Keynes and Socialism

(Text of a talk I delivered at the Neubauer Institute in Chicago on April 5, 2024.)

My goal in this talk is to convince you that there is a Keynesian vision that is much more radical and far-reaching then our familiar idea of Keynesian economics.

I say “a” Keynesian vision. Keynes was an outstanding example of his rival Hayek’s dictum that no one can be a great economist who is only an economist. He was a great economist, and he was many other things as well. He was always engaged with the urgent problems of his day; his arguments were intended to address specific problems and persuade specific audiences, and they are not always easy to reconcile. So I can’t claim to speak for the authentic Keynes. But I think I speak for an authentic Keynes. In particular, the argument I want to make here is strongly influenced by the work of Jim Crotty, whose efforts to synthesize the visions of Keynes and of Marx were formative for me, as for many people who have passed through the economics department at the University of Massachusetts.

Where should we begin? Why not at the beginning of the Keynesian revolution? According to Luigi Passinetti, this has a very specific date: October 1932. That is when Keynes returned to King’s College in Cambridge for the Michaelmas term to deliver, not his old lectures on “The Pure Theory of Money,” but a new set of lectures on “The Monetary Theory of Production”. In an article of the same title written around the same time, he explained that the difference between the economic orthodoxy of the “the theory which I desiderate” was fundamentally the difference between a vision of the economy in terms of what he called “real exchange” and of monetary production. The lack of such a theory, he argued, was “the main reason why the problem of crises remains unsolved.”

The obvious distinction between these two visions is whether money can be regarded as neutral; and more particularly whether the interest rate can be thought of — as the textbook of economics of our times as well as his insist — as the price of goods today versus goods tomorrow, or whether we must think of it as, in some sense, the price of money.

But there is a deeper distinction between these two visions that I think Keynes also had in mind. On the ones side, we may think of economic life fundamentally in terms of objects — material things that can be owned and exchanged, which exist prior to their entry into economic life, and which have a value — reflecting the difficulty of acquiring them and their capacity to meet human needs. This value merely happens to be represented in terms of money. On the other side, we may think of economic life fundamentally in terms of collective human activity, an organized, open-ended process of transforming the world, a process in which the pursuit of money plays a central organizing role. 

Lionel Robbins, also writing in 1932, gave perhaps the most influential summary of the orthodox view when he wrote that economics is the study of the allocation of scarce means among alternative uses. For Keynes, by contrast, the central problem is not scarcity, but coordination. And what distinguishes the sphere of the economy from other areas of life is that coordination here happens largely through money payments and commitments.

From Robbins’ real-exchange perspective, the “means” available to us at any time are given, it is only a question of what is the best use for them. For Keynes, the starting point is coordinated human activity. In a world where coordination failures are ubiquitous, there is no reason to think — as there would be if the problem were scarcity — that satisfying some human need requires withdrawing resources from meeting some other equally urgent need. (In 1932, obviously, this question was of more than academic interest.) What kinds of productive activity are possible depends, in particular, on the terms on which money is available to finance it and the ease with which its results can be converted back into money. It is for this reason, as Keynes great American successor Hyman Minsky emphasized, that money can never be neutral.

If the monetary production view rejects the idea that what is scarce is material means, it also rejects the idea that economic life is organized around the meeting of human needs. The pursuit of money for its own sake is the organizing principle of private production. On this point, Keynes recognized his affinity with Karl Marx. Marx, he wrote, “pointed out that the nature of production in the actual world is not, as economists seem often to suppose, a case of C-M-C’, i. e., of exchanging commodity (or effort). That may be the standpoint of the private consumer. But it is not the attitude of business, which is the case of M-C-M’, i. e., of parting with money for commodity (or effort) in order to obtain more money.”

Ignoring or downplaying money, as economic theory has historically done, requires imagining the “real” world is money-like. Conversely, recognizing money as a distinct social institution requires a reconception of the social world outside of money. We must ask both how monetary claims and values evolve independently of the  real activity of production, and how money builds on, reinforces or undermines other forms of authority and coordination. And we must ask how the institutions of money and credit both enable and constrain our collective decision making. All these questions are unavoidably political.

For Keynes, modern capitalism is best understood through the tension between the distinct logics of money and of production.  For the orthodox economics both of Keynes’s day and our own, there is no such tension. The model is one of “real exchange” in which a given endowment of goods and a given set of preferences yielded a vector of relative prices. Money prices represent the value that goods already have, and money itself merely facilitates the process of exchange without altering it in any important way.

Keynes of course was not the first to insist on a deeper role for money. Along with Marx, there is a long counter tradition that approaches economic problems as an open ended process of transformation rather than the allocation of existing goods, and that recognizes the critical role of money in organizing this process. These include the “Army of brave heretics and cranks” Keynes acknowledges as his predecessors.

One of the pioneers in this army was John Law. Law is remembered today mainly for the failure of his fiat currency proposals (and their contribution to the fiscal troubles of French monarchy), an object lesson for over-ambitious monetary reformers. But this is unfair. Unlike most other early monetary reformer, Law had a clearly articulated theory behind his proposals. Schumpeter goes so far as to put him “in the front rank of monetary theorists of all times.” 

Law’s great insight was that money is not simply a commodity whose value comes from its non-monetary uses. Facilitating exchange is itself a very important function, which makes whatever is used for that purpose valuable even if it has no other use. 

“Money,” he wrote, “is not the Value for which goods are exchanged, but the Value by which goods are exchanged.” The fact that money’s value comes from its use in facilitating exchange, and not merely from the labor and other real resources embodied in it, means that a scarcity of money need not reflect any physical scarcity. In fact, the scarcity of money itself may be what limits the availability of labor: “’tis with little success Laws are made, for Employing the Poor or Idle in Countries where Money is scarce.”

Law here is imagining money as a way of organizing and mobilizing production.

If the capacity to pay for things — and make commitments to future payments — is valuable, then the community could be made better off by providing more of it. Law’s schemes to set up credit-money issuing banks – in Scotland before the more famous efforts in France – were explicitly presented as programs for economic development.

Underlying this project is a recognition that is central to the monetary production view; the organization of production through exchange is not a timeless fact of human existence, but something that requires specific institutional underpinning — which someone has to provide. Like Alexander Hamilton’s similar but more successful  interventions a half century later, Law envisioned the provision of abundant liquidity as part of a broader project of promoting commerce and industry.

This vision was taken up a bit later by Thornton and the anti-bullionists during the debates over suspension of gold convertibility during and after the Napoleonic Wars. A subsequent version was put forward by the mid-19th century Banking School and its outstanding figure, Thomas Tooke — who was incidentally the only contemporary bourgeois economist who Karl Marx seems to have admired — and by thinkers like Walter Bagehot, who built their theory on first hand experience of business and finance.

A number of lines divide these proto-Keynesian writers from the real-exchange orthodoxy.

To begin with, there is a basic difference in how they think of money – rather than a commodity or token that exists in a definite quantity, they see it as a form of record-keeping, whose material form is irrelevant. In other words credit, the recording of promises, is fundamental; currency as just one particular form of it.

Second, is the question of whether there is some simple or “natural” rule that governs the behavior of monetary or credit, or whether they require active management. In the early debates, these rules were supposed to be gold convertibility or the real bills doctrine; a similar intellectual function was performed by Milton Friedman’s proposed money-supply growth rule in the 20th century or the Taylor Rule that is supposed to govern monetary policy today. On the other side, for these thinkers, “money cannot manage itself,” in Bagehot’s famous phrase.

Third, there is the basic question of whether money is a passive reflection of an already existing real economy, or whether production itself depends on and is organized by money and credit. In other words, the conception of money is inseparable from how the non-monetary economy is imagined. In the real-exchange vision, there is a definite quantity of commodities already existing or potentially producible, which money at best helps to allocate. In the monetary production view, goods only come into existence as they are financed and paid for, and the productive capacity of the economy comes into being through an open-ended process of active development.

It’s worth quoting Bagehot’s Lombard Street for an example:

The ready availability of credit for English businesses, he writes, 

gives us an enormous advantage in competition with less advanced countries — less advanced, that is, in this particular respect of credit. In a new trade English capital is instantly at the disposal of persons capable of understanding the new opportunities… In countries where there is little money to lend, … enterprising traders are long kept back, because they cannot borrow the capital without which skill and knowledge are useless. … The Suez Canal is a curious case of this … That London and Liverpool should be centres of East India commerce is a geographic anomaly … The main use of the Canal has been by the English not because England has rich people … but because she possesses an unequalled fund of floating money.

