is such a thing as “thinking like an economist,” even if not every economist thinks that way. Framing every question as a problem of optimization under constraints is a very particular style of reasoning. And, as Berman observes, the most important site of this thinking is not the work of professional economists with their “frontier research,” but undergraduate classes and in schools of public policy where those in government, non-profits, and the press acquire this perspective.

Berman also is right to link this distinctive economic style of reasoning to a narrowing of American political horizons. At the same time, she is appropriately cautious about attributing too much independent influence to it — ideas matter, she suggests, but as tools of power rather than sources of it.

The problem with the book is not that she is unfair to economists; it’s that she concedes too much ground to them. Thinking Like an Economist is attentive to the shifting backgrounds of leaders and staff in federal agencies — if you’re wondering who was the first economics PhD to head the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, this is the book for you. But this institutional history, while important, sometimes crowds out critical engagement with the ideas being discussed.

Take the term efficiency, which seems to occur on almost every page of the book, starting with the cover. The essence of the economic style, says Berman, is that government should make decisions “to promote efficiency.” But what does that mean?

We know what “efficient” means as applied to, say, a refrigerator. It means comparing a measurable input (electricity, in this case) to a well-defined outcome (a given volume maintained at a given temperature). There is nothing distinct to economics in preferring a more energy-efficient to a less energy-efficient appliance. Unions planning organizing campaigns, socialists running in elections, or public housing administrators all similarly face the problem of getting the most out of their scarce resources.

But what if the question is whether you should have a refrigerator in the first place, or if refrigerators ought to be privately owned? What could “efficient” mean here?

To an economist, the answer is the one that maximizes “utility” or “welfare.” These things, of course, are unobservable. So the measurement of inputs and output that defines efficiency in the every day sense is impossible.

Instead, what we do is start with an abstract model in which all choices involve using or trading property claims, and people know and care about only their own private interests. Then we show that in this model, exchange at market prices will satisfy a particular definition of efficiency — either Pareto, where no one can get a better outcome without someone else getting a worse one, or Kaldor-Hicks, where improvements to one person’s situation at the expense of another’s are allowed as long as the winners could, in principle, make the losers whole. Finally, in a sort of argument by homonym, this specialized and near-tautological meaning of “efficiency” is imported back into real-world settings, where it is used interchangeably with the everyday doing-more-with-less one.

When someone steeped in the economic style of thinking says “efficiency,” they mean something quite different from what normal people would. Rather than a favorable ratio of measurable out- puts to inputs, they mean a desirable outcome in terms of unmeasurable welfare or utility, which is simply assumed to be reached via markets. A great part of the power of economics in policy debates comes through the conflation of these two meanings. A common-sensical wish to get better outcomes with less resources gets turned into a universal rule that economic life should be organized around private property and private exchange.

Berman is well aware of the ambiguities of her key term, and the book contains some good discussions of these different meanings. But that understanding seldom makes it into the primary narrative of the book, where economists are allowed to pose as advocates of an undifferentiated “efficiency,” as opposed to non-economic social and political values. This forces Berman into the position of arguing that making government programs work well is in conflict with making them fair, when in reality an ideological preference for markets is often in conflict with both.

To be sure, there are cases where Berman’s frame works. Health care as a right is fundamentally different from a good that should be delivered efficiently, by whatever meaning. But in other cases, it leads her seriously astray. There are many things to criticize in the United States’ thread- bare welfare state. But is one of them really that it focuses too much on raising recipients’ in- comes, as opposed to relieving their “feelings of anomie and alienation”? Or again, there are many reasons to prefer 1960s and ‘70s style environmental regulation, with simple categorical rules, to the more recent focus on incentives and flexibility. But I am not sure that “the sacredness of Mother Earth” is the most convincing one.

That last phrase is Berman’s, from the introduction. It’s noteworthy that in her long and informative chapter on environmental regulation, we never hear the case for strong, inflexible standards being made in such terms. Rather, the first generation of regulators “built ambitious and relatively rigid rules … because they saw inflexibility as a tool for preventing capture” by industry, and because they believed that “setting high, even seemingly unrealistic standards … could drive rapid improvements” in technology. Meanwhile, their economics-influenced opponents like Charles Schultze (a leading economist in the Johnson and Carter administrations, and a central figure in the book) and Carter EPA appointee Bill Drayton, seem to have been motivated less by measurable policy outcomes than by objections on principle to “command and control” regulation. As one colleague described Drayton’s belief that companies should be allowed to offset emissions at one plant with reductions elsewhere, “What was driving Bill was pure intellectual conviction that this was a truly elegant approach — The Right Approach, with a capital ’T’ and ‘R’.” This does not look like a conflict between the values of equity and efficiency. It looks like a conflict between the goal of making regulation effective on one side, versus a preference for markets as such on the other.

