A Conversation I Don’t Want to Have

UPDATE: Aaron Benanav was sick and tested positive for covid the day of the event. So it didn’t take place. A fitting reminder, perhaps, of the context in which these debates are happening.

This Wednesday, John Jay College is hosting a debate between me and Aaron Benanav on, ostensibly, industrial policy and global overcapacity, whatever that means.

This is an event I agreed to participate in very reluctantly. To be honest, the prospect of it has been causing me considerable stress and anxiety lately. As a way of relieving this, I thought I would try to articulate why this is a conversation I don’t want to have.

1. I don’t like polemics, especially with others on the left. Doug Henwood used to quote a line from Foucault, which unfortunately I cannot locate at the moment, on the dangers of approaching intellectual debates on the model of war. I feel this strongly. We all know how unpleasant social media discussions become when everything gets reduced to which side you are on.

This is not some new development with social media. Alexander Cockburn tells this story about Lenin:

Krupskaya once tried to get him out of Zurich to take the day off, relaxing in the Alps and admiring nature. He tried but stayed fidgety, finally crying out to Krupskaya in exasperation, ‘Those bloody Mensheviks spoil everything.’

It’s very easy, once you’ve picked a side, to let those bloody other-siders spoil everything. I know I am susceptible to that tendency, I’ve given in to it too much in the past. So I’d rather avoid settings that encourage the picking of teams. I don’t like the debate format. I don’t like being on “Team Keynes” against “Team Brenner,” or however this is supposed to line up.

If one is going to have a debate, it should be with someone you respect, with a view that you can imagine holding, or perhaps have held in the past. Better than a debate is a conversation, with people whose ideas may be in tension at various points but who are genuinely interested in learning from each other. A public debate in front of an audience, by contrast, is a sort of combat where the goal is negative critique, tearing down, rather than synthesis.

2. I don’t find the overcapacity argument coherent enough to try to refute it. I’ve read a lot of Brenner’s stuff, it’s all over the map. I’ve read some of Benanav. The affect is clear enough: He really hates Keynesians. But as for a set of substantive claims about observable social reality, I don’t see it. Very smart people like Seth Ackerman and Alex Williams and Tim Barker have tried to engage with them, without much success. Experience suggests that trying to extract a coherent meaning of overcapacity to engage with will just provoke a response of “that’s not what we meant.” Debating this non-argument feels like wrestling with a cloud.

3. I don’t think that the kind of knowledge that both Brenner-Benanav and their critics are aspiring to is even possible. I don’t think the position they are taking can be replaced with a better one; the question is just not a useful one.

What I mean is this. Capitalism, or better, capital, is a game, an activity that people engage in. It has its rules, its values, its categories. Understanding its logic is important. But logic, on the level of logic, only tells us about the parameters, the dimensions, of capitalist space. It tells us nothing about what will actually happen. At best it allows us to identify tendencies, all of which have their counter-tendencies. The logic of capital tells us which ways the system can move, but nothing about how it has moved, or will move. When we turn to explaining concrete historical developments — retrospectively or prospectively — we need to do so in concrete historical terms. If we ask, let us say, why employment growth was slower in most European countries in the 1980s and 1990s compared with the 1960s and 1970s, there are a number of possible factors that might contribute, or point in the other direction. The only possible answer to the question will be a quantitative one, asking how much various factors contributed in this particular period. General tendencies of capitalism tell us nothing at all.

The academic work I feel best about is a couple of papers asking, in a concrete historical way, how we explain the changes in household debt-income ratios over the past 100 years The answers turn out to be different in different periods. The interesting thing, to me, is the key takeaway that the rise in the debt ratio in the 1980-2008 period, versus the stable ratio in the previous 20 years, is entirely explained by higher interest rates plus lower inflation. But the methodology — and this is the critical point — also reveals plenty of exceptions. During the mid 2000s, for instance, it really is true that households were borrowing more. If we want to learn about the world, we need a method of asking questions that gives answers of the form “x percent this, but also y percent that”, or “in this period mostly this, but in that period mostly that,” or “this factor was supporting the overall trend but that factor was retarding it.” These are all quantitative statements, and will be different depending on the place and time we are discussing. If you think you can reason in a purely logical way to concrete historical outcomes, you aren’t talking about the real world.

4. Continuing from 3 — to have a useful discussion, the questions have to be reframed as concrete, operational ones. Public spending on green energy will improve the bargaining power of workers, or it won’t. Chinese investment in renewable energy has reduced, or increased, manufacturing investment in the rest of the world by this much, more or less. Some more or less concretely specified central bank policy to favor green investment could reduce carbon emissions by some amount, or more, or less. Until we frame our questions in this sort of way, with answers that are numbers or clear yes-or-nos, there is nothing useful to talk about. We need to debate principles in such a way that we are learning about concrete reality. I don’t see this debate as a step towards that.

5. I am not convinced that the phenomenon of “stagnation” or “overcapacity” exists. It is true that by most measures growth appears to have been stronger in Europe in the decades after World War II than, to the extent we have comparable measures, in most other times and places. But it is not at all clear that the absence of this outstanding performance should be described as a distinct phenomenon of “stagnation” or “overcapacity”. Maybe we should instead ask what combination of institutional factors created this exceptional case. Nor is it clear that the same pattern exists if we broaden our focus — China, in the decades of so-called stagnation, has seen what is probably the greatest episode of capitalist accumulation in human history. (The problems that China poses for the Brenner argument need more attention than I am in a position to give.) 

And even if “stagnation” is valid as a descriptive historical fact, it doesn’t follow that it represents any underlying tendency. Let’s say we are in the US in 1935. Why is business investment so low, why are so many people unemployed? “Because it’s a depression” would be true in a certain descriptive sense. But, obviously, as an explanation it would get us nowhere at all. I’m not convinced that talking about overcapacity today is much different from that.

Admittedly, the question of whether some capitalist economies can be described as experiencing stagnation (and which ones, and over what period) is a concrete, empirically-tractable question, in a way that some inherent tendency toward stagnation is not. But the claim would have to be much more precisely specified before it could be disputed. And clearly neither of us is undertaking the sort of detailed, data-based analysis that would be called for.

6.  Benanav’s response to my blog post — it really was just a blog post — was dishonest and insulting. It still pisses me off that I can write, as I did, “leftists should not imagine that we control the state,” and get quoted as saying “we control the state.” It annoys me that I can suggest an analogy between the transition way from carbon and the industrial revolution and get this response: “any such comparison between the 1840s—an era of incipient French industrialization—and contemporary overcapacity, following the onset of the demand shift over a century later, is so ahistorical as to border on the absurd.” I mean, what is this? Ahistorical, absurd? Come on man. Industrialization wasn’t just a random bolt from the blue, it was the result of exactly the kind of positive feedback mechanisms I was talking about.

This blithe dismissal is simply a refusal to engage with the argument. I was trying to introduce something interesting into the conversation — is anyone else writing about the Green New Deal quoting 19th century French historians? And this guy, who is supposed to be some kind of social scientist, just pisses on it. I won’t pretend it doesn’t annoy me.

7. I have other work to do. I am trying to finish this book. I am trying to teach. (My teaching is bad, but my students are excellent.) I am trying to write opinion pieces for a general public; perhaps people will read them. All of that seems more important than this thing.

8. Finally the biggest one. The debate objectively places me in the position of a defender of the Biden Administration, something that, at this moment, I have no desire to be. Maybe, if I’m honest, this is the real reason why I am so angry about having to do this debate. Thousands of children are dead and dying under the rubble of Gaza. The bombs that killed them are marked “Made in USA.” Will I, under these circumstances, stand up and defend Bidenomics? No, I will not.

As an analytic matter, it’s certainly possible to separate the general case for industrial policy from the murderous regime that is currently its standard bearer. But in the specific context of the United States in November 2023, I don’t know that you can. Maybe my anger at Benanav, and at my colleagues who pushed me to debate him, is really anger at myself for having associated myself with a regime of child-killers. This is a possibility I must take seriously. It calls for resolute self-criticism and introspection.

There is a very complex and difficult problem here. We must sometimes take a clear stand on principle, we must stand against fascism and genocide. We must also, all the time, make an honest assessment of existing conditions, and what we can do in the concrete circumstances we find ourselves in. We must recognize that the path to a better world consists of one step after another, and starts from where we currently are.

Sometimes these two principles are consistent, sometimes they are not. It can be hard to figure out how to reconcile them. We do have to figure it out. I would be very interested in a roundtable on how socialists should relate to the state and established parties in the current moment. But one — or at least I — would have to approach it in a spirit of uncertainty, questioning and an openness to learning from others. Not a debate between opposing sides. 

However: John Jay economics is a great program! And we need students! So please do come out for this thing, and, if you’re at a suitable stage of life, please apply to our graduate program. Someday, maybe you will get all this stuff right, where I clearly have not.

At Substack: Hello World

I barley keep up this blog any more; do I really need a new format for (not) writing online? The problem, from my point of view, is that, these days, the only way people see blogs (or most other things one writes) is via twitter. And relying on twitter does not, at this point, see like a great idea. I’m moderately hopeful that an email newsletter can offer an alternative way.