The capacity for reorganization is what matters, in other words. The economic problem is not a scarcity of material wealth, but of institutions that can rapidly redirect it to new opportunities. For Bagehot as for Keynes, the binding constraint is coordination.

It is worth highlighting that there is something quietly radical in Bagehot’s argument here. The textbooks tell us that international trade is basically a problem of the optimal allocation of labor, land and other material resources, according to countries’ inherent capacities for production. But here it’s being claimed is not any preexisting comparative advantage in production, but rather the development of productive capacities via money; financial power allows a country to reorganize the international division of labor to its own advantage.

Thinkers like Bagehot, Thornton or Hamilton certainly had some success on policy level. For the development of central banking, in particular, these early expressions of of monetary production view played an important role.  But it was Keynes who developed these insights into a systematic theory of monetary production. 

Let’s talk first about the monetary side of this dyad.

The nature and management of money were central to Keynes’ interventions, as a list of his major works suggests – from Indian Currency Questions to the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. The title of the latter expresses not just a list of topics but a logical  sequence: employment is determined by the interest rate, which is determined by the availability of money.

One important element Keynes adds to the earlier tradition is the framing of the services provided by money as liquidity. This reflects the ability to make payments and satisfy obligations of all kinds, not just the exchange of goods focused on by Law and his successors. It also foregrounds the need for flexibility in the face of an unknown future.

The flip side of liquidity —  less emphasized in his own writings but very much by post Keynesians like Hyman Minsky — is money’s capacity to facilitate trust and promises. Money as a social technology provides offers flexibility and commitment.

The fact that bank deposit — an IOU — will be accepted by anyone is very desirable for wealth owner who wants to keep their options open. But also makes bank very useful to people who want to make lasting commitments to each other, but who don’t have a direct relationship that would allow them to trust each other. Banks’ fundamental role is “acceptance,” as Minsky put it – standing in as a trusted third party to make all kinds of promises possible. 

Drawing on his experience as a practitioner, Keynes also developed the idea of self-confirming expectations in financial markets. Someone buying an asset to sell in the near term is not interested in its “fundamental” value – the long-run flow of income it will generate – but in what other market participants will think is its value tomorrow. Where such short-term speculation dominates, asset prices take on an arbitrary, self-referential character. This idea is important for our purposes not just because it underpins Keynes’ critique of the “insane gambling casinos” of modern financial markets, but because it helps explain the autonomy of financial values. Prices set in asset markets — including, importantly, the interest rate — are not guide to any real tradeoffs or long term possibilities. 

Both liquidity and self-confirming conventions are tied to a distinctive epistemology , which emphasizes the fundamental unknowability of the future. In Keynes’ famous statement in chapter 12 of the General Theory,

By ‘uncertain’ knowledge … I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable.  The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, … About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know!

Turning to the production side, taking the he monetary-production view means that neither the routine operation of capitalist economies nor the choices facing us in response to challenges like climate change should be seen in terms of scarcity and allocation.

The real-exchange paradigm sees production as non-monetary process of transforming inputs into outputs through a physical process we can represent as a production function. We know if we add this much labor and this much “capital” at one end, we’ll get this many consumption goods at the other end; the job of market price is to tell us if it is worth it.  Thinking instead in terms of monetary production does not just mean adding money as another input. It means reconceiving the production process. The fundamental problem is now coordination — capacity for organized cooperation. 

I’ve said that before. Let me now spell out a little more what I mean by it. 

To say that production is an open ended collective activity  of transforming the world, means that its possibilities are not knowable in advance. We don’t know how much labor and machinery and raw materials it will take to produce something new — or something old on an increased scale — until we actually do it. Nor do we know how much labor is potentially available until there’s demand for it.

We see this clearly in a phenomenon that has gotten increasing attention in macroeconomic discussions lately — what economists call hysteresis. In textbook theories, how much the economy is capable of producing — potential output — does not depend on how much we actually do produce There are only so many resources available, whether we are using them or not. But in reality, it’s clear that both the labor force and measured productivity growth are highly sensitive to current demand. Rather than a fixed number of people available to work, so that employing more in one area requires fewer working somewhere else, there is an immense, in practice effectively unlimited fringe of people who can be drawn into the labor force when demand for labor is strong. Technology, similarly, is not given from outside the economy, but develops in response to demand and wage growth and via investment. 

All this is of course true when we are asking questions like, how much of our energy needs could in principle be met by renewable sources in 20 years? In that case, it is abundantly clear that the steep fall in the cost of wind and solar power we’ve already seen is the result of increased demand for them. It’s not something that would have happened on its own. But increasing returns and learning by doing are ubiquitous in real economies. In large buildings, for instance, the cost of constructing later floors is typically lower than the cost of constructing earlier ones. 

In a world where hysteresis and increasing returns are important, it makes no sense to think in terms of a fixed amount of capacity, where producing more of one thing requires producing correspondingly less of something else. What is scarce, is the capacity to rapidly redirect resources from one use to a different one.

A second important dimension of the Keynesian perspective on production is that it is not simply a matter of combining material inputs, but happens within discrete social organisms. We have to take the firm seriously as ongoing community embodying  multiple social logics. Firms combine the structured cooperation needed for production; a nexus of payments and incomes; an internal hierarchy of command and obedience; and a polis or imagined community for those employed by or otherwise associated with it.

While firms do engage in market transactions and exist — in principle at least — in order to generate profits, this is not how they operate internally. Within the firm, the organization of production is consciously planned and hierarchical. Wealth owners, meanwhile,  do not normally own capital goods as such, but rather financial claims against these social organisms.

When we combine this understanding of production with Keynesian insights into money and finance , we are likely to conclude, as Keynes himself did, that an economy that depends on long-lived capital goods (and long-lived business enterprises, and scientific knowledge) cannot be effectively organized through the pursuit of private profit. 

First, because the profits from these kinds of activities depend on developments well off in the future that cannot cannot be known with any confidence. 

Second, because these choices are irreversible — capital goods specialized and embedded in particular production processes and enterprises. (Another aspect of this, not emphasized by Keynes, but one which wealth owners are very conscious of, is that wealth embodied in long-lived means of production can lose its character as wealth. It may effectively belong to the managers of the firm, or even the workers, rather than to its notional owners.) Finally, uncertainty about the future amplifies and exacerbates the problems of coordination. 

The reason that many potentially valuable  activities are not undertaken is not that they would require real resources that people would prefer to use otherwise. It is that people don’t feel they can risk the irreversible commitment those activities would entail. Many long-lived projects that would easily pay for themselves in both private and social terms are not carried out, because an insufficient capacity for trustworthy promises means that large-scale cooperation appears too risky to those in control of the required resources, who prefer to keep their their options open. 

Or as Keynes put it: “That the world after several millennia of steady individual saving, is so poor as it is in accumulated capital-assets, is to be explained neither by the improvident propensities of mankind, nor even by the destruction of war, but by the high liquidity- premiums formerly attaching to the ownership of land and now attaching to money.”

The problem, Keynes is saying, is that wealth owners prefer land and money to claims on concrete productive processes. Monetary production means production organized by money and in pursuit of money. But also identifies conflict between production and money.

We see this clearly in a development context, where — as Joe Studwell has recently emphasized — the essential first step is to break the power of landlords and close off the option of capital flight so that private wealth owners have no option but to hold their wealth as claims on society in the form of productive enterprises. 

The whole history of the corporation is filled with conflicts between the enterprise’s commitment to its own ongoing production process, and the desire of shareholders and other financial claimants to hold their wealth in more liquid, monetary form. The expansion or even continued existence of the corporation as an enterprise requires constantly fending off the demands of the rentiers to get “their” money back, now. The “complaining participants” of the Dutch East India Company in the 1620s, sound, in this respect, strikingly similar to shareholder activists of the 1980s. 

Where privately-owned capital has worked tolerably well — as Keynes thought it had in the period before WWI, at least in the UK — it was because private owners were not exclusively or even mainly focused on monetary profit.