On anti-trust regulation, the subject of another chapter in the book, the efficiency-versus-equity frame also obscures more than it reveals. The fundamental shift here was, as Berman says, away from a concern with size or market share, toward a narrower focus on horizontal agreements between competitors. And it is true that this shift was sometimes justified in terms of the supposed greater efficiency of dominant firms. But we shouldn’t take this justification at face value. As critical anti-trust scholars like Sanjukta Paul have shown, courts were not really interested in evidence for (or against) such efficiency. Rather, the guiding principle was a preference for top-down coordination by owners over other forms of economic coordination. This is why centralized price-setting by Amazon is acceptable, but an effort to bargain jointly with it by publishers was unacceptable; or why manufacturers’ prohibitions on resale of their products were accept- able but the American Medical Association’s limits on advertising by physicians was unacceptable. The issue here is not efficiency versus equity, or even centralized versus decentralized economic decision making. It’s about what kind of authority can be exercised in the economic sphere.

Berman ends the book with the suggestion that rebuilding the public sector calls for rethinking the language in which policies are understood and evaluated. On this, I fully agree. Readers who were politically active in the 2000s may recall the enormous mobilizations against George W. Bush’s proposals for Social Security privatization — and the failure, after those were abandoned, to translate this defensive program into a positive case for expanding social insurance. More recently, we’ve seen heroic labor actions by public teachers across the country. But while these have sometimes succeeded in their immediate goals, they haven’t translated into a broader argument for the value of public services and civil service protections.

As Berman says, it’s not enough to make the case for particular public programs; what we need is better language to make the positive case for the public sector in general.

“Earnings Shocks and Stabilization During COVID-19”

The other day, I put up a post arguing, on the basis of my analysis of the income data in the Current Population Survey, that the economic disruptions from the pandemic had not led to any reduction in real income for the lowest-income families. This is the opposite of the Great Recession, and presumably earlier recessions, where the biggest income losses were at the bottom. The difference, I suggested, was the much stronger fiscal response this time compared with previous downturns. 

My numbers were rough — tho I think informative — estimates based on a data set that is mainly intended for other purposes. Today I want to call attention to an important paper that reaches similar conclusions on the basis of far better data.

The paper is “Earnings Shocks and Stabilization During COVID-19” by Jeff Larrimore, Jacob Mortenson and David Splinter.1 If you’re following these debates, it’s a must-read.

The question they ask is slightly different from the one I did. Rather than look at the average change in income at each point in the distribution, they ask what fraction of workers experienced large declines in their incomes. Specifically they ask, for each point at the distribution of earnings in a given year, what fraction of workers had earnings at least 10 percent lower a year later? They include people whose earnings were zero in the second year (which means the results are not distorted by compositional effects), and do the exercise both with and without unemployment insurance and — for the most recent period — stimulus payments. They use individual tax records from the IRS, which means their sample is much larger and their data much more accurate than the usual survey-based sources.

What they find, first of all, is that earnings are quite volatile — more than 25 percent of workers experience a fall in earnings of 10 percent or more in a typical year, with a similar share experiencing a 10 percent or more increase. Looking at earnings alone, the fraction of workers experiencing large falls in income rose to about 30 percent in both 2009 and 2020; the fraction experiencing large increases fell somewhat in 2009, but not in 2019. See their Figure 1 below.

Turning to distribution, if we look at earnings alone, large falls were more concentrated at the bottom in 2020 than in 2009. This is shown in their Figure 2.  (Note that while the percentiles are based on earnings plus UI benefits, the  vertical axis shows the share with large falls in earnings alone.)  This pattern is consistent with the concentration of pandemic-related job losses in low-wage sectors. 

But when you add unemployment insurance in, the picture reverses. Now, across almost the whole lower half of the distribution, large falls in earnings were actually less common in 2020 than in 2019. And when you add in stimulus payments, it’s even more dramatic. Households in the bottom 20 percent of the distribution were barely half as likely to experience a larger fall in income in the crisis year of 2020 as in they were in the normal year of 2019.

The key results are summarized in their Table 1, below. It’s true that the proportion of low-wage households that experienced large falls in earnings during 2020 was greater than the proportion of high-wage households. But that’s true in every year — low incomes are just much more volatile than high ones. What’s different is how much the gap closed. Even counting the stimulus payments, households in the top fifth of earnings were somewhat more likely to experience a large fall in earnings in 2020 than in 2019. But in the bottom fifth, the share experiencing large falls in income fell from 43 percent to 27 percent. Nothing like this happened in 2009 — then, the frequency of large falls in income rose by the same amount (about 6 points) across the distribution. 

One thing this exercise confirms is that the more favorable experience low-income households in the pandemic downturn was entirely due to much stronger income-support programs. Earnings themselves fell even more disproportionately at the bottom than in the last recession. In the absence of the CARES Act, income inequality would have widened sharply rather than narrowed.

The one significant limitation of this study is that tax data is only released well after the end of the year it covers. So at this point, it can only tell us what happened in 2020, not in 2021. It’s hard to guess if this pattern will continue in 2021. (It might make a difference whether the child tax credit payments are counted.) But whether or not it does, doesn’t affect the results for 2020.