In any case, my new substack is here. It’s pretty no-frills at the moment. I’ve pasted the first post below. For the moment I plan on cross-posting everything, but depending on how the substack goes I may revisit that.


What is this? This is an email newsletter, delivered through Substack. You probably get some others like it already. This one is from me, Joshua William Mason, or J. W. Mason as I usually write it. It’s called Money and Things. This specific email or post is the first one.

Why am I getting this? Either you signed up for it, or I added you. I subscribed a few people who I thought might be interested in hearing from me now and then. I hope you don’t mind! If you do, there’s an unsubscribe button somewhere. I promise I won’t add you again.

Thanks for reading Money and Things! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.

What’s the point of it? My main goal with this is to share things I’ve said or written in other settings, along with some interesting things I have read. I write a fair amount in a fair number of venues, and am in the news now and then. So it seems worth having one place to share it all with people who might like to see it. And then, despite the firehouse of content constantly aimed at each of our heads, it still can be nice to have someone point out something worth reading that you might not have run across otherwise.

The other goal is to have a structure for comments on things that are happening in the world. There are always things going on that I don’t have the time or energy or confidence to write about at length, but might have something interesting to say about in a more informal setting. Will a substack be any better for this than the blog I’ve been keeping for the past dozen years? I don’t know, but it seems worth a try.

So, a lot like a twitter feed, then? Yes, very much. I want to use the newsletter to share material that right now I use twitter for. Not everyone is on twitter, after all. And while I can’t see myself getting off twitter entirely – there are still too many interesting people there – I would like to spend less time on it, for all the familiar reasons.

How often will you be sending these? I’m vaguely hoping for once a week. I’m sure it won’t be more often than that; it could be much less. I will at least try to send one out whenever I publish something.

Why is the newsletter called Money and Things? Well, that captures the range of my interests. I write a lot about money, finance, central banks, credit and debt, inflation and other money-related and money-adjacent topics. But I also write about other things.

Also, Money and Things is the working title of the book that Arjun Jayadev and I are working on. This book has been in progress for longer than I care to think about, but it’s now mostly written and should be coming out from the University of Chicago Press  sometime in the next year. So I also want to use this email to share material from the book, and, down the road, to encourage people to read it.

What is the book about? Oof, I hoped you wouldn’t ask that. Well, it’s about money … and things.

Can you be more specific? The book is an effort to pull together some different strands of thinking around money that Arjun and I have been grappling with since we were students at the University of Massachusetts 20 years ago. One place to start is the tendency — both in economics and everyday common sense — to think of money either as just one useful object among others, or as a faithful reflection of a material world outside itself. Whereas to us it seems clear we should think of it as constituting its own self-contained world, a game or a logic, that in some ways responds to external material and social reality, but also evolves autonomously, and reshapes that external world in its turn. Economists like to think that when we measure things in terms of money, that is capturing some pre-existing “real” value or quantity. (Like, when you see a figure like GDP, you assume in some sense it reflects a quantity of stuff that was produced.) But in fact — our argument goes — while money is a yardstick that allows all sorts of things to be numerically compared, it doesn’t reflect any underlying quantity except money itself.

Keynesians have been criticizing the idea that money is neutral, just a veil, for decades. But we think there’s still space to spell out what the positive alternative looks like, and why it matters. You might say it’s an attempt to elevate the argument of our “Fisher dynamics” papers — where we argued that movements in debt-income ratios have more to do with interest rates and inflation than change in borrowing behavior — into a worldview or paradigm.

What we’re mainly interested in is the interface or boundary between money-world and the concrete world outside of it. (One jokey summary is that we’re starting from Keynes’ General Theory of Money, Interest and Employment, and writing about the “and”.) The idea is that by focusing there, we can connect some long-standing theoretical questions around the nature of money with contemporary debates about policy and politics, and with historical developments like the shareholder revolution or the euro crisis. We’re aiming for a spot in intellectual space somewhere between Jim Crotty, Perry Mehrling, Doug Henwood and David Graeber, if that makes sense.

Will you have a better answer to this question by the time the book comes out? I hope so!

Getting back to the newsletter — will there be free and paid versions? No, there will not. If someone wanted to give me money for it, I wouldn’t say no. If I got a little, I’d buy my kids ice cream. If I got a significant amount, which seems unlikely, then I might put more time into writing it. If I get none at all, that’s perfectly fine.

My personal view – which I know not everyone shares – is that if you are a tenure-track academic, it’s a bit unethical to charge money for a newsletter or similar product. The job of an academic is not just teaching; we are being paid to think about the world and share what we learn. So to me – again, I know many people feel differently – when you turn your work as a scholar into a kind of private business venture, that’s almost a form of embezzlement. Perhaps you saw Inside Job, that movie about economists and the financial crisis. Remember how eagerly someone like Frederic Mishkin turned his stature as a big-name monetary economist into big checks for himself? I don’t want to be that guy. Of course I’m not under any illusion that my integrity carries anything like the market price of a Mishkin’s. But it’s still worth something to me.

To be clear, this doesn’t apply to people who make a living as journalists or writers. If you are a professional writer your readers need to be paying you one way or another, and subscriber-only newsletter content is a legitimate way to make that happen. But as an academic, I’m already being compensated for this kind of work.

Does this mean your book will also be distributed for free? Well, no. The publishers will charge whatever they normally do for a book like this, and Arjun and I will get whatever (presumably small) royalties we’re entitled to out of that.

So how is that different? I don’t know. I feel like it’s different? Of course producing a physical book is costly, and the publisher has their own employees, whose services are valuable, and other costs that have to be paid. On the other hand, it would be technically feasible to just put the book up online as a pdf, and let anyone download it. So making people pay is in some sense a choice we are making. Still, if Inside Job had merely caught Mishkin admitting he’d published a book about financial crises, I don’t think that would have been much of a gotcha. Although then again, on the other hand, the textbook-writing business does seem a bit morally compromised. (Personally I try not to assign anything I can’t distribute a free pdf of.) I do hope our book will be used in the classroom. But I wish students could get excerpts of it in xeroxed course packets, they way I did when I was in college.

Anyway. Money and Things, the newsletter, will always be entirely free. Money and Things, the book, will not be.

You seem to have strong feelings on this topic. Do you have anything else to say about it? Yes, I do. I’ve always found it infuriating that so much scholarly work is hidden behind paywalls. It goes against the whole idea of scholarship, especially if you think of your academic work as part of some political project or as otherwise useful. During the six-seven years between my two stints in graduate school, I was intermittently engaged in online economics discussions, and I found it deeply frustrating that there were so many interesting articles that, without an academic affiliation, I was not permitted to read. I hope someday we recognize IP as applied to academic work for what it is, a comprehensive regime of censorship. (And Alexandra Elbakyan, the creator of sci-hub, as one of humanity’s heroes.)

A bit more recently, but still some years ago, I joined the steering committee of the Union for Radical Political Economics in large part to see if I could convince them to convert URPE’s journal, the Review of Radical Political Economics, to open access. Here you are, I thought, doing work that’s supposed to be part of a larger transformative project, that is relevant not just for other academics but for workers and activists. So why are you enlisting the power of the state to stop people from reading it?

As is often the case, what seemed unanswerable in principle turned out to be less straightforward in practice. The leadership of URPE the organization is largely separate from that of the journal; there’s a multi-year contract with the publisher; and even if open access were allowed, URPE’s share of the subscription revenue is basically the organization’s entire budget. If we went open-access, how would we pay the editor, or award fellowships to students in heterodox programs, or fly people out for the steering committee meetings? Maybe, I suggested, allowing people to read the journal is more important than flying people to meetings. Easy for you to say, someone replied, you live in New York; for others, if they can’t come out and meet in person, they won’t be part of this community at all. Besides, are there really so many non-academics who want to read RRPE?

Maybe if I’d pushed harder I could have got somewhere. But the obstacles were real, and no one seemed to agree with me, so I gave up, and eventually left the steering committee. (Life is too short to be on too many committees.) But I still think I was right.

Anything else? No, I think that’s it for now. But don’t worry – there will be another post coming shortly after this one.

“Inflation is bad. But mass unemployment would have been worse.”

(Lauren Melodia and I had an op-ed in the Nov. 21 Washington Post, challenging the idea that today’s inflation means that the stimulus measures of the past year and half were too large. I’m posting it here as well.)

As we think about rising prices today, it’s important not to lose sight of where we were not so long ago. In the spring of 2020, much of the economy abruptly shut down. Schools and child-care centers closed. Air travel fell below 100,000 people a day, compared with 2.5 million daily passengers in a normal year. No one was staying in hotels or going to the gym. About 1.4 million small businesses shut their doors in the second quarter of the year.