“Enterprise,” he writes, “only pretends to itself to be mainly actuated by the statements in its own prospectus, however candid and sincere. Only a little more than an expedition to the South Pole, is it based on an exact calculation of benefits to come. Thus if the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters, leaving us to depend on nothing but a mathematical expectation, enterprise will fade and die.” 

(It’s a curious thing that this iconic Keynesian term is almost always used today to describe financial markets, even though it occurs in a discussion of real investment. This is perhaps symptomatic of the loss of the production term of the monetary production theory from most later interpretations of Keynes.)

The idea that investment in prewar capitalism had depended as much on historically specific social and cultural factors rather than simply opportunities for profit was one that Keynes often returned to. “If the steam locomotive were to be discovered today,” he wrote elsewhere, “I much doubt if unaided private enterprise would build railways in England.”

We can find examples of the same thing in the US. The Boston Associates who pioneered textile factories in New England seem to have been more preserving the dominant social position of their interlinked families as in maximizing monetary returns. Schumpeter suggested that the possibility of establishing such “industrial dynasties” was essential to the growth of capitalism. Historians like Jonathan Levy give us vivid portraits of early American industrialists Carnegie and Ford as outstanding examples of animal spirits — both sought to increase the scale and efficiency of production as a goal in itself, as opposed to profit maximization.

In Keynes’ view, this was the only basis on which sustained private investment could work. A systematic application of financial criteria to private enterprise resulted in level of investment that was dangerously unstable and almost always too low. On the other hand — as emphasized by Kalecki but recognized by Keynes as well — a dependence on wealth owners pursuit of investment for its own sake required a particular social and political climate — one that might be quite inimical to other important social goals, if it could be maintained at all.

The solution therefore was to separate investment decisions from the pursuit of private wealth.  The call for the “more or less comprehensive socialization of investment” at the end of The General Theory, is not the throwaway line that it appears as in that book, but reflects a program that Keynes had struggled with and developed since the 1920s. The Keynesian political program was not one of countercyclical fiscal policy, which he was always skeptical of.  Rather it envisioned a number of more or less autonomous quasi-public bodies – housing authorities, hospitals, universities and so on – providing for the production of their own specific social goods, in an institutional environment that allowed them to ignore considerations of profitability.

The idea that large scale investment must be taken out of private hands was at the heart of Keynes’ positive program.

At this point, some of you may be thinking that that I have said two contradictory things. First,  I said that a central insight of the Keynesian vision is that money and credit are essential tools for the organization of production. And then, I said that there is irreconcilable conflict between the logic of money and the needs of production. If you are thinking that, you are right. I am saying both of these things.

The way to reconcile this contradiction is to see these as two distinct moments in a single historical process. 

We can think of money as a social solvent. It breaks up earlier forms of coordination, erases any connection between people.As the Bank of International Settlements economist Claudio Borio puts it: “a well functioning monetary system …is a highly efficient means of ‘erasing’ any relationship between transacting parties.” A lawyers’ term for this feature of money is privity, which “cuts off adverse claims, and abolishes the .. history of the account. If my bank balance is $100 … there is nothing else to know about the balance.”

In his book Debt, David Graeber illustrates this same social-solvent quality of money with the striking story of naturalist Ernest Thompson Seton, who was sent a bill by his father for all the costs of raising him. He paid the bill — and never spoke to his father again. Or as Marx and Engels famously put it, the extension of markets and money into new domains of social life has “pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors”, and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash payment”.

But what they neglected to add is that social ties don’t stay torn asunder forever. The older social relations that organized production may be replaced by the cash nexus, but that is not the last step, even under capitalism. In the Keynesian vision, at least, this is a temporary step toward the re-embedding of productive activity in new social relationships. I described money a moment ago as a social solvent. But one could also call it a social catalyst.  By breaking up the social ties that formerly organized productive activity, it allows them to be reorganized in new and more complex forms.

Money, in the Keynesian vision, is a tool that allows promises between strangers. But people who work together do not remain strangers. Early corporations were sometimes organized internally as markets, with “inside contractors” negotiating with each other. But reliance on the callous cash payment seldom lasted for long.  Large-scale production today depends on coordination through formal authority. Property rights become a kind of badge or regalia of the person who has coordination rights, rather than the organizing principle in its own right.

Money and credit are critical for re-allocating resources and activity, when big changes are needed. But big changes are inherently a transition from one state to another. Money is necessary to establish new production communities but not to maintain them once they exist. Money as a social solvent frees up the raw material — organized human activity —  from which larger structures, more extensive divisions of labor, are built. But once larger-scale coordination established, the continued presence of this social solvent eating away at it, becomes destructive.

This brings us to the political vision. Keynes, as Jim Crotty emphasizes, consistently described himself as a socialist. Unlike some of his American followers, he saw the transformation of productive activity via money and private investment as being a distinct historical process with a definite endpoint.

There is, I think, a deep affinity between the Keynes vision of the economy as a system of monetary production, and the idea that this system can be transcended. 

If money is merely a veil, as orthodox economics imagines, that implies that social reality must resemble money. It is composed of measurable quantities with well-defined ownership rights, which can be swapped and combined to yield discrete increments of human wellbeing. That’s just the way the world is.  But if we see money as a distinct institution, that frees us to imagine the rest of life in terms of concrete human activities, with their own logics and structures. It opens space for a vision of the good life as something quite different from an endless accumulation of commodities – a central strand of Keynes’ thinking since his early study of the philosopher G. E. Moore.

 In contemporary debates – over climate change in particular – a “Keynesian” position is often opposed to a degrowth one. But as Victoria Chick observes in a perceptive essay, there are important affinities between Keynes and anti-growth writers like E. F. Schumacher. He looked forward to a world in which accumulation and economic growth had come to an end, daily life was organized around “friendship and the contemplation of beautiful objects,” and the pursuit of wealth would be regarded as “one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease.”

This vision of productive activity as devoted to its own particular ends, and of the good life as something distinct from the rewards offered by the purchase and use of commodities, suggests a deeper  affinity with Marx and the socialist tradition. 

Keynes was quite critical of what he called “doctrinaire State Socialism.” But his objections, he insisted, had nothing to do with its aims, which he shared. Rather, he said, “I criticize it because it misses the significance of what is actually happening.” In his view, “The battle of Socialism against unlimited private profit is being won in detail hour by hour … We must take full advantage of the natural tendencies of the day.” 

From Keynes’ point of view, the tension between the logic of money and the needs of production was already being resolved in favor of the latter.  In his 1926 essay “The End of Laissez Faire,” he observed that “one of the most interesting and unnoticed developments of recent decades has been the tendency of big enterprise to socialize itself.” As shareholders’ role in the enterprise diminishes, “the general stability and reputation of the institution are more considered by the management than the maximum of pro

A shift from production for profit to production for use — to borrow Marx’s language — did not necessarily require a change in formal ownership. The question is not ownership as such, but the source of authority of those managing the production process, and the ends to which they are oriented. Market competition creates pressure to organize production so as to maximize monetary profits over some, often quite short, time horizon. But this pressure is not constant or absolute, and it is offset by other pressures. Keynes pointed to the example of the Bank of England, still in his day a private corporation owned by its shareholders, but in practice a fully public institution.

Marx himself had imagined something similar:

As he writes in Volume III of Capital, 

Stock companies in general — developed with the credit system — have an increasing tendency to separate … management as a function from the ownership of capital… the mere manager who has no title whatever to the capital, … performs all the real functions pertaining to the functioning capitalist as such, … and the capitalist disappears as superfluous from the production process. 

The separation of ownership from direction or oversight of production in the corporation is, Marx argues, an important step away from ownership as the organizing principle of production.  “The stock company,” he continues, “is a transition toward the conversion of all functions… which still remain linked with capitalist property, into mere functions of associated producers.” 

In short, he writes, the joint stock company represents as much as the worker-owned cooperative “the abolition of the capitalist mode of production within the capitalist mode of production itself.” 

It might seem strange to imagine the tendency toward self-socialization of the corporation when examples of its subordination to finance are all around us. Sears, Toys R Us, the ice-cream-and-diner chain Friendly’s – there’s a seemingly endless list of functioning businesses purchased by private equity funds and then hollowed out or liquidated while generating big payouts for capital owners. Surely this is as far as one could get from Keynes’ vision of an inexorable victory of corporate socialism over private profit? 