While the US experienced the most rapid fall in economic activity in history, low-wage workers experienced much less instability in their incomes than in a “good” year. This seems like a very important fact to me, one that should be getting much more attention than it is.

It didn’t have to turnout that way. In most economic crises, it very much doesn’t. People who are saying that the economy is over stimulated are implicitly saying that protecting low-wage workers from the crisis was a mistake. When the restaurant workers should have been left to fend for themselves. That way, they wouldn’t have any savings now  and wouldn’t be buying so much stuff. When production is severely curtailed, it’s impossible to maintain people’s incomes without creating excess demand somewhere else. But that’s a topic for another post. 

The point I want to make — and this is me speaking here, not the authors of the paper — is that the protection that working people enjoyed from big falls in income in 2020 should be the new benchmark for social insurance. Because the other thing that comes out clearly from these numbers is the utter inadequacy of the pre-pandemic safety net.  In 2019, only 9 percent of workers with large falls in earnings received UI benefits, and among those who did, the typical benefit was less than a third of their previous earnings. You can see the result of this in the table — for 2009 and 2019, the fraction of each group experiencing large  falls in earnings hardly changes when UI is included. Before 2020, there was essentially no insurance against large falls in earnings.

To be sure, the tax data doesn’t tell us how many of those with big falls in earnings lost their jobs and how many voluntarily quit. But the fact that someone leaves their job voluntarily doesn’t mean they shouldn’t be protected from the loss of income. Social Security is,  in a sense, a form of (much more robust) unemployment insurance for a major category of voluntary quits. The paid family and medical leave that, it seems, will not be in this year’s reconciliation bill but that Democrats still hope to pass, is another.

Back in the spring, people like Jason Furman were arguing that if we had a strong recovery in the labor market then we would no longer need the $400/week pandemic unemployment assistance. But this implicitly assumes that we didn’t need something like PUA already in 2019.

I’d like to hear Jason, or anyone, make a positive argument that before the pandemic, US workers enjoyed the right level of protection against job loss. In a good year in the US economy, 40 percent of low-wage workers experience a fall in earnings of 10 percent or more. Is that the right number? Is that getting us the socially optimal number of evictions and kids going to bed hungry? Is that what policy should be trying to get us back to? I’d like to hear why. 

“Monetary Policy in a Changing World”

While looking for something else, I came across this 1956 article on monetary policy by Erwin Miller. It’s a fascinating read, especially in light of current discussions about, well, monetary policy in a changing world. Reading the article was yet another reminder that, in many ways, debates about central banking were more sophisticated and far-reaching in the 1950s than they are today.

The recent discussions have been focused mainly on what the goals or targets of monetary policy should be. While the rethinking there is welcome — higher wages are not a reliable sign of rising inflation; there are good reasons to accept above-target inflation, if it developed — the tool the Fed is supposed to be using to hit these targets is the overnight interest rate faced by banks, just as it’s been for decades. The mechanism by which this tool works is basically taken for granted — economy-wide interest rates move with the rate set by the Fed, and economic activity reliably responds to changes in these interest rates. If this tool has been ineffective recently, that’s just about the special conditions of the zero lower bound. Still largely off limits are the ideas that, when effective, monetary policy affects income distribution and the composition of output and not just its level, and that, to be effective, monetary policy must actively direct the flow of credit within the economy and not just control the overall level of liquidity.

Miller is asking a more fundamental question: What are the institutional requirements for monetary policy to be effective at all? His answer is that conventional monetary policy makes sense in a world of competitive small businesses and small government, but that different tools are called for in a world of large corporations and where the public sector accounts for a substantial part of economic activity. It’s striking that the assumptions he already thought were outmoded in the 1950s still guide most discussions of macroeconomic policy today.1

From his point of view, relying on the interest rate as the main tool of macroeconomic management is just an unthinking holdover from the past — the “normal” world of the 1920s — without regard for the changed environment that would favor other approaches. It’s just the same today — with the one difference that you’ll no longer find these arguments in the Quarterly Journal of Economics.2

Rather than resort unimaginatively to traditional devices whose heyday was one with a far different institutional environment, authorities should seek newer solutions better in harmony with the current economic ‘facts of life.’ These newer solutions include, among others, real estate credit control, consumer credit control, and security reserve requirements…, all of which … restrain the volume of credit available in the private sector of the economy.

Miller has several criticisms of conventional monetary policy, or as he calls it, “flexible interest rate policies” — the implicit alternative being the wartime policy of holding key rates fixed. One straightforward criticism is that changing interest rates is itself a form of macroeconomic instability. Indeed, insofar as both interest rates and inflation describe the terms on which present goods trade for future goods, it’s not obvious why stable inflation should be a higher priority than stable interest rates.

A second, more practical problem is that to the extent that a large part of outstanding debt is owed by the public sector, the income effects of interest rate changes will become more important than the price effects. In a world of large public debts, conventional monetary policy will affect mainly the flow of interest payments on existing debt rather than new borrowing. Or as Miller puts it,

If government is compelled to borrow on a large scale for such reasons of social policy — i.e., if the expenditure programs are regarded as of such compelling social importance that they cannot be postponed merely for monetary considerations — then it would appear illogical to raise interest rates against government, the preponderant borrower, in order to restrict credit in the private sphere.