More than 20 million Americans lost their jobs in the early days of the pandemic, and there was a very real possibility that many would face hunger, eviction and poverty. Many economists predicted a deep downturn comparable to the Great Recession that followed the financial crisis of 2007-08, if not the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Even at the start of this year, as Congress was debating the American Rescue Plan, it was far from clear that we were out of danger. In January, there were 10 million fewer jobs than a year earlier. Covid-related deaths were running at 30,000 per week — the highest rate at any point in the pandemic. No one knew how fast vaccines could be rolled out. There was still a real risk that the economy could tip into depression.

Thanks to stimulus measures, including the $2.2 trillion Cares Act, signed by President Donald Trump in March 2020, and the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan, signed by President Biden in March 2021, that didn’t happen. People who lost their jobs in restaurants, airports, hotels and elsewhere continued to pay their rent and put food on the table.

For much of 2020 and 2021, all the uncertainty — and the risks associated with vacationing, dining out and so on — meant households held back on spending, and savings piled up. Now, with the economy reopening and the worst of the pandemic (let’s hope) behind us, people are rushing to make use of those savings. Unfortunately, businesses can’t adjust production as fast as people can spend money, resulting in the inflation we’re seeing now: Prices rose 0.9 percent from September to October 2021 and are up 6.2 percent since October 2020.

It would be nice if there were a way to avoid economic catastrophe during the year-plus of pandemic restrictions while also avoiding rising prices today. But in the real world, there probably wasn’t. The pandemic imposed costs on the economy that had to be paid one way or another.

Think of it this way. When a restaurant shuts down for public health reasons, two things happen: Its services are not available for purchase, and the people who work there lose their incomes. If the government does nothing, aggregate demand and supply will remain in rough balance, but the displaced workers will be unable to pay their bills. Alternatively, the government can step in to maintain the incomes of the displaced workers. In this case, the spending that consumers might have done in restaurants will spill over into the rest of the economy — if not right away, then eventually. In a sense, the rising costs we’re seeing today are a result of economic production that didn’t happen last year.

In economics textbooks, the level of demand that brings the economy to full employment will also cause stable inflation — an assumption labeled “the divine coincidence.” But here on Earth, things don’t always work out so neatly. The level of spending required to replace incomes lost in the pandemic, combined with the disruptions to production and trade, meant there was no way to get an adequate recovery without some increase in inflation, especially given the bumps on the road to controlling the coronavirus. As the spread of the delta variant and some Americans’ resistance to getting a vaccine have held back spending on services, demand has spilled over into goods. And as it turns out, our global supply chains are unable to handle a rapid rise in demand for goods — especially because many manufacturers had expected a deep downturn and planned accordingly.

Today’s inflation has surprised many people, including us. We had been more worried about sustained high unemployment. One of us even gave a talk a year ago called “The Coronavirus Recession Is Just Beginning.” We were wrong about that. But then, so was almost everyone. In the summer of 2020, the Congressional Budget Office was predicting that the unemployment rate in late 2021 would be 8 percent; in fact, it has fallen to 4.6 percent. Many private forecasters were similarly gloomy. Under the circumstances, policymakers were absolutely right to prioritize payments to families.

The economist Larry Summers has been making the case since February that the government’s stimulus programs were larger than required and ran the risk of “inflationary pressures of a kind we have not seen in a generation.” Fiscal conservatives are claiming that Summers has been vindicated because inflation is higher than most supporters of the most recent relief package expected. But the economic data doesn’t match the scenario he described.

Summers predicted that the cumulative stimulus impact would be larger than the country’s output gap — the difference between actual and potential gross domestic product. Today, despite the stimulus, both real and nominal GDP remain significantly below the pre-pandemic trend. So unless you think the economy was operating above potential before the pandemic, there’s no reason to think it is above potential now. To the extent that domestic conditions are contributing to inflation, it’s not because spending has surpassed the economy’s capacity but because there has been a rapid shift in demand from services to goods.

In any case, most of the inflation we’re seeing is due not to domestic conditions but to the worldwide spike in food, energy and shipping costs. Perhaps we could have had inflation of 5 percent instead of 6 percent if the stimulus had been smaller. The cost of that trade-off would have been material hardship for millions of families and the risk of tipping the economy into a downturn. And that, fundamentally, is why today’s inflation is not a sign that the stimulus was too large: It has to be weighed against the risks on the other side.

After 2007, the United States experienced many years of high unemployment and depressed growth, thanks in large part to a stimulus that most now agree was too small. Policymakers belatedly learned that lesson, and as a result, the United States is making a rapid recovery from the most severe economic disruption in modern history. Yes, inflation is a real problem that needs to be addressed. In a recent Roosevelt Institute brief, we suggested that rather than raise interest rates, the best way to control inflation is to address supply constraints in the sectors where prices are climbing. But as bad as inflation is, mass unemployment is much worse. Given the alternatives, policymakers made the right choice.

At Age of Economics: How Should an Economist Be?

The website Age of Economics has been carrying out a series of interviews with economists about what the purpose of the discipline it is, and what its relationship is to capitalism as a historical social system. I believe there will be 52 of these interviews, one each week over the course of 2021. Earlier this spring, they interviewed Arjun Jayadev and myself. You can watch video of the interview here. I’ve pasted the transcript below.

 

Q: Why does economics matter?

JWM: The most obvious way that economics matters is that it has an enormous prestige in our society. Economists have a level of respect and authority that no other social scientist, arguably no other academic discipline possesses. An enormous number of policy debates are conducted in the language of economics. There’s an ability of an economist to speak directly in policy settings, in political settings in a way that most academics simply can’t. And so Joan Robinson has that famous line that the reason you study economics is to avoid being fooled by economists.

And there’s some truth to that. Even if you think that the discipline is completely vacuous, it’s worth learning its language and techniques just in order to be able to at least criticize the arguments that other economists are making. But I would say we don’t think that economics is completely worthless and vacuous because we think it does bring some positive ways of thinking to the larger conversation. One thing that is defining of economics is the insistence on formalizing ideas, expressing your thoughts in some highly abstract way, either as a system of equations or a system of diagrams in a way where you’re explicitly stating all of the causal relationships that you think exist in the story that you’re trying to tell.

And that’s a useful habit of thinking that is not necessarily as widespread outside the economics profession. Sometimes you can learn new things just by writing down your assumptions and working through them. The whole debate in the heterodox field about wage led growth versus profit led growth, what are the circumstances where redistribution from profits to wages is likely to boost demand? And what are the situations where it’s likely to reduce demand? There are real insights that come out of trying to write down your vision of the economy as a system of equations.

The notion of balance of payments-constrained growth, where we think that maybe for a lot of countries, the thing that’s fundamentally driving the rate of growth that they can sustain is how responsive, how income-elastic, their exports are versus their imports is another set of ideas that comes out of writing down a formal model in the first case.

So this is a useful discipline that training as an economist gives you, that people with other kinds of backgrounds don’t have. This effort to make explicit the causal connections that you have in mind.

AJ:  It’s also important to realize that economics has come up with some very useful concepts, to make sense of this world around us: concepts like GDP or employment. These are concepts which are well defined and measured, and help us to have an understanding of the system as a whole.

Admittedly, lots of economics education doesn’t pay as much attention to this side of economics as it should. And maybe the question was an implicit critique — when you ask why does economics matter, there are some people who feel that it doesn’t matter because of what’s happened to the discipline. Josh and I both like this particular quote by the economist Trygve Haavelmo. He said that the reason that you learn economics is to – I believe the phrase is – “to be a master of the happenings of real life”.

And that that’s why one should be doing economics, not as an exercise in and of itself, but to understand what’s happening in the world.

JWM: That’s right. The real secret to doing good economics is to start from somewhere other than economics. You may come into economics with a set of political commitments as Arjun and I both did, but you may also come in with a desire to make money in the business world and you’re associating with people who do that, or you come in because you’re focused on a particular set of public debates that you want to clarify your thinking about. If you come in with some other set of concerns that are going to guide you in terms of what’s important, what’s relevant, what’s reasonable, then you’ll find a lot of useful tools within economics.

The problem arises with people – and, unfortunately, this I’d say is the majority of professional economists – who don’t have any independent intellectual or personal base, their intellectual development is entirely within academic economics. And then it becomes very easy to lose sight of the happenings of real life that this field is supposed to be illuminating.

Q: What are the differences between economic science (academic economics) and economic engineering (policymaking)?

JWM: Today there’s a very wide gap between academic economics and what we might call policy economics, particularly in macro. If you’re a labor economist, maybe the terms that are used in academic studies and the terms that are used in policy debates might be might be closer to each other. But there’s a long standing divide between the questions that academic macroeconomists ask and the questions that come in policy debates which has gotten much wider since the crisis.

The unfortunate fact – and people are going to say this is not fair, but I can tell you, I’ve looked at qualifying exams, recent ones from graduate programs in macroeconomics, and this is a fair characterization, what I’m about to say – that the way academic macroeconomics trains people to think is to imagine a representative agent with perfect knowledge of the probabilities of all future events, who is then choosing the best possible outcome for them in terms of maximizing utility over infinite future time under a given set of constraints. That is literally what you are trained to think about if you are getting an academic training in macroeconomics. For people who are not economists listening to this, you have to study this stuff to understand how weird it is.