But I think this is a one-sided view. I think it’s a mistake — a big mistake — to identify the world around us as one straightforwardly organized by markets, the pursuit of profit and the logic of money.

As David Graeber emphasized, there is no such thing as a capitalist economy, or even a capitalist enterprise.  In any real human activity, we find distinct social logics, sometimes reinforcing each other, sometimes in contradiction. 

We should never imagine world around us — even in the most thoroughly “capitalist” moments — is simply the working out of a logic pdf property, prices and profit. Contradictory logics at work in every firm — even the most rapacious profit hungry enterprise depends for its operations on norms, rules, relationships of trust between the people who constitute it. The genuine material progress we have enjoyed under capitalism is not just due to the profit motive but perhaps even more so in spite of it. 

One benefit of this perspective is it helps us see broader possibilities for opposition to the rule of money. The fundamental political conflict under capitalism is not just between workers and owners, but between logic of production process and of private ownership and markets. Thorstein Veblen provocatively imagined this latter conflict taking the form of a “soviet of engineers” rebelling against “sabotage” by financial claimants. A Soviet of engineers may sound fanciful today, but conflicts between the interests of finance and the needs of productive enterprise — and those who identify with them — are ongoing. 

Teaching and nursing, for example, are the two largest occupations that require professional credentials.But teachers and nurses are also certainly workers, who organize as workers — teachers have one of the highest unionization rates of any occupation. In recent years, this organizing can be quite adversarial, even militant. We all recall waves of teacher strikes in recent years — not only in California but in states with deeply anti-union politics like West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona and Kentucky. The demands in these strikes have been  workers’ demands for better pay and working conditions. But they have also been professionals’ demands for autonomy and respect and the integrity of their particular production process. From what I can tell, these two kinds of demands are intertwined and reinforcing.

This struggle for the right to do one’s job properly is sometimes described as “militant professionalism.” Veblen may have talked about engineers rather than teachers, but this kind of politics is, I think, precisely what he had in mind. 

More broadly, we know that public sector unions are only effective when they present themselves as advocates for the public and for the users of the service they provide, and not only for their members as workers. Radical social service workers have fought for the rights of welfare recipients. Powerful health care workers unions, like SEIU 1199 in New York, are successful because they present themselves as advocates for the health care system as a whole. 

On the other side, I think most of us would agree that the decline or disappearance of local news outlets is a real loss for society. Of course, the replacement of newspapers with social media and search engines isn’t commodification in the straightforward sense. This is a question of one set of for-profit businesses being displaced by another. But on the other hand, newspapers are not only for-profit businesses. There is a distinct professional ethos of journalism, that developed alongside journalism as a business. Obviously the “professional conscience” (the phrase is Michelet’s) of journalists was compatible with the interests of media businesses. But it was not reducible to them. And often enough, it was in tension with them. 

I am very much in favor of new models of employee-owned, public and non-profit journalism. Certainly there is an important role for government ownership, and for models like Wikipedia. But I also think — and this is the distinct contribution of the Keynesian socialist — that we should not be thinking only in terms of payments and ownership. The development of a distinct professional norms for today’s information sector is independently valuable and necessary, regardless of who owns new media companies. It may be that creating space for those norms is the most important contribution that alternative ownership models can make 

For a final example of this political possibilities of the monetary-production view, we can look closer by, to higher education, where most of us in this room make our institutional home. We have all heard warnings about how universities are under attack, they’re being politicized or corporatized, they’re coming to be run more like businesses. Probably some of us have given such warnings. 

I don’t want to dismiss the real concerns behind them. But what’s striking to me is how much less often one hears about the positive values that are being threatened. Think about how often you hear people talk about how the university is under attack, is in decline, is being undermined. Now think about how often you hear people talk about the positive values of intellectual inquiry for its own sake that the university embodies. How often do you hear people talk about the positive value of academic freedom and self-government, either as specific values of the university or as models for the broader society? If your social media feed is like mine, you may have a hard time finding examples of that second category at all.

Obviously, one can’t defend something from attack without at some point making the positive case that there is something there worth defending. But the point is broader than that. The self-governing university dedicated to education and scholarship and as ends in themselves, is not, despite its patina of medieval ritual, a holdover from the distant past. It’s an institution that has grown up alongside modern capitalism. It’s an institution that, in the US especially, has greatly expanded within our own lifetimes. 

If we want to think seriously about the political economy of the university, we can’t just talk about how it is under attack. We must also be able to talk about how it has grown, how it has displaced social organization on the basis of profit. (We should note here the failure of the for-profit model in higher education.) We should of course acknowledge the ways in which higher education serves the needs of capital, how it contributes to the reproduction of labor power. But we also should acknowledge all the ways that is more than this.

When we talk about the value of higher education, we often talk about the products — scholarship, education. But we don’t often talk about the process, the degree to which academics, unlike most other workers, manage our own classrooms according to our own judgements about what should be taught and how to effectively teach it. We don’t talk about how, almost uniquely in modern workplaces, we the faculty employees make decisions about hiring and promotion collectively and more or less democratically. People from all over the world come to study in American universities. It’s remarkable — and remarkably little discussed — how this successful export industry is, in effect, run by worker co-ops.

 At this moment in particular, it is vitally important that we make the case for academic freedom as a positive principle. 

Let me spell out, since it may not be obvious, how this political vision connects to the monetary production vision of the economy that I was discussing earlier. 

The dominant paradigm in economics — which shapes all of our thinking, whether we have ever studied economics in the classroom — is what Keynes called, I distinction to his own approach, the real exchange vision. From the real-exchange perspective, money prices  and payments are a superficial express of pre-existing qualities of things — that they are owned by someone, that they take a certain amount of labor to produce and have a definite capacity to satisfy human needs. From this point of view, production is just a special case of exchange. 

It’s only once we see money as an institution in itself, a particular way of organizing human life, that we can see production as something distinct and separate from it. That’s what allows us to see the production process itself, and the relationships and norms that constitute it, as a site of social power and a market on a path toward a better world. The use values we socialists oppose to exchange value exist in the sphere of production as well as consumption. The political demands that teachers make as teachers are not legible unless we see the activity they’re engaged in in terms other than equivalents of money paid and received.

I want to end by sketching out a second political application of this vision, in the domain of climate policy. 

First, decarbonization will be experienced as an economic boom. Money payments, I’ve emphasized, are an essential tool for rearranging productive activity, and decarbonizing will require a great deal of our activity to be rearranged. There will be major changes in our patterns of production and consumption, which in turn will require substantial changes to our means of production and built environment. These changes are brought about by flows money. 

Concretely: creating new means of production, new tools and machinery and knowledge, requires spending money. Abandoning old ones does not. Replacing existing structures and tools and techniques faster than they would be in the normal course of capitalist development, implies an increase in aggregate money expenditure. Similarly, when a new or expanding business wants to bid workers away from other employment, they have to offer a higher wage than an established business needs to in order to retain its current workers. So a rapid reallocation of workers implies a faster rise in money wages.

So although decarbonization will substantively involve a mix of expansions of activity in some areas and reduction of activity in others, it will increase the aggregate volume of money flows. A boom in this sense is not just a period of faster measured growth, but a period in which demand is persistently high relative to the economy’s productive potential and tight labor markets strengthen the bargaining position of workers relative to employers – what is sometimes called a “high-pressure economy.” 

Second. There is no tradeoff between decarbonization and current living standards. Decarbonization is not mainly a matter of diverting productive activity away from other needs, but mobilizing new production, with positive spillovers toward production for other purposes.

Here again, there is a critical difference between the monetary-production and the real-exchange views of the economy. In the real-exchange paradigm, we possess a certain quantity of “means.” If we choose to use some of them to reduce our carbon emissions, there will be less available for everything else. But when we think in terms of social coordination organized in large part through money flows, there is no reason to think this. There is no reason to believe that everyone who is willing and able to work is actually working, or people’s labor is being used in anything like its best possible way for the satisfaction of real human needs. Nor are relative prices today a good guide to long-run social tradeoffs. 

Third.  If we face a political conflict involving climate and growth, this will come not because decarbonization requires accepting a lower level of growth, but because it will entail faster economic growth than existing institutions can handle. Today’s neoliberal macroeconomic model depends on limiting economic growth as a way of managing distributional conflicts. Rapid growth under decarbonization will be accompanied by disproportionate rise in wages and the power of workers. Most of us in this room will probably see that as a desirable outcome. But it will inevitably create sharp conflicts and resistance from wealth owners, which need to be planned for and managed. Complaints about current “labor shortages” should be a warning call on this front.