Arguably, this consideration applied more strongly in the 1950s, when government accounted for the majority of all debt outstanding; but even today governments (federal plus state and local) accounts for over a third of total US debt. And the same argument goes for many forms of private debt as well.

As a corollary to this argument — and my MMT friends will like this — Miller notes that a large fraction of federal debt is held by commercial banks, whose liabilities in turn serve as money. This two-step process is, in some sense, equivalent to simply having the government issue the money — except that the private banks get paid interest along the way. Why would inflation call for an increase in this subsidy?

Miller:

The continued existence of a large amount of that bank-held debt may be viewed as a sop to convention, a sophisticated device to issue needed money without appearing to do so. However, it is a device which requires that a subsidy (i.e., interest) be paid the banks to issue this money. It may therefore be argued that the government should redeem these bonds by an issue of paper money (or by an issue of debt to the central bank in exchange for deposit credit). … The upshot would be the removal of the governmental subsidy to banks for performing a function (i.e., creation of money) which constitutionally is the responsibility of the federal government.

Finance franchise, anyone?

This argument, I’m sorry to say, does not really work today — only a small fraction of federal debt is now owned by commercial banks, and there’s no longer a link, if there ever was, between their holdings of federal debt and the amount of money they create by lending. There are still good arguments for a public payments system, but they have to be made on other grounds.

The biggest argument against using a single interest rate as the main tool of macroeconomic management is that it doesn’t work very well. The interesting thing about this article is that Miller doesn’t spend much time on this point. He assumes his readers will already be skeptical:

There remains the question of the effectiveness of interest rates as a deterrent to potential private borrowing. The major arguments for each side of this issue are thoroughly familiar and surely demonstrate most serious doubt concerning that effectiveness.

Among other reasons, interest is a small part of overall cost for most business activity. And in any situation where macroeconomic stabilization is needed, it’s likely that expected returns will be moving for other reasons much faster than a change in interest rates can compensate for. Keynes says the same thing in the General Theory, though Miller doesn’t mention it.3 (Maybe in 1956 there wasn’t any need to.)

Because the direct link between interest rates and activity is so weak, Miller notes, more sophisticated defenders of the central bank’s stabilization role argue that it’s not so much a direct link between interest rates and activity as the effect of changes in the policy rate on banks’ lending decisions. These arguments “skillfully shift the points of emphasis … to show how even modest changes in interest rates can bring about significant credit control effects.”

Here Miller is responding to arguments made by a line of Fed-associated economists from his contemporary Robert Roosa through Ben Bernanke. The essence of these arguments is that the main effect of interest rate changes is not on the demand for credit but on the supply. Banks famously lend long and borrow short, so a bank’s lending decisions today must take into account financing conditions in the future. 4 A key piece of this argument — which makes it an improvement on orthodoxy, even if Miller is ultimately right to reject it — is that the effect of monetary policy can’t be reduced to a regular mathematical relationship, like the interest-output semi-elasticity of around 1 found in contemporary forecasting models. Rather, the effect of policy changes today depend on their effects on beliefs about policy tomorrow.

There’s a family resemblance here to modern ideas about forward guidance — though people like Roosa understood that managing market expectations was a trickier thing than just announcing a future policy. But even if one granted the effectiveness of this approach, an instrument that depends on changing beliefs about the long-term future is obviously unsuitable for managing transitory booms and busts.

A related point is that insofar as rising rates make it harder for banks to finance their existing positions, there is a chance this will create enough distress that the Fed will have to intervene — which will, of course, have the effect of making credit more available again. Once the focus shifts from the interest rate to credit conditions, there is no sharp line between the Fed’s monetary policy and lender of last resort roles.

A further criticism of conventional monetary policy is that it disproportionately impacts more interest-sensitive or liquidity-constrained sectors and units. Defenders of conventional monetary policy claim (or more often tacitly assume) that it affects all economic activity equally. The supposedly uniform effect of monetary policy is both supposed to make it an effective tool for macroeconomic management, and helps resolve the ideological tension between the need for such management and the belief in a self-regulating market economy. But of course the effect is not uniform. This is both because debtors and creditors are different, and because interest makes up a different share of the cost of different goods and services.

In particular, investment, especially investment in housing and other structures, is mo sensitive to interest and liquidity conditions than current production. Or as Miller puts it, “Interest rate flexibility uses instability of one variety to fight instability of a presumably more serious variety: the instability of the loanable funds price-level and of capital values is employed in an attempt to check commodity price-level and employment instability.” (emphasis added)

The point that interest rate changes, and monetary conditions generally, change the relative price of capital goods and consumption goods is important. Like much of Miller’s argument, it’s an unacknowledged borrowing from Keynes; more strikingly, it’s an anticipation of Minsky’s famous “two price” model, where the relative price of capital goods and current output is given a central role in explaining macroeconomic dynamics.