Unfortunately that aspect of the profession has not changed very much since the financial crisis of a decade ago. On the other hand, the public debate on macroeconomic questions has moved a lot. So there’s a much wider range of perspectives if you look at people in the policy world or the financial press or even in the business world. So in some ways the public debate has gotten much better over the past decade, but that’s widening the gap between the public debate and academic macroeconomics. I don’t know how exactly this will come about, but at some point we’re going to have to essentially throw out the existing graduate macroeconomics curriculum and start fresh, roll back the clock to 1979 or start from somewhere else, because it does seem like the dominant approach in academic macroeconomics is an intellectual dead end.

AJ: We have friends who are doing a lot of good work in labor economics. People like Arin Dube at UMass Amherst, which is one of these places which takes these things seriously, or my colleague Amit Basole where I am at Azim Premji University. And in some fields there is back and forth between the world that exists and policymaking and the craft of economics and academic economics.

It requires also talking to people from outside the discipline to see how far academic economics and macroeconomics has drifted away from policymaking. And this is why I come back to the Haavalmo point. The reason for us to be doing many of the things we are doing is academic macroeconomist is to try to see if we can have an effect on the world, understand the world. And this distinction has become so sharp right now to make it dysfunctional.

Now, the additional problem that comes with it is that because this kind of theory is hard, it’s complex and it’s weird, people spend a lot of time invested in this activity. When I say this activity, I mean basically solving equations, but for some imaginary state. That’s not only limited to macro, but it’s the worst in macro. And as a result, it becomes very hard for people to pull away from that, and say that there’s something wrong. The emperor’s new clothes moment is extremely painful to face.

But it is interesting that one of the advantages of studying macroeconomics is there are always people who want to understand what’s happening in the world. And what you might call concrete policy macroeconomics has got much more open, much more interesting than in the past. There’s an economic science aspect in concrete policy macroeconomics. I wouldn’t want to separate them so sharply as you might have done in the question.

JWM: And to be fair, there are plenty of prominent mainstream macroeconomists who have a lot of interesting and insightful things to say about real economies. The thing is that when they’re talking about the real world, they ignore what they do in their scholarly work. They’re smart enough and they’ve got time and energy that they can they can follow both tracks at once, but they’re still two separate tracks.

But for most people, that’s not practical. And if you get sucked into the theory, then you stop thinking about the real questions. And the other thing, just to be fair, is that in the world of empirical macroeconomics, there’s more interesting work being done. The problem is that there isn’t a body of theory that the empirical work can link up with.

Q: What role does economics play in society? Does it serve the common good?

JWM: You can certainly criticize economists for being ideological. There are very specific assumptions about how the world works that are baked into the theory in a way that is not even visible to the people who are educated in that theory.

But it’s almost impossible to imagine a non-ideological economics. In principle we could study the economy scientifically in the way we study other areas of existence scientifically. But we can’t do it as long as we live in a capitalist economy because the questions are too close to the basic structures of authority and hierarchy of our society. They are too close to the ways that all the inequalities, all the sources of power in our society are legitimated.

They can’t just be scrutinised in a neutral way from the outside. So as long as we live under capitalism, we are never going to have an established scientific study of capitalism. That’s just not possible. In a way, you could even say that the function of a lot of academic economics is not so much to instill a particular ideological view of capitalism, but just to stop people from thinking about it systematically at all. It gives you something else to think about instead.

That doesn’t mean that on an individual level we should not aspire to be scientific in a broad sense in our approach. We should expose our ideas to critical scrutiny. We should systematically consider alternatives and formulate hypotheses and see if the world is giving us reason to think our hypotheses are right or wrong. we should follow that.

But we should also recognize that you’re going to be on the margins as you do this. That’s OK, because the life of a professional economist is pretty good. So the margins of the profession is still a perfectly fine place to be. But that’s where you’re going to be. Or occasionally in moments of deep crisis, when the survival of the system is at stake, then there will be periods where a more rational perspective on it is tolerated.

But the notion that we’re going to persuade people in the economics profession that we have a better set of ideas and we’re going to win out that way, it misses that there is a deep political reason why economics is the way it is. So again, as we were saying at the beginning, if you want to do good scientific work, you have to have a foot outside the profession to give you a base somewhere else.

Hayek is probably not somebody that neither of us agrees with on very much, but he has a nice line about this, he says, “no one can be a great economist who is only an economist.” And that’s very true.

AJ: The question reminds me of the famous story about Keynes when he finishes being the editor of the Economic Journal, where he raises a toast to the economists who are the trustees of the possibility of civilization. There’s a belief among economists that  they are standing apart and guiding the forces of history.

Well, that sounds a little pompous. Keynes could get away with it. Nowadays we wouldn’t say that, but we’d say that we maximizing social welfare, which is in some ways the same thing. One of the things that you ask is, is it serving the common good? One of the things that economics does in its training is posit a common good. And that immediately takes you away from the space of politics. Because there are many situations in the economy in which there are conflicts of interest.

These are not just conflicts of opinions. It’s conflicts around things like the distribution of income and so on. And these questions become unavoidably political. It’s pulling away from that, which, by the way, the Classical economists never did, that allows you to talk about something abstract like social welfare. So I would say the economics can play a role in trying to understand what we would want to have from a democratic, open, egalitarian society. But positing something like the common good can sometimes obscure that.

Q: Economics provides answers to problems related to markets, efficiency, profits, consumption and economic growth. Does economics do a good job in addressing the other issues people care about: climate change and the wider environment, the role of technology in society, issues of race and class, pandemics, etc.?

JWM: We might turn this question around a little bit. Economics does best when it’s focused on urgent questions like climate change. We do better economics when we’re oriented towards towards real urgent live political questions like around race and class. This is what we’re saying: Economics when it’s focused on questions of markets and efficiency in the abstract, doesn’t contribute very much to the conversation. It quickly loses contact with the real phenomena that it’s supposed to be dealing with.

And what focuses our attention is precisely that second set of questions that you raise. Those are the questions that create enough urgency to force people to adopt a more realistic economics. So in that sense, we do a better job talking about markets, we give a better, more useful definition of things like efficiency when we’re focused on concrete questions like climate change. There’s a good reason that modern macroeconomics begins with the Great Depression, because this is a moment when you do need to look at the economy as it is.

Today, it’s obvious that the existing models aren’t working, and there’s a political urgency to coming up with a better set of stories, a better set of tools. The climate crisis has a good chance to be a similar clarifying moment as the 1930s, more so than the financial crisis of a decade ago or whatever the next financial crisis is.

Climate change may force us to rethink some of our broader economic ideas in a more fundamental way. The truth is established economic theory does not give good answers in general to the problems of profits, economic growth and so on. And a focus on climate change can improve the field in that way.

The other thing you bring up is race, class, and gender. The problem here is that nobody has a God’s eye view of the world. Nobody can step out of their own skin and see things from a perfectly objective view. As a middle class white man in the United States, I have a particular way of looking at the world, which is in some ways a limiting one. Economics as a field would be better if we had more diversity, a broader range of backgrounds and perspectives.

AJ: I’d like to add, there is no reason why a particular set of tools that you use in one sphere should automatically be something that you can use in another sphere. The way that modern economics is set up is just a set of maximization problems, it allows people to seamlessly say that they are studying on the one hand buying oranges and apples, and on the other side solving the problems of climate change.

So there is an issue in the way that you posit, that  it is using tools which it may be – I agree with Josh, it’s not very good at – but it may be better than its applications in other spheres. A famous example is the choice of discount rate for climate change. And that’s been such a long-standing disaster in the amount of time we’ve spent to think about this particular issue for which that analysis is completely inappropriate.

So, yes, there are places when it may be more appropriate, but maybe it’s not even very appropriate in those spheres. I would agree with Josh that this current moment and other moments of crisis – you mentioned 2008 – has opened up the space to think much more carefully about specific issues. And when you have a crisis that confronts you, it forces you to come up with a different economics or use other traditions of economics which have better answers than the ones that are there presently.

Q: As we live in an age of economics and economists – in which economic developments feature prominently in our lives and economists have major influence over a wide range of policy and people – should economists be held accountable for their advice?

JWM: As Arjun was saying earlier, this question is almost giving economics as a field too much credit, in the sense that it suggests that a lot of economic outcomes are directly dependent on the advice given by economists. Economics, as we’ve said, has an enormous prestige in terms of the presence of economists in all sorts of public debates. But a lot of times if you look at how views change, it’s not the economists who are leading the way. It’s the politicians or the broader public who’ve shifted. And then the economist come in to justify this after the fact.

There’s a certain sense, as a concrete example, where a lot of the development in macroeconomic theory over the past generation has been an after-the-fact effort to justify the policies that central banks were already following. Like a way of demonstrating that what central banks were already doing in terms of inflation target, using something like the Taylor Rule was the socially optimal thing. And that generalizes pretty widely.