Fourth. There is no international coordination problem — the countries that move fastest on climate will reap direct benefits.

An influential view of the international dimension of climate policy is that “free riding … lies at the heart of the failure to deal with climate change.” (That is William Nordhaus, who won the Nobel for his work on the economics of climate change.) Individual countries, in this view, bear the full cost of decarbonization measures but only get a fraction of the global benefits, and countries that do not engage in decarbonization can free-ride on the efforts of those that do.

A glance at the news should be enough to show you how backward this view is. Do Europeans look at US support for the wind, solar and battery industries, or the US at China’s support for them, and say, “oh, what wonderfully public-spirited shouldering of the costs of the climate crisis”? Obviously not.  Rather, they are seen as strategic investments which other countries, in their own national interest, must seek to match.

Fifth. Price based measures cannot be the main tools for decarbonization.

There is a widely held view that the central tool for addressing climate should be an increase in the relative price of carbon-intensive commodities, through a carbon tax or equivalent. I was at a meeting a few years ago where a senior member of the Obama economics team was also present. “The only question I have about climate policy,” he said, “is whether a carbon tax is 80 percent of the solution, or 100 percent of the solution.” If you’ve received a proper economics education, this is a very reasonable viewpoint. You’ve been trained to see the economy as essentially an allocation problem where existing resources need to be directed to their highest-value use, and prices are the preferred tool for that.

From a Keynesian perspective the problem looks different. The challenge is coordination — bottlenecks and the need for simultaneous advances in multiple areas. Markets can, in the long run, be very powerful tools for this, but they can’t do it quickly. For rapid, large-scale reorganization of activity, they have to be combined with conscious planning — and that is the problem. The fundamental constraint on decarbonization should not be viewed as the potential output of the economy, but of planning capacity for large-scale non-market coordination. 

If there is a fundamental conflict between capitalism and sustainability, I suggest, it is not because the drive for endless accumulation in money terms implies or requires an endless increase in material throughputs. Nor is it the need for production to generate a profit. There’s no reason why a decarbonized production process cannot be profitable. It’s true that renewable energy, with its high proportion of fixed costs, is not viable in a fully competitive market — but that’s a characteristic it shares with many other existing industries. 

The fundamental problem, rather, is that capitalism treats the collective processes of social production as the private property of individuals. It is because the fiction of a market economy prevents us from developing the forms of non-market coordination that actually organize production, and that we will need on a much larger scale. Rapid decarbonization will require considerably more centralized coordination than is usual in today’s advanced economies. Treatment of our collective activity to transform the world as if it belonged exclusively to whoever holds the relevant property rights, is a fundamental obstacle to redirecting that activity in a rational way. 

 

Remembering Jim Crotty

Last weekend I went up to Amherst, for an event — half conference, half memorial — in honor of Jim Crotty.

Jim was a very important presence for me when I was at a graduate student at the University of Massachusetts, as he was for many people who passed through the economics program there in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. His approach to economics, drawing on the traditions of Marx and Keynes, was for us almost the definition of heterodox macroeconomics. He was also a model for us as a human being. He never wavered from his political commitments, and he was — as many speakers at the event testified — a wonderful person, down to earth, warm and outgoing.

Some years ago, Arjun Jayadev and I recorded a long interview with Jim. INET has put video of the interview online. (The videos are somewhat abridged; you can read the full transcript here. ) I think the interview managed to capture Jim’s broader outlook as well as his economics interests. (Well, some of them — his interests were very broad!) He also has some very interesting things to say about the origins of radical economics as a distinct body of thought in the 1970s. I think the videos are well worth watching, if you want to get a sense (or a reminder) of what Jim Crotty was all about.

I wrote a piece on his work in 2016, to go along with the interviews. That piece focuses on his argument for taking Keynes seriously as a socialist, the argument which later became his last published work, Keynes against Capitalism. (There is an earlier draft that circulated within the UMass economics department, which I think makes the argument more clearly than the published book does.)

For this event, Arjun and I wrote an article on Jim, talking more about what his teaching meant for us and how one might carry his vision forward. It will be published in an upcoming special issue of the Review of Radical Political Economics, along with a number of other pieces on Jim’ thought and work. Here are some excerpts from our contribution. You can read the whole thing here, if you’re interested.

 

 

“If Keynes were Alive Today…”: Reflections on Jim Crotty

by Arjun Jayadev and J. W. Mason

Jim Crotty’s ECO 710 was for us, as for hundreds of UMass grad students over the past 40 years, the starting point for systematic thought about the economy as a whole. In this he was, like all the great teachers, presenting not so much any particular technique or ideas as himself as a model – a touchstone to go back to when you hit a dead end, and a living example of how to be a serious economist-in-the-world. The content of the class varied over the years, but it usually involved a close reading of The General Theory, with a focus on its three great advances— fundamental uncertainty, liquidity preference and effective demand.

Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of Jim’s pedagogy and scholarship, almost alone among economists we have known, was his ability to synthesise these two thinkers in ways that gave equal weight to both, that placed them in conversation rather than in tension. Crotty’s Marx anticipates Minsky, while his Keynes is a political radical – a socialist – in ways that few others have recognized.

Perhaps his most profound contribution to both traditions was the brilliant 1985 article “The Centrality of Money, Credit, and Financial Intermediation in Marx’s Crisis Theory” (Crotty 1985). There, he developed the idea that the Marxian vision of capitalist crises could only be understood in terms of the development of the credit and the financial system – that it was only via financial commitments that a fall in the profit rate could lead to an abrupt crisis rather than just a slower pace of accumulation. His reconstruction of a vision of the credit system that may either dampen or amplify disruptions to the underlying process of production suggests that Marx anticipated the ideas about financial fragility later developed in the Post Keynesian tradition. With a critical difference: While Minsky has finance calling the tune, in the Marx-Crotty version the ultimate source of instability is in the real world of labor and capital.

For us, Jim’s most important work came in four areas. The first was the interplay of real and financial instability in capitalist crises, as in the 1985 article and his work after 2008. Second was the shifting relationship between shareholders and managers in the governance of corporations. Third was his insistence on the importance of fundamental uncertainty for macroeconomic theory – if we imagine one phrase in Jim’s voice, it is “we simply do not know.” Last, chronologically, but certainly not least, was his rehabilitation of Keynes’ socialist politics – a socialist Keynes to go with his Minskyan Marx.

Most of Crotty’s published work fits within the broad post-Keynesian tradition. But his earlier and stronger commitment was to Marx. In a series of papers in the 1970s with Raford Boddy he put class conflict and imperialism front and centre in the analysis of contemporary capitalism, exploring Marxian crisis theory and what it could illuminate about contemporary macroeconomic problems. From the mid-1980s onward, his published work no longer used an explicitly Marxist framework, and the name Keynes appears much more often than that of Marx. But this was a matter of shifting focus and circumstances rather than any more fundamental re-evaluation. In a conversation with us in 2016, he described Marx as: “clearly the more brilliant social scientist and thinker and philosopher” of the two, “with a much more ambitious project, with clearer and deeper political roots.” And yet, he added: “I am writing a book about Keynes.”

At Jacobin: Yes, We Should Support Industrial Policy and the Green New Deal

(This piece was published by Jacobin on April 6, 2023, in response to the Dylan Riley post linked in the first paragraph. The version below adds a few unimportant footnotes and one somewhat important paragraph that I forgot to write before submitting it — the one about halfway through that mentions Oskar Lange.)

A few days ago, Dylan Riley wrote a post on New Left Review’s Sidecar blog that provoked a furious response on twitter. 1 Since I largely agree with the criticism made by Alex Williams, Nathan Tankus, Doug Henwood and others, perhaps I shouldn’t add to the chorus. But I want to try to clarify the larger stakes in this debate.

Riley’s piece starts from the suggestion that the failure of Silicon Valley Bank reflects a larger crisis of overcapacity and lack of investment opportunities. SVB, he writes,

had parked a huge quantity of its deposits in low-yield – but supposedly safe – government-backed securities and low-interest bonds. … the bank was overwhelmed by the massive growth in deposits from its tech clients – and neither it nor they could find anything worthwhile to invest in. …the SVB collapse is a beautiful, almost paradigmatic, demonstration of the fundamental structural problem of contemporary capitalism: a hyper-competitive system, clogged with excess capacity and savings, with no obvious outlets to soak them up.