If we take a step back, of course, it’s obvious that some goods are more illiquid than others, and that liquidity conditions, or the availability of financing, will matter more for production of these goods than for the more immediately saleable ones. Which is one reason that it makes no sense to think that money is ever “neutral.”5

Miller continues:

In inflation, e.g., employment of interest rate flexibility would have as a consequence the spreading of windfall capital losses on security transactions, the impairment of capital values generally, the raising of interest costs of governmental units at all levels, the reduction in the liquidity of individuals and institutions in random fashion without regard for their underlying characteristics, the jeopardizing of the orderly completion of financing plans of nonfederal governmental units, and the spreading of fear and uncertainty generally.

Some businesses have large debts; when interest rates rise, their earnings fall relative to businesses that happen to have less debt. Some businesses depend on external finance for investment; when interest rates rise, their costs rise relative to businesses that are able to finance investment internally. In some industries, like residential construction, interest is a big part of overall costs; when interest rates rise, these industries will shrink relative to ones that don’t finance their current operations.

In all these ways, monetary policy is a form of central planning, redirecting activity from some units and sectors to other units and sectors. It’s just a concealed, and in large part for that reason crude and clumsy, form of planning.

Or as Miller puts it, conventional monetary policy

discriminates between those who have equity funds for purchases and those who must borrow to make similar purchases. … In so far as general restrictive action successfully reduces the volume of credit in use, some of those businesses and individuals dependent on bank credit are excluded from purchase marts, while no direct restraint is placed on those capable of financing themselves.

In an earlier era, Miller suggests, most borrowing was for business investment; most investment was externally financed; and business cycles were driven by fluctuations in investment. So there was a certain logic to focusing on interest rates as a tool of stabilization. Honestly, I’m not sure if that was ever true.But I certainly agree that by the 1950s — let alone today — it was not.

In a footnote, Miller offers a more compelling version of this story, attributing to the British economist R. S. Sayers the idea of

sensitive points in an economy. [Sayers] suggests that in the English economy mercantile credit in the middle decades of the nineteenth century and foreign lending in the later decades of that century were very sensitive spots and that the bank rate technique was particularly effective owing to its impact upon them. He then suggests that perhaps these sensitive points have given way to newer ones, namely, stock exchange speculation and consumer credit. Hence he concludes that central bank instruments should be employed which are designed to control these newer sensitive areas.

This, to me, is a remarkably sophisticated view of how we should think about monetary policy and credit conditions. It’s not an economywide increase or decrease in activity, which can be imagined as a representative household shifting their consumption over time; it’s a response of whatever specific sectors or activities are most dependent on credit markets, which will be different in different times and places. Which suggests that a useful education on monetary policy requires less calculus and more history and sociology.

Finally, we get to Miller’s own proposals. In part, these are for selective credit controls — direct limits on the volume of specific kinds of lending are likely to be more effective at reining in inflationary pressures, with less collateral damage. Yes, these kinds of direct controls pick winners and losers — no more than conventional policy does, just more visibly. As Miller notes, credit controls imposed for macroeconomic stabilization wouldn’t be qualitatively different from the various regulations on credit that are already imposed for other purposes — tho admittedly that argument probably went further in a time when private credit was tightly regulated than in the permanent financial Purge we live in today.

His other proposal is for comprehensive security reserve requirements — in effect generalizing the limits on bank lending to financial positions of all kinds. The logic of this idea is clear, but I’m not convinced — certainly I wouldn’t propose it today. I think when you have the kind of massive, complex financial system we have today, rules that have to be applied in detail, at the transaction level, are very hard to make effective. It’s better to focus regulation on the strategic high ground — but please don’t ask me where that is!

More fundamentally, I think the best route to limiting the power of finance is for the public sector itself to take over functions private finance currently provides, as with a public payments system, a public investment banks, etc. This also has the important advantage of supporting broader steps toward an economy built around human needs rather than private profit. And it’s the direction that, grudgingly but steadily, the response to various crises is already pushing us, with the Fed and other authorities reluctantly stepping in to perform various functions that the private financial system fails to. But this is a topic for another time.

Miller himself is rather tentative in his positive proposals. And he forthrightly admits that they are “like all credit control instruments, likely to be far more effective in controlling inflationary situations than in stimulating revival from a depressed condition.” This should be obvious — even Ronald Reagan knew you can’t push on a string. This basic asymmetry is one of the many everyday insights that was lost somewhere in the development of modern macro.

The conversation around monetary policy and macroeconomics is certainly broader and more realistic today than it was 15 or 20 years ago, when I started studying this stuff. And Jerome Powell — and even more the activists and advocates who’ve been shouting at him — deserves credit for the Fed;s tentative moves away from the reflexive fear of full employment that has governed monetary policy for so long. But when you take a longer look and compare today’s debates to earlier decades, it’s hard not to feel that we’re still living in the Dark Ages of macroeconomics

2019 Books

Books I read in 2019. I’m sure I’m forgetting one or two.