So I’m not sure that we should be blaming or crediting economists for policy outcomes that they probably do more to legitimate or help with the execution of than to shift. The other reason I don’t personally see this as a particularly productive direction to go in is: who’s going to impose the accountability, who’s going to step in and say, all right, you were wrong and that had consequences and now you’re going to pay a penalty.

There’s no consensus position from which to do that. So we all just have to go on making our arguments the best we can and we’re not going to reach agreement. And so we try to shift the debate our way and somebody else shifts it their way, and there’s never going to be an impartial referee who’s going to come in and say that one side was right and the other was wrong.

AJ: Having been practicing economist for 10-15 years, broadly one has to realize that whatever you say and whatever you think and whatever you do, is strictly circumscribed by what the world is open to at that point of time. That’s something that’s sometimes hard for us to accept. There are many people who for years made the argument that we shouldn’t be so concerned about supply constraints, and it was only after 2012, 13, 14, 15- when the world started to move away from austerity or the costs of austerity became well known, that space was made for these arguments. And it’s always like that.

Spaces are there in some moments and not in other moments. And there are those people who for whatever reason in some universities, in some spaces, seem to capture elite opinion. They’re the ones who you see again and again and again. It doesn’t matter if they’re right or wrong, they’re the ones who are opinion makers.

I don’t think this is distinct from any other kind of marketing. There are always going to be a few people who are opinion and market leaders. Having said that, it would be good to have a list of when people were wrong. And sometimes it would be good to take people down a peg or two.

But again, I don’t think it’s an important thing. I don’t think that we should necessarily valorise economics and economists one way or the other.

6. Does economics explain Capitalism? How would you define Capitalism?

AJ: If you want to think about capitalism as a system, you need to go back to Karl Marx. You don’t have to call yourself a Marxist, but if you want to think about the questions like the ones that you just posed, you have to take him very seriously because his work is the foundation of many of the ways that we think about capitalism. Josh and I are working on a book and we take up this question about what capitalism means, and in our minds it has a clear definition. It has three elements, or three phases.

The first is the conversion of all kinds of human activities and their products into commodities, this thing that you buy and sell, this alienated thing that is sold in markets. That’s the first. The second is the endless accumulation of money as an end to itself. That’s the drive of the system, which seems to be out of human control. And then finally, something which is very critical and which gives it some of its emotional heft, there is the hierarchy in the workplace where people work under the authority of the boss.

All three of these elements are there historically. But their fusion in this incredibly changeable system that we’ve had for 200 years, that has been unique. That’s the central aspect that we want to focus on, the combination of these three things. And it’s the fact that when combined it gives you this dynamism, this ability to transform society, in far reaching ways that seem out of human control. That’s what I would say capitalism is.

JWM: I agree, that’s the correct definition of capitalism as a system. The problem comes when you try to pull out one of those elements in isolation and think that’s what defines the system. It’s the fusion of the three of them.

The other piece, which maybe isn’t quite as defining but historically has been very important, is that the process of endless accumulation has this moment in the middle of it where money is tied up, locked up in long-lived means of production, that you’re not just buying commodity, working it up and then selling it again, but you’ve got machines, you’ve got buildings, you’ve got technology.

So there’s this long gap between the outlay and the final sale. And that’s one of the things that has made this a system that is dynamic and has transformed human productive capacities in ways that we would agree with Marx’s judgment that in the long run, expand the space for human freedom and possibilities because it’s broken up the old, local, simple ways of carrying out productive activity and allowed people to have a much more extensive division of labor, much wider scale cooperation and the development of all of these new ways of transforming the world through technology that didn’t exist before or that were much – let’s not say it didn’t exist, but developed much more slowly in limited ways before.

But this is also where a lot of the conflict comes up, because you build up a business and it exists for its own purposes, it has its own norms, it has its own internal logic. And then at some point, you have to turn the products of that back into money to keep the accumulation process going. And so a lot of the tensions around the system come from that.

The other part of your question is, can economics explain capitalism. From our point of view economics is part of the larger set of social phenomena that grow out of the generalisation of capitalism as a way of organizing human life and productive activity. In that sense, you can’t use the tools of economics to explain capitalism, because economics is within capitalism. The categories of economics are specific to capitalism. If you want to explain the origins of it, you need a different set of tools. It’s a historical question rather than one that you can answer with the tools of economics.

Q: Is Capitalism, or whatever we should call the current system, the best one to serve the needs of humanity, or can we imagine another one?

JWM: We don’t have to imagine other systems, they’re all around us. As Arjun was saying earlier, we all of us experience every day systems where productive activity is organized through some collective decision making process. An enormous amount of our productive work, our reproductive labor that keeps us going individually and collectively, is carried out in the family. Some families are more egalitarian, some families are more hierarchical, but no family is organized on the basis of the pursuit of profit – well, let’s not say none, but a trivially small fraction of them are.

So we all have firsthand experience that this is a way that we can organize our activity. We all know that within the workplace you personally don’t make decisions based on some profit maximizing criteria. And your immediate boss isn’t doing it that way either. Probably they’re just following orders and some bureaucratic system, or perhaps there’s an element of voluntary cooperation going on.

But either way, it’s a different way of organizing our activity than the notion of markets and the pursuit of profit. As academics, we’re fortunate enough to have a collective decision making process that covers a lot of the traditional roles of the capitalist employer. We collectively decide on hiring and we collectively organize our work schedules and so on. 

Obviously, very few workers in the world are as fortunate as academics in that way. But the point is that this is a model that exists. It works. Certainly here in the United States, higher education is one of our big industrial success stories. And it’s organized as a bunch of little worker co-ops!

In any workplace, there are moments when people sit down to make a decision together, where people do stuff because that’s just what makes sense and what they’ve agreed to do, as opposed to somebody making a calculation of self-interest. This is what David Graeber in his wonderful book, Debt, talks about as “everyday communism.” Even in the most traditional workplace if somebody says pass me that hammer or can you do some little favor for me, people do it just as a way of cooperating and not because they’ve been ordered to or because they’re calculating that it will pay off for them.

And then we have a huge public sector in the world as well. We have public schools and public libraries and public transit and fire and police services and so on. So we already have an enormous amount of non-capitalist organization of production around us. We don’t have to imagine it.

The challenge intellectually is to generalize from this stuff, to recognize how these principles can be applied more broadly. We don’t have to create something new, but we do have to bring in general principles. For people on the left, or people who support individual public sector programs or individual non- capitalist ways of organizing particular activities, there’s often a tendency to make the argument in terms of that specific activity: well, here’s why we want public schools and we want better funding for our public schools. As opposed to trying to articulate what is the general principle that makes markets and the pursuit of profit a bad way to organize that. What is the general principle that says teachers should have autonomy?

We want less authority of the boss in the classroom. That’s why we have civil service protection, that’s why we have professions, because we want workers to have autonomy. But we need to be able to say why.

We want to move away from the model of proletarian labor where you’re completely under the authority of the boss. We do that in a lot of specific cases already. The intellectual challenge is to generalize that and see how we can apply it more broadly to the areas of society where it’s not not currently organized that way.

AJ: The question is nicely posed, because most people would broadly agree that capitalism generates a lot of good. But there’s been a sense right from the beginning that it may not be serving the needs of humanity. That the only word that describes this is a drive, an alien drive which sometimes intersects with the need of human beings and very often doesn’t.

When we think about  what happens in farms, for example, and how so many people spend their entire lives working as drones, it’s very tragic history.  Yes, people are richer and healthier as well. But capitalism, the way that it’s developed, has not served the needs of humanity. 

We don’t have to look historically. Let’s look at what’s happening right now with vaccination. The belief that you needed intellectual property and you can only solve this by the genius of a few pharmaceutical companies when in fact, what happened in all of this innovation was that it was the public sector backing all of this, which made certainly some of the vaccines even viable in the first place. And so now you have this perverse situation where some people are prevented from access because we want to maintain whatever capitalist institutions that we’ve built up.

So it’s important to realize that capitalism, while it’s done many great things as Marx and others recognized, it’s never been a force which has very nicely dovetailed with human needs. But that what’s useful now to think about is, as Josh said, we don’t need to imagine an alternative – we have a model and a system that’s already there, that we’re going to replace it with.

This thing will happen incrementally. Maybe this is radical optimism, but we both believe that the domain organized around these arbitrary hierarchies – the market and so on, is shrinking. Maybe in the next few generations with the challenge of climate change, with more crises and with a truly global world, the responses to those will mean that the domain of collective freedom will be much greater in the future than now.

And the domain of capitalism will be smaller. 

JWM:  I want to amplify something Arjun just said — the vaccine is a perfect example of this dynamic. On the one hand, we have a urgent collective problem, this pandemic. And the solution is directed by the public. It’s a collective decision mediated by governments to devote our common resources to solving this problem.

And it’s incredibly effective when you want to solve this problem and you have a political decision to do it. You can work wonders. And it’s carried out by scientists who have a whole set of professional norms around the conduct of science, which is precisely in order to suppress market incentives. We don’t want scientists thinking about how to get rich. Now, we do get that because that’s ubiquitous in our society, but the reason we have a whole set of professional norms around science is precisely because we think that this is the activity that people carry out better when they’re insulated from market incentives.