This is an elegant framing but it runs into a problem immediately, involving the ambivalent meaning of ‘invest.” The depositors in SVB were not venture capitalists, but the firms that they had stakes in. The reason SVB had such big deposits was not because finance was unable to find profitable outlets even in the tech world, but precisely because it had done so. (Whether these businesses are doing anything socially useful is of course a different question.) The fact that SVB’s assets consisted of Treasury bonds rather than loans to its depositors reflects the shift in business financing, especially in tech, away from banks toward specialized venture capital funds — an interesting development, certainly, but one that doesn’t tell us anything about the overall population of businesses looking for financing.

Lurking behind Riley’s formulation here seems to be a crude version of commodity money theory, in which money is either out in the world being useful, or being left idle in the bank. But money in the real world is always in the form of bank deposits — that’s what money is — regardless of how actively it is circulating.

To be fair, Silicon Valley Bank is just the hook here. The real argument of the post — the one that provoked such a reaction — is that the ongoing crisis of overcapacity means that Green New Deal-type programs of public investment in decarbonization are a self-defeating dead end.   “Imagine,” writes Riley,

that Bidenomics in its most ambitious form were successful. What exactly would this mean? Above all it would lead to the onshoring of industrial capacity in both chip manufacturing and green tech. But that process would unfold in a global context in which all the other capitalist powers were vigorously attempting to do more or less the same thing. The consequence of this simultaneous industrialization drive would be a massive exacerbation of the problems of overcapacity on a world scale, putting sharp pressure on the returns of the same private capital that was ‘crowded-in’ by ‘market-making’ industrialization policies.

There are a number of distinct arguments in, or at least in the vicinity of, Riley’s post. We can of course debate the specific content of the IRA — where does it fall on Daniela Gabor’s spectrum from “de-risking” to the “big green state”? There’s a larger political question about the extent to which activists and intellectuals on the left should attach themselves to programs carried out by the established political actors through the state, as opposed to popular movements outside of it. And then there is the specific question of overcapacity — is it reasonable to think that any boost to investment via public spending will just diminish opportunities for profitable accumulation elsewhere?

I’m not unsympathetic to the first two of these arguments, even if I don’t agree with them in this particular case.

In my opinion, the IRA model passes two key tests: The public money goes to productive enterprises, not to holders of financial assets; and there is affirmative direction of spending toward specific activities. To me there is an important difference between “for each new solar panel you install with union labor, you will get x dollars of subsidies” and “if you hold a bond that fits these broad criteria, the interest is taxed at a lower rate” — even though, at a sufficiently high level of abstraction, both involve subsidizing private capital. But there’s a lot of room for debate here about how to describe specific measures and where to draw the line; a different read of its provisions might plausibly put the IRA on the other side of it.

Similarly, it’s important to remember that winning some specific legislation does not mean that you control the state — there’s a real danger in imagining ourselves “in the room where it happens” when in reality we are very far from it. When Riley writes that “no socialist should advocate an ‘industrial policy’ of any sort, nor have any truck with self-defeating New Deals,” I, obviously, do not agree. But if you wrote a parallel sentence about the humanitarian activities of the US military in various parts of the globe, I would agree wholeheartedly.  Over the years I’ve had many disagreements with people with broadly similar political commitments, who thought this particular intervention could was worth supporting. As far as I am concerned, when the instruments of the state are marines and cruise missiles, the only possible engagement from the left is protest and obstruction.

War is different from industrial policy. But one can imagine an argument along these lines that would be worth taking seriously. If you wanted to write a stronger critique of the Green New Deal from the left, you might stress the tight links between industrial policy and nationalism, and the frightening anti-China rhetoric that’s a ubiquitous part of the case for public investment.

Here, though, I want to talk about the specifically economic argument, about overproduction.

Riley’s post draws on a long-standing argument among writers for the New Left Review, that the fundamental challenge for contemporary capitalism is overproduction or excess capacity. In this story, the end of the postwar Golden Age was due to the end of US dominance in world trade. Starting in the 1970s, stable oligopolies in manufacturing gave way to to cutthroat competition as producers from an increasing number of countries competed for a limited market. Because manufacturing is so dependent on long-lived, specialized capital goods, producers are unwilling to exit even in the face of falling prices, giving rise to chronic depressed profits and excess capacity, and a turn to financial predation — what Robert Brenner calls neofeudalism — as an alternative outlet for investment. Even when profits recover, there’s little incentive to accumulate new means of production, given that there’s already capacity to produce more than markets can absorb. 

The most influential version of this story is probably Brenner’s book-length New Left Review article from 1998. 2 It is clearly compelling on some level – a lot of people seem to believe something like it. It draws on a long tradition of theories of overproduction and destructive competition, going back at least to the underconsumption theories of Hobson, Lenin and Luxemburg on the one side and, on the other, the first generation of the US economics profession, shaped by the pathological effects of competition between railways. Richard Ely, founder of the American Economics Association, described the problem clearly: “whenever the principle of increasing returns works with any high degree of intensity, competition can never regulate private business satisfactorily.”  His contemporary Arthur Hadley described destructive competition in capital-intensive industries in very much the same terms as Brenner: at prices 

far below the point where it pays to do your own business, it pays to steal business from another man. The influx of new capital will cease; but the fight will go on, either until the old investment and machinery are worn out, or until a pool of some sort is arranged.

(The quotes are from Michael Perelman’s excellent The End of Economics.)

There’s an important truth to the idea that, in a world of long-lived specialized capital goods and constant or falling marginal costs, there is no tendency for market prices to reflect costs of production. Too much competition, and firms will sell at prices that don’t recoup their fixed costs, and drive each other to bankruptcy. Too little competition, and firms will recover their full costs and then some, while limiting socially useful output. No market process ensures that competition ends up at the goldilocks level in the middle.

But while this problem is real, there’s something very strange about the way Riley deploys it as an argument against the Green New Deal. Rather than a story about competition, he — following Brenner — talks as if there was a fixed amount of demand out there that producers must compete for. In a world of overproduction, he says, any public investment will just create more excess capacity, driving down profits and accumulation somewhere else.

In a funny way, this is the mirror image of the Treasury View of the 1930s — which said that any increase in public employment would just mean an equal fall in private employment — or of its modern day successors like Jason Furman and Lawrence Summers. The Furman-Summers line is that the world has only a certain amount of productive capacity; any public spending above that level that will just result in inflation, or else crowding out of private investment. The Brenner-Riley line is that the world has only a certain amount of demand, both in general and for carbon-reducing technology specifically. Try to produce any more than that, and you’ll just have excess capacity and falling profits. Both sides agree that the economy is like a bathtub — try to overfill it and the excess will just run over the sides. The difference is that for first side demand is the water and productive capacity is the tub, while for the other the water is capacity and the tub is demand.

Riley invokes Oskar Lange’s 1930s discussions of electoral socialism in support of his contention that “half-measures are self-contradictory absurdities” — which very much includes any “blather about New Deals.” But the situation facing socialist governments in the 1930s was quite different. Their problem was that any serious discussion of nationalization would terrify capital and discourage investment, sending the economy into a deeper slump and dooming socialists’ prospects for extending their initial electoral gains. This meant that nationalization had to be carried out all at once or not at all — which in practice, of course, meant the latter. (There is a good discussion of this in Przeworski’s Paper Stones.) Keynesian fiscal policy was precisely what offered the way out of this trap, by allowing an expansion of the public sector on terms consistent with continued private accumulation. Riley here is rejecting exactly the solution to the problem Lange identified.

But there’s a deeper problem with the Riley-Brenner vision. In Jim Crotty’s review of Brenner’s long article, he argues that, in response to what Brenner saw as an excessive focus on labor-capital conflict in accounts of the end of the postwar boom, he created an equally one-sided story focused exclusively on inter-capitalist competition. I think this gets to the crux of the matter.

Let’s take a step back.