Novels and stories

Transit. This is a lovely short novel by the German communist Anna Seghers, which I stumbled across on my parents’ shelves. Set, and written, in World War II France, it tells the story of various refugees waiting in Marseilles to work through the interminable bureaucratic process of acquiring the exit and transit visas they need to leave the country. It’s a beautiful evocation of the mix of unsettledness and bureaucratic stasis that is the life of the refugee, but it’s also got the tight construction of a classic 19th century novel, where the plot unfolds with a retrospective inevitability. There was apparently (and coincidentally) a movie based on it that came out this year.

Jews without Money, by Mike Gold. The classic autobiographical novel of the early 20th century Lower East Side ghetto, which I was shamed into finally reading by my friend Ben. It is, obviously, a socialist realist novel, which walks through, with unconcealed anger, all the deprivations, petty and not-so-petty humiliations, pointless tragedies, and self-defeating compensations of being poor in a rich city. (“It’s better to be dead in this country than not to have money,” says the narrator/author’s father in his final defeat, when he fails even at selling bananas. “Promise me when you’ll be rich when you grow up, Mikey!”) But it’s also and even more a novel of the intense emotions and heightened contrasts of the world seen through a child’s eyes – what it reminded me of most was Bruno Schultz’s magical realist stories of his Polish childhood. 

Overthrow. A novel of Occupy, or more precisely the period immediately after Occupy was shut down, by my Brooklyn neighbor Caleb Crain. It’s the very rare novel of graduate school and radical politics that takes its protagonists seriously. The plot revolves around a post-Occupy working group, and their frictions and collisions with each other and, eventually, with the security apparatus. The working group is focused on something like ESP or telepathy, whose status is never quite resolved – it appears variously as a metaphor for the alternative forms of collective action and decisionmaking that  Zuccotti Park was an experiment in; or a metaphor for sociality itself (as in Ursula LeGuin’s story “Solitude,” where any kind of social relationship is understood as a form of magic); or as a literalization of hacking and surveillance and the various other intercepted signals of our world; or as the kind of shared imaginary object that holds together any community; or at face value, in which sense it functions as the McGuffin that keeps the story moving.

I am very much the target audience for this novel —8 years ago, a very pregnant Laura and I were running away from the cops after a brief reoccupation of Zuccotti Park, and a bit later our now-emerged son’s first political action was a rally in support of striking grocery workers organized by Occupy Kensington, a post Occupy working group not unlike the activists Crain writes about. So take my opinion with a grain of salt, but I liked this book very much.

Cloudburst, Tom McGuane. A greatest-hits collection of stories by the author of Gallatin Canyon and Crow Fair, both of which I liked very much. The stories are mostly set in Montana, among more or less downwardly mobile people. Not having spent any time in that part of the country, I can’t say how realistic they are, but to me they feel true to life. 

Books I read for teaching (do these even count?)

Modern Macroeconomics: Its Origins, Development, and Current State, by Snowdon and Vane. Delivers what it says on the tin. Randy Wray used to use this to teach macroeconomics at UMKC.I tried it for the first time this year, and I thought it worked pretty well. 

Data Visualization, by Kieran Healy, and Quantitative Social Science, by Kosuke Imai. I used these two for my research methods class in the John Jay MA program. They worked ok.

The Book of Why, by Judea Pearl. I would never have made it through this book if I hadn’t assigned it — the early chapters are full of over-the-top auto-hagiography, as if the author were the first person to ever think about how statistical evidence could be used to answer questions of cause and effect. But if you persevere, there’s actually quite a bit of interesting stuff in here on how to think rigorously about causality.

Books I read with Eli, age 7/8 (missing some for sure here)

What If and How To by Randall Munroe, the xkcd guy. These are genuinely good books about applying physics concepts and quantitative reasoning to interesting real-world problems. How To is the better one.

The Hobbit. I’d forgotten how charming and light-hearted and funny this book is. It was wonderful reading it with my son, but it didn’t leave me with any desire to move on to Lord of the Rings.

A Short History of the World, by Enrest Gombrich. This is really nicely done. I highly recommend it to anyone with kids aged six to 12 or so. 

Peter Pan. This is a much weirder book than I had realized – Barrie did have some ideas about mothers. But it kept Eli riveted.

The Pushcart War. On of those wonderful New York books everybody should read.

How to Invent Everything. Another pop science book. The joke ratio is a little high for my tastes – I don’t see why you would write a book about science if you don’t think the science is interesting enough to carry it on its own. But there is a lot of good practical science mixed in with the jokes. before I read it, I didn’t know what coppicing was, or how charcoal is made. Now I do.

Crossing on Time. The latest from the prolific David Macaulay, author of CityCathedralHow Things Work, etc. (We probably read some of those too this year, come to think of it.) This combines a history of passenger steamships with the story of the particular ship he and his family sailed on when they immigrated to the US in the 1950s.

Books read for professional reasons

Austerity: When It Works and When It Doesn’t. See review here.