And then we have a centralized public direction to mobilize their activity. But the problem is that the fruits of that still have to be squeezed into this box of private property. Somebody has to have a property right over all this collective labor and public resources in the form of a patent.

And that then limits the value of this work. It makes the success much less than it could have been. We already are seeing that conflict and we’re going to continue seeing it even more so as we deal with problems like the pandemic and climate change and so on.

When we urgently need to solve a problem, we find we do it by suppressing the logic of the market and making decisions collectively. But then as long as we still have this overarching insistence on organizing our claims on each other in the form of property rights, it creates a conflict, it gets in the way of that. And over time, again, just the necessity of solving our urgent problems is going to force us to move away from the private property model and away from the pursuit of profit, and towards more rational collective ways of dealing with the problems that face us.

A new macroeconomics?

UPDATE: The video of this panel is here.

[On Friday, July 2, I am taking part in a panel organized by Economics for Inclusive Prosperity on “A new macroeconomics?” This is my contribution.]

Jón Steinsson wrote up some thoughts about the current state of macroeconomics. He begins:

There is a narrative within our field that macroeconomics has lost its way. While I have some sympathy with this narrative, I think it is a better description of the field 10 years ago than of the field today. Today, macroeconomics is in the process of regaining its footing. Because of this, in my view, the state of macroeconomics is actually better than it has been for quite some time.

I can’t help but be reminded of Olivier Blanchard’s 2008 article on the state of macroeconomics, which opened with a flat assertion that “the state of macro is good.” I am not convinced today’s positive assessment is going to hold up better than that one. 

Where I do agree with Jón is that empirical work in macro is in better shape than theory. But I think theory is in much worse shape than he thinks. The problem is not some particular assumptions. It is the fundamental approach.

We need to be brutally honest: What is taught in today’s graduate programs as macroeconomics is entirely useless for the kinds of questions we are interested in. 

I have in front of me the macro comp from a well-regarded mainstream economics PhD program. The comp starts with the familiar Euler equation with a representative agent maximizing their utility from consumption over an infinite future. Then we introduce various complications — instead of a single good we have a final and intermediate good, we allow firms to have some market power, we introduce random variation in the production technology or markup. The problem at each stage is to find what is the optimal path chosen by the representative household under the new set of constraints.

This is what macroeconomics education looks like in 2021. I submit that it provides no preparation whatsoever for thinking about the substantive questions we are interested in. It’s not that this or that assumption is unrealistic. It is that there is no point of contact between the world of these models and the real economies that we live in.

I don’t think that anyone in this conversation reasons this way when they are thinking about real economic questions. If you are asked how serious inflation is likely to be over the next year, or how much of a constraint public debt is on public spending, or how income distribution is likely to change based on labor market conditions, you will not base your answer on some kind of vaguely analogous questions about a world of rational households optimizing the tradeoff between labor and consumption over an infinite future. You will answer it based on your concrete institutional and historical knowledge of the world we live in today. 

To be sure, once you have come up with a plausible answer to a real world question, you can go back and construct a microfounded model that supports it. But so what? Yes, with some ingenuity you can get a plausible Keynesian multiplier out of a microfounded model. But in terms of what we actually know about real economies, we don’t learn anything from the exercise that the simple Keynesian multiplier didn’t already tell us.

The heterogenous agent models that Jón talks about are to me symptoms of the problem, not signs of progress. You start with a fact about the world that we already knew, that consumption spending is sensitive to current income. Then you backfill a set of microfoundations that lead to that conclusion. The model doesn’t add anything, it just gets you back to your starting point, with a lot of time and effort that you could have been using elsewhere. Why not just start from the existence of a marginal propensity to consume well above zero, and go forward from there?

Then on the other hand, think about what is not included in macroeconomics education at the graduate level. Nothing about national accounting. Nothing about about policy. Nothing about history. Nothing about the concrete institutions that structure real labor and product markets. 

My personal view is that we need to roll back the clock at least 40 years, and throw out the whole existing macroeconomics curriculum. It’s not going to happen tomorrow, of course. But if we want a macroeconomics that can contribute to public debates, that should be what we’re aiming for.

What should we be doing instead? There is no fully-fledged alternative to the mainstream, no heterodox theory that is ready to step in to replace the existing macro curriculum. Still, we don’t have to start from scratch. There are fragments, or building blocks, of a more scientific macroeconomics scattered around. We can find promising approaches in work from earlier generations, work in the margins of the profession, and work being done by people outside of economics, in the policy world, in finance, in other social sciences.  

This work, it seems to me, shares a number of characteristics.

First, it is in close contact with broader public debates. Macroeconomics exists not to study “the economy” in the abstract — there isn’t any such thing — but to help us address concrete problems with the economies that we live in. The questions of what topics are important, what assumptions are reasonable, what considerations are relevant, can only be answered from a perspective outside of theory itself. A useful macroeconomic theory cannot be an axiomatic system developed from first principles. It needs to start with the conversations among policymakers, business people, journalists, and so on, and then generalize and systematize them. 

A corollary of this is that we are looking not for a general model of the economy, but a lot of specialized models for particular questions. 

Second, it has national accounting at its center. Physical scientists spend an enormous amount of time refining and mastering their data collection tools. For macroeconomics, that means the national accounts, along with other sources of macro data. A major part of graduate education in economics should be gaining a deep understanding of existing accounting and data collection practices. If models are going to be relevant for policy or empirical work, they need to be built around the categories of macro data. One of the great vices of today’s macroeconomics is to treat a variable in a model as equivalent to a similarly-named item in the national accounts, even when they are defined quite differently.

Third, this work is fundamentally aggregative. The questions that macroeconomics asks involve aggregate variables like output, inflation, the wage share, the trade balance, etc. No matter how it is derived, the operational content of the theory is a set of causal relationships between these aggregate variables. You can certainly shed light on relationships between aggregates using micro data. But the questions we are asking always need to be posed in terms of observable aggregates. The disdain for “reduced form” models is something we have to rid ourselves of. 

Fourth, it is historical. There are few if any general laws for how “an economy” operates; what there are, are patterns that are more or less consistent over a certain span of time and space. Macroeconomics is also historical in a second sense: It deals with developments that unfold in historical time. (This, among other reasons, is why the intertemporal approach is fundamentally unsuitable.) We need fewer models of “the” business cycle, and more narrative descriptions of individual cycles. This requires a sort of figure-ground reversal in our thinking — instead of seeing concrete developments as case studies or tests of models, we need to see models as embedded in concrete stories. 

Fifth, it is monetary. The economies we live in are organized around money commitments and money flows, and most of the variables we are interested in are defined and measured in terms of money. These facts are not incidental. A model of a hypothetical non-monetary economy is not going to generate reliable intuitions about real economies. Of course it is sometimes useful to adjust money values for inflation, but it’s a bad habit to refer to the result quantities as “real” — it suggests that there is some objective quantity lying behind the monetary one, which is in no way the case.

In my ideal world, a macroeconomics education would proceed like this. First, here are the problems the external world is posing to us — the economic questions being asked by historians, policy makers, the business press. Second, here is the observable data relevant to those questions, here’s how the variables are defined and measured. Third, here are how those observables have evolved in some important historical cases. Fourth, here are some general patterns that seem to hold over a certain range  — and just as important, here is the range where they don’t. Finally, here are some stories that might explain those patterns, that are plausible given what we know about how economic activity is organized.

Well, that’s my vision. Does it have anything to do with a plausible future of macroeconomics?

I certainly don’t expect established macroeconomists to throw out the work they’ve been doing their whole careers. Among younger economists, at least those whose interest in the economy is not strictly professional, I do think there is a fairly widespread recognition that macroeconomic theory is at an intellectual dead end. But the response is usually to do basically atheoretical empirical work, or go into a different field, like labor, where the constraints on theory are not so rigid. Then there is the heterodox community, which I come out of. I think there has been a great deal of interesting and valuable work within heterodox economics, and I’m glad to be associated with it. But as a project to change the views of the rest of the economics profession, it is clearly a failure.

As far as I can see, orthodox macroeconomic theory is basically unchallenged on its home ground. Nonetheless, I am moderately hopeful for the future, for two reasons. 

First, academic macroeconomics has lost much of its hold on public debate. I have a fair amount of contact with policymakers, and in my experience, there is much less deference to mainstream economic theory than there used to be, and much more interest in alternative approaches. Strong deductive claims about the relationships between employment, inflation, wage growth, etc. are no longer taken seriously.

To be sure, there was always a gulf between macroeconomic theory and practical policymaking. But at one time, this could be papered over by a kind of folk wisdom — low unemployment leads to inflation, public deficits lead to higher interest rates, etc. — that both sides could accept. Under the pressure of the extraordinary developments of the past dozen years, the policy conversation has largely abandoned this folk wisdom — which, from my point of view, is real progress. At some point, I think, academic economics will recognize that it has lost contact with the policy conversation, and make a jump to catch up. 