The development of a capitalist economy is a complex process, which can go wrong at many points. Production on an increased scale requires the expansion of the physical and organizational means of production, with whatever technical and material requirements that entails. Additional labor must be enlisted and supervised. New raw materials must be acquired, and the production process itself has to be carried out on an increased scale. The resulting products have to be sold at a price that covers the cost of production — in other words, there must be sufficient demand. The resulting surplus has to be channeled back to investment. All of this has to take place without excessive changes in relative prices, and in particular without politically destabilizing changes in wages or the distribution of income. The reinvestment stage normally happens via the financial system; the ongoing payment commitments this generates have to be consistently met. And it all must take place without generating unsustainable cross-border payment flows or commitments. 

All of these steps have to happen in sync, across a wide range of sectors and enterprises. A business expanding production has to be confident that the market for its products is also growing, as well as the supply of the inputs it uses, the financing it depends on, and the labor it exploits. An interruption in any of these will halt the whole process. When growth is steady and incremental, this can be mostly taken for granted, but not in the case of more rapid or qualitative change, as in industrialization.

This problem was clearly recognized by earlier development economists. It’s the idea behind the “two gap” and “three gap” models of Hollis Chenery and his collaborators, the “big push” of Rosenstein-Rodan, or Gerschenkron’s famous essay on late industrialization.3  Everything has to move forward together. Industrialization requires not only factories, but ports, railroads, water, electricity, schools. All of these depend on the others. You need savings (or at least credit), and you need demand, and you need labor, and you need foreign exchange.4 

At the same time, an essential feature of the capitalist mode of production is that the various steps each involve different decision makers, acting with an eye only to their own monetary returns. From the point of view of each decision maker, the choices of all the others look like fixed, objective constraints. From the point of view of a particular producer, the question of whether there is sufficient demand to justify additional output is an objective fact. For the producers collectively, it is their decisions that determine the level of demand just as much as — in fact simultaneously with — the level of current output.  But for them individually, it’s a given, an external constraint. 

The problem comes when in thinking about the system as a whole we treat something like destructive competition not as what it is – a coordination problem – but from the partial perspective of the individual producer. From this perspective, it appears as objectively given, as if there were only so much demand to go around. The mainstream, of course, makes the exact same error when they treat the productive capacity of the system as prior to and independent of the actual level of activity. (This is the point of Arjun Jayadev’s and my recent paper on supply constraints.) The fact that when one part of the system moves ahead faster it encounters friction from parts that are lagging imposes genuine limits on the pace of expansion — both supply and demand constraints are real – but we should not treat them as absolute or externally given. 

The faster and farther reaching are the changes in production, the harder it is for a decentralized market system to maintain coherence, and the more necessary conscious, more or less centralized coordination becomes. This was one of the main lessons of the economic mobilization for World War II, and a critical consideration for decarbonization. Planning is ubiquitous in real-world capitalism, and more rapid transformations in activity require planning at a higher level.  

At the same time, we shouldn’t underestimate the capacity of our system of anarchic production for profit to eventually break through the barriers it encounters — something Marx understood better than anyone. That is why it’s become the world-encompassing system it is. Sustained demand will itself call forth the new labor and improved production techniques required to meet it.  Conversely, while Say’s law may not hold in the short run, or as a matter of logic, it is very much the case that improvements in production create new markets, and expand demand qualitatively as well as quantitatively.

Overproduction and excess capacity are not new phenomena. They have been a recurring feature of the great crises that capitalist economies have experienced for the past two hundred years. Here is Jules Michelet’s beautiful contemporary description of the 1842 commercial crisis in France:

The cotton mills were at the last gasp, choking to death. The warehouses were stuffed, and there were no sales. The terrified manufacturer dared neither work nor stop working with those devouring machines. Yet usury is not laid off, so he worked half-time, and the glut grew worse. Prices fell, but in vain; they went on falling until cotton cloth stood at six sous.

We should never forget about the misery and chaos of crises like this. But we should also not forget how this story ends. It is not “and then eventually enough mills were shut down and things went back to how they were before.”

Here’s how the Michelet passage continues:

Then something completely unexpected happened. The words six sous aroused the people. Millions of purchasers — poor people who had never bought anything — began to stir. Then we saw what an immense and powerful consumer the people is when engaged. The warehouses were emptied in a moment. The machines began to work furiously again, and chimneys began to smoke. That was a revolution in France, little noted but a great revolution nonetheless. It was a revolution in cleanliness and the embellishments of the homes of the poor; underwear, bedding, table linen, and window curtains were now being used by whole classes who had not used them since the beginning of the world.

An openness to the possibility of this sort of transformational change is what’s fundamentally missing from both the Summers-Furman and Brenner-Riley views. This is not a system in homeostasis, that if disturbed returns to its old position. It is a system lurching from one unstable equilibrium to another. And this is very relevant, I think, to decarbonization. 

Not so very long ago, it was conventional wisdom that photovoltaic energy was never going to be more than a niche power source — useful when you can’t connect to the grid, but way too expensive to to ever be used at utility scale. And now look — solar accounted for nearly half of new electricity generation installed last year. There’s an almost endless scope for further growth in renewable energy, as more of the economy is electrified. The fact that Silicon Valley Bank was holding a bunch of Treasury bonds does not mean that the field of productive investment has been exhausted.

The tremendous growth of renewable energy over the past generation wouldn’t have happened without public subsidies and regulation. At the same time, most of the actual production has been carried out by employees of private, profit-seeking businesses. Riley is absolutely right that no one should be counting on private investment in education or in care work. Explaining why those activities depend critically on the autonomy and intrinsic motivation of the workers carrying them out, and are therefore inherently unsuited to for-profit businesses, is something we need to keep doing. The same goes for many public functions that have been turned over to contractors. But there are many other areas where it is still possible to harness the profit motive to meet human needs. 

(I am not, to be clear, saying anything about the virtues of markets or the profit motive in the abstract. I would like to progressively eliminate them from human life. I am simply stating the fact that my house was put up by a private builder, for profit, and yet the roof does keep out the rain.) 

There is plenty of scope to criticize the specific content of the IRA and other climate legislation, and the strategic choices of the groups that support them. (Altho a bit of humility is called for with the latter.) But we need to categorically reject the idea that there is some hard constraint such that any program to increase private spending on decarbonization will be canceled out by a reduction in spending somewhere else. 

The bottom line, both for the politics and the economics, is that we need to resist thinking in terms of a change in one area while everything else stays the same. Ceteris paribus may be a useful analytic tool, but it’s fundamentally inapplicable to historical processes where one change creates the pressure, and the possibility, for another. 

Yes, given the existing productive technology, given existing markets, one country’s support for renewable energy might compete with another’s. But these things are not given. Economies of scale exist at the level of the industry as well as the firm; technological progress in one place quickly spills over to others. As, say, hydrogen becomes practical for large-scale energy storage, it will be come practical to produce green energy in areas where it isn’t today. This is as far as you can get from the Brenner paradigm of a zero-sum competition for shares of a fixed market.

The real problem for the Green New Deal and broader industrial policy program is not scarcity, whether of material or of markets. It is twofold. First, it requires a capacity for public planning that is currently lacking, in the US and elsewhere. Industrial policy means building up and legitimating the state’s direct role in a wider range of activity— a challenge when the biggest existing form of direct public provision, the public schools, are under ferocious attack from the right. Second, to the extent that a rush of public and private spending leads to a sustained boom, that will create profound challenges for a system that is used to managing distributional conflicts through unemployment. We’ve gotten a sense of what the political reaction to full employment might look like from recent inflation discourse, with its fears of “labor scarcity.” It’s reasonable, for now, to respond that it’s silly to worry about a wage-price spiral when labor is so weak. But what happens when labor is stronger?

These are real challenges. But we shouldn’t see them as arguments against this program, only as markers for where the next conflicts are likely to be. That’s always how it is. “Gradualism cannot work,” declares Riley, but all politics is incremental. Socialism is only a direction of travel. Even if the “commanding heights of the economy” could “be seized at once” — Riley’s rather ambitious alternative to the Green New Deal — that would only be a step toward the next struggle.

A program to mobilize the existing bourgeois state to push private spending in the direction of meeting human needs, and the need for a habitable planet in particular, faces many obstacles — that is true. Whatever successes the left has had under the Biden administration have been limited and compromised. Some of the most important, like the expansion of unemployment and family benefits, have already been rolled back — that is also true. But the same could be said for all the socialist programs of the past. We have to just keep going, with one eye on the long run direction of travel and the other on the contingencies of the present. The one thing we can say for certain about the future is that it hasn’t happened yet. If we keep going, we will see things that haven’t been seen since the beginning of the world.