Open Borders, by Bryan Caplan. Caplan is a right-wing libertarian who I don’t agree with about much. But I do agree with him that there is a clear economic and moral case for unrestricted immigration. I reviewed this book for the publisher, and while I did suggest some changes — some of which were incorporated into the final draft — I had no reservations about recommending it for publication.

Books by friends

Never a Lovely So Real. A biography of perhaps my favorite novelist, Nelson Algren, by my neighbor Colin Asher. (Our kids are in the same karate class. It’s Brooklyn!) It’s a beautifully constructed book — when I’d finished it, I wanted to start it over again, just to see better how the story fit together. I don’t know how much people read Algren today — I used to have the habit, when I went into a bookstore, of looking for Never Come Morning on the shelves, and seldom found it. But in my opinion he should be in the first tier of the American canon, ahead of Updike and Hemingway and whoever else people read in high school. “The son of a Polish baker and mulatto pigsticker crouched across the canvass,” begins the final chapter of Never Come Morning; that’s more of humanity than you’ll find in the collected works of Saul Bellow. The book gets that, and it gets his writing, which combines lyricism and social realism in a way I don’t think anyone else has managed.

It also gets his politics, and how those politics were essential to the art. Like his friend Richard Wright, or like Mike Gold, Algren is someone who never would have become a novelist if it hadn’t been for the Communist Party. A major contribution of the book is to document, based on FBI files among other evidence, how the inexplicable stalling-out of Algren’s career after The Man with a Golden Arm was the country’s best-selling book and a movie starring Frank Sinatra, is fully explained by McCarthyism. Algren’s friends may have thought he was falling into paranoia, but he really was being followed on the street, his house was being surveilled, his mailed opened, his calls listened into. The publishers who rejected his books, and the editors who spiked his essays, were doing so on the advice of the FBI. It’s a huge loss for humanity: As Laura says, the cost of McCarthyism “is not only those imprisoned or deprived of their livelihood: it is the unions never organized, the books never written, and the films never made.” Algren, who knows, might have had a whole shelf. 

The People’s Republic of Wal Mart, by Leigh Phillips and Michal Rozworski. The fact that production under capitalism is organized not by markets but by the conscious plans of corporations, is one of those facts that is completely obvious when you think about it, but still somehow radical and controversial. I don’t, to be clear, mean plans for for world domination, I mean the routine plans of getting input a from the warehouse here via a truck driven by this person, in time for that person to combine it with this other input using those tools. These tasks are all assigned by planners. A huge number of people cooperate in the production in all of the worldly goods around us, and essentially none of this cooperation is organized through markets. (Which doesn’t mean that markets are not an important feature of capitalism, they just don’t coordinate production.) Phillips and Rozworski make this case clearly and pointedly for the world’s largest corporation, and draw the natural conclusion that there’s nothing utopian about a planned economy – the raw materials are all around us. In large part it’s framed around the “calculation debate” of the 1920s. This is possibly not the most direct way of approaching the topic. But it does pass through some interesting territory, like Project Cybersyn, the precursor to the internet developed in Chile under Allende, which I had never heard of before.

Capital City. A short book on the politics of real estate and of urban planning by Sam Stein. Sam is a graduate student in geography at CUNY, and the book is very much written from that social position — animated by an expansive vision of the possibilities of urban planning, and by fresh anger at the ways it instead functions as an adjunct to the landlords’ lobby. Arguably the book’s strengths would have been better communicated if it were presented as a book about city planning, rather than a book about cities. (I don’t imagine it would have gotten nearly as many readers that way, so Sam and Verso probably made the right call.) One of those strengths is his perfect ear for the cant of really existing planning. Here’s Amanda Burden, Bloomberg’s planning director, describing black neighborhoods as effectively uninhabited: “We are making so many more areas of the city livable. Now young people are moving to neighborhoods  like Crown Heights that 10 years ago wouldn’t have been part of the lexicon.” Here’s her successor in the de Blasio administration, Carl Weisbrod, explaining that what’s good for the landlords is good for New York: “There are very few industries where the self-interest of the industry and the fundamental interests of the citizens are so deeply intertwined as the real estate industry.” And here’s Mayor SUV himself, with one of his classic but-what-can-I-do? shrugs: “I think there’s a socialistic impulse, which I hear every day, in every kind of community, that they would like things to be planned in accordance to their needs. And I would, too. Unfortunately, what stands in the way of that is hundreds of years of history that have elevated property rights and wealth to the point that that’s the reality that calls the tune.” Sure, it would be nice to organize the city to meet human needs, says our progressive mayor, but landlord profits come first and that’s just the way it is. If quotes like this fill you with anger and you’d like to experience more of it, you should definitely pick up this book.