Keynes got a lot of things right, but one thing I think he got wrong was that “practical men are slaves to some defunct economist.” The relationship is more often the other way round. When practical people come to think about economy in new ways, economic theory eventually follows.

I think this is often true even of people who in their day job do theory in the approved style. They don’t think in terms of their models when they are answering real world questions. And this in turn makes our problem easier. We don’t need to create a new body of macroeconomic theory out of whole cloth. We just need to take the implicit models that we already use in conversations like this one, and bring them into scholarship. 

That brings me to my second reason for optimism. Once people realize you don’t have to have microfoundations, that you don’t need to base your models on optimization by anyone, I think they will find that profoundly liberating. If you are wondering about, say, the effect of corporate taxation on productivity growth, there is absolutely no reason you need to model the labor supply decision of the representative household as some kind of intertemporal optimization. You can just, not do that. Whatever the story you’re telling, a simple aggregate relationship will capture it. 

The microfounded approach is not helping people answer the questions they’re interested in. It’s just a hoop they have to jump through if they want other people in the profession to take their work seriously. As Jón suggests, a lot of what people see as essential in theory, is really just sociological conventions within the discipline. These sorts of professional norms can be powerful, but they are also brittle. The strongest prop of the current orthodoxy is that it is the orthodoxy. Once people realize they don’t have to do theory this way, it’s going to open up enormous space for asking substantive questions about the real world. 

I think that once that dam breaks, it is going to sweep away most of what is now taught as macroeconomics. I hope that we’ll see something quite different in its place.  

Once we stop chasing the will-o-wisp of general equilibrium, we can focus on developing a toolkit of models addressed to particular questions. I hope in the years ahead we’ll see a more modest but useful body of theory, one that is oriented to the concrete questions that motivate public debates; that embeds its formal models in a historical narrative; that starts from the economy as we observe it, rather than a set of abstract first principles; that dispenses with utility and other unobservables; and that is ready to learn from historians and other social scientists.

The Roaring 2020s: Further Reading

Mike Konczal and I have a piece in the New York Times arguing that the next few years could see a historic boom for the US economy, if policy makers recognize that strong demand and rising wages are good things, and don’t get panicked into turning toward austerity. 

Mike and I and our colleagues at the Roosevelt Institute are planning a series of papers on “planning for the boom” over the coming year. The first, asking how high employment could plausibly rise under conditions of sustained strong demand, will be coming out later this month. In the meantime, here are some things I’ve written over the past few years, making the case that there is much more space for demand-led growth in the US economy than conventional estimates suggest, and that the benefits from pursuing it are broader than just producing more stuff.

In my recent post on the economics of the Rescue Plan, I highlighted the way in which the expansive public spending of the Biden administration implicitly embraces a bigger role for aggregate demand in the longer term trajectory of the economy and not just in short-run fluctuations:

Overheating may have short-term costs in higher inflation, inflated asset prices and a redistribution of income toward relatively scarce factors (e.g. urban land), but it also is associated with a long-term increase in productive capacity — one that may eventually close the inflationary gap on its own. Shortfalls on the other hand lead to a reduction in potential output, and so may become self-perpetuating as potential GDP declines.

I’ve continued making this argument in an ongoing debate with the University of Chicago’s Harold Uhlig at this new site Pairagraph. I also discussed it with David Beckworth on his excellent macroeconomics podcast. 

In many ways, this story starts from debates in the mid 2010s about the need for continued stimulus, which got a big impetus from Bernie Sanders first campaign in 2016. I tried to pull together those arguments in my 2017 Roosevelt paper What Recovery? There, I argued that the failure of per-capita GDP to return to its previous trend after 2009 was a striking departure from previous recessions; that an aging population could not explain the fall in labor fore participation; that slower productivity growth could be explained at least in part by weak demand; and the the balance of macroeconomic risks favored stimulus rather than austerity.  

In a more recent post, I noted that the strong growth and low unemployment of the later part of the decade, while good news in themselves, implied an even bigger demand shortfall in the aftermath of the recession:

In 2014, the headline unemployment rate averaged 6.2 percent. At that time, the benchmark for full employment (technically, the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, or NAIRU) used by the federal government was 4.8 percent, suggesting a 1.4 point shortfall, equivalent to 2.2 million excess people out of work. But let’s suppose that today’s unemployment rate of 3.6 percent is sustainable—which it certainly seems to be, given that it is, in fact, being sustained. Then the unemployment rate in 2014 wasn’t 1.4 points too high but 2.6 points too high, nearly twice as big of a gap as policymakers thought at the time. 

I made a similar set of arguments for a more academic audience in a chapter for a book on economics in the wake of the global financial crisis,  Macroeconomic Lessons from the Past Decade”. There, I argue that

the effects of demand cannot be limited to “the short run”. The division between a long-run supply-side and a short-run demand-side, while it may be useful analytically, does not work as a description of real world developments. Both the size of the labor force and productivity growth are substantially endogenous to aggregate demand. 

This set of arguments is especially relevant in the context of climate change; if there is substantial slack in the economy, then public spending on decarbonization can raise current living standards even in the short run. Anders Fremstad, Mark Paul and I made this argument in a 2019 Roosevelt report, Decarbonizing the US Economy: Pathways toward a Green New Deal. I made the case much more briefly in a roundtable on decarbonization in The International Economy:

The response to climate change is often conceived as a form of austerity—how much consumption must we give up today to avoid the costs of an uninhabitable planet tomorrow? … The economics of climate change look quite different from a Keynesian perspective, in which demand constraints are pervasive and the fundamental economic problem is not scarcity but coordination. In this view, the real resources for decarbonization will not have to be withdrawn from other uses. They can come from an expansion of society’s productive capabilities, thanks to the demand created by clean-energy investment itself. 

If you like your economics in brief video form, I’ve made this same argument about aggregate demand and climate change for Now This.

The World War II experience, which Mike and I highlight in the Times piece, is discussed at length in a pair of papers that Andrew Bossie and I wrote for Roosevelt last year. (Most of what I know about the economics of the war mobilization is thanks to Andrew.) In the first paper, The Public Role in Economic Transformation: Lessons from World War II, we look at the specific ways in which the US built a war economy practically overnight; the key takeaway is that while private contractors generally handled production itself, most investment, and almost all the financing of investment, came from the public sector. The second paper, Public Spending as an Engine of Growth and Equality: Lessons from World War II, looks at the macroeconomic side of the war mobilization.

Among the key points we make here are that potential output is much more elastic in response to demand than we usually assume; that both the labor force and productivity respond strongly to the level of spending; that the inflation associated with rapid growth often is a sign of temporary shortfalls or bottlenecks, which can be addressed in better ways than simply reducing aggregate spending; and that strong demand is a powerful force for equalizing the distribution of income. The lessons for the present are clear:

The wartime experience suggests that the chronic weak demand the US has suffered from for at least the past decade is even more costly than we had realized. Not only does inadequate spending lead to slower growth, it leads to lower wage gains particularly for those at the bottom and reinforces hierarchies of race and sex. Conversely, a massive public investment program in decarbonization or public health would not only directly address those crises, but could also be an important step toward reversing the concentration of income and wealth that is one of the great failures of economic policymaking over the past generation. 

I also discuss the war experience in this earlier Dissent review of Mark Wilson’s book Destructive Creation, and in a talk I delivered at the University of Massachusetts in early 2020.

Alternative approaches to inflation control isn’t something I’ve written a lot about —  until recently, the question hasn’t seemed very urgent. But Mike, me and our Roosevelt colleague Lauren Melodia did write a blog post last month about why it’s a mistake to worry about somewhat higher inflation numbers this year. One aspect of this is the “base effect” which is artificially increasing measured inflation, but it’s also important to stress that genuinely higher inflation is both a predictable result of a rapid recovery from the pandemic and not necessarily a bad thing. 

A few years ago, Mike and I wrote a paper arguing for a broader toolkit at the Fed. Our focus at the time was on finding more ways to boost demand. But many of the arguments also apply to a situation — which we are definitely not in today, but may be at some point — where you’d want to rein demand in. Whichever way the Fed is pushing, it would be better to have more than one tool to push with. 

Another important background debate for the Times piece is the idea of secular stagnation, which enjoyed a brief vogue in the mid 2010s. Unfortunately, the most visible proponent of this idea was Larry Summers, who … well, let’s not get into that here. But despite its dubious provenance, there’s a lot to be said for the idea that recent decades have seen a persistent tendency for total spending to fall short of the economy’s productive potential. In this (somewhat wonkish) blog post, I discussed this idea in terms of Roy Harrod’s model of economic growth, and suggested a number of factors that might be at work:

for secular, long-term trends tending to raise desired saving relative to desired investment we have: (1) the progressive satiation of consumption demand; (2) slowing population growth; (3) increasing monopoly power; and (4) the end of the industrialization process. Factors that might either raise or lower desired savings relative to investment are: (5) changes in the profit share; (6) changes in the fraction of profits retained in the business sector; (7) changes in the distribution of income; (8) changes in net exports; (9) changes in government deficits; and (10) changes in the physical longevity of capital goods. Finally, there are factors that will tend to raise desired investment relative to desired saving. The include: (11) consumption as status competition (this may offset or even reverse the effect of greater inequality on consumption); (12) social protections (public pensions, etc.) that reduce the need for precautionary and lifecycle saving; (13) easier access to credit, for consumption and/or investment; and (14) major technological changes that render existing capital goods obsolete, increasing the effective depreciation rate. These final four factors will offset any tendency toward secular stagnation.