Links for July 20, 2016

The responsibilities of heterodoxy. Arjun Jayadev and I have an ongoing project of interviewing dissenting economists who we think deserve wider recognition. Our first interview was with Axel Leijonhufvud; the second, just now up at the INET site, is with our old professor Jim Crotty. Jim’s ECO 710 was for us, as for hundreds of UMass grad students over the past 30 years, the starting point for systematically thinking about the economy as a whole. (You could think of him as sort of the Earth-II version of Rudi Dornbusch.) You can read more of my thoughts about him at the link.

Here’s an interesting clip that didn’t make it into the INET version:

The radicalism — and coherence — of Keynes larger political-economic program is a topic I’d like to return to in the future, as is the importance of an organic relationship to some broader social movement or political project. For heterodox economists, I think even more than for other academics, it’s impossible to even do good scholarship if your relationship to your object of study is only as a scholar. Science, as Max Weber says, “presupposes that what is yielded by scientific work is important in the sense that it is ‘worth being known.’ … This presupposition cannot be proved by scientific means.”

 

The problem with heterodoxy. The post here about the non-existence of mainstream economics is now up at Evonomics, in a somewhat improved form. While we’re on that topic, I will let loose with a peeve. Joan Robinson is like a god to me — in an anthropological sense she might even literally be a divinity for my tribe. But I hate that often-quoted line that the only reason to study economics is “to avoid being fooled by economists.” It reinforces the worst habit of heterodox people: putting negative critique above positive efforts to understand the world.

 

Articles to read. Three recent articles that really deserve posts of their own:

Thomas Palley on negative interest rates (he’s against them).

Jerry Epstein on the costs of big finance.

Cédric Durand and Maxime Gueuder on the weakening link between profits and corporate investment. I’ve been planning to write something on exactly this; clearly it will have to respond to this paper.

 

Interest rates and trade imbalances. Izabella Kaminska has a very interesting post up at FT Alphaville. (Does she write any other kind?) This one brings out two important points. First, to the extent that low interest rates mainly lead to bringing forward future spending — this is  probably especially true in housing — they are good tools for dealing with temporary downturns but not for secular shortfalls. (Kaminska doesn’t say so, but this is one reason the “natural rate” concept is misleading.) Second, the macroeconomic significance of trade imbalances depends on what happens to the corresponding financial flows — and this isn’t automatic. Continuous British surpluses in the gold standard era were compatible with steady growth of the world economy because they financed investment — in railroads especially — in the peripheral countries, using British capital goods. The general lesson is:

If countries want to carry international surpluses indefinitely the suggestion here is they need also to reinvest those “savings” into capacity expanding investments abroad.

Also in FT Alphaville, here’s a nice post by Matthew Klein on a question that should be obvious, but is seldom asked: If large current account deficits are dangerous, then what exactly is the purpose of allowing free flows of portfolio investment across borders? From the point of view of the receiving country, the only benefit of portfolio inflows is that it lets them finance current account deficits. If that’s not desirable, why allow them? Klein doesn’t give the clear negative answer that I would, but it’s the right question to be asking.

 

Evicted. At Dissent, my Roosevelt colleague Mike Konczal has an excellent review of two new books on eviction and foreclosure. It’s an important topic, and Evicted looks like an important book. I had some debates about it on twitter that clarified a question that doesn’t quite come out in the review itself. Are housing costs so high for more people because of market and regulatory failures that allow landlords to exploit poor tenants? Or is the cost of providing adequate housing simply greater than poor families can pay? The first points toward tenants organizing and better regulation of rental housing, the latter toward direct or indirect subsidies or direct public provision of housing.

Also from Mike, a review of two recent books about the appropriate role of the state.

 

Rising health costs in Europe. Via Adam Gaffney, here’s an interesting article on rising household payments for heatlh care in Europe, even in countries that are notionally single payer. Adam’s summary:

 It supports the hypothesis—put forward by many—that there has been a *partial* retreat from universal health care in Europe (especially if we define universal health care as free care at point of use for all). The main findings are as follows:

-The odds of having any out-of-pocket expenditures on health care in the previous 12 months (among 11 European nations) were 2.6 fold higher in 2013 than in 2006-2007;

-Overall out of pocket payments for health care increased 43.6% (inflation adjusted) between 2006-2007 and 2013;

-The proportion of individuals with catastrophic health care expenditures rose, particularly in Spain and Italy, which have been particularly hard-struck by austerity.

My take: We need to stop thinking about universal health care as an end goal or terminus: its actually a work in progress, and neoliberal health policy ideology has already done a number on it in Europe.

 

The poor stay poor. My old UMass comrade Mike Carr has a new article on income mobility, coauthored with Emily Wiemers. There’s a nice writeup of it in The Atlantic.

 

The right vs the rentiers? I was interested to learn that one of Theresa May’s declared priorities as Prime Minister is reforming corporate governance, including requiring worker representatives on boards. I have no idea if anything will come of it, but it’s interesting to see ideas that would be well to the left of the mainstream here adopted at least rhetorically by a conservative government in the UK. Was also interesting, in the coverage, to see some acknowledgement of the importance of cogovernance and works councils in Germany. Obviously export surpluses should not be taken as the measure of economic success in any broader sense, but it’s still worth pointing out that Europe’s biggest exporter is one of its least liberal economies.

Also in Theresa May news, doesn’t it seem like if Article 50 can’t be invoked without Scotland’s ok, that means Brexit isn’t happening? Which I think was the safe bet all along. Because if what scares you is that the “burghers of middle England” can “with a single vote destroy trillions of dollars of value,” then you can probably relax. The trillions will win the next round.

Keynes Quote of the Day

From Britain’s Industrial Future:

The notion that the only way to get enough effort out of the brain-worker is to offer him unfettered opportunities of making an unlimited fortune is as baseless as the companion idea that the only way of getting enough effort out of the manual worker is to hold over him the perpetual threat of starvation and misery for himself and those he loves. It has never been even supposed to be true, at all events in England, of the soldier, the statesman, the civil servant, the teacher, the scientist, the technical expert.

And to think this was the Orange Book of 1928! Times have changed.

They sure have. Then, it seemed like the move away from institutions based on material incentives to institutions based on intrinsic motivation was well underway, or at least realizable. While today — perhaps in Britain even more than the US — the tide is running strong the other way, with the good and great eager to get teachers and technicians, if not yet soldiers and statesmen, onto the unlimited-fortune/starvation-and-misery plan.

The context of the quote is interesting, too — it’s part of a larger argument for the “more or less comprehensive socialization of investment” Keynes would continue to argue for in the General Theory. Since managers of private firms already work for “a certain salary, plus the hope of promotion or bonus,” nothing would change if their businesses were publicly owned: “The performance of functions by Public Concerns in place of privately owned Companies and Corporations would make but little difference to the ordinary man.” If soi-disant hard Keynesians read more Keynes, they would find a much more radical vision there than countercyclical fiscal policy.

(via Jim Crotty’s unpublished book on Keynes. Encouraging him to get that thing out is high up on my list of life goals. Britain’s Industrial Future was officially written by a committee of Liberal grandees headed by Lloyd George. But this passage was written by Keynes, Crotty says, and he would know.)

Quoted for truth

“You can’t completely trust anyone who’s not a communist,” says Jim Crotty.

No you can’t — except one is often inclined to let the trust extend a generation down. Case in point: A. Hiring A. was, for better or worse, probably my biggest single contribution to the Working Families Party in my five years there. But the guy was a puzzle — his vibe was pure corporate-pragmatic — “we don’t really believe our own propaganda, do we?” he’d say — and yet he’d left a successful and presumably lucrative career in business (he’d been, inter alia, general counsel at the teen clothing chain Delia’s) to do grunt work in left-wing politics. And he was good at it!

So, a puzzle. So one day, driving back from Albany, E.B. and I started asking him about his background, where his politics came from. And come to find out, A.’s father was a Chilean communist, who’d fled the country after the coup against Allende. We looked at each other as if to say: Well, now it makes sense.

(EDIT: Names changed to abbreviations because these folks still work in politics and possibly don’t want to be outed as crypto-commies. Lame, I know.)