Other nonfiction books

The Racketeer’s Progress, by Andrew Wender Cohen. Nathan Newman has been telling me to read this book since forever and I finally did, mostly on a couple of long plane flights. The subject is the labor movement in Chicago in the early decades of the 20th century. It’s in the service of a very specific argument: that we misunderstand the historical labor movement if we think of it like today’s, as bargaining on behalf of employees of a specific employer. Rather, he argues that turn-of-the-last-century unions saw themselves — and were at least intermittently accepted — as sovereign governments of their crafts or industries. Membership as such didn’t matter, it was about establishing rules that everyone in an industry had to follow. Employers went along, at least sometimes,  partly because the unions enjoyed broad popular legitimacy; partly because they had the power to make their rules stick; and partly because, at least in industries exposed to national competition, workers and businesses had a shared interest in excluding outsiders. There were, for instance, major and successful strikes to enforce the principle that only Illinois milk could be sold in Chicago, and only local electrical components could be installed in Chicago’s skyscrapers.

Why “racketeer”, tho? It’s true that Al Capone got his entree into Chicago labor thanks to this system of craft governance — not, as you might expect, as an enforcer of it, but rather as the publicly-announced guarantor of local employers defying union authority. (It was dry cleaners specifically who enlisted the mob to enforce their property rights against labor.) The term “racketeering” meanwhile, was coined specifically to describe union activities aimed at a form of sovereignty rather than at narrowly-defined economic interests. The term from its beginning, in other words, was intended not describe a legitimate activity corrupted by the presence of organized criminals, but to suggest that unions as they existed were inherently corrupt. The idea that unions historically represented the interests of an industry or occupation as a whole, and not of a particular employer, suggests that the historical model of American unionism may be more, not less, relevant, in the gig economy. 

Turtles as Hopeful Monsters, by Olivier Rieppel. The best book I’ve ever read about evolution is Mary West-Eberhardt’s Developmental Plasticity and Evolution. This isn’t that, but it’s the best book I’ve read on evolution in a while. And it makes the same basic argument: Evolution, at the macro level, is more than natural selection. It isn’t just differential reproduction of randomly varying organisms, but rather depends on a set of specific mechanisms that generate useful variation in body plans, and that conversely ensures that the random genetic variation generally gives rise to a functional organism. The genes, in other words, are just one input to the developmental process; or to put it another way, the capacity for evolution on a more than bacterial scale is something that itself had to evolve. The specific issue with turtles, in this context, is not just their shell; it’s also the distinct but related fact that their shoulders are inside their ribcage, rather than outside it as in all other vertebrates. Like the double-jointed jaw in a handful of snakes — the original “hopeful monsters” — this is a feature that can’t have developed incrementally but had to arrive all at once.  The question then is what it says about evolution that such leaps are possible, and what it says about the study of evolution that there’s been such reluctance to acknowledge them.

Warfare State, by James Sparrow. A nice history of domestic policy during World War II, or more precisely, how the scope of government in American life expanded during the war and how people reacted to it. The book draws heavily on reports from the Office of War Information, the 1940s-era propaganda and morale agency, and that shows in its choice of topics — there’s a bit more than strictly needed on the PR side of the war effort. But there’s also lots of interesting, well-organized material on policy around labor, housing and so on during the war, as well as on the more radical but unrealized proposals of people like Walter Reuther, which are arguably one of the great roads not traveled in US history. I read this in the course of putting together a Roosevelt paper on the war mobilization as a model for the Green New Deal, which should be coming out soon.

 

Previous editions:

2017 Books

2016 books

2015 books

2013 books

2012 books I

2012 books II

2010 books I

2010 books II

Utz-Pieter Reich on the Nominal and the Real

What oft was thought, but ne’er so well expressed1:

The lack of realism in microeconomic value theory has been overcompensated by an unquenched desire for `real’ figures. Idealism in the concepts of theory has resulted in a plethora of empirical concepts for real value, and the development of index number theory is thus characterised by an inventive sequence of euphemistic terms. We have an `ideal’ index, a `true’ (cost of living) index, an `exact’ index, a `superlative’ index and, last but not least, a `hedonic’ index.

At the same time, the word `real’ is employed in more than one sense in economics. It can mean the opposite to `nominal’, in other words a value figure corrected for a change in the value of the currency unit through a general price index. It can also mean `volume’, which is correction by means of a price index specifically tailored to the aggregate under consideration. It may mean `material’ as in `real’ assets rather than `financial’ assets, or the `real sector’ which produces such assets, as opposed to the `financial sector’, which deals with non- produced assets. In none of these uses is `real’ opposed to `fictitious’, but to the layman the difference is nevertheless unclear. The very act of `speaking in real terms’ conveys the idea that one has happily left behind the cloudy and unreliable world of bookkeeping and institutional regulations, and settled safely in the world of tangible objects. …

But the operational issues stirred up by using these terms have not been adequately addressed. To obtain such real variables, nominal figures are simply divided by some notional price index without regard to the ways in which this index is produced and the change in meaning it may imply for the resulting aggregate. …

In this [book] we make every effort to convince the reader that nominal values are real values in the sense of `actual’, and of what is observable as a statistical fact, while real values, as conceived by economic value theory, are constructs. They are imputations in the proper sense of the word… The dual character of the national accounts, distinguishing between institutional units and transactions on the one hand, and functional units and product flows on the other, provides the theoretical background for this view.

From Utz-Pieter Reich, National Accounts and Economic Value