Hysteresis — the effect of demand conditions on potential output — and secular stagnation are two important considerations that suggest that big boost in spending, as we are looking at now, could permanently raise the economy’s growth path. A third, less discussed consideration is that demand itself may be persistent. I discuss that possibility in a recent blog post.  

An important aspect of an economic boom which we unfortunately could not fit into the op-ed is the way that faster growth and moderately higher inflation reduce the burden of debt for both the private and public sector. Historically, growth rates, inflation and interest rates have had a bigger effect on the household debt ratio than household borrowing has. This is a major focus of my scholarly work — see here and here. The same thing goes for public debt, as I’ve discussed in a blog post here. The degree to which both the past year’s stimulus and a possible future boom has/will strengthen balance sheets across the economy is seriously underappreciated, in my view.

The question of public debt has moved away from center stage recently. Criticism of public spending lately seems more focused on inflation and supposed ”labor supply constraints.” But if the anti-boom contingent shifts back toward scare stories about public debt, I’ve got pre-rebuttals written here and here.

For the broader economic perspective I’m coming from, I haven’t done a better job laying it out than this interview with the Current Affairs podcast. The ostensible topic is Modern Monetary Theory, but it’s really a general conversation about how we should think about the economy. You could also look at the teaching materials on this website. On the more concrete debates about economic potential and the limits to public spending, Arjun Jayadev and I have written a couple of stock-taking pieces: Strange Defeat: How Austerity Economics Lost All the Intellectual Battles and Still Won the War, and more recently The Crash of Austerity Economics.

Finally, I want to highlight something I wrote about a year ago: The Coronavirus Recession Is Just Beginning. There, I argued that the exceptional reduction in activity due to the pandemic would probably be followed by a conventional recession. You will note that this is more or less the opposite of the argument in the Times piece. That’s because my post least year was wrong! But I don’t think it was unreasonable to make that prediction at the time. What I didn’t take into account, what almost no one took into account, was the extraordinary scale of the stimulus over the past year. Well ok! Now, let’s build on that.

Video: The Macro Case for the Green New Deal

(Earlier this week, I gave a virtual presentation at an event organized by the Roosevelt Institute and the Green New Deal Network. Virtual events are inferior to live ones in many, many ways. But one way they are better, is that they are necessarily on video, and can be shared. Anyway, here is 25 minutes on why the economic situation calls for even more spending than the (surprisingly ambitious) proposals from the Biden administration, and also on why full employment shouldn’t be seen as an alternative to social justice and equity goals but as the best way of advancing them.)

A Few Followup Links

The previous post got quite a bit of attention — more, I think, than anything I’ve written on this blog in the dozen years I’ve been doing it.

I would like to do a followup post replying to some of the comments and criticisms, but I haven’t had time and realistically may not any time soon, or ever. In the meantime, though, here is some existing content that might be relevant to people who would like to see the arguments in that post drawn out more fully.

Here is a podcast interview I did with some folks from Current Affairs a month or so ago. The ostensible topic is Modern Mone(tar)y Theory, but the conversation gave me space to talk more broadly about how to think about macroeconomic questions.

A pair of Roosevelt reports (cowritten with Andrew Bossie) on economic policy during World War II are an effort to find relevant lessons for the present moment: The Public Role in Economic Transformation: Lessons from World War II, Public Spending as an Engine of Growth and Equality: Lessons from World War II

Here is a piece I wrote a couple years ago on Macroeconomic Lessons from the Past Decade. Bidenomics could be seen as a sort of deferred learning of the lessons from the Great Recession. So even though this was written before the pandemic and the election, there’s a lot of overlap here.

This report from Roosevelt, What Recovery? is an earlier stab at learning those lessons. I hope to be revisiting a lot of the topics here (and doing a better job with them, hopefully) in a new Roosevelt report that should be out in a couple of months.

If you like podcast interviews, here’s one I did with David Beckworth of Macro Musings following the What Recovery report, where we talked quite a bit about hysteresis and the limits of monetary policy, among other topics.

And here are some relevant previous past posts on this blog:

In The American Prospect: The Collapse of Austerity Economics

A Baker’s Dozen of Reasons Not to Worry about Government Debt

Good News on the Economy, Bad News on Economic Policy

A Demystifying Decade for Economics

A Harrodian Perspective on Secular Stagnation

Secular Stagnation, Progress in Economics

Announcement: Money and Things

Arjun Jayadev and I are writing a book. The working title is Money and Things: How Finance Shapes the World. Here’s what it’s about:

Money is one of our most ubiquitous social technologies. It is also one of the most misunderstood.  Economics students in college are taught that money is just a convenience to avoid the clumsiness of barter – that prices and incomes depend on underlying “real” values, and money is just a veil. Academic economists insist that money is “neutral” – that the long-run development of the economy depends on “real” factors like population growth and technological progress, which have nothing to do with money or credit. Many people still have some vague notion that money is backed by something “real”, perhaps vaults of gold under Fort Knox, while those who do understand that money is nothing but an entry on bank ledger, often feel this is dangerous and unnatural, and demand that a sharp line be drawn between credit and money. For the vast majority of people money is simply the background hum of the world they live in, something that they pay attention to only occasionally, if perhaps with a sense of unease. 

This book seeks to open up the world of money as it really is and its relationship to the world. Dawing on the work of Karl Marx, John Maynard Keynes, Hyman Minsky, and other “heterodox” economic thinkers, the book argues that there is no real economy behind the monetary one. In economic questions, money itself is what is real.

This claim is developed through two related arguments. First, that money and finance are autonomous — that changes in money flows, assets and debt do not just reflect underlying activities of production and consumption but have their own independent dynamics. And second, that money does not merely facilitate economic activity, but reshapes it in far-reaching ways. This is a challenge to the conventional wisdom that money payments and quantities offer a transparent window onto the concrete, material world – that a certain amount of money must correspond to an equivalent amount of stuff. And it is a challenge to the economics orthodoxy that money is “neutral” in relation to the larger economy. On the contrary, monetary phenomena like debt and exchange rates have profound and lasting effects on the development of economies and the broader society.

The book is organized in three sections, moving from the abstract to the concrete.  The first section explores the rules and logic of money as a distinct social activity, starting with the most basic building blocks of economic units and payments and building up to balance sheets, interest, exchange rates, and other more complex features of money-world. It then explores how these money terms do — and don’t — match up to the material and social world around us, critically examining concepts like “real” GDP. While numbers like this are often thought of as measuring some physical quantity, this is logically incohenerent and practically misleading.

In the second section, the book turns to the institutions that operate at the interface between money-world and society. This section explores the links between money and society, the tensions and conflicts between them, and the ways that they are actively managed. It includes chapters on the politically contested questions of reforms to the monetary system, and the sustainibility of private and public debt. The section’s main focus is on central banks and corporations as two key actors that manage the tension between an economic world imagined purely in terms of money claims and payments, and the concrete human activities of production and reproduction. 

In the final section, the book explores how the tension between society and the world of money plays out politically.  With chapters on Europe in the wake of the euro crisis, the US, the developing world, and the problem of climate change, it shows how many political developments can be understood in terms of a fundamental conflict between enforcing the logic of money, on the one hand, and meeting the concrete needs of human societies on the other. Much of what is called neoliberalism can be seen as an effort to compel politics and society to conform to the logic of money. At the same time, these constraints provoke counter responses, and the institutions constructed to maintain the dominance of money can themselves become vehicles for collective action toward other ends.

The book is an attempt to build a more sustained argument out of various things Arjun and I have written, especially this and this. It will also incorporate material from a great many posts on this blog over the past decade, including these and these and these.

If all goes according to plan, the book will be out from University from Chicago Press in early 2022.

 

Video: Monetary Policy since the Crisis

On May 30, I did a “webinar” with INET’s Young Scholar’s Intiative. The subject was central banking since the financial crisis of a decade ago, and how it forces us to rethink some long-held ideas about money and the real economy — the dstinction between a demand-determined short run and a supply-determined long run; the neutrality of money in the long run; the absence of tradeoffs between unemployment, inflation and other macroeconomic goals; the reduction of monetary policy choices to setting a single overnight interest rate based on a fixed rule.My argument is that the crisis — or more precisely, central banks’ response to it — creates deep problems for all these ideas.

The full video (about an hour and 15 minus, including Q&A) is on YouTube, and embedded below. It’s part of an ongoing series of YSI webinars on endogenous money, including ones by Daniela Gabor, Jo Mitchella nd Sheila Dow. I encourage you, if you’re interested, to sign up with YSI — anyone can join — and check them out.

I didn’t use slides, but you can read my notes for the talk, if you want